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United States v. Ira Nathan Heaps
39 F.3d 479
4th Cir.
1994
Check Treatment

*1 Act”) (citation and internal structure of omitted).

quotation have here no such aid to assist our

We

discovery meaning. § 545’s Hence the grievous ambiguity or uncertáin-

cases reveal “day”

ty. though appeared It the word is

in a criminal statute with no indication what- (a) (b) twenty-four hours or

soever whether period daylight (excluding night) ambiguity is a similar

intended. Ours phrase

leads us to the conclusion 545’s law,”

“contrary involving the definition crime, “lenity” principle ap- when the

plied, regulatory does not include violations. my judgment, the conviction under and,

Count Nine should be reversed there-

fore, respectfully dissent. America,

UNITED STATES of

Plaintiff-Appellee, HEAPS,

Ira Nathan Defendant-

Appellant.

No. 93-5923. Appeals,

United States Court

Fourth Circuit.

Argued June 1994.

Decided Oct.

480 Bronx, NY, Berne, Richard

ARGUED: W. Thomas, Sp. Anita appellant. for Asst. U.S. Alexandria, VA, Atty., appellee. ON Fahey, Atty., BRIEF: Helen F. U.S. Alex- andria, VA, appellee. HALL, MURNAGHAN,

Before and NIEMEYER, Judges. Circuit part part Reversed and affirmed in published opinion. Judge MURNAGHAN opinion, Judge wrote the K.K. joined. Judge HALL an NIEMEYER wrote concurring opinion part dissenting and part.

