United States v. Irvin Alamia Moran (91-6309) and Rena Morales (91-6310)

America, STATES UNITED

Plaintiff-Appellee, (91-6309) Rena MORAN Alamia

Irvin (91-6310), Defendants- Morales

Appellants. 91-6309, 6310.

Nos. Appeals, Circuit.

Sixth 17, 1992. Nov.

Argued July

Decided Rehearing Suggestion

Rehearing and Sept. Denied Banc

En open,

the door Hughes strong smelled a marijuana. that he odor identified as point, Hughes At this called Officer Du- crest to the scene and told him about thé marijuana. odor of Officer request- Ducrest permission truck, ed to search the and Mor- Collins, Cynthia Atty. (argued J. Asst. U.S. Meanwhile, an consented. got Moran into briefed), Atty., and Office Mem- Hughes’ patrol car. When Officer Ducrest TN, phis, plaintiff-appellee. for truck, got to the he heavy noticed the scent of air freshener that seemed to have been briefed), Craig (argued William Hall sprayed immediately before point. The TN, Memphis, defendants-appellants. for only person who could applied spray Morales, passenger who remained in the KENNEDY, MARTIN, Before: throughout seat Despite incident. the air JONES, Judges. Circuit freshener, Ducrest detected the odor of raw marijuana. searched, When the truck was MARTIN, Jr., F. Judge. BOYCE law enforcement officials found several duffel Irvin Alamia Moran and Rena Morales bags containing pounds a total of 160 appeal possession their convictions for of marijuana. bags were located in the marijuana with intent to distribute. Both passenger area behind the seats. Moran and the district court’s deni- Morales were then read their rights Miranda suppress al of their motions to evidence and placed under arrest. of their motions to dismiss the indictment 27, 1989, On November a- criminal com- Speedy plaint against was filed Morales and Moran. seq. et § Morales also contends that A grand jury federal returned a one-count sufficient evidence does not exist sustain against indictment both defendants on De- judgment his conviction. vacate the We cember 11. The charged indictment them the district court and remand the case for aiding abetting each in other dismissal of the indictments with directions possession with intent marijua- to distribute to determine whether the indictments should 841(a)(1). in na violation of 21 U.S.C. On prejudice. be dismissed with or without 10, 1990, January Moran and Morales were 27, 1989, Ducrest, On November David J. arraigned, and subsequently the'trial was Deputy Shelby County, Sheriffs Tennes- 20. The court later see, operating stationary radar device continuance to allow the defendants to file to monitor eastbound traffic on Interstate 40 scheduling motions and to avoid radar, According near Airline Road. January conflicts for Moran’s counsel. On Moran drove Ducrest in a Nissan truck 24, Moran filed a motion to evi- speed with tinted at a sixty-three windows dence found the vehicle. Morales filed a per fifty-five miles miles-per-hour hour motion to the same evidence on zone. Ducrest Lanny contacted Officer February 5. The district court conducted an Hughes by patrol radio in a car and asked evidentiary speeding. him to the truck for By May denied both motions on 11. 1991, both Moran-and Morales filed motions Hughes, When Moran noticed Moran to dismiss the indictments violation of the pulled got over and out of the to talk to truck Speedy Trial Act. These motions were de- Hughes the officer. noticed that the pickup May jury nied on 28. A convicted both guard had struck the rail pulled when Moran July defendants on being After off the road but that Moran showed no con- September sentenced on both defendants regarding possible damage cern to the truck. timely appeals. filed The officer then asked Moran for evidence of registration. the truck opened a door Trial Act sets time limits on passenger, Morales, and asked the Rena prosecution bringing a case to trial give registration him the documents. arraignment When or indictment. 