Defendant Gregory Howard appeals from the March 26, 2014, order entered by the district court denying his motion to suppress. Defendant’s motion argued that the warrant to search his residence was not supported by probable cause. After the motion was denied, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute Oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The plea agreement reserved Defendant’s right to appeal the motion to suppress. Defendant now exercises that right.
For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.
BACKGROUND
On February 6, 2013, a Kentucky court issued a warrant tо search Defendant Gregory Howard’s residence. The affidavit supporting the warrant, written by Detective Willie Skeens of the Kentucky State Police’s UNITE drug task force, stated in pertinent part:
On the 5th day of Feb. 2013, at approximately 5:45 p.m., affiant received information from:
Shawn Compton that Brian Howard was currently conducting narcotics deliveries for a variety of addicts in Magoffin Co[.] Shawn Compton states that Brian Howard is receiving the narcotics from Greg Howard a relative of Brian Howard at the location described herein and the photo attached hereto.
The witness states that Brian Howard does not have a vehicle and usually borrows the purchasers vehicle and drives to the residence described herein to pick up the pills for the addicts while leaving the addicts at Brians home located on coon creek.
On 02-05-2013 myself and Det Adams met the witness at an undisclosed location in Magoffin co and conducted a control buy from Brian Howard.
The witness stated they arrived at the residence of Brian Howard on Coon Creek and Brian Howard took the witnesses money and vehicle and began pulling out of the driveway and stopped[.] Brian exited the vehicle and told the witness that Greg Howard had just contacted him and told him to wait 15 minutes before leaving coon creek to come get the pills.
Durring [sic] the buy the witness stated that Brian 'Howard went to the residence of Greg Howard described herein to purchase a quantity of Oxycodone pills for the witness. Detectives also personally observed the witnesses vehi*797 cle leaving the residence described herein.
The witness stated that when Brian returned with the pills that was purchased that Brian Howard told the witness that he went to purchase the pills from Greg Howard and further told the witness that Greg Howard was currently laying low because he was scared of getting caught by Law Enforcement.
(R. 26-2, Search Warrant & Affidavit, Pg ID # 55.) On the following page, the affidavit states:
Acting on the information received, affi-ant conducted the following independent investigation:
UNITE and KSP have been receiving tips about Greg Howard and his Oxyco-done trafficking activities that has been directly linked to Howards Grocery located in Magoffin CountyU Unite detectives have made controlled buys from the store from individuals associated with Greg Howard.
(Id. at 56.)
Upon execution of the search warrant, officers found Defendant attempting to dispose of pills in a bathroom sink. The officers recovered a portion of the pills, which were later determined to be Oxyco-done. The officers also recovered $5,172 in currency from a bag inside the residence, which included $840 in buy money used during the controlled buy between Brian Howard and Shawn Compton.
Defendant was indicted on 'November 7, 2013, for conspiracy and intent to distribute oxycodone pills, a Schedule II cоntrolled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On February 18, 2014, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from the search of his home pursuant to the warrant. The district coui*t permitted briefing on the motion and held a telephonic status conference on March 3, 2014, at which the court determined that a hearing on the motion would not be necessary. On March 26, 2014, the court issued an order-denying Defendant’s motion. United States v. Howard,
In its order, the district court held that Shawn Compton “was a named informant and his statements are therefore generally considered to be reliable even without independent corroboration to establish his credibility.” Id. at *2. The court further held that, even if Cоmpton was not presumptively reliable, the detectives’ observations during the controlled buy constituted sufficient coxroboration to establish probable cause. Id. at *3. The court noted, however, that the detectives’ independent investigation of Howards Grocery was “of limited value.” Id. Finally, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that the warrant lacked sufficient particularity. Id.
After the court denied his motion to suppress, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea that reserved the right to appeal the district court’s ruling on the motion to suppress. On October 15, 2014, the court accepted Defendant’s plea, and he was sentenced below the guidelines to timé served and placed on supervised release. Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
In considering the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Smith,
II. Analysis
The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation ____” U.S. Const, amend. IV. In deciding whеther the affidavit supporting a warrant establishes probable cause, magistrates must consider “the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Allen,
A magistrate may rely on hearsay evidence provided by an informant when considering whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant. United States v. Helton,
make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstаnces set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
Gates,
Importantly, these indicia of an informant’s credibility — veracity and basis of knowledge — provide only a framework for determining whether an informant’s tip creates probable cause. See Helton,
In Gales, the Supreme Court provided examples of how the veracity/basis of knowledge framework might play out:
If, for example, a particular informant is known for the unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal activities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause based on his tip — Likewise, if an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity — which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability— we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary. Adams v. Williams, [407 U.S. 143 ,92 S.Ct. 1921 ,32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)]. Conversely, even if we entertain some doubt as to an informant’s motives, his explicit and detailed description of al*799 leged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.