OPINION MURNAGHAN, Judge: Circuit defendant, Heaps, ap- Ira Nathan has pealed judgment from the of the United District Court for the Eastern States District Virginia finding guilty him of all counts of eight-count charged indictment. 1 Count conspiracy possess the defendant with methylendioxyamphetamine distribute (MDA), commonly “ecstasy,” known as § 21 2 violation of U.S.C. 846. Count charged conspiracy the defendant with commit in violation of 18 charged § U.S.C. 371. Counts 3 and ecstasy defendant with distribution of in vio- 841(a)(1) lation of U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C. charged 5 and 7 Counts with in violation of 18 1956(a)(1)(A)© Finally, §§ and 2. charged 6 and 8 Counts the defendant with money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)® §§ and 2. The defendant was 29, 1993, sentenced on October to months 1, 3, as to and to confinement Counts 2, 5, 6, 78 months confinement as to Counts concurrently with one another. Boccia to run testified he met the defendant June, 1991, two-year period sentencéd to a at a Grateful Dead He was also concert in Washington, special D.C. The defendant supervisory release assess- became a totalling ecstasy connection for the that Beck and ments $400. *3 Boccia sold to the DEA. Boccia testified charges stemmed from the distribu- The during supported by 1991 he himself ecstasy Geoffrey tion of Boccia and Gillian selling drugs working and as a bike messen- Beck, subsequent payment and the from ger. Beck and Boccia to the defendant wire upon Boccia further testified that receiving transfer. quantity ecstasy defendant, a from the he five in The Government called witnesses pay portion and Beck would for a of the case-in-chief, including Special Agent ecstasy, drugs, pay sell the and then Drug Robert Valentine of the Enforcement outstanding profits balance from of the (DEA), Beck, Geoffrey Administration Gillian ecstasy sales. Boccia testified that he and Boccia, Maire, Stacey Deputy United bought ecstasy Beck for about or $12 $13 Agent Drake. States Marshal David Valen- hit, larger quantities a sold it in for $13 ecstasy purchased that he from tine testified hit, quantities a in smaller for $14 $20 separate and Boccia on five occasions Beck a hit. $25 August between 1991 and November 1991. Both Beck and Boccia in testified that purchased ecstasy from He 150 tablets June, 1991, defendant, through prear- 9,1991, August Boccia on in Beck and Wash- rangement Beck, approximately with sold $2,000. 6, ington, September for D.C. On ecstasy pills they to Beck which then re- 1991, and Boccia sold 240 tablets to Beck sold. The supplied pills defendant next $3,500 Alexandria, in Agent for Valentine ecstasy 8, August to Beck and Boccia on During purchase, Virginia. this Beck told 1991, $4,000 in day New York. The ecstasy Agent Valentine that the came from purchase placed phone before this Beck call people two New York who were 40 or 45. apartment from her to the defendant. 12, 1991, Alexandria, September Virgi- On nia, distributed an additional 10 Beck tablets 1991, August, Beck testified later Agent Valentine connection with the again supplied the defendant 500 hits of ec- 6, September 1991 sale. stasy to her and another friend in New York. arranged Beck testified that she to meet the 5, 1991, D.C., Washington, On October apartment,” defendant at “Frank’s but the Agent purchased Valentine 85 tablets from defendant was not there. She met with sale, Boccia. Prior to this Beck and Boccia Frank, who told her that the defendant had ecstasy capsules sold 115 of a different vari- left in a items her dresser drawer. Beck ety Agent Valentine. Beck and Boccia ecstasy stated that she retrieved from the capsules supplied testified that the 115 being Frank drawer. Beck described as be- California, by Jeffrey Saunders of not years age. tween 40 and 45 13, 1991, Finally, defendant. on November Alexandria, Agent Virginia, pur- Valentine sup- Boccia testified that the defendant 10,350 dosage chased units of LSD from plied ecstasy him Septem- with 500 hits of $5,000 Beck and Boccia for in cash. 5, $4,000. brought ber 1991 for Boccia D.C., ecstasy Washington, back to and sold it Beck testified that was a defendant Agent and others. Valentine from York. friend New She and the defen- trips approximately dant took two to Jamaica for which the Beck testified that at 11:25 13, 1991, wired, paid. p.m. defendant Beck visited the defendant on November she via Union, regular spoke New York on basis and to Western two 'orders made out “Stacey was, telephone periodically. Stacey him over the Maire.” Maire at the She that, transactions, exception pur- girl- with testified of the time the defendant’s Saunders, Jeffrey chase from all of the ecsta- friend. She later became his wife. Beck sy bought during that she that the had her the summer stated defendant instructed in the 1991 was obtained from the defendant. and Boccia to send the orders “Stacey upon may order court motion of the defendant Maire.” One name of proceeding amount of and the transfer the as to that defen- in the was sent ... money Beck Boccia dant to another district. other for $500. was the sent to The decision whether to transfer a case is Agent Valentine Alexan- sale of LSD to committed to the sound discretion of the 13, dria, November Virginia, on Espinoza, district court. United States v. 153, Cir.), explained that the Beck and Boccia Both 102 S.Ct. 70 L.Ed.2d 125 U.S. Washington, sent from orders were (1981). may only court The district be re D.C., ecstasy. payment for Beck testified versed if it has abused its discretion. only she and Boccia owed reason ecstasy pre- was for money to the defendant The defendant has asserted that since all *4 viously supplied to them. activity by him in conducted furtherance of York, charged the crimes occurred in New he sending after the mon- Beck testified that should not have had to stand trial in the orders, ey telephoned the defendant to she Virginia, Eastern District of where he be- it had been sent. Maire testi- confirm that prejudiced lieves he was his status before money picked up the in fied that she New Virginia a as a New Yorker. of the defendant. York at the direction She orders, brought the cashed the two outset, At the we note that venue was apartment the that she and the proper Virginia. in the Eastern District of shared, put and the cash in a defendant proper, have held that venue in We is a money box. conspiracy, any multi-district in district in n The DEA arrested Beck and Boccia on conspirator which a has committed overt 8, cooperated January 1992. Beck with the Martinez, act. States v. United 901 F.2d telephone two undercover DEA and made 374, Moreover, 376 when a defendant. The second call was calls conspiracy is formed in one district and overt wiring of more made to discuss in acts are taken furtherance of it in other previous supplies owed for defendant districts, proper against is venue all of the ecstasy. specifically if Beck asked the next any in defendants one of those districts. in payment should be sent the name of Sta- Parts, Levy United States Auto 787 F.2d cey Maire. The defendant indicated that was (4th Cir.), 946, 828, 479 U.S. necessary payment. next not for the (1986). 93 L.Ed.2d 56 S.Ct. Since in the instant case overt in acts furtherance of Deputy States Marshall United David charged conspiracies two occurred in the Drake testified that he arrested the defen- Virginia, Eastern District of the Southern February dant in York on New 1993. York, District of New and the District of arrested, being After the defendant asked Columbia, properly lay venue in each of the I ... Drake “What should do? without in- three districts for Counts myself, you, I criminating all can tell I inwas indictment. wrong place wrong at the time.” Drake Washing- DEA told the defendant that the Similarly, the Government has assert probably speak ton want would with him. proper ed that venue was in the Eastern said, ‘What, cooperate? The defendant ... I Virginia through District of for Counts 3 give up big guy, just can’t can’t.” agree. We The two distribution counts al Alexandria, leged ecstasy distribution of II Virginia. laundering counts matter, preliminary As a the defen stemmed from the wire transfer of argued dant has that the district court should representing proceeds of the sale of LSD permitted change pursuant have a of venue Virginia. in the Eastern District of See 21(b). 21(b) provides F.R.C.P. Rule Rule Beddow, 1330, 1336 United States v. pertinent part: (6th Cir.1992) (venue for a parties proper any For the convenience of the case is district in which the occurs). witnesses, justice specified and in the interest Whoever, challenges knowing property Govern- involved The defendant in a represents on cases such as Martinez financial transaction reliance ment’s Parts, supra, arguing proceeds activity, his of some form Levy Auto of unlawful sought attempts a conducts or distinguishable since he to conduct case is such away transaction change of venue from district financial which fact involves activity, specified illegal activity and to a he had conducted no ... virtually alleged carrying in which all of his with the intent district Moreover, specified activity; ... knowing occurred. since Beck or conduct convicted, charged, designed nor the transaction were neither is whole or in Boccia him, argues part nature, ... disguise trial with to conceal or stood location, source, treating ownership, district court erred example as an of multidistrict the control of the instant case activity.... litigation, single than as a defendant rather alleged eo-eonspirators stood ease. Had the guilty shall be of an offense. 18 U.S.C. him, trial with the defendant concedes 1956(a)(1). In order to sustain a conviction proper in would have been the Eastern venue statute, under the Government must Virginia. District (1) prove that: the defendant conducted or argument not Though the defendant’s attempted transaction; to conduct a financial *5 unable to find appeal, (2) some we are without property proceeds the involved the in (3) that the district court abused its discretion specified activity; unlawful the defendant allowing proceed to in the Eastern the case property represented knew that the involved decision, making Virginia. District of proceeds the of some form of unlawful activi- (4) the district court relied on the factors enu- ty; engaged the defendant in the financial Supreme v. merated the Court Platt promote transaction with the intent the Co., 240, Mining Mfg. Minnesota & U.S. carrying specified activity; on of unlawful (1964). There, 769, 11 L.Ed.2d 674 (5) 84 S.Ct. knowing while that the transaction was the court noted ten factors which court designed part, whole or to conceal or (1) may exercising consider its discretion: nature, location, disguise source, the the the (2) defendant; location of the location of wit- ownership, proceeds the or the control of the (3) nesses; likely location of events to be in activity. unlawful 18 U.S.C. (4) issue; records; location of documents and 1956(a)(1); Montoya, § United States (5) (6) business; disruption of the defendant’s F.2d (7) expense parties; to the location of coun- charged The indictment violations of 18 (8) sel; trial; accessibility place relative first, § 1956 on two theories: that the (9) district; conditions in docket each $2,000.00 Stacey wire transfer from Beck to (10) any specific might other element which carrying on Maire was sent to 243-44, affect the transfer. Id. at 84 S.Ct. at specified activity, punishable unlawful under 771-72. 1956(a)(l)(A)(i), second, § that 18 U.S.C. For the reasons stated the district disguise designed the transaction was it court we find that did not abuse its discre- source, ownership, or control of the application tion of the Platt factors to activity, punishable of the unlawful under particularly that the instant case. We note 1956(a)(1)(B)®. The defendant has ar- activity charged, and for which the defen- gued that the evidence was insufficient to responsibility, dant had no small was con- support his conviction for two reasons. entirely in ducted almost the Eastern Dis- First, argued he has the Government Virginia. trict of never established that he knew that the mon- Second, ey proceeds. has was unlawful he Ill argued prove that the Government failed to alleged transaction was intended to The defendant has asserted that the evi- that the carrying specified him mon- on of dence was insufficient to convict ey laundering activity, designed or that it was to conceal or under 18 U.S.C. 1956. The location, nature, source, provides pertinent part: disguise statute court, denying control of the standard. The district ownership, or the dismiss, activity. defendant’s motion stated: it seems to me that the circumstantial evi- rightly agree parties that both Since drugs expects dence of one who fronts proof that the defendant require theories payment back from it is on notice and question know- the transactions conducted knowledge going has is represented property involved ing that coming drugs. if be from Just as he was illegal activity, proceeds of some form of corn, consigning grain, consigning you ex- question that we first turn our it to that is pect coming back from the attention. corn sales. It is true that the district court’s comment A perhaps betrays require- confusion about the 1956(a)(1) requires the Gov Section subjective knowledge proved. ment be prove the defendant had ernment However, the evidence cer- outlined above subjective knowledge” that the mon “actual tainly was sufficient for a rational trier ey used in a transaction fact to conclude that the defendant knew the an unlawful was derived from source. Unit money illegal drugs him as sent Campbell, ed States v. 977 F.2d illegal from was itself derived the sale of — Cir.), U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. drugs. (1993). 1331, 122L.Ed.2d 716 The defendant may just not be convicted on what he should B However, have known. Id. both direct and to Counts 5 and 7 of indict As circumstantial evidence can be used to estab ment, required prove the Government was knowledge given lish are the same engaged in a financial Awan, weight. United States v. *6 promote transaction with the intent to 1415, 1434 carrying activity. on of 18 1956(a)(1)(A)©. Viewing light the evidence in the Government, most to the favorable Gold predicated argu- has The Government Witkowski, smith v. 981 F.2d $2,000 ment the transfer of the was — Cir.), denied, U.S. -, cert. 113 S.Ct. promote carrying speci- to intended on of (1993), 125 L.Ed.2d 709 we find that first, fied unlawful on two theories: subjective the evidence of the defendant’s the transfers were done to establish knowledge of the source of the funds was goodwill promote ecstasy future sales of sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Gov defendant; second, by the that the transfers presented ernment circumstantial evidence completed drug the antecedent distributions. jury reasonably from which a could infer However, adequate there has been no dis- $2,000 the defendant knew that the wired to coming tinction between the in to the defen- proceeds drugs. him were from the sale of possession subsequent dant of and the use The evidence that Beck and Boe- established thereafter, i.e., going while the was drug during cia dealers and out. The first of the Government’s theories summer and fall of 1991 the defendant was is, therefore, absolutely baseless. There was primary ecstasy. their source of Boccia’s presented payment no evidence that the was primary support dealing means of was goodwill subsequent drug made to create drugs supplied by the defendant. Beck only transactions. Not were there no subse- friends, the defendant were and the evidence transactions, quent drug but neither Govern- showed that she and Boecia were fronted purpose ment witness testified that the of the drugs by payment. the defendant for later payment encourage was to the defendant to Rather, principal objection ap- supply drugs. The defendant’s more pears apparent merely satisfy completed to be to the district court’s was a debt of a and, shows, belief that conviction under the statute as far as record final could objective be knowledge sustained under an transaction. mentioned, depositing funds without the check. the second Govern Id. De-