18 U.S.C. indictment). day prior arrésted statute is purpose seq. The et seventy- arraignment the Sixth effective make quantify “to Consequently, Id. period. speedy day trial.” right Amendment bring Moran required to States United 476 v. United Henderson seventy of within to trial 1878, 299 L.Ed.2d Morales 90 333, 106 S.Ct. arraignment barring the The J., dissenting). December (1986) (White, delays. any other excludable date that: provides Act is guilty plea of not in which any case In delay excluded of periods particular Two in charged entered, of defendant trial the Moran at issue. court are district the the com- or indictment information al- of time challenge the exclusion Morales commence shall offenses- of an mission of part motions filing pretrial lowed filing date seventy days within hearing the time between the or of the information (and public) its court issued the district the date (cid:127) defendant indictment, date the fromor the On Janu- to ruling motions on the of officer judicial appeared has that court announced ary the district pending, charge is such in which court the file fifteen to give the would occurs.... last date whichever undisputed that under It motions. is pretrial 3161(c)(1). § 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(1)(F), speedy-trial the § 18 U.S.C. filed a “periods running when Moran stopped certain permits clock The statute computing January motion be] [to ... must the that district the trial contend which Morales time within the 3161(h). cir the § One not it excluded when 18 U.S.C. erred court commence.” period is seventy-day but filed also motion was which after cumstance time resulting “delay any by the district allowed prior specifically is duration time tolled motion, of such motions. any pretrial preparation for the court period conclusion through the Therefore, is whether the motion of, disposition on, preparation prompt other hearing or court for district .the allowed 3161(h)(1)(F). § ques- U.S.C. motion....” is excludable. motions “delay reason time in this circuit. excludable yet Another been answered has tion exceed period, not ably attributable denying the order court district In any proceeding during days, the indict- motions dismiss defendants’ actually under concerning the Seventh noted ment, court the district by the court.” advisement v. States conclusion Circuit’s begin 3161(h)(1)(J). trial does If § (7th Cir. 1064-65 Barnes, F.2d amount additional days or an seventy within filing of 1990) for the time provid the exclusions allowed time decision The Barnes is excludable. in 3161(h), or indictment by section ed holding in States on the based motion of be must dismissed formation Cir. 152-53 Montoya, 827 prejudice. defendant, or without held 1987). Montoya, the Seventh de 3162(a)(2). court The U.S.C. by the district court period the indictment whether termines clock speedy-trial stops the filing motions prejudice- because without with or dismissed the defen- unless motions deadline until whether to evaluate position in the best it is it has allocated the court dant informs ends serve properly reprosecution and that potential too much time Richmond, 735 justice. United concern proceed without case should 208, 217 pretrial motions. any possible casé, the In the Cir the Seventh disagree with indict from the date to run We began period expressly ex The statute Mentz, conclusion. cuit’s See United ment. filing of the period “from the only the Cir.1988) cludes (holding that sev the conclusion motion [pretrial] run at begins to period enty-day time disposition on, prompt or other hearing the defendant indictment date of, 31.61(h)(1)(F). such motion.” post-hearing .18 U.S.C. its memorandum. thirty- provide day 3161(h)(l)(J) does not that a statute benchmark in section re- .quires district court for prompt disposition of the motion motions is to be excluded from the is held and the district has Moreover, seventy-day computations. the' supplemental filings received all to avoid re- should not starting burden be on the defendant to speedy-trial Mentz, clock. steps keep take speedy- affirmative F.2d at 326. running. trial clock we determine argues United States forty-two days elapsed non-excludable tolling speedy-trial computation con December 1989 and between tinued until because the statute does twenty-eight- 1990. This calculation leaves explicitly apply not the thirty-day limit to day period in which the defendants had to be pretrial consideration of motions. Unit The

