United States v. International Brotherhood of TeamstersUnited States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Star Market Company (Star Market) appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, David N. Edelstein, Judge, entered on October 29, 1991.
Star Market argues that the reinstatement proceedings conducted by the Consent Decree Officers, and enforcement hearing held in the district court, ran afoul of constitutional due process requirements. Star Market further contends that the district court’s enforcement of the Officers’ reinstatement order effectively reversed a binding arbitration award in violation of federal labor law. Because we find no merit in either argument, we affirm the district сourt’s order in its entirety.
BACKGROUND
This appeal joins the ranks of what has now become a legion of cases arising out of the government’s enforcement of the Consent Decree entered into on March 14, 1989 by the United States Government and the IBT. The Consent Decree was a critical part of the settlement of the government’s civil RICO action, see Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (1984 & Supp.1991), brought in 1988 in an effort to rid the IBT of its domination by organized crime. The Consent Decree instituted sweeping structural reforms of the IBT’s electoral and disciplinary processes. Its “central purpose” is to insure “[t]he fair and open conduct of the 1991 IBT election,” U.S. v. IBT (Yellow Freight),
The facts relevant to our review of the present controversy are largely set forth in the district court’s opinion and order in United States v. IBT,
On May 13,1991, Star Market terminated Neal J. Henderson, a union steward, from his employment with the company. At the time he was fired, Henderson had been employed by the Star Market supermarket
Henderson claims that the true reason for his termination was to retaliate against him for his union election activities. In the most recent election held by his Teamster local, IBT Local 25 (Local 25), Henderson had opposed the slate of powerful incumbents, successfully campaigned for an insurgent slate of candidates, and was himself elected as a Local 25 delegate to the International Union convention. In response to these activities, Star Market supervisors made disparaging comments to Henderson regarding his candidacy for delegate, as well as his support for the opposition slate. Henderson contends that Star Market’s negative reaction to his involvement in union politics culminated in his being fired.
After being dismissed from his job, Henderson filed a grievance pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Local 25 and Star Market, claiming, inter alia, that his discharge was politically motivated. He also filed a protest with the EO alleging that the retaliatory nature of his dismissal violated the Election Rules promulgated under the Consent Decree. The EO deferred decision on Henderson’s protest until the contractual grievance process had culminated in a decision, but notified the parties that his investigation would proceed. The EO also advised the parties that he would not be bound by any decision reached in the grievance proceedings conducted pursuant to the CBA.
The CBA’s grievance procedure provided for a two-step review. The first step consisted of a joint grievance panel comprised equally of union and employer panelists. If the panel was unable to reach a consensus, the second step was for the grievance to be submitted to binding arbitration before an independent arbitrator. Henderson advised the EO of his concern that he would not receive fair treatment from the grievance panel because a powerful incumbent union official, opposed by Henderson, controlled the selection of the union panelists. The EO advised Star Market of Henderson’s concern and noted that the EO’s review of the Election Rule protest would also include a review of the grievance process itself and the union’s representation of Henderson in that process.
On May 22, 1991, the joint grievance panel deadlocked on Henderson’s grievance, and the matter went to arbitration. On June 12, 1991, an arbitrator held a hearing on Henderson’s grievance. On June 17, relying exclusively upon the provision of the CBA entitled, “Breaks and Free Time,” the arbitrator found Henderson’s discharge to be justified. Although Henderson argued that he was a victim of retaliation, the arbitrator did not address the issue.
Thereafter, the EO completed his own investigation of Henderson’s protest. The investigation revealed that Star Market’s dismissal of Henderson was a disproportionately severe sanction as compared to those imposed for similar offenses by other employees. Other shift-break infractions of an equal magnitude had resulted in company discipline ranging from no sanctions whatsoever to verbal warnings. Indeed, in one case where an employee became verbally abusive to a supervisor and ultimately assaulted the supervisor with a billiard ball after the supervisor found him playing pool on company time, the employee was only suspended for twenty days.
The EO also considered a Star Market employee notice that had beеn posted after Henderson’s arbitration hearing. This notice stated “that certain shifts are some
As provided for in the Election Rules, Star Market appealed the EO’s decision to the IA. On September 16, 1991, the IA conducted a hearing by telephone — a procedure consented to by Star Market — and accepted a written submission from Star Markеt which contained legal arguments concerning jurisdiction, deference to the arbitrator and due process. On September 18, 1991, the IA issued a written decision affirming the EO’s decision in all respects.