As positing provided opportunity is that the transfer of the the check theories ment’s drug carry completed illegal the antecedent trans for the defendant out the Therefore, action, completion bribery. jury presented that this alone is suffi The with sufficient evidence from to sustain the conviction. Govern which to find cient beyond deposit three cases from other circuits doubt that the ment relies on reasonable position. pro- The first of these of the check amounted to an support of its intent to Paramo, carrying bribery. mote the on of Id. is United States — (3d Cir.1993), U.S. -, Cavalier, Finally, in United States v. (1994). 1076, 127 In Para- L.Ed.2d 393 S.Ct. (5th Cir.1994), up- F.3d 90 the Fifth Circuit mo, embezzled IRS tax refund the defendant held the defendant’s con- Coconspirator Vega, at 1215. checks. Id. Cavalier, upon viction based mail fraud. IRS, sent fictitious re tax examiner for physical possession the defendant took of a payees in New York. The fund checks van, satisfy required monthly failed to picked up the checks and defendant then payments, and then sold the van for cash. depositéd Id. at 1215. The defendant them. Meanwhile, reported the van cashing argued participation that his company as stolen to the insurance promote carrying on the checks did not paid remaining off the lien on the van. Id. at of mail fraud. Id. at 1217. The Government Fifth 95. The Circuit held that the transfer argued promoted that Paramo mail fraud holder, of a check from the insurer to the lien checks into when he converted embezzled defendant, pro- because of the fraud of the cash. Id. completed moted the mail fraud. Id. at 93. “Here, first determined that a Cavalier caused to be Third Circuit reinvested or by engaging plowed defendant can violate the statute back the of his mail fraud to ” not in financial transactions that his overall scheme to defraud.... but, here, only ongoing activity, or future Id. activity. prior unlawful Id. at 1218. Since foregoing The Government relies on the Paramo understood that the embezzled cases, Cavalier, particularly argue checks would have been worthless unless reasonably that “the could have conclud- exchanged cashed at a bank or otherwise ed defendant caused the currency, jury rationally

