United States v. Jessie Lee Maness
23 F.3d 1006
6th Cir.
1994
Check Treatment

*1 realize a Reasonable officers warrantless situation, exceptional such

search absent circumstances, exigent violates the fourth Reasonable officers would

amendment. exigency no

agree in this situation existed.

Describing unacceptable outrageous and taken officers this case as “rea-

actions competency profes-

sonable” offends practiced overwhelming ma-

sionalism

jority Recog- across the nation. of officers overt,

nizing presented “no hostile O’Brien probable no

threat” and there was cause to crime, any

believe he committed unrea-

sonable and overzealous officers would ha- by surrounding persecute

rass and O’Brien breaking its

his home and windows. this

case, the officers’ refusal to obtain a warrant magistrate,

from a neutral and detached de- hours,

spite passing of several resembles self-righteous arrogance lynch mob.

Unfortunately, imagi- the officers’ overactive

nations, paranoia aggressive irrational

conduct incited a scenario which left O’Brien

paralyzed. precisely type It is this of situa-

tion the fourth amendment is intended to

prevent. I would AFFIRM the therefore finding court’s that the officers

district were qualified immunity.

not entitled to America,

UNITED STATES of

Plaintiff-Appellee, MANESS, Lee

Jessie Defendant-

Appellant.

No. 93-5867. Appeals, States Court Circuit.

