UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Rayburn JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 12-10633.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Filed Jan. 31, 2014.
586
Argued and Submitted Jan. 15, 2014.
Thomas Scott Hartzell, T.S. Hartzell, Attorney at Law, Tucson, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, FISHER and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM*
As appellant acknowledged in his briefs, and at oral argument, the application of the good-faith exception to this case is controlled by United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir.2012), which held that officers who placed and monitored a GPS device on a suspect‘s car reasonably relied on then-binding precedent. As a three judge panel, we are bound by Pineda-Moreno. See generally Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). Thus, although the government conceded below that the placement and use of a GPS device on Leon‘s vehicle was unconstitutional under United States v. Jones, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012), the district court did not err in ruling that the fruits of these searches were nevertheless admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d at 1090-91.
AFFIRMED.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Rayburn JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 12-10633.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Filed Jan. 31, 2014.
Argued and Submitted Jan. 15, 2014.
Before: BYBEE and BEA, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, Judge.*
MEMORANDUM**
James Johnson ( Johnson ) appeals the district court‘s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea entered pursuant to a plea agreement in which he admitted to tampering with a victim in violation of
Under
Johnson‘s indictment failed to allege explicitly that a federal law enforcement officer, as opposed to a state law enforcement officer, likely would have been contacted by the victim. The indictment included, however, a citation to the relevant statute, which should have put Johnson on notice of this element of the offense. Because Johnson raised his challenge to the indictment for the first time post-conviction, [t]he only issue ... is whether the indictment, by reference to [the statute],’ alleged sufficient information to cure the deficiency. United States v. James, 980 F.2d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir.1992) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Coleman, 656 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir.1981)). We are satisfied that any deficiency was cured by the statutory citation here, as the statute clearly sets out the element at issue.
Additionally, even if the plea colloquy were deficient by failing to ensure that a sufficient factual basis supported this element of the charged offense, as required by United States v. Villalobos, 333 F.3d 1070, 1073-74 (9th Cir.2003), Johnson was not prejudiced by any error. Johnson conceded at oral argument that the alleged underlying assault by Johnson, a non-Indian, on the victim, an Indian, is subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction pursuant to
We also find Johnson‘s other claims regarding irregularities at the plea hearing to be meritless. The district court properly denied Johnson‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on unspecified evidence that he was innocent. Similarly, Johnson‘s claim below that he did not understand the
AFFIRMED.
Ferrari MOODY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Kevin CHAPPELL, Warden; California Department of Corrections And Rehabilitation, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 10-55842.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Filed Jan. 31, 2014.
588
Argued and Submitted Dec. 2, 2013.
Ferrari Moody, Soledad, CA, pro se.
J. Michael Lehmann, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondents-Appellees.
Before: D.W. NELSON, WARDLAW, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM*
Ferrari Moody ( Moody ) appeals the dismissal of his federal habeas petition with prejudice. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
The district court did not err in dismissing Moody‘s claim that the state trial court denied him his due process right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
Jury tampering is an effort to influence the jury‘s verdict by threatening or offering inducements to one or more of the jurors. United States v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir.1999). In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial[.] Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954). Here, however, the contact the spectators made with Juror No. 7 did not concern the criminal trial pending before the jury, id. at 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, nor did it involve coercion, bribery, threats or inducements, Dutkel, 192 F.3d at 895, 897. Moreover, Juror No. 7 did not know who the spectators were, or if they were friends with Moody or the victim.
Thus, in denying this claim, the state court did not apply clearly established federal law in an objectively unreasonable manner. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000);