Star Market did not appeal the IA’s decision to the district court and steadfastly refused to comply with the IA’s direction to reinstate Henderson. On October 24, 1991, at the EO’s and IA’s request, the government brought an Order to Show Cause in the district court directing Star Market to demonstrate why the court should not, inter alia, affirm the IA’s decision and direct Star Market to fully comply within 24 hours or be in сivil contempt. On October 29, 1991, the district court granted the order and imposed a coercive sanction of $10,-000 per day should Star Market fail to comply. Star Market appealed. After the district court declined to stay its order pending appeal, another panel of this court entered a stay. We now vacate the stay and affirm.
DISCUSSION
I. State Action and Due Process Claims
Star Market argues that the Henderson protest proceedings conducted by the EO, and IA’s review and affirmance of the EO’s decision, violated Star Market’s procedural due process rights under the United States Constitution. More precisely, Star Market contends that it was not a party to the Consent Decree and is not bound by it; that it was denied sufficient notice of the charges lodged against it; that the EO and the IA did not afford it a meaningful opportunity to present evidence and be heard; and that the EO and the IA were not sufficiently impartial to pass constitutional muster. Star Market further argues that these alleged constitutional infirmities affected the enforcement proceedings held in the district court, and therefore the district court’s order should be reversed. We are not persuaded by any of these arguments.
As a threshold matter, in order for Star Market to succeed on its due process claim it must establish that the officers appointed pursuant to the Consent Decree were “state actors” in the constitutional sense. See Blum v. Yaretsky,
Star Market argues that even if the Consent Decree officers were not themselves state actors, the district court is an arm of the government, and its enforcement of the IA’s decision supplies the requisite state action needed to trigger due process rights. However, in Senese, we put this argument to rest as well. There
In any еvent, even if state action had been involved, we do not think that Star Market suffered from the deprivation of due process safeguards. In Yellow Freight,
Furthermore, Star Market’s claim that it was denied procedural due process is belied by the record. In a May 14, 1991 letter to Henderson, Stаr Market and Local 25, the EO notified Star Market of Henderson’s Election Rule protest, supplied it with a copy of Henderson’s grievance letter, and solicited any information that Star Market had regarding the matter. In deferring his decision until after the arbitrator rendered his decision, the EO effectively gave Star Market more than three months to prepare and submit its case. After the EO found Star Market to have violated the Election Rules and ordered Henderson’s reinstatement with back pay and benefits, Star Market took an appeal to the IA. At the option of the parties, including Star Market which was represented by counsel, the IA conducted a telephone hearing. The IA invited all parties to submit written statements for his consideration and received a submission from Star Market.
Finally, Star Market declined to exercise its right of appeal from the IA to the district court under the Election Rules. Instead it chose to sit back, do nothing and force the government to initiate contempt proceedings in the district court. Star Market’s argument that it was not required to be proactive, but rаther could disregard the IA’s order until judicially required to comply, draws no support from the NLRB cases that it cites. See e.g. In re the National Labor Relations Board,
II. Displacement of the Arbitrator’s Decision
Star Market’s second argument is more ingenuous than its first. It contends that
Certain labor disputes may come under the provisions of a collective bargaining contract as well as within the purview of the Consent Decree. Here, the grievancе arbitration conducted pursuant to the CBA, and the parallel Election Rule proceedings held by the EO and IA, reached conflicting results with respect to Henderson’s reinstatement. Under these circumstances the question arises as to which determination is controlling.
Star Market points out that the labor contract under which Henderson was employed contained an anti-discrimination provision to protect those employees who engaged in union politics. The Election Rules more specifically sought to insure that union members did not suffer retaliation as a result of disfavored campaign activities related to the 1991 national IBT election. Star Market argues that where the collective bargaining agreement affords protections which encompass rights contained in the Election Rules, the favored status of binding arbitration under federal labor law preempts related Election Rule enforcement proceedings. We disagree. Rather, we hold that (1) where a consent decree provides individual union members with a source of independent rights as a mеans of effectuating the consent decree’s intended goal, and (2) where the purpose of the consent decree transcends the localized function of particular collective bargaining agreements and, instead, impacts upon the structure and processes of a national parent union, federal policy favoring independent arbitration of labor disputes does not preempt the procedures created to insure the implementation of the consent decree.