Sixth March

Submitted May 4,

Decided *2 felon, in violation of 18

victed U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). November the United On specifying States filed a notice Maness meaning within the “armed career criminal” Criminal Act. The Act of the Armed Career provides fifteen-year for a minimum term- of imprisonment if of a defendant convicted violating 922(g) previously and has Section felonies, three violent com- been convicted of mitted on different occasions. 18 U.S.C.. 924(e). support of the -enhanced sen- In tence, the United States offered evidence of burglary three North Carolina con- Maness’ two convictions victions. The first occurred May and the third conviction (briefed), Schmutzer, Atty. Asst. Ed U.S. September Although occurred on Knoxville, TN, plaintiff-appellee. Maness was convicted of the initial two bur- (briefed), Federal Defend- Kim A. Tollison day, underly- glary charges on the same Knoxville, TN, Services, for defendant- er ing place events took on different occasions. appellant. pled guilty to On November Maness single pursuant count of the indictment RYAN, MARTIN, Before: provisions plea agreement of a with to the SUHRHEINRICH, Judges. Circuit The district court initial- the United States. MARTIN, Jr., Judge, Circuit years BOYCE F. ly Maness to six five sentenced and. court, in opinion of the which imprisonment, by delivered the of to be followed months SUHRHEINRICH, Judge, joined. light Circuit years supervised three of release. of . RYAN, Judge (p.-), delivered sentencing Circuit prior convictions and the Maness’ concurring opinion. by dictated the Armed Career enhancements however, Act, the district court re- Criminal MARTIN, Jr., Judge. Circuit BOYCE F. fifteen-year to a term of sentenced Maness improperly court Claiming that the district years supervised and five of imprisonment Nor,th burglary Carolina considered 15,. timely appeal 1993. This release on June purpose violent felonies for the convictions as followed. pursuant enhancing his sentence Act, 18 U.S.C. Armed Career Criminal Analysis II. 924(e), appeals Lee Maness the sen- Jessie argues Maness that the district court. For the imposed the district tence enhancing based on his erred in his sentence reasons, following affirm the district we convictions, claiming that a court. 14-54 of the Gener conviction under Section is not necessar al of North Carolina Statutes I. Facts therefore, and, cannot be ily a violent 16,1992, in Loudon Coun- On June officers finding is an armed support to that he used stop ty, attempted to a car driven Tennessee meaning of Section career criminal within receiving telephone call by Maness after 924(e). provides, The North Carolina statute the driver of the car was intoxicated. “[a]ny person part, who breaks pertinent officers, but was sought Maness to evade the intent, commit any building with to or enters The offi- finally apprehended at a roadblock. larceny pun be any felony or therein shall car and found a load- cers .then searched the § 14- ished as a felon.” N.C.Gen.Stat. ed .38 caliber six-shot revolver. statute re the North Carolina Because breaking entering, Maness jury subsequently quires grand A federal re- under this stat charging Ma- maintains that his convictions turned a one-count indictment disagree. felonies. We possession of a a con- ute are not violent ness with firearm question us with a presents Taylor. con- tion of a Maness 924(e). cerning determining definition Be- whether Section 14-54 substan tially corresponds statute is a with the cause the law, definition, objec review Maness’ claim matter of de we must consider the least Brady, tionable conduct that novo. United States would violate this stat *3 Cir.1993) (district (6th Bowden, interpreta- court’s ute. 666 See United States v. 975 F.2d — (4th denied, Cir.1992), Criminal Act is re- 1080 tion of Armed Career cert. U.S. novo). (1993) -, 1351, de 113 S.Ct. 122 L.Ed.2d viewed 732 (noting obligation the court’s to “assume that possessing a firearm in For a felon viola- gained entry [the defendant] without break 922(g)(1), the Armed tion of 18 U.S.C. Ca- If, therefore, ing”). prohibits Section 14-54 imposes mandatory a Act mini- reer Criminal any conduct that does not rise to the level of years imprison- mum of fifteen of sentence generic burglary, language then the of the ment, if the defendant has three convic- substantially correspond statute does not to a felonies ... tions for “violent committed on generic burglary, and convictions under the different from one another.” 18 occasions statute, more, North without Carolina will 924(e). Accordingly, we consider U.S.C. support not a Section en sentence (1) whether Maness was convicted of three hancement. (2) felonies, violent and whether the offenses were committed different occasions. previously Two of our sister circuits have 14-54, light considered Section of the A. Violent Felonies Armed Career Criminal Act. While we agree results, adopt with their we cannot 924(e)(2)(B) burglary Section includes reasoning. their In United States v. felony. Taylor its definition of a violent v. Anderson, (1st 335, Cir.1990), 921 F.2d 340 States, 575, 598, 495 110 U.S. S.Ct. expound the First Circuit did not on its (1990), 109 L.Ed.2d 607 the Su- conclusory statement that a “North Carolina preme dispute among Court settled lower breaking entering clearly conviction for burglary to what constitutes a courts as qualifies predicate as a offense under the 924(e). Adopting purposes of a term Section Taylor definition.” The Fourth Circuit commonly pre- that used to is more describe reached the same conclusion in United States conduct, scription drugs than criminal Cir.1992), Bowden, (4th 1080, 975 F.2d 1084-85 Taylor “generic” burglary court defined a as —- denied, U.S.-, rt. 113 S.Ct. “any having the basic crime elements of ce 1351, (1993),' 122 stating, L.Ed.2d 732 “[cer unprivileged entry unlawful or into or re- tainly entry of a man who enters without structure, building maining in a or with in- breaking with intent to commit a or Taylor pro- tent to commit a crime.” Id. larceny privileged.” is neither lawful nor gener- vides that a conviction meets the (1) ic definition of a where North Because Carolina is located within statute, language of the under which the Circuit, usually the Fourth we would defer to convicted, substantially defendant was corre- prediction the Fourth of an Circuit’s issue of definition; sponds with the impression regarding first North Carolina (2) regardless language or of the exact of the Etc., Arts, state law. Factors Inc. v. Pro statute, charges brought (2nd Inc., 278, Cir.1981), 283 cert. against the defendant contained all of the denied, 456 U.S. 102 S.Ct. 72 generic burglary. elements of a Id. at (1982). However, L.Ed.2d 442 we do not Supreme 110 S.Ct. at 2160. Because the adopt reasoning the Fourth Circuit’s for two “generic,” has chosen the term we First, reasons. we that believe the Fourth employ expression as well. Circuit’s 14-54 does satisfy TayloPs generic not definition of a Language 1. The the North burglary. defining generic burglary, Carolina Statute Taylor specifically court set forth two (1) The United States claims that the North and distinct elements: “unlawful into, entry unprivileged remaining Carolina statute meets the defini- or or in a (2) structure,” necessarily satisfy Taylor to com- court’s two- “intent building or Taylor, at generic burglary. 495 U.S. definition of a mit a crime.” element’ According to the Bowden However, 14-54, at S.Ct. because Section as defined court, a crime necessari- the intent to commit Court, Carolina re- North un- entry unprivileged ly qualifies an quires unprivileged entry both an unlawful or ease, believe that this the we lawful. Were within, to commit a and the intent crime required simply have Taylor court would substantially that Section 14-54 cor- believe intent; to do otherwise single element of responds generic burgla- definition of redundant. would be ry. may the unlawful or not conclude that entry bur- unprivileged element 2. The Prior Convictions Defendant’s by determining, glary without satisfied *4 more, entry accompanied by was the that we believe that Section While 14-54 a intent to commit crime. substantially corresponds to the definition of Taylor, generic burglary a also per- importantly, if we were More even actually conclude that Maness was convicted unprivileged entry element that the suaded generic burglaries. Taylor of three As the by satisfied of a could be explained, “an offense constitutes ‘bur entry to merely finding an with the intent 924(e) purposes glary’ for of a sen crime, [Section] obligated a we are to disre- commit charging paper if case, tence enhancement ... the because, deciding in that gard Bowden jury actually required and instructions the contrary a Fourth Circuit did not follow jury generic Fac- to find all of the elements of prior supreme court decision. See state (“A Etc., court in in tors 652 F.2d at 283 federal order to convict the defendant.” obligated 602, Taylor, circuit would be to disre- 110 another 495 U.S. at S.Ct. at 2160. gard holding however, [court a state law undertaking analysis, this if located] which the state is appeals within trial court is not limited to situations where persuaded prior that state court deci- prior conviction was the re the defendant’s overlooked.”). inadvertently sions had been jury may The district court sult of a verdict. Boone, 297 256 S.E.2d In State v. N.C. actually commit also find that the defendant (N.C.1979), the North Carolina Su- 686 when, here, generic ted rejected preme position taken Court pled guilty charges that con defendant to court, that, concluding the Bowden instead generic burgla of the elements of a tained all intent, entry, with felonious cannot “an even ry. Barney, F.2d 635 United States v. 955 the owner’s punished be when it is with (10th Garza, Cir.1992); 921 United States v. The Boone court also held that consent.” (5th Cir.1991); Tay 59 United States v. F.2d im- express could be either or such consent (8th lor, Cir.1991); F.2d 703 932 plied. on to Id. at 687. As the court went (9th O’Neal, 937 F.2d 1369 Cir. States v. note, contrary 14- interpretation of Section McConnell, 1990); United States v. 54 would: Cir.1990). (8th 448 make it render the statute so broad as to virtually meaningless. entering A witness regard two 1980 to the Maness’ With intending perjury a court house to commit convictions, transcript review of the of the guilty entry. Equal- would be of felonious indicate that guilty pleas and the indictments ly guilty entering his would be a man own charges contain pled guilty to that Maness intending home or office to file fraudu- generic burglary. Addi elements persons lent tax return. If such do that tionally, against Ma the indictment returned intend, they they commit crimi- which will charges that Ma ness for the 1987 offense acts; be, nal their but crimes should “unlawfully, willfully feloniously did ness respectively, perjury and tax evasion —not building ... with the break and enter a entry. felonious Thus, commit a therein.” intent to (citations omitted). Id. at 687 against returned Maness and the indictments transcript guilty pleas indicate of his we believe that the Fourth Circuit’s that, language of regardless of the exact of Section 14-54 would not