negotiable “the drug plowed from the sales be back to cashing *7 could have found that the of each possess his overall scheme to and growth prosper- to check contributed the drugs.” distribute ity by creating preceding of each mail fraud argument un- We find the Government’s value out of an otherwise unremunerative Cavalier, First, view, persuasive. our su- enterprise.” Id. There, pra, distinguishable. is next relies on United Government fraudulently had to induce the insurance Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068 Cir. States company to send a check to the credit com- 1991), approval a with case cited Paramo. pany extinguish against to cause it to its lien Montoya, sting oper In FBI a the conducted Here, contrast, by his vehicle. the defen- bribery activity ation to uncover the only dant’s crime was the consummation defendant, an elected official. Id. at 1077. (cid:127) ecstasy, charged the sale of for which he was agent The FBI undercover made a money picked up and convicted. The was at payment to the defendant. The defendant the Western Union office the defendant’s personal deposited the check into his account wife, placed in a box in a drawer at his and, appeal, argued on that the check could drugs home. Were itself the promoted bribery not have the because the promoted held to be a transaction that the activity completed upon unlawful was activity unlawful of that same transaction receipt agent. of the check from the FBI Id. virtually every drugs would sale be at 1076. money laundering as soon automatic violation money disagreed, stating changed The Ninth Circuit that hands. this Understood way, such that it the defendant could not have made use of the 1956 would have reach Cir.1991), very squarely al- same conduct consistent with our criminalize would case, holding In drug laws. The here. the instant ready criminalized below, prosecution argued court has observed the context of Tenth Circuit challenge money Blockburger a launder- defendant could have used the funds to “turn a buy drugs,” thereby pro- charge: around and more ing Jackson, moting drug dealing. In the Sev- continuing enterprise criminal Like money enth Circuit described this class of appears in- Congress ... to have statute laundering practice plow- offenses as “the money laundering statute to be tended the ‘specified ing back unlawful activ- underly- from separate crime distinct a ity’ activity.” Id. at 842. money generated the to be ing offense that The Jackson defendant was convicted of report The senate laundered. “promoting” under expresses the need for a federal criminal theory drug proceeds pur- as to he used to directly at the aimed offense beepers, buy phone, a chase mobile and to money gained illegal laundering the from payments, rent and via make checks made report money activity. on the The Senate dispute by out to at cash. Id. 841. With no plain laundering bill makes the bill money the defendant that he knew create a was intended to “new Federal activity, up- derived from unlawful the court against laundering.” offense Sen. 4_ beepers, held his conviction as to the since Congress aimed Rep. 99-433 at they there was evidence at trial that laundering at conduct that crime drug used further activities. Id. As to underlying follows time the crime rather money spent phone, pay- for a for rental pun- than to afford an alternative means of ments, however, and disbursed as cash ishing prior “specified activi- Seventh Circuit held the insufficient evidence ty.” Congress enacted the launder- because provide punishment ing statute to government prove did not punishment rather

