On July 8, 1996, Mr. Jаmes Gustav Hogan pled guilty to one count of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1994). In support of his guilty plea, Mr. Hogan represented to the court that
[o]n January 10, 1996, ... [he] did, by intimidation, unlawfully take from the person and presеnce of Shannon A. Mark money in the amount of $6,425.00, belonging to and in the care, custody and control on [sic] the Lyon County State Bank, Em-poria, Kansas, an institution the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation....
The presentence report calculated Mr. Hogan’s total offense level at 21, premised on a base offense level for robbery of 20, pursuant to USSG § 2B3.1(a) (1995); plus a two-lеvel increase for robbery of a financial institution, pursuant to USSG § 2B3.1(b)(l)(A); a two-level increase for use of an express threat of death, pursuant to USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F); and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to USSG § 3El.l(a), and (b)(1) and (2). The two-level increase in his base offense level for an express threat of death was based on the robbery note Mr. Hogan handed the bank teller, which read, “I have a gun. Pass the money over fast. No dye packs or you die.”
At sentencing, the district court overruled Mr. Hogan’s objections to the two-level increase in his base offense level for making an express threat of death. The district court found the language of the robbery note indistinguishable from an example of an express threat of death in the commentary to § 2B3.1. The district court also found the robbery note, couрled with Mr. Hogan’s action of keeping one hand in his pocket to give the impression he had a gun, “would distinctly and directly indicate to a victim that the defendant intended to kill or otherwise cause the death of the victim unless she cooperated.” The court then adopted the presen-tenee report and sentenced Mr. Hogan to thirty-seven months imprisonment.
On appeal, Mr. Hogan challenges the two-level increase in his base offense level for an express threat of death. Initially, Mr. Hogan contends the threat in the robbery note was not an express threat of death as required by USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). Mr. Hogan primarily bases this cоntention on the fact that dye packs are designed to “explode” at a later time and not while the robber is receiving the money. Therefore, he argues, the victim would have to believe the robber would return to kill her after the dye packs were discovered, which he states is an unrealistic expectation. Mr. Hogan also argues the announcement of a weapon does not constitute an express threat of death. Next, he contends the government failed to present any evidence the victim was in “significantly greater fear” for her life as a result of the statement in the robbery note than was inherent in the robbery itself.
1
We review the district court’s legal interpretation and appli
*444
cation of the sentencing guidelines
de novo. United States v. Lambert,
First, the district court looked to the examples of an “express threat of death” in the guideline commentary and found Mr. Hogan’s robbery note indistinguishable.
See
USSG § 2B3.1, comment, (n.6). We agree. The language used by Mr. Hogan is practically indistinguishable from the commentary example, “Give me the money or you are dead.”
Id.
“Commentary interpreting the sentencing guidеlines is binding on the federal courts unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with the guideline it interprets.”
United States v. Farnsworth,
Second, contrary to Mr. Hogan’s assertion, there is nothing conditional or indirect about the robbery note. A bank robber who unequivocally demands money, states he hаs a gun, and informs the teller she will die if she does not comply with his demands leaves nothing for the victim or the court to infer and, thus, makes an express threat of death pursuant to § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F).
See United States v. Moore,
Third, although this threat may be somewhat disingenuous, since Mr. Hogan would have no way of knowing whether the teller gave him a bundle of money secured by a dye pack until after he completed the robbery, there is no requirement in § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) that the threat be realistic or actionable to be an express threat of death.
See
USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). It only requires the robber make an express threat of death which places the victim in significantly greater fear than that necessary to constitute an element of the offense of robbery. USSG § 2B3.1, comment, (n.6);
Robinson,
Fourth, Mr. Hogаn’s assertion that the announcement of a weapon is not an express threat of death misperceives the issue. In this case, the robbery note not only announced the possession and presence of a weapon, it specifically directed the clerk to hand over the money without any dye packs *445 “or you die.” We must consider the robbery note or threat as a whole and not as unconnected individual statements. Therefore, while Mr. Hogan may be correct that the announcement of a weapon alone may be insufficient to constitute an express threat of death, that is not our case. 2 Here, the robbery note contained the additional statement “No dye packs or you die” which, as we held previously, is an express threat of death pursuant to § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F).
Finally, we consider Mr. Hogan’s assertion § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) requires the threat place the victim in “significantly greater fear” than that associated with the robbery itself. In the commentary to § 2B3.1, the court is advised it
should consider that the intent of [§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) ] is to provide an increased offеnse level for eases in which the offender(s) engaged in conduct that would instill in a reasonable person, who is a victim of the offense, significantly greater fear than that necessary to constitute an element of the offense of robbery.
USSG § 2B3.1, comment, (n.6). Therefore, in order to qualify for the enhancement pursuant to § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F), the robber must instill in the victim “significantly greater fear than that necessary to constitute an element оf the offense of robbery.” USSG § 2B3.1, comment, (n.6).
See Robinson,
In
Lambert,
this Court considered the application of § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) where an еxpress threat of death was made by the defendant’s accomplice.
It is irrelevant the government did not present any evidence establishing the victim’s state of mind or whether she actually experienced a significantly greater fear. The test for whether the enhancement applies is an objective one. The commentary to § 2B3.1 specifically directs the court to look at what a “reasonable” victim would experience based on the defendant’s conduct, not what the actual victim experienced. USSG § 2B3.1, comment, (n.6).
See United States v. Cadotte,
Accordingly, we hold Mr. Hogan’s robbery note constituted an express threat of death and the district court properly apрlied USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). Therefore, the two-level *446 enhancement for an express threat of death pursuant to USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) was appropriate.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Mr. Hogan also claims application of § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) is erroneous because hе did not actually possess a gun at the time of the robbery, but merely kept his hand in his pocket to give the impression he had a gun. However, even assuming Mr. Hogan did not have a gun, this fact does not affect the apрlicability of § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F).
See United States v. Figueroa,
. This court has not decided whether a statement that a defendant possessеs a gun, but which does not contain any threat to use the gun can support an increase trader § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). However, the circuits to have considered this issue have reached divergent results.
See, e.g., Figueroa,