1010 States, 14-54, guilty Taylor in pled all three forbids v. United 495 U.S. Maness 575, 600-03, 2143, 2159-60, contain the elements of 110 S.Ct. 109 charges that cases to (1990). by Taylor. Taylor instructs to burglary, as defined L.Ed.2d 607 us statutory prior look to the definitions of the Occasions B. Different particular facts un- offenses and not derlying those convictions. Id. question of turn to the nowWe prior burglary con two of Maness’ whether The defendant’s convictions under on occasions different from occurred victions statute, the North Carolina N.C.Gen.Stat. Although two Maness’ one another. 14-15(a), are for violent felonies within the May occurred convictions meaning if 14- of 18 U.S.C. section con these two criminal conduct 54(a) charges “generic burglary” as defined at locations and place took victions 598-99, 495 U.S. at 110 S.Ct. at days. In United States v. Bra on different charges “generic burgla 2158. The statute (6th Cir.) (en banc), dy, F.2d 669 988 ry” “entry” proscribes if “un it means — denied, U.S.-, 166, 126 114 S.Ct. cert. 598, 110 unprivileged entry.” Id. at lawful (1993), recently this held 126 L.Ed.2d According at 2158. to the North S.Ct. Car by a defendant at “offenses committed Court, olina it does. State places against differ times and different Boone, (1979), 683 N.C. S.E.2d *5 sepa as ... should be counted ent victims “entry” proscribed in held the predicate [Section] convictions under rate 14-54(a) i.e., “wrongful entry, section with 924(e)(1).” Therefore, consistent with this out consent of the owner.” Id. 256 Brady, in we conclude that decision Court’s S.E.2d at 685. regarded properly Maness’ the district court 14-54(a) Therefore, “ge- charges section occurring on different occa 1980 offenses burglary”; felony” neric a “violent within the sions. 924(e). meaning of 18 U.S.C.

III. Conclusion that Maness was convicted of

We conclude burglary under either mode of determining

analysis whether offense for pur- burglary,

constitutes

poses of a sentence enhance- Furthermore, consistent with this

ment. decisions, past we find that Maness’ Court’s America, UNITED STATES of prior were committed on crimes Plaintiff-Appellee, properly the district court occasions. Maness’ convictions as vio- considered pur- and enhanced his sentence lent felonies TINSON, Defendant-Appellant. Paul Act. suant to the Armed Career Criminal No. 92-3631. reasons, judgment foregoing For the affirmed. district court is Appeals, States Court of Sixth Circuit. RYAN, Judge, concurring. Circuit Argued Sept. view, my to look to inappropriate, It is defendant’s facts 4,May Decided to decide burglary convictions order crimes are violent felonies for whether those enhancing the defendant’s purpose Armed Career Criminal

sentence under the 924(e). so,

Act, doing 18 U.S.C.

majority opinion perilously comes close to expressly

doing what