addition to other than phones played cellular the same punishment. role —or instead of other We find that any drug opera- indeed role —in Davis’s Congress intended beepers. tions as the “specified activity” sepa- Likewise is the rent- be payments al separately punishable. the checks written to rate offense cash; certainly expenditures these main- Edgmon, United States v. lifestyle, tained Davis’ but more than this — (10th Cir.1991), 1213-14 they promoted is needed establish that , 3037, 120 U.S 112 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 906 . — drug his activities. (1992). Although the Tenth consid Circuit case, only Id. at the instant question ered the different context and evidence as to what was done with the perhaps placed emphasis too much on the put after it was sent was that it was in a box past temporal distinction between and future house, in a drawer the defendant’s behav- crimes, Congress’ insight into intention is *8 ior far more innocuous than even that consid- Congress prevent valuable. intended to ered the Seventh Circuit in Jackson. already prohibited by ill than those other other laws. The statute should not be inter money no that There was evidence preted any drug to make transaction a mon acquired through was itself ey laundering crime. promote activity. used to an unlawful Fol- Jackson, lowing supra, the rationale of we holding To the extent that our con carry that hold the Government failed to holdings by flicts with and Ninth Third proving burden in that the defendant intends Circuits, Paramo, Montoya supra, see activity to unlawful within mean- respectfully disagree we must that the mere ing of the statute. receipt money of a transfer and the subse can, quent placement of cash in a box of C itself, constitute under the Circuit, holding by statute. A that in the the Seventh We also must conclude Jackson, United States v. 935 F.2d 832 instant case the Government failed to sustain clearly proof wiring as to Counts 6 and 8 of The record shows that the its burden indictment, required money to to for which it was the defendant’s wife was for purpose designed, of convenience and prove that the transactions not conceal nature, part, disguise the ment. to While the evidence was no doubt whole source, location, ownership, money or the sufficient to show was paid illegal activity, was the control of the 1956(a)(l)(B)(i). present § Government did not activity. 18 The evidence to U.S.C. show intent to theory conceal the funds or evidence has been that the de- Government’s prove promotion illegal activity. of another fendant instructed Boccia and Beck to trans- Consequently, now $2,000 we reverse the defen rather than to him fer the his wife dant’s conviction on disguise to conceal and the source order and 8* Counts ownership of the funds from law enforce- authorities, punishable conduct under ment IV 1956(a)(l)(B)(i). 18 U.S.C. The defendant has raised several other only who testified as to the witness appeal concerning evidentiary issues on rul- purpose arrangement Stacey for the was ings by the district court. Discussion Maire, the wife of the defendant. She was rulings, including these the district court’s witness, called as a Government. under request possible denial of the defendant’s immunity, grant of and testified that material, Jencks Act would add little to the pick up defendant asked her funds explanations given by the district court. We going “he wasn’t to be around. He

