United States v. Jason CastleUnited States v. Jason Castle
HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge.
Jason Castle was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm,
On January 13, 2015, we affirmed the district сourt‘s decision in its entirety. United States v. Castle, 596 Fed.Appx. 422 (6th Cir. 2015). Subsequently, on June 2, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), holding that the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act,
I.
On April 17, 2012, three Memphis рolice officers stopped a white Chevrolet Impala because its windows appeared to violate Tennessee‘s window-tint law.
The three detectives who conducted the traffic stop testified at trial, as did Webb аnd Detective Brandon Champagne, an officer who tried to recover fingerprints from the gun. Each witness testified that the gun did not belong to him or her and that he or she had not placed the gun between Castle‘s feet. Detective Champagne testified that he did not find fingеrprints on the firearm recovered at the scene, but that based on his experience, finding fingerprints on firearms is exceptionally rare. The jury convicted Castle as charged.
Castle was sentenced to 271 months’ imprisonment—within the Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months, but 91 months mоre the statutory-minimum sentence. The district court based the sentence in part on “relevant conduct” consisting of a robbery that occurred two days before the traffic stop.
II.
A.
Castle first argues that the Government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to
There was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Castle actually possessed the firearm recovered from the scene. Castle exited the vehicle in an awkward, squatting position; Detective Branning testified that when Castle moved towards the rear of the car a firearm fell out of his pant leg; and Detective Goedecke testified that, after Castle took one step towards the back of the car, he “heard a metal sound hit the ground, looked down and saw it was a pistol that had fallen out of [Castle‘s] pants leg.” (R. 93, PID 869). Both detectives testified that the firearm introduced at trial was “the firearm that was recovered from the scene that fell out of Mr. Castle‘s pants leg.” (R. 93, PID 872). Finally, each of the three detectives on the scene, as well as Webb, testified that he or she had not planted the firearm that was found between Castle‘s feet. (R. 93, PID 851, 872, 894, 910). Although Castle offered an аlternative theory at trial, the jury was not obliged to accept the theory.
Given the record as a whole, specifically the detectives’ testimony, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Castle “possessеd” the firearm recovered at the traffic stop. Thus, the Government introduced sufficient evidence to convict Castle under
B.
Castle next argues that the district court erred in permitting “Detective Champagne to testify as [ ] both a fact and expert witness without giving a сautionary instruction.” (Appellant Br. 31). We review a district court‘s evidentiary rulings, including rulings on witness testimony under
Detective Champagne testified that he could not recover any “prints of value“—prints that allow the police to affirmatively identify someone—from the firearm found at the traffic stop. (R. 93, Trial Tr., PID 920). However, he went on to explain that in his career as a detective, it is exceptionally rare to recover fingerprints off of firearms, estimating that in the approximately 1,500 fingerprint-on-firearm cases in which he has been involved, he has found at most four prints of value. (R. 93, Trial Tr., PID 922). Over Castle‘s objection, the district court determined that Detective Champagne was testifying as a lay witness, not as an expert.
To be sure, Detective Champagne‘s testimony stemmed from his personal knowledge, but it was not of the sort typically thought of as lаy testimony. See
C.
Castle next argues that the district court erred in giving a supplemental jury instruction in response to a question from the jury regarding the meaning of “possession” because the supplemental instruction was cumulative to the original jury instructions. (Appellant Br. 39). However, Castle does not argue that the supplemental instruction contained an inaccurate statement of law. We review the district court‘s response to a question from the jury for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Khalil, 279 F.3d 358, 367 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. August, 984 F.2d 705, 712 (6th Cir. 1992)). Under the “high standard” applicable to this sort of challenge, we will reverse a conviction only if the jury instructions, taken as a whole, were “‘confusing, misleading, and prejudicial.‘” United States v. Young, 553 F.3d 1035, 1050 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Clark, 988 F.2d 1459, 1468 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Initially, the district court gave a jury instruction that closely parallels the Sixth Circuit‘s proposed pattern-jury instruction for “possession.” See Sixth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, § 2.10A. Nevertheless, during deliberations, the jury asked for an “expanded definition and examples of possession and сontrol.” (R. 69, Jury Supp. Inst., PID 417). The district court then gave the following supplemental instruction:
Regarding possession, the [original] instructions on pages 19 and 20 of the instructions define that element of the crime charged. You should use those instructions.
To further assist you, I will now provide some additional clarification to add to and supplement the definition of possession that you already have.
If you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant physically held the Smith & Wesson .38 caliber handgun that is Exhibit 4, then he possessed it within the meaning of the law. No specific amount of time of possession is required. If a person physically con-
trols an item and knows that he does, even for a few seconds, he possesses it within the meaning of the law. A person has possession of something if the person knоws of its presence and has physical control of it. Therefore, a person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing, at a given time, is then in actual possession of it. Possession under [§] 922(g) requires that a person know that the item is a firearm and know that he has control of it in order for the person to possess it within the meaning of the court‘s instructions.
Remember, you may not single out, or disregard, any of the Court‘s instructions on the law. You must follow all of the Court‘s instructions on the law, taking each in the light of all the others.
(R. 69, Jury Supp. Inst., PID 417-18).
The district court‘s supplemental instruction was not misleading, confusing, or prejudicial, and Castle does not challenge the substance of the instruction. At most, the district court clarified how possession would apply to this case, by, for example, replacing general terms with terms specific to the case. The proper interpretation of “possession” was integral to the sole issue in dispute, and nothing the district court provided distracted the jury from its ultimate responsibility or presented it with collateral information. See United States v. Washington, 702 F.3d 886, 895 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating thаt a district court should refrain from answering jury questions regarding collateral or irrelevant issues); United States v. Fisher, 648 F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2011) (same). Further, each aspect of the supplemental instruction was an accurate statement of the law, and as a whole responsive to the jury‘s request for аn “expanded” definition of possession, which is undoubtedly “an important legal issue.” See United States v. Nunez, 889 F.2d 1564, 1567 (6th Cir. 1989) (reversing a district court‘s decision to not provide a supplemental instruction because the jury‘s question regarded “an important legal issue“). Finally, in two separate pаragraphs, the district court explained to the jury that it should use the original instructions and that it could “not single out, or disregard” any of the original instructions. See Young, 553 F.3d at 1050 (stating that we look at the jury instructions as a whole when determining whether they were inappropriate). We find no еrror.
III.
Castle also challenges various aspects of his sentence. Although we do not believe that the district court erred in the manner argued by Castle, see Castle, 596 Fed.Appx. at 426-28, we remand for resentencing given that the district court “relied on the armed-career-criminal minimum sentence to find that Castle deserved ‘at least a 15-year sentence,‘”1 id. at 428.
Post-Johnson, an individual cannot be considered an “armed career criminal” due to past “violent felony” convictions unless the qualifying crimes involved an element of force; were burglary, arson, or extortion; or involved the use of an explosive. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2563 (“Today‘s decision [that the residual clause of
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Castle‘s conviction and REMAND for resentencing in light of Johnson.