54 F. 221 | 8th Cir. | 1893
(after stating the facts as above.) When this case was before the supreme court of the United States on appeal from a former decree of the circuit court, dismissing the bill, it was held that the appellees could neither invoke the plea of laches nor limitations as a defense to the right of the United States to redeem. U. S. v. Insley, 130 U. S. 263, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485. We ■are relieved, therefore, of the necessity of considering such defenses, and will confine our attention to the question whether the second decree dismissing the bill can be sustained upon the ground on which the circuit court appears to have rested its decision. The circuit court held, in effect, that a bail bond or recognizance taken in a federal court or before a United States commissioner sitting in Kansas, for the appearance before a United States court of that district of a person charged with an offense against federal laws, can only be enforced in the mode prescribed by the laws of Kansas; that by the statutes of that state (paragraph 5218, Gen. St. 1889) such bonds and recognizances can only be enforced by a civil action brought in some court of competent jurisdiction after the lapse of the term at which the forfeiture is declared; and that the judgment in favor of the United States against McElroy was null and void, and not merely voidable, because it was rendered on scire facias, and before the adjournment of the term at which the forfeiture was declared. As the view thus.entertained by the trial court places the federal courts in a condition of practical dependence upon local laws in a matter which is intimately connected with the efficient exercise of their criminal jurisdiction, we think it should not be adopted, unless it is clearly warranted by some federal statute.
It has frequently been held that United States commissioners derive their power to take bail for offenses against the laws of the United States from section 1014 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. That section provides that, “for any crime or offense against the United States, the offender may, by any justice or
Another position was taken by the defendants in the circuit court, and seems to be relied upon in this court, that the marshal’s deed to the lot in controversy, wMch was executed after the death of McElroy, is void, and conveys no title, for the reason that the action was not revived in the name of his heirs or legal representatives before the deed was executed. With reference to that contention, it is only necessary to say that as the sale of the lot was made and approved, and a deed was ordered to be executed, during the lifetime of McElroy, we do not perceive that the right of the United States to redeem is in any way impaired, even though it be true that the deed is in fact void. The deed is the mere evidence of transactions that had been fully consummated in the lifetime of the judgment debtor. But we are unwilling to concede that the deed is defective for the reasons above stated and urged. The law seems to be quite well settled that a deed made under such circumstances is valid, notwithstanding the failure to revive. Herm. Ex’ns, § 213, and citations. The decree of the circuit court is therefore reversed, with directions to enter a decree in favor of the United States, in such form as the parties have heretofore stipulated shall be entered in case the right of the United States to redeem was sustained.