12 M.J. 890 | U.S. Army Court of Military Review | 1982
OPINION OF THE COURT
What may well be described as another symptom of the disease besetting the regulation of black-marketing in Korea has brought to this Court a controversy over the value of the contraband goods in this illicit commerce. Drawn into issue by the defendant’s appeal
During the sentencing phase of the proceedings below, the Government called Criminal Investigation Command (CID) Agent Hambrick as a witness in aggravation. He testified, over defense objection, as to the black market value of the items (television sets, video recorders, cassette/radio players, and stereos) which the appellant pleaded guilty to dealing in. In support of his qualifications, he testified that he had been stationed in the Korea area on-and-off for five years and as an agent he had personally handled fifty or so black market cases. Additionally, he stated that, on a monthly basis, he reviewed official statistical information for the previous year regarding black market activities. This information included the current value for various items (including items similar to those involved in this case) sold on the black
We find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting Special Agent Hambrick’s testimony and we affirm.
The overwhelming weight of civilian authorities and the Military Rules of Evidence provide that the valuation of property may be proved by a witness who is qualified to express an opinion as to value.
Assuming, arguendo, that the military judge should not have allowed the testimony of the CID agent, we do not find reversible error. The appellant suffered no prejudice inasmuch as the convening authority disapproved the $10,000.00 fine and the appellant was protected by a lenient pretrial agreement. Considering the seriousness of the offenses we cannot perceive a sentence that did not include a punitive discharge.
Accordingly, the findings of guilty and the sentence are affirmed.
. In accordance with his pleas, appellant was convicted of violating a lawful general regulation by wrongfully selling (three specifications) and wrongfully loaning (one specification) property imported free of custom duties to an individual not authorized duty-free privileges, signing a false official record (eighteen specifications), and larceny (twenty-seven specifications) in violation of Articles 92, 107, and 121, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 892, 907, and 921 (1976). On motion of the Government, the military judge dismissed six specifications alleging forgery in violation of Article 123, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 923. The officer members sentenced appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement at hard labor for eight years, total forfeitures, a $10,000 fine, and reduction to Private E-l. The convening authority approved only so much of the sentence as provided for a dishonorable discharge, confinement for five years, total forfeitures, and reduction to Private E-l. He further suspended for eighteen months the approved confinement in excess of three years with provision for automatic remission.
. Paragraph 200a (7), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Revised edition). See generally Am.Jur. Proof of Facts § 499 (1959); McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence §§ 13-17 (E. Cleary, 2d ed. 1972); J. Munster and M. Larkin, Military Evidence § 8.13 (2d. 1978); S. Saltzburg and K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual (1977) 413-445 (2d ed.supp. 1980); S. Saltzburg, L. Schinasi, and D. Schlueter, Military Rules of Evidence Manual, 322-328 (1981); 3 J. Weinstein and M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence § 702 (1981); 2 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 620 (C. Toria, 13th ed. 1973); and 7 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1940-1943 (Chadbourn, rev. 1978).
. Mil.R.Evid. 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Additionally, Mil.R.Evid. 703 permits an expert to base his opinion upon facts or data that he has reviewed or that he has been told about in order to form his opinion. See Mil.R.Evid. 703 and S. Saltzburg, L. Schinasi, and D. Schlueter, Military Rules of Evidence Manual, Editorial Comment, supra.
. Mil.R.Evid. 801(c).
. Mil.R.Evid. 401. Any suggestion that the evidence, although relevant, was inadmissible because its probative value was outweighed by the danger that it would result in (1) unfair prejudice, (2) confusion, (3) mislead the court members, (4) cause undue delay, (5) waste time, or (6) be needlessly cumulative, has been dispelled by the military judge’s ruling admitting the evidence. The trial judge’s ruling is, however reviewable by an appellate court if he abused his wide discretion by admitting the evidence. Mil.R.Evid. 403.