tried. ed States adopt contends that we should speedy-trial question The other is Seventh question. Circuit’s riilé on the In many seventy-one days by how of the taken Tibboel, v: court district to rule on the to motions (7th Cir.1985), the court held that the maxi suppress are not excludable. Section mum days thirty number excludable is' 3161(h)(1)(F) the fil excludes days in a ease with pretrial numerous mo ' ing disposition aof motion to the tions but is whatever days number of period tolling motion. This necessary reasonably make to prompt deci speedy-trial clock includes time after a hear However, sion. merely Tibboel created an ing on a motion when district court is exception that extends the beyond time limit waiting supplemental filings from the thirty days in cases with multiple motions necessary disposition that are require additional time for consider the motion. Henderson v. United case, ation. In only'two motions, 321, 330-31, 1876-77, U.S. 90 pertaining suppression to of the same evi Morales, (1986). L.Ed.2d 299 Moran and dence, are at issue. We do not believe that (h)(í)(J) claim that 18 U.S.C. 3161 does not the district court thirty needed more than delays beyond thirty days exclude after the days Moreover, to deliberate. the United disposition motions. Section State's us to invoke the excep asks Tibboel 3161(h)(1)(J) excludes from the tion pleadings number of in computation any “delay reasonably attribut case, volved in the instant rather than the any period, thirty able to not to days, exceed number of motions as Tibboel. Even during any proceeding which concerning the though eighteen the district court plead had actually by under advisement address, ings to basically each of these items added). (emphasis the court” “A motion is suppression involved the same issue: ‘actually under advisement’ ‘the court acquired evidence at the time of Un arrest. papers receives all reasonably ex circumstances, der these we do not believe ” _’ Mentz, pects (quoting 840 F.2d at 327 that the court needed district additional time Henderson, 106 S.Ct. at to research issues. we de 1876)). cline to apply to the case at hand.1 Tibboel reject this the United States filed alsoWe the district court’s rationale post-hearing the final excluding memorandum on thirty-day Janu the time after the ary correctly 1991. Moran speedy-trial computations. and Morales began again contend that the clock applied run on district justice” court an “ends of 3161(h)(8). March because at that point, continuance days passed had provides since the States filed statute for the exclusion' of: Montoya, Such cases as Tibboel and that the "are exclusions be used either Act, exceptions Speedy create cir- undermine the time limits established purpose, guarantee cumvent its which is to very purpose or to subvert the the Act was de- Henderson, speedy trial. See 476 U.S. at fulfill”). signed to (White, J., dissenting) (noting at 1878 S.Ct. filed a motion the date a con- resulting from [a]ny period seventy-day cal- are included own evidence any judge on his granted tinuance forty-one the last count We also con- culation. judge if the motion to rule days taken on seventy-one findings of his basis tinuance eighty- The total taking such justice served the ends allowable the maximum exceeds interest three best outweigh the action Therefore, we trial. Trial Act. speedy under the the defendant public case for and remand judgment vacate the 3161(h)(8)(A). indictments. entry of dismissal issued originally court The district the in- whether will determine continuance ends .of or with- be dismissed dictments a motion filing of “the to allow decision, a result prejudice. As out (empha continuity of counsel” argument re- Morales’ not decide we need terms, very added). upon its Based sis sufficiency evidence. garding only until lasted dissenting. scheduling KENNEDY, Judge, counsel’s filed and were However, the dis resolved. were difficulties out, con- points majority theAs the expanded retroactively later court trict delay violate of periods particular two tend time of the to exclude continuance their justify dismissal and thus Act the on ruled court through date the First, indictments. that court reasoned district motion. calcula- seventy-day the exclusion separate ends issue not need did Court the District by time allowed tion of the time between continuance Second, defen- pretrial motions. filing for already been April 11 had January 24 the time follow- challenge exclusion dants This continuance. by the earlier excluded dis- hearing before suppression ing the permit rationalization post-hoe type trict, judge. States See United ted. Cir.1985) (“ judge contest- the first regard ‘A with 600, expressly Speedy time is whether period violations ed time wipe out cannot by preparing for they occurred a district court have Act after grant justified may motions findings the. calculation, basis delay on what seventy-day an excludable ing omitted)). (citation agree that parties All delay occurred.’” under the Act.. day 18 U.S.C. in accordance with December clock ran forty-one January indicted, 3161(h)(1)(J), we determine until § were after defendants dis days elapsed they while ar- were 10, 1990, non-excludable on which date on considering how rule Court arraignment, court was trict At raigned. motions, and suppress. filing of for motions fifteen fact, motion to did, file a our holding does conflict agree that All on Monroe, opinion United filing this mo- upon tolled clock was that a (6th Cir.1987), held where .we 3161(h)(1)(F). § tion, under U.S.C. section delay may be excluded appropriate 3161(h)(8)(B), providing to dis motions to defendants’ response In interest delay that a finding made Act, District of the for violation miss period beginning of to the justice prior of Seventh a line relied Court however, no delay. the instant a. court an that when to conclude cases such, As was made. finding schedule, the time nounces Speedy Trial under the not excludable Un excludable. filing motions is for the Montoya, 827 der United (7th Cir.1987), request absent 152-53 aforemen making all After running-in keep clock awas find that there otherwords adjustments, we tioned request com mencement forty- Trial Act. The Speedy immediate violation time less less casebecause date indictment between two any prospective cifically than allotted is sufficient for preparation set for mo- period motions - the time may tions be excluded from filing motions tolls the calculation under the Act. Trial Act clock until the motions deadline. regard issue with to the second con Court, According Montoya any period period tested time is what amounts of time preparation papers set aside for of motions after the hearing and submission qualifies proceeding[ as an ] “other concern may of the motions be excluded from the ing the defendant” under seventy-day calculation. The District Court 3161(h)(1), if filing even the time for mo had the motions under advisement from Feb requested by tions is not defendant and even 5, 1991, ruary when the District Court re actually if no motions are filed. Under the request specific ceived Moran’s findings,2 Montoya interpretation of the the ex when it issued its order on press motion, exclusion of time related to the Under section 3161(h)(1)(F) delineated in 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(1)(J), the thirty days first of this “from the of the motion Tibboel, are excludable. See 753 F.2d motion,” prompt disposition of[ ] such is then 611; Janik, United States v. 723 F.2d implicit read as additional to the exclusion of (7th Cir.1983) 543-44 (recognizing pre time.1 also See trial motion is a matter under advisement Barnes, 1059, 1064-65 States v. 909 F.2d thus Cir.1990); Tibboel, United States v. 3161(h)(1)(J)’s thirty-day applies). allowance issue, however, This still leaves at the exclud- reading plausible Such a of the Act is ability of remaining time between the language under the of the statute. Subsec- completion ruling and the (h)(1) “delay tion states that excludable re- the motions to sulting from other proceedings concerning government argues that we should the defendant” is “not to” limited the includ- adopt the Seventh Circuit’s rule that Further, delays. ed list of excludable 3161(h)(1)(J) section thirty-day limit does not history legislative supports interpre- such an apply multiple pretrial where Jodoin, motions have tation. See United States v. 672 (1st Cir.1982). been filed with a district court and that in F.2d 238 Statements can 3161(h)(1)(F)’s stead section “promptness” emphasizing be found the inexhaustive na- requirement is the limit on the using “proceed- ture of the list and time the terms by taken ings” multiple district court to “procedures” decide interchangeably. Tibboel, motions. 753 at Since 611- motions is much rule, Adoption however, 12. easily of such a “procedure” more referred to as a would concerning help not “proceed- decide the defendant than as a and there ing,” permit such fore we leave the statements exclusion of a decision of whether to expressly adopt panel reasonable time it for another is which —one prepare pretrial District Court to faced with motions. the situation of a district court adopt Here, I deciding multiple would the rule stated in gov .motions. Montoya days spe- rule, and hold that the fifteen ernment asks us to invoke the Tibboel reads, 3161(h) pertinent part: evidentiary hearing 1. 18 U.S.C. 2. The on the was (h) However, following periods delay held 1991. shall be Henderson computing excluded in the time within which an v. United 476 U.S. filed, (1986), information or an indictment must be or in Supreme L.Ed.2d 299 Court held that computing the time within which the trial of waiting the time in which a court is for submis such offense must commence: post-hearing sion of briefs and memoranda (1) Any period delay resulting from other excluded, yet should be because is not defendant, proceedings concerning the includ- ready requisite to resolve a motion until all infor ing but not to— limited 330-31, provided. mation has been Id. at Thus, S.Ct. at 1876-77. the District Court did (F) delay resulting any pre-trial mo- actually not have the motion under advisement tion, of the motion until on, prompt conclusion of the disposition or other of, motion; that a no indication gives judge If mo- not 'pleadings, number of the balancing upon a was continuance While Court. District tions, by the faced Speedy Trial specified factors of the with confronted indeed Court District the indictment to dismiss Act until asked respect to (18) pleadings” “eighteen great danger is of the for violation documents, motions, these each of converted will be every continuance essentially involved out, points majority creating into a continuance retroactively ac- evidence of the issue: same clearly not the time, excludable pickup truck. stop of through the quired faced, of the intent mo- one Court The District mo- defendant, two and these each tion (the of facts out violations wipe' the same judge on cannot