Our conclusion draws supрort from prior holdings of this Court. In Yellow Freight, we held that the NLRB did not have sole jurisdiction over an Election Rule protest that also fit the description of an unfair labor practice. The protest concerned an employer’s no-solicitation rule barring non-employee union members from campaigning for union office on the employer’s property. “We conclude[d] that the NLRB [did] not have exclusive jurisdiction over the conduct at issue on this appeal, and that the district court and its appointed officers accordingly did not err in addrеssing it.” Yellow Freight,
Yellow Freight’s, holding stemmed largely from our desire to “avoid inconsistent interpretations of, and judgments regarding, the Consent Decree, and also to avoid repetitive litigation that would distract the government and the court-appointed officers from implementation of the Consent Decree.” Id. We have considered the interest in avoiding inconsistent interpretations of the Consent Decree great enough to sustain “an injunction prohibiting all members and affiliates of the IBT from initiating any legal proceeding relating to the Consent Decree ‘in any сourt or forum in any jurisdiction’ (emphasis added) other than the district court from which this appeal was taken....” Id. at 105 (quoting United States v. IBT,
Our holding is grounded on the principle that a federal court need not defer to an arbitrator's decision when a plaintiff’s
Our review of these decisions, however, shows that they did not simply turn on the statutory nature of the independent rights involved. Rather, these decisiоns relied as much upon considerations of the limits on both the arbitrator’s jurisdictional basis, and the arbitrator’s particular realm of competence.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Supreme Court stated that,
[a]s the proctor of the bargain, the arbitrator’s task is to effectuate the intent of the parties. His source of authority is the collective-bargaining agreement, and he must interpret and apply that agreement in accordance with the “industrial common law of the shop” and the various needs and desires of the parties.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has viewed an arbitrator’s professional skill as narrowly circumscribed. While arbitrators are normally well versed in the workings of the industry from which a particular dispute arises, their field of expertise is limited to resolving individual contract disputes which rarely involve broad public interest considerations. Accordingly, “[bjecause the ‘specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land,’ ... many arbitrators may not be conversant with the” issues surrounding the enforcement of the Consent Decree. Barrentine,
Henderson’s Election Rule protest raises both of these considerations. To begin with, whether or not the Consent Decree carried the force of a federal statute, it was undeniably a source of rights separate and distinct from the CBA. These rights were “designed to supplement, rather than supplant” the rights enjoyed by employees under the CBA. Gardner-Denver Co.,
Nor was the EO bound by the arbitrator’s factual conclusions. Cf. McDonald,
Here, the arbitrator’s findings, which were before the EO and the IA, omit any mention of Henderson’s retaliation claim. Moreover, the arbitrator could not have considered the Star Market employee notice clarifying the company’s break-time policy that was posted after the Henderson arbitration hearing had ended. This evidence served to corroborate Henderson’s retaliation claim. Without the benefit of this information, and given the lack of any findings with respect to Star Market’s retaliatory behavior, it is clear to us that the arbitrator’s factual inquiry and conclusions were incompletе. Thus, his findings were rightly refused conclusive effect in both the Election Rule protest proceedings and the subsequent enforcement proceedings held in the district court. Cf. Nevins v. NLRB,
Given the breadth of the undertaking contemplаted by the Consent Decree, we believe that arbitrators are not well-suited to grapple with the problem of its enforcement. As has been borne out by the incessant litigation spawned by the government’s attempt to enforce the Consent Decree, the Consent Decree has engendered a multiplicity of complex issues that may simply be beyond the “specialized competence” of most arbitrators. In an attempt to rid the IBT of its historic mob domination, an endeavor greatly beneficial to the public interest, the court-appointed officers have been charged with overseeing the organization and execution of a national union election. This has proven to be an arduous task, requiring extensive coordination of nation-wide activities. In anticipation of this, the Consent Decree established an entire institutional structure in order to secure its own implementation.
While certain aspects of these Consent Decree cases relate to the “law of the shop,” their general import goes far beyond the provisions of any рarticular labor contract. We do not question the invaluable role that arbitrators serve in aid of smooth labor relations, and nothing we have stated herein should be construed as taking issue with the well established federal policy favoring arbitration of labor contract disputes. However, collective bargaining agreements and the Consent Decree address different problems and serve different purposes. The former governs the daily relations between particular employers and their employees, while the latter is an attempt to rebuild the infrastructure of an entire national labor organization. Considering these different objectives, we think it consistent with federal labor policy that where they differ, collective bargaining agreements yield to the Consent Decree, and that the Consent Decree officers and the district court remain free to complete their task unencumbered by collateral arbitration results. Cf. Barrentine,
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we hold that the district court and its appointed officers afforded Star Market adequate procedural safeguards, and that Henderson’s Election Rule protest was not preempted by the arbitration provision in his union collective bargaining agreement.
Judgment affirmed; stay vacated.