James Wayne Johnson was indicted on three counts of receiving firearms previously shipped or transported in interstate commerce while a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(h)(1) & 924(a) (1976), and on one count of possessing firearms in or affecting commerce while a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (1976). Johnson waived a jury trial and the district court tried the case on the basis of stipulated facts. On July 27, 1982, the court found Johnson guilty on all four counts. Johnson was sentenced to three five-year terms on the first three counts, to be served consecutively, and to a two-year term on the fourth count, to be served concurrently with his other terms. Johnson appeals and we affirm as to all four counts.
Johnson initially asserts that the affidavit underlying the warrant to search his Minneapolis-area residence on March 11, 1982, was insufficient. That search produced the weapons which were the basis of his present conviction. We disagree with this assertion. In our view, the affidavit was more than sufficient to establish probable cause to issue the search warrant. It established evidence of Johnson’s unlawful possession of firearms by virtue of a named informant’s statements to a California detective in the course of a connected drug/murder investigation. That informant related specific circumstances surrounding her observations of Johnson with firearms in his Minneapolis-area residence in February of 1982, and her reliability was supported by the fact that she led detectives directly to the victims’ bodies in the California drug/murder case.
See Aguilar v. Texas,
Johnson next asserts that the officers searching his residence on March 11, 1982, had no authority to remove a floor safe from his bedroom and later open it at the police station without his consent. That safe contained two of the weapons used to convict Johnson. There is no merit to this assertion. A search warrant authorizing the search of defined premises also authorizes the search of containers found on that premises which reasonably might conceal items listed in the warrant.
United States v. Ross,
Johnson finally contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he ever received or possessed the two weapons listed in the first two counts and the fourth count of the indictment, or that his receipt of the weapon listed in Count II was a transaction separate from his receipts of the weapons in Counts I and III. We disagree. Johnson’s possession of each of the weapons listed in the indictment reasonably could be inferred from the stipulated facts considered by the district court. In particular, the California informant would have testified that she saw Dale Nelson, Johnson’s nephew, “return” a weapon similar to that listed in Count I to Johnson during the informant’s visit at the Johnson residence in February of 1982. During that same
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visit, she saw Johnson exercise personal control over the floor safe in which the officers found the weapons listed in Counts II and III. In addition, William Fox, a friend of Johnson, would testify that he sold the gun listed in Count III to Johnson. Finally, a licensed gun dealer in Minneapolis would testify that he sold Johnson’s nephew the gun listed in Count I. From these stipulated facts, the court reasonably could infer that Johnson did in fact possess each of the three weapons listed in the indictment, individually in Counts I — III for receipt, and collectively in Count IV for possession. Possession is circumstantial evidence of Johnson’s prior receipt of these weapons.
Cf. United States v. Haley,
We have held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) (1976) requires that simultaneous receipt of several firearms be charged in a single count, rather than charging a separate count for each firearm received in a single transaction.
United States v. Powers,
Therefore, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.