tions focused A district truck) and law they have pickup Act and search doc- seizure findings (Fourth search Amendment occurred circumstances, I would trine). an excluda- granting justified these mo- multiple delay oc- exception apply Tibboel’s ble for which tions, implicit rationale curred. and delib- research time needed additional Crane, (quoting at variety of issues. a number erate 45). In both Janik, F.2d at 544 - rejected Richmond, the Court Crane upon ruled defendants’ itWhen delay put court rationalizations indictment, dismiss to dismiss. denying motions forth in retroactively an “ends create attempted to Richmond, at 606; 3161(h)(8)for justice” exclusion suspicious of Thus, we days per beyond the it took the time justice” exclusion “ends retroactive Court’s 3161(h)(1)(J), stating by section mitted on defendants’ rule taken to pending the issues “complexity of here, decide I would not motions. “complex delay, since justified the motions” period from however, I believe since judg considered court’s deserve issues 11,1991, motions, April the decision not warrant arbitrary do deadlines ment again agree the clock its deserved decision exclud- 21, 1991, properly April stopped, has Circuit study.” As this and attention thirty of result, only if even As a able. require indicated, for “difficult on the motions to rule days taken sixty-four disposition, days for than more ex- not to be determined suppress were justice’ continuance ‘ends days cludable, non-excludable the total of appropriate 3161(h)(8)may available after seventy not exceed would Mentz, 840 findings.” States United Cir.1988) H.R.Rep. (citing 315, n. 22 326 dismiss, the motion denying the in When 33, reprinted Cong.2d 93d Sess. No. justice ends 7426) reason for an gave as a Court Cong. & Admin.News Code 1974 April exclusion indi- added). has also This Circuit (emphasis parties for the need of April 1991 place the reasons need a court cated that ruling on receiving the trial underlying an ends (Defendants filed a the motions continu- grants the time it at the record so the April to dismiss motion actually consider ance, long it does as as excluded.) are date subsequent days the contin- grants at the time factors those 6,May trial date for that it set It stated 776 uance. and that needed time give Rich- 1991 to Cir.1985); 606 to set unreasonable have been it would that' This mond, day after announcement for the however, the trial clear, in its equally been has 6,May motions. The ruling on the made rationalizations post-hoc hostility to by an entered order trial date was for violation to dismiss time of motion motions were on the the decisions day after caution- Act, Judge Posner’s quoting Court’s statement supports the filed. that: ary words why sixty-three as to the reason it intended to exclude per miles in fifty-five hour mile this time. It did not an order at the per enter speed hour zone on Interstate 40. Du- February 5, time because it felt its earlier pulled crest out to enter traffic in order to excluding 1990 order time from the stop pickup, but then saw that Officer the motions to to the trial date was Lanny Hughes approaching already sufficient.3 in the flow of traffic. Ducrest radioed Hughes requested that he pick- adjustments all of the When above up. Hughes over, pulling did so. exclusion and inclusion of time from the sev- driver of pickup, Moran, defendant enty-day aggre- calculation under the Act are guardrail. struck the quickly He then gated, up I exited following end with the results. the truck Hughes and met days granted at the rear fifteen the District Hughes vehicle. him properly motions are escorted back seventy days compartment driver’s inspected allowed under the reg- his are the twelve between the end of istration and driver’s license. While at the testimony truck waiting registration papers, receipt pa- Court’s of the final Hughes strong detected a marijuana. odor of pers necessary to take the issue under ad- He then asked Moran to come with him to Also excluded are the visement. ten car, patrol Hughes where radioed Du- April between arrived, crest. When approached Ducrest he (when dismiss), defendants filed motions to pickup strong noticed a odor of thirty days and the for consideration of the marijuana. Ducrest also noted that the mar- seventy-day motion. Included in calcula- ijuana partially odor was camouflaged by a twenty-nine days tion are the between the strong cologne. odor of appeared It arraignment. indictment and if Even I then Hughes and Ducrest someone had thirty-four sixty-four days include tak- sprayed the pickup heavily interior en the District Court to rule on the with cologne during Hughes the time suppress, motions to the total non-exeludable patrol with Moran at the only car. The sixty-three days, amount to person who could have pick- done so was the and thus the limit set the Act up’s passenger, Morales, who re- was not violated. passenger mained during seat may again, period. the case Since be tried I would also rule on appeal. the other issues raised on Receiving permission Moran, to do so from Both the two law enforcement officers searched Court’s denials of their motions to pickup large and discovered several duf- evidence. Defendant Morales also chal- bags containing fel pounds marijuana lenges sufficiency sup- of the evidence to cab, directly in the passenger behind the port a conviction. I affirm bags up seat. The space took the entire suppress Court’s refusal to and evidence also behind the seat and in fact extended above guilt

