United States v. Jesus Acosta-OlivasUnited States v. Jesus Acosta-Olivas
The government appeals from the district court’s imposition of a seventy-eight month sentence on defendant Jesus Acosta-Olivas. The district court determined that Mr. Aeos-ta-Olivas qualified for a downward departure from the statutory minimum mandatory sentence of ten years, because he met all the requirements of
BACKGROUND
On March 9, 1994, Francisco Javier Rosales-Quiroz, accompanied by his wife and small child, drove a 1990 Nissan Sentra to the United States Border Patrol checkpoint near Truth or Consequences, New Mexico. When questioned by Border Patrol agents about their citizenship, they prоduced documentation, and when questioned about the car, Rosales-Quiroz stated that he owned the car and had purchased it approximately fifteen days before. A Border Patrol agent apparently recognized the car as the type which was commonly used to hide сontraband in its bumpers. When he inspected the rear bumper of the Rosales-Quiroz ear, the agent noticed that mud had been placed on the bolts and brackets. With Rosales-Quiroz’s consent, the agent removed the rear bumper and found fourteen plastic packages contаining a substance which field-tested positive for cocaine. Rosales-Quiroz and his wife were arrested, and a search of their car revealed 23.4 kilograms of cocaine.
Rosales-Quiroz gave conflicting stories as to the details of where in Albuquerque the cocaine was to be delivered. However, consistent with what he had told one DEA agent, Rosales-Quiroz called a telephone number in El Paso, Texas, and was told to go to room 213 at the Howard Johnson Plaza Hotel in Albuquerque. A DEA agent supervised this phone call.
When agents went to the hotel, they observed a man matching Rosales-Quiroz’s description of ‘Willie,” whom Rosales-Quiroz said paid him to deliver the cocaine. When Rosales-Quiroz and another agent drove Rosales-Quiroz’s car to the hotel parking lot, Mr. Acosta-Olivas approached the ear and asked the agent if he had the “рroduce.” When the agent indicated it was in the car, Mr. Acosta-Olivas said he did not want to remove the drugs in the parking lot, and said he would follow the car to a warehouse where they could remove the contraband. When he returned to the parking lot to get into his
Rosales-Quiroz pled guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. The government filed a motion stating that he had provided substantial assistance to the government under USSG § 5K.1, and he was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment.
Mr. Acostа-Olivas also pled guilty, but refused to cooperate with the government. He did, however, provide the government and court with a letter describing his own involvement in the conspiracy.
Because of the quantity of cocaine involved, Mr. Acosta-Olivas was subject to the statutory mandatory minimum of tеn years, under
DISCUSSION
The only issue in this case is whether the district court correctly determined that Mr. Acosta-Olivas met the requirements of
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 сriminal history point, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense;
(3) the offеnse did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person;
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. 848; and
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement.
18 U.S.C. 3553(f). The government argues that § 3553(f)(5) requires a defendant “to tell the government all he knows about the offense of conviction and the relevant conduct, including the identities and participation of others, in order to qualify for relief from the statutory mandatory minimum sentence.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. Mr. Acosta-Olivas argues that the section merely requires him to detail his own personal involvement in the crime, and he asserts that the district court correctly held that his letter met that standard.
We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of a statute or the sentencing guidelines.
United States v. Richards,
Section 3553(f) was enacted as a “safety valve” to permit courts to sentence less culpable defendants to sentences under the guidelines, instead of imposing mandatory minimum sentences. As the legislative history of the section states, without such a safety valve, for “the very offenders who most warrant proportionally lower sentences — offenders that by guideline dеfinitions are the least culpable — mandatory mínimums generally operate to block the sentence from reflecting mitigating factors.” H.R.Rep. No. 103-460, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.,
As indicated, the statute and guideline themselves require the disclosure of “all information and evidence ... concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.”
As applied to Mr. Acosta-Olivas, the guideline would thereforе require disclosure of everything he knows about his own actions and those of his co-conspirators.
See United States v. Rodriguez,
Mr. Acosta-Olivas argues that this interpretation has the effect of requiring him to become a government informant, and thereby renders USSG § 5K1.1 on substantial assistance redundant. As both parties point out, we should interpret statutory provisions and the guidelines in a way which gives meaning and effеct to each part of the statutory or guideline scheme.
See Daleske v. Fairfield Communities, Inc.,
Section 5K1.1 concerning substantial assistance operates very differently from § 5C1.2. Section 5K1.1 requires a motion from the government and the government’s evaluation of the extent of the defendant’s assistance is given “substantial weight.” USSG § 5K1.1, comment, (n. 3). Under § 5C1.2, by contrast, the court determines whether a defеndant has complied with its provisions, including subsection 5.
See United States v. Cabell,
eliminates the necessity for a defendant to obtain a letter from the prosecution under section 5K1 ... in order to obtain a reduction of an otherwise mandatory minimum sentence. Instead, a defendant may come forward and furnish all available information and obtain consideration as a result if justified, regardless of the position of the prosecutor and regardless of whether anyone else can be prosecuted and convicted based on the defendant’s disclosures.
Shendur v. United States,
On the other hand, Mr. Aсosta-Olivas’ interpretation of § 3553(f)(5) and § 5C1.2 renders USSG § 3El.l(b)(l) concerning enhanced acceptance of responsibility largely redundant. Under § 3El.l(b)(l), a defendant with an initial offense level of 16 or higher, like Mr. Acosta-Olivas, can qualify for an additional 1 level decrease if he “timely provid[es] complete information to the government concerning his own involvement in the offense.” USSG § 3El.l(b)(l). While § 3El.l(b)(l) requires “timely disclosure,” and § 5C1.2(5) requires disclosure “not later than the time of sentencing,” Mr. Acosta-Olivas’ interpretation of .§ 5C1.2(5) to only require disclosure of his own involvement would make the two sections virtually identicаl.
In sum, § 3553(f), as repeated in guideline § 5C1.2, was clearly intended to permit courts to sentence relatively less culpable offenders to sentences below an otherwise applicable mandatory statutory minimum sentence. Besides requiring that a defendant seeking to avail himself of this safety vаlve meet certain objective criteria, the section also requires that a defendant truthfully tell all he knows to the government, regardless of whether this information is useful to the government. Presumably, this requirement assists courts in determining whether a defendant truly is relatively less culpable. We therefore hold that the district court erred in interpreting § 3553(f)(5) to require a defendant to reveal only information regarding his own involvement in the crime, not information he has relating to other participants.
For the foregoing reasons, we REMAND this case with instructions to vacate the sen-
Notes
. The language of § 3553(f) has been adopted verbatim in the United States Sentencing Comm’n Guidelines Manual at § 5Cl.2.
. The presentence report recommended no downward adjustment for Mr. Acosta-Olivas' role in the offense.
. In this case, the district court interpreted the scope and meaning of § 3553(f)(5). We therefore review that legal determination de novo. We note, however, that a district court's application of the correct legal standard to a particular defendant, and the specific conclusion that the defendant is or is not eligible for relief under § 3553(f), would ordinarily bе reviewed for clear error.
See United States v. Rodriguez,