185 F. 165 | S.D.N.Y. | 1911
Two questions are raised: First, whether a seaman or member of the crew of a vessel are within the section quoted; and, second, whether the indictment is adequate in its terms. It must be conceded in the first place that there is no statute absolutely excluding any Chinaman from the United States except a laborer. Act May 6, 1882, c. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1305), specifically refers to laborers only; and, though the act of September 13, 1888, was unquestionably broadly comprehensive of all Chinese persons, sections 1 and 15 admittedly never went into effect, and it is very doubtful whether sections 2, 3, and 4 ever did either. Sections 5 to 14, inclusive, all of which have been from time to time re-enacted, are administrative sections, and do not exclude any new classes. On the other hand, under section 6 of the act of 1882, originally as well as when amended by Act July 5, 1884, c. 220, 23 Stat. 116 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1307), a Chinese person, not a laborer, was also excluded, who did not ob
There seems to be no doubt on authority that a seaman is not a laborer. This has been held in a number of the decisions (Re Ah Kee [D. C.] 22 Fed. 519; Re Monean [C. C.] 14 Fed. 44; Re Jam [D. C.] 101 Fed. 989); and it accords with the reasonable usage of words. A sailor does manual labor, but he is certainly not, under ordinary parlance, a laborer, either skilled or unskilled. Congress in Act 1893, § 2, recognized the word as not covering all those who do manual labor by specifically including certain occupations such as fishing, which are of the same kind as seafaring. I have no doubt on principle that a seaman is not included in the term. The purpose of the act was to prevent the entry of those who by their different standard of living should depress the wages in America of those who can least resist such competition. Of course, a nice economic speculation might suggest the same reason for applying the act to American seamen, but unhappily there are not many such anyway, and, besides, the act would not then be coterminous with its purposes, because most seamen coming here are on foreign ships and do not compete with our countrymen. Therefore I hold that under the act of 1882, and the subsequent acts, a seaman is not a laborer and so absolutely excluded.
Coming now to the penal provision in question, it is clear that section 9 of the act of 1888 only made penal the landing of Chinamen excluded by law, either absolutely, or conditionally. It is true that the words have literally a broader significance, but they would have been essential as an effective administrative measure, had the expected ratification of the treaty occurred. In that case all Chinamen would have been excluded, except those mentioned in section 2 of the act,
However, even if this were true, the indictment is faulty. In Taylor v. U. S., 207 U. S. 120, 28 Sup. Ct. 53, 52 L. Ed. 130, the Supreme Court said that “bringing into the United States” meant bringing with intent to leave. That was under the immigration acts, but the words there used were apparently taken from the act of 1882, and, in any case, they ought to have the same construction here as there. It is 'true that another alternative ground of decision was suggested in that case, .but the language of the. opinion is certainly strong enough not to be disregarded except by the court itself. It must be held to be the law, therefore, that the intent to leave is included in the terms “bringing” as used in this statute. If so, it is a.specific intent, and must be
. Again, if the theory be that the seaman, though not a laborer, .was conditionally excluded, because he had no certificate, that fact should be stated. Qua seaman he is not excluded; qua Chinaman he is conditionally excluded, but the conditions are not in form provisos to a general excluding act. They are formally a part of the excluding clause itself. That is the usual test for conditions which must be negatived.
Demurrer sustained and indictment quashed.