because find that it acted well within its discretion go him.” also asked me She testified its decisions on these matters. pick up money “I order orders 2, 5, 6, Accordingly nowwe reverse Counts identification,” bring needed to and stated grounds and 8 and affirm on all other you “you prove had to were the appeal. person name on the order” whose they Accordingly, judgment “if and that were in someone else’s name, you pick wouldn’t have been able to IN PART AND AF- REVERSED Further, up.” the Government offered them FIRMED IN PART. taped telephone conversation between the defendant and Beck wherein Beck indicated NIEMEYER, Judge, concurring in Circuit going she was to send the defendant some part dissenting part: him, of the owed more she asked respect Heaps’ With to Ira convictions on Stacey again.” if “she should send it to De- indictment, III B Counts 5 and 7 of the Part “Hum, responded, fendant no. You don’t majority opinion of the concludes that you need to do that know.” The defense has government carry failed to its burden of argued go- that since the defendant was not proving Heaps engaged in a financial ing away at time of the be second transaction with intent to wiring money, of the there was no reason meaning within the of the him to have the sent to his wife. We statute, laundering. persuaded are that the second conversation 1956(a)(l)(A)(i). For the reasons that fol- prosecution corroborates the witness’ testi- low, portion opin- I dissent from that mony that the was sent in her name respects, ion. In all other I concur. away. the defendant would be because Heaps A convicted on Counts 5 and 7 *9 money laundering

