Case Information
*1 Before EDMONDSON, BIRCH and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James Donnell Oner pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing a firearm after *2 having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district cоurt sentenced him to the statutory minimum of fifteen years imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which provides for an enhanced sentence if the offender has three prior “violent felony” convictions arising from separate occasions. On appeal, Mr. Onеr challenges his sentence, arguing that none of his three prior convictions—namely two convictions for aggravated fleeing or еluding a police officer in violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(3)(a) and one conviction for armed robbery in violation of Fla. Stat. § 812.13(2)(a) —constitutе a “violent felony” under the ACCA.
I.
We review de novo whether a defendant’s prior convictions qualify as a “violent felony” within the meaning of the ACCA. United States v. Canty, 570 F.3d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 2009).
Under the ACCA, the term “violent felony” is defined in pertinent part as any felony that
(i) has as an element the use, attempted usе, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
*3
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). We have noted that this definition is virtually
identical to the definition of a “crime of violence” under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.2(a)(1)-(2). See United States v. Harris, 586 F.3d
1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009). Cоmpare U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)-(2), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). For that reason, the same analysis used to determine whether
an offense qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA is also used to
determine whether an offense qualifies as a “crime of violence” under
§ 4B1.2(a)(1)-(2). See Harris,
A.
Florida law makes it a secоnd-degree felony for a person to “[d]rive[ ] at high speed, or in any manner which demonstrates a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property” while “willfully flee[ing] or attempt[ing] to elude a law enforcement officer” in a marked patrol car with its sirens and lights activated. Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(3)(a). Whether this crime qualifies as a “violent felony” depends on whether it falls within the ACCA’s so-called “residual clause” in that it “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). As Oner concedes, our precеdent squarely requires us to hold that it does.
*4
In United States v. Orisnord,
[t]he dangerous circumstances surrоunding a person’s attempt to flee from law enforcement coupled with the person’s operation of a motor vehicle most assuredly presents a “potential risk of physical injury” to others. And the stress and urgency of the situation will likely cause the person fleeing to drive recklessly, turning any pursuit into a high-speed chase with the potential for serious harm to pedestrians, other drivers, and the pursuing officers. Indeed, collisions between fleeing vehicles and pedestrians or other vehicles sharing the road are common. Moreоver, by deliberately disobeying a law enforcement officer, the fleeing motorist provokes an inevitable, escalated cоnfrontation with the officer when he is finally apprehended. “Such a confrontation inherently presents the serious potential risk of рhysical injury because the fleeing driver[,] intent on his goal of eluding the officer[,] faces the decision of whether to dispel the officer’s interference or yield to it.”
Orisnord,
Following our decision in Orisnord, the Supreme Court deсided a trilogy of
cases considering whether a prior conviction qualifies as a “violent felony” under
the ACCA’s residual clause. See Chambers v. United States, __ U.S. __, 129 S.
*5
Ct. 687 (2009); Begay v. United States,
In light of those cases, we again considered in United States v. Harris, 586 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009), whether § 316.1935(3)(a) qualifies as “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2(a)(2). We held that it did, rеasoning that the statutory elements of “willfully flees or attempts to elude” a police officer either at a “high speed” or with “a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property” required purposeful conduct and that the risks flowing from such action presented, like the enumerated crimes, a serious potential risk of physical injury to others. Harris, 586 F.3d at 1288–89.
In light of our analysis and holding in Harris, we hold that convictions under § 316.1935(3)(a) qualify as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. The district court thus did not err with respect to Oner’s two convictions thereunder.
B.
Oner’s argument thаt his conviction for armed robbery under Fla. Stat.
§ 812.131(2)(a) does not qualify as a “violent felony” under the ACCA is likewise
without merit. In United States v. Dowd,
Perhaps realizing the futility of his аrgument, Oner mentions that he only
raises it in anticipation of a favorable ruling in United States v. Johnson, __ U.S.
__,
The district court thus did not err in finding that Oner’s conviction for Florida armed robbery qualified as a “violent felony” under the ACCA.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
[1] The statutes have not been amended since Oner’s convictions.
[2] Oner tells us that he raised this issue to preserve it for possible appellate review.
[3] Florida’s armed robbery statute was amended on October 1, 1987, by redefining the offense of “robbery.” 1987 Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. 87-317 (West).
[4] The holding in Johnson did not implicate the so-called “residual clause” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). It is therefore not relevant to our analysis in Part I.A.