Id, at 233-34,
Here, the facts contained in the affidavit bolstered Compton’s veracity and, to a lesser extent, his basis of knowledge. In addition, the contrоlled buy described in the affidavit corroborated Compton’s tip. For these reasons, we conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed, and that the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress should therefore be affirmed.
A. Veracity or Reliability
The “veracity or reliability” factor of the Gates framework concerns the individual informant’s credibility as such. See Gates,
The Supreme Court illustrated this principle in Florida v. J.L.,
Florida v. J.L. thus suggests that where an informant is known to police, that informant’s tip is entitled to more weight because (1) officers can assess the informant’s reputation or otherwise evaluate her credibility, and (2) the threat of prosecution for filing a false statement is circumstantial evidence of veracity. See id.; see also United States v. May,
This Circuit has placed particular emphasis on the “informant’s reputation” fac
We have also accorded considerable weight to the threat of prosecution that a named informant faces for filing a false police report. See, e.g., United States v. Hodge,
We note, however, that the cases cited by the district court involved named informant tips supported by other indicia of credibility. In Hodge, an informant named in the warrant affidavit stated that he witnessed “the manufacture of methamphetаmine, several firearms, and a bomb” at the defendant’s residence.
Similarly, in Williams, not only was the informant named; оfficers “corroborated the information [the informant] provided through multiple sources, including [two cooperating witnesses], who correctly identified [defendant’s] block.”
Indeed, all our named informant cases share this common thread — affidavits containing an informant’s name plus other indicia of reliability. See, e.g., United States v. Kinison,
Read in this light, our cаses are more in step with the Supreme Court’s admonition that courts evaluating probable cause must take into account the “totality of the circumstances,” Gates,
With these principles in mind, we turn to the case at hand. Notably, the affidavit provided the magistrate with no information regarding Compton’s history as an informant. Even so, that Compton faced the threat of prosecution for filing a false police report bolstered his veracity. See K.R.S. § 519.040 (establishing criminal penalties for “falsely reporting an incident”).
Defendant’s principal argument on appeal is that the typical presumption of veracity for named informants ought not apply to Compton because he did not subject himself to liability for filing a falsé report. Specifically, Defendant argues that because Compton’s account of what
Second, Defendant provides no authority for the proрosition that prosecution for falsely reporting an incident under K.R.S. § 519.040 is impossible where a report is based on hearsay. That section of the Kentucky Penal Code provides:
(1) A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident when he:
(b) Reports to law enforcement authorities an offense or incident within their official concern knowing that it did not occur; or
(c) Furnishes law enforcement authorities with information allegedly relating to an offense or incident within their official concern when he knows he has no information relating to such offense or incident; or
(d) Knowingly gives false information to any law enforcement officer with intent to implicate another....
K.R.S. § 519.040. A hearsay statеment— especially one concerning the declarant’s own illegal activity — almost certainly constitutes an “incident” or “information” that can both “relate to an offense” or implicate the declarant in illegal activity. It follows that fabricating such a hearsay statement would violate the statute. See id.
More importantly, even assuming Compton’s tip did not subject him to the threat of criminal prosecution, the affidavit provided additional indicia of Compton’s veracity: as with the informant in Miller, Compton worked with police to corroborate his own tip. See Miller,
For these reasons, we conclude that the indicia of Compton’s veracity contained in the affidavit lent his tip considerable weight in the totality of the circumstances analysis.
B. Basis of Knowledge
The “basis of knowledge” factor of the Gates framework “refers to the particular means by which an informant obtained his information.” Smith,
[tjhere must be sufficient indication of the underlying circumstances from which an informant could reasonably conclude illegal activity is afoot.... In assessing an informant’s “basis of knowledge,” the degree of detail containеd in a tip may be used to infer whether the informant had a reliable basis for making his statements.... An explicit and detailed description of the alleged wrongdoing allows a magistrate to “reasonably infer that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way.”
Conversely, in Helton, the Court evaluated the statements of an anonymous tipster regarding a house being used for illegal activity. Helton,
The affidavit in this case states that, according to Compton:
Brian Howard was currently conducting narcotics deliveries for a variety of addicts in Magoffin Co ... Brian Howard is receiving narcotics from [Defendant] a relative of Brian Howard at [Defendant’s residence].
[Compton] states that Brian Howard does not have a vehicle and usually borrows the purchasers vehicle and drivers to [Defendant’s residence] to pick up the pills for the addicts while leaving the addicts at Brians home____
(R. 26-2, Pg ID # 55.)
