United States v. Issac Belt

518 F. App'x 215

4th Cir.

2013

Check Treatment

Docket

Salramon GONZALES, a/k/a Alex Ramirez, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ennis OATES, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 12-7985.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 18, 2013. Decided: April 22, 2013.

215

Salramon Gonzales, Appellant Pro Se. Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Salramon Gonzales seeks to appeal the district court‘s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court‘s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Gonzales has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, deny a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Issac Rashad BELT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-8029.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 18, 2013. Decided: April 22, 2013.

James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Thomas Sarachan, Staff Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Barbara S. Sale, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Issac Rashad Belt appeals the district court‘s order granting his motion for reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006). Although the district court granted Belt‘s § 3582 motion, the court did not reduce Belt‘s sentence to the full extent he requested. On appeal, Belt argues that, under the Supreme Court‘s decision in Dorsey v. United States, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012), the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA“), Pub.L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, should apply to his motion. Contrary to Belt‘s assertion, however, Dorsey did not alter this court‘s prior holding that the FSA does not apply retroactively to defendants sentenced prior to its effective date. See United States v. Bullard, 645 F.3d 237, 248 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 356, 181 L.Ed.2d 225 (2011).^* Because Belt was sentenced in April 2006, prior to the FSA‘s effective date, the FSA had no effect on Belt‘s mandatory minimum sentence, and the district court properly concluded that Belt was not entitled to a sentence reduction under the Act. Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.

Notes

Belt‘s attempt to distinguish is meritless, as the Supreme Court made clear in that the FSA does not apply to defendants sentenced before the FSA‘s effective date of August 3, 2010. ; see (acknowledging that consideration of a § 3582(c)(2) motion does not constitute “a full resentencing by the court“).