The Government introduced no other evi- of the indictment for 1956(a)(l)(A)(i). tending § dence to show that violation of 18 U.S.C. 13, 1991, purpose concealing money alleges had the of the Count 5 that on November $1,500 by co-conspirators. by him wire to sent to the Gillian Beck transferred * addition, conspiracy money money laundering In since the convic- to launder is also reversed. reversed, tions are the on 2 of conviction Count majority carry- Heaps argues, opinion the intent

Heaps “with nothing specified agrees, unlawful that this transaction was ing of such distribution],” drugs. majori and Count 7 al- drug payment than a [illegal more notes, on the same date ty payment drugs transaction leges a similar ‘Were the itself review, Our there- promoted $500. in the amount held to be a transaction fore, presented the facts to the must take activity of that same transaction gov- favorable to the jury light most virtually every drugs would be an sale of whether a reasonable and determine ernment laundering money automatic violation as soon under the jury convict the defendant could money changed hands.” United States Cf. proof. I conclude that applicable standard Edgmon, 952 F.2d Cir. v. jury’s supported the verdict ample evidence 1991) (“Congress appears to have intended two counts and would on those of conviction sepa a statute to be affirm. therefore underlying of rate crime distinct from the generated to be laun fense continuing Beginning in June 1991 dered.”) 1991, Heaps, who was locat- until November City, regular suppli- York was the ed New agree that the constitut While drug “ecstaey,” illegal which is sold er of the ing drug a violation cannot serve as the pills, to Gillian Beck and Geof- tablets or money laundering, that does not basis for Boccia, located in frey who were the Wash- com mean that a financial transaction after bought Beck and Boccia ington, D.C. area. pletion illegal drug activity, if even consignment, drugs, often on and sold connected, closely cannot constitute Beck, portions. them to customers in small laundering. A violation 18 U.S.C. Heaps, visited him in New York friend of 1956(a)(1)(A)© requires § a “financial trans travelled with him to City regularly and even (1) necessary action” that is not to the estab Heaps’ expense on two occasions. Jamaica at underlying illegal activity; lishment of the paid portion Boccia for a Typically, Beck and (2) supports promotes illegal or drugs in or other advance and of the tablets activity.* typically by This is revealed evi profits owed from the remitted the balance drug dence that the of a sale are drugs were sold. after the “plowed purchase drugs back” into the $1,500 Indeed, payments of $500 equipment ways or in other used continue pro- were derived from the November 1991 illegal conspiracy. See United States drug and were remitted to ceeds of sales Jackson, F.2d 841-42 of the Heaps to cover the balance amounts Additionally, in circumstances where non- drug purchases. previous him for owed to monetary proceeds are received in the form instructions, Beck wired the Heaps’ On security, may of a a violation occur when the 13, 1991, $2,000 p.m. 11:25 on November at security (by is converted a financial transac Maire, Stacy Heaps’