find the evidence of Morales’ sufficient seat level. support to his conviction. checking speeds scope

While traffic of sufficiency with station- our review of of ary 1989, Shelby radar on November inquiry evidence is narrow. Our County, Deputy reviewing Tennessee Sheriffs David “whether after the evidence in the pickup light Ducrest clocked a Nissan truck prosecution, at most favorable to the not, however, approval justice I do wish to indicate February of in the ends of continuance of "grandfather” attempt "allowing Court’s to 1990 were aof motion to time taken to continuity rule on the motions to (emphasis of counsel.” added) previous under the upon ends of exclusion The continuance based these factors difficulty only 1990. The with extended until the motions filed were attempt justifying scheduling this at exclusion of the counsel’s difficulties were resolved. excluding that a continuance time must be retroactively expand- based A continuance cannot be actually motivating year on the factors the continu- ed—over a later—to include new factors 1985); ance. 776 F.2d at 606 Cir. when a district court finds itself a need with to Richmond, 735 F.2d at 216. The reasons exclude time in order not to violate contest- the defendant found the have fact could trier rational of whether factual and lost the ed beyond the crime elements essential Although defen- speeding. truck was Ellzey, pickup v. United doubt.” reasonable tar- evidence some Cir.1989) Moran introduced dant (quoting 324, 328 stops traffic vehicles for of out-of-state geting Virginia, 443 Jackson was introduced evidence (1979)). Hughes, no byA 61 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. by the District noted As to Ducrest. upon cir- relation entirely may rest guilt finding of fatal, for the Dis- Court, proves absence Ellzey, 874 evidence. cumstantial matter that a factual as found trict Court reading and commit- the radar made Ducrest jury could rational no say that I cannot further stop. The District Court ted to the marijua- possession guilty Morales find to committed that Ducrest had found aiding and or of to distribute intent na with and chase pull to out stop, by preparing to intent with possession abetting Moran pickup truck, seeing that the bore uncontested Hughes presented distribute. presented We plates. are license out-of-state overwhelming an he detected testimony that could hold" upon which we no evidénce with approached he first marijuana odor clearly erroneous. findings factual to these moments returning a few Upon pickup. objectively facts, stop was these Under excessive sprayed an later, had someone See constitutional. and therefore reasonable truck, cologne inside amount Crotinger, pas- found inside was cologne container Morales was compartment. senger challenges the also during this Morales the truck Defendant person with access marijuana jury conclude Court’s admission could District A rational period. effectively con truck Morales sprayed pickup. in fact found had Morales challenge standing to no detection he has impede the officers’ cedes order pack in which truck or very seat Moran’s the search marijuana behind impede challenges the instead active effort Morales ages sat. within.4 Morales crime, theory, possession Morales’ continuing the vehicle. Under discovery of stop distribute, challenge a sufficient a vehi standing to provides have passengers intent in- them, if the vehicle single-count stop for conviction that detains cle basis distrib- unconstitutional, subsequent intent to then possession dictment stop abetting. aiding and evidence stop items ute fruits of - even valid, search consensual found constitutionality of challenges the Wong Sun barred the vehicle —are con- pickup. Moran stop of the original 371 U.S. in the truck the.marijuana found tends (1963). L.Ed.2d evidence, admitted been have Assuming speeding traffic the issue. arguing that the decide need not We his stop, thus violated standing in nature and pretextual has Morales similar rights. Under stop of the vehicle was Amendment held that Fourth have we be- circumstances, has found interests upon this Court intrusion acceptable violated found a defendant occupants. cause showing no speed limit convictions. Thus, AFFIRM I would using im- officers enforcement of law made particular to isolate criteria permissible a. violation offender, constitutional no traffic Dunson, shown. had been Cir.1991). 989, 993-94 be read to the search stop which led vehicle. the search.of consented 4. Moran holding in Supreme Court's the driver that when conflict clear has been 148-49, Illinois, gives permission Rakas v. 421, vehicle owner (1978), 432-33, search, as to that a vehi- is effective permission 58 L.Ed.2d req- customarily well. United vehicle as passenger of the passenger does not cle French, None of challenge a privacy expectation of uisite concerning Mo- follows the discussion vehicle. search validity, standing rales'

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Irvin Alamia Moran (91-6309) and Rena Morales (91-6310)

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Sep 2, 1993

Citation: 998 F.2d 1368

Docket Number: 91-6309, 6310

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.