These statements do little to establish Compton’s basis of knowledge. The affidavit does not state how Compton knows any of this; the credibility gained from professed firsthand knowledge is absent. See Smith,
Unfortunately, Compton’s tip was largely devoid of detail. The first paragraph, especially, contains little that would substantiate a particularized basis of knowledge: the use of a middleman and stash house in the sаle of drugs is not unique. The names and relationship of the suspects likewise suggest only a basic familiarity with the operation. The second paragraph does a bit more work: that Brian Howard would leave “addicts” at his house and use their cars to drive to Defendant’s house is, we assume, an unusual way to operate as a middleman. Compton’s inclusion of these details regarding Brian Howard’s modus operandi thus suggested some particularized basis of knowledge. And, as discussed below, these details provided investigators with the opportunity to corroborate Compton’s tip.
In all, however, Compton’s tip as described in the affidavit was largely devoid of detail, and the affidavit failed to state
C. Corroboration
Where the veracity and basis of knowledge of an informant have been thoroughly established, corroboration of the tip may not be necessary. See Allen,
Here, in addition to the indicia of reliability discussed above, the affidavit described two possible instances of corroboration: first, the controlled buy; second, the independent investigation into drug sales at a grocery store associated with Defendant. Each is addressed in turn.
i. The Controlled Buy
When an informant’s statement contains a prediction about criminal behavior, such a prediction provides officers with an opportunity to “test the informant’s knowledge or credibility.” Florida v. J.L.,
In this case, detectives attempted to corroborate Compton’s tip by staging a controlled buy. As Defendant notes, however, the controlled buy had little corroborative value; this is so for two reasons. First, what happened during the controlled buy was relayed almost entirely by Compton himself: no undercover officers participated in the buy, Compton did nоt wear a wire, and there was limited surveillance. Thus, to the extent discussion of the controlled buy in the affidavit was an attempt to bolster Compton’s otherwise unknown credibility, the magistrate was forced to
Even so, the affidavit contains one important fact: during the controlled buy, detеctives witnessed Compton’s car leaving Defendant’s residence. This fact was important in two respects. First, it substantiated Compton’s prediction that his own vehicle would be used to pick up the drugs. Second, it linked the alleged criminal activity to Defendant’s residence.
Certainly, the detectives’ observation would have gone further in corroborating Compton’s tip if, for example, Brian Howard had been seen behind the wheel of the vehicle as it left Defendant’s residence. We reiterate, however, that an “affidavit is judged on the adequacy of what it does contain, not on what it lacks, or on what a critic might say should have been added.” Allen,
For this reason, wе find unavailing Defendant’s assertion that the controlled buy was of no value because “Compton had no personal knowledge as to what occurred inside [Defendant’s] residence.” (Def.’s Br. at 18.) The magistrate that issued the warrant did not need corroboration of what happened inside Defendant’s residence; the magistrate needed only enough information to verify Compton’s credibility as an informant. United States v. McCraven,
For these reasons, we сonclude that the investigator’s corroboration of Compton’s tip lent that tip additional credibility.
ii. The Independent Investigation
The affidavit in this case also contained facts about an “independent investigation” conducted by investigators. This section of the affidavit states that police:
[had] been receiving tips about [Defendant] and his Oxycodone trafficking activities that has been directly linked to Howard’s Grocery located in Magoffin County ... detectives have made controlled buys from the store from individuals associated with [Defendant].
(R. 26-2, Pg ID # 56.) The United States argues that this independent investigation lends weight to the affidavit because it suggests that Defendant is a drug dealer, and the magistrate was allowed to infer
We agree with the district court’s assessment. The affidavit supporting a warrant “must suggest ‘that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific “things” to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought’ and not merely ‘that the owner of property is suspected of crime.’ ” McPhearson,
observation of drug trafficking outside of the dealer’s home can provide probable cause to search the dealer’s house[,] ... [n]one of these cases ... supports the proposition that the defendant’s status as a drug dealer, standing alone, gives rise to a fair probability that drugs will be found in his home.
United States v. Frazier,
In this case, the independent investigation did little to confirm, on its own, that drugs would be found in Defendant’s residence.' The investigation’s sole value, therefore, was in corroborating Compton’s tiр that Defendant was a drug dealer. But, as the district court noted, the investigation provides little in this respect: it suggests only that drugs were purchased at a grocery store associated with Defendant from persons associated with Defendant. Such information is several inferences removed from corroborating Compton’s tip that Defendant was dealing drugs out of his home through Brian Howard.
For these reasons, we conclude that the independent investigation described in the warrant is worth little weight in the totality of the circumstances analysis.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the fact that named informants possess some inherent credibility by virtue of the consequences of lying to law enforcement, see Hodge,
- Nevertheless, our holding should not be taken as an invitation for investigators to draft — or for executing officers to rely upon — similarly threadbare affidavits. We are well aware that affidavits “are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation.” United States v. Ventresca,
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.
Notes
. Defendant does not raise this argument on appeal.
. Practical considerations also caution against giving dispositive weight to an informant’s tip merely by virtue of her being named in the affidavit. Some classes of informants, named or otherwise, are not renowned for their veracity. See, e.g., Jaben v. United States,