UNITED STATES of America v. John ANGELL, Appellant.
No. 13-1458.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Oct. 22, 2014.
Argued Sept. 9, 2014.
161
The truth is that we will never know for sure if Bennett would have plеaded guilty if he knew all of the facts. But, we do know that his judgment was clouded by misunderstanding up through the time of his trial because his counsel did not do his job. Therefore, even if Bennett meant it when he told his uncle that he was going to make the government prove its case, there is no doubt that he said this while wrongly believing that—no matter what—he faced a minimum of twenty years imрrisonment, served consecutive to the term he was already serving, if the District Court judged him guilty. Under these circumstances, it is simply impossible to conclude that Bennett was reasonаbly capable of making up his mind about a plea, whether for or against. He did not have the facts he needed to make a sound choice. Because of this, the Distriсt Court made a clear error when it decided as fact that—in spite of what he said—Bennett was determined to go to trial. To the contrary, in the context of this unusual casе, Bennett’s attempt to make a plea deal at the start of trial is enough to show that he was willing to plead. Therefore, he deserves the benefit of the doubt about the degree to which his counsel’s mistakes interfered with his judgment and impacted his sentence.
For all of these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the cause with instruction for the District Court to grant the motion under
Robert Epstein [ARGUED], Federal Community Defender Office for The Eastern District of Pennsylvania, West Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.
Before: SMITH, SHWARTZ, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
OPINION *
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
John Angelí was found guilty by a jury of eleven counts of traveling for purposes of engaging in sex with a minor in violation of
Angelí was hired by the victim’s father to drive the victim and his sister between their father’s house in Pennsylvania and their mother’s house in New York. Angelí drove in this capacity fоr eight years and became very close with both children. The Government alleged that Angelí repeatedly abused the victim during trips his
I.
Angelí does not dispute that there was sufficient evidence to find that he violated both statutes at some point—mоst notably, the Government introduced a tape of a call the victim made to Angelí (as part of the FBI’s investigation) during which the two discussed their sexual relationship, at times referring to sex as “what happened in the Lexus.” Rather, Angelí argues that the evidence was insufficient to find that he did so on the particular dates attached to each count. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the abuse occurred on all of the dates in question. See, e.g., United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir.2013) (en banc).
The victim initially told investigators that Angelí abused him “every time” they travelled alone together. At trial the victim testified on direct examination that it happened “[p]robably, I think every time we were alone.” On cross-examination he testified: “just about every time that [we] were in the car alone, something happened;” “I mean, I didn’t keep a record. I’m not sure if it happened every single time,” and agreed that it “would be fair to say” that he was abused “most times” they were alone together. Aside from establishing that Angelí was alone with the victim on the dates charged in the indictment (in part by introducing EZ-Pass records from those dates which showed that Defendant’s trips on the PA Turnpike varied somewhat significantly in time) the Government offered no other evidence to tie the abuse to those dates.
“[I]t is the jury’s province (and not ours) to make credibility determinations.” United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir.2011). The victim consistently testified that, at a minimum, he believed the abuse occurred every time they were alone together. The jury was entitled to believe him, especially given the Government’s overwhelming evidence that abuse occurred. In addition to the taped call with Angelí, the Government introduced the testimony of an expert urologist who examined Angelí and found that he had genital scarring consistent with a description given by the victim.
If the jury could conclude that the abuse occurred on all of the dates in question, it could certainly conclude that “a significant or motivating purpose” of the travel was to facilitate the abuse. See United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2004) (rejecting the argument that “the dominant” purpose of the travel be related to the abuse). That conclusion is not inconsistent with the fact that Angelí also crossed state lines for the purpose of performing his job of transporting the victim between his parents’ houses.
II.
Although an element of
The evidence that any misconduct occurred on all of the dates in question or even any particular date in question, while sufficient, was not ovеrwhelming: the victim did not testify with certainty and the EZ-Pass records indicated that it was unlikely Angelí stopped on the turnpike (where some but not all of the abuse allegedly occurred) fоr long enough to abuse the victim on some of the dates. See United States v. Dobson, 419 F.3d 231, 240 (3d Cir.2005) (“To be sure, the Government presented evidence from which the jury could have concluded that Dobson knеw of the fraudulent nature of the UL scheme. However, this does not preclude a finding of prejudice for purposes of plain error.“); Haywood, 363 F.3d at 207 (plain error cannot be ignored based on “[s]peculation about what the jury could have done if properly instructed“). Even if we were inclined to agree with the Government that there was no unfairness, the рublic reputation of the proceedings would still be impugned. See Dobson, 419 F.3d at 241 (“a conviction based on an incomplete charge taints the reputation of the judicial prоcess“).
III.
Accordingly, we will affirm the