via Western Union tion) money, thereby yielding into a benefit girlfriend. Maire then cashed the by a transaction which is distinct from the “money placed orders and the cash illegal underlying activity. independently Heaps’ apartment. box” in case, dispute Heaps does not could this the most obvious demonstra- payback November tion of is the loan conclude that the orders which, effect, illegal drug by Heaps activities Beck to continued arrangement sent wire interstate commerce and that the credit facilitated the illegal pro- underlying illegal drug conspiracy. Heaps nature of the While knew $2,000 point Heaps argue does is that there is no direct evidence that ceeds. The engage actually “plowed illegal in the financial back” into he did not transac- was carry- drug activity, the intent to the circumstantial evidence tions “with activity.” clearly ing supports on of the conclusion that 1956(a)(l)(A)(i). ongoing drug conspiracy supported * Cashing money wire or other order falls within the definition "the movement of funds 1956(c)(4)(A)(i). it involves means.” 18 U.S.C. *10 "financial transaction" because by “fronting” Heaps they which tained checks which through a scheme cashed to realize drugs illegal conduct, to Beck and Boccia. With- distributed the benefits their $2,000 payment, each, such a scheme would by out the showing the court held that $2,000 payment The cashed, not have continued. checks were had agreed arrangement a credit to as satisfied been established. As court in Paramo jury part “fronting” scheme. The said: prior of similar presented with evidence case, present In the Paramo understood subsequent transactions and could well have the embezzled checks would have $2,000 promoted concluded been worthless unless cashed at a bank or scheme which had been existence for the exchanged negotiable otherwise for cur- Significant- and fall of 1991. entire summer fact, rency. jury rationally Given this 1993, ly, January Beck after her arrest cashing could have found that the of each telephone Heaps placed an undercover call to growth check contributed pros- to the in which the two coordinated the next install- perity of preceding by each mail fraud previously complet- ment of owed for creating value out of an otherwise unre- transactions, drug demonstrating the ed thus enterprise. munerative arrange- ongoing nature of their financial Similarly, 998 F.2d at 1218. in this case circumstances, ment. In similar the Second Beck created a fund with Western Union on concluded, in v. Circuit United States Skin- Heaps (through girlfriend) his drew to (2nd ner, Cir.1991), 946 F.2d 176 obtain cash furtherance of his credit ar- purchase of U.S. Postal Service or- rangement with Beck and Boccia. drug from the sales and the ders any resup- lifeblood business is the transmission of those orders to ply capital, particularly when credit drug supplier constituted extended, reason, and for I this conclude that because that financial transaction facilitated the evidence was sufficient to allow a drug conspiracy. Id. at 177-78. $2,000 money-order conclude that the trans- Although the above evidence is sufficient Heaps actions between Beck and on Novem- support jury’s verdict on the 13,1991, promoted carrying ber on of the counts, laundering I note that the verdict is alleged illegal drug conspiracy and therefore further buttressed the transaction with 1956(a)(1)(A)®. violated 18 U.S.C. (1) Union, separate Western which was from I Heaps would therefore affirm the convic- necessary drug elements of the violation indictment, tion under Counts 5 and 7 of the (2) 1991, supported it. In November and, respect majority’s with to the decision already after she had received and distribut counts, respectfully on those dissent. drugs, Washing ed Beck transferred cash ton, exchange D.C. Western Union

promise pay Western Union cash Stacy designated payee,

New York to a i.e.

Maire. This commercial transaction was payment money drugs; more than America, UNITED STATES of private it was a “financial transaction” in the Plaintiff-Appellee, fully supported ongoing sector which drug conspiracy, necessary but was not drug establish the violation. Similar conclu Tracy WALKER, Defendant-Appellant. sions have been reached somewhat distin No. 94-5084. guishable apposite but no factual circum less Third, Fifth, Appeals, United States Court stances and Ninth Cir Paramo, Fourth Circuit. cuits. See United States v. — (3rd Cir.1993), F.2d 20, Argued July 1994. -, U.S. 127 L.Ed.2d 393 S.Ct. Decided Oct. (1994); Cavalier, United States v. 17 F.3d 90 (5th Cir.1994); and States v. Monto United

ya, 945 F.2d each of cases, fraudulently

these the defendants ob-

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Ira Nathan Heaps
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date Published: Oct 31, 1994
Citation: 39 F.3d 479
Docket Number: 93-5923
Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.
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