UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner, v. Honorable Jim R. CARRIGAN, Respondent, and Peter Kiewit Sons’ Company, Harold L. Cherry, and Richard L. McVaney, Parties in Interest-Respondents.
No. 86-2152
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
Nov. 7, 1986
Finally, the values obtained in claimant‘s blood gas studies are within the normal range.
If a claimant establishes the presumption under one of the listed methods, the Director may not rebut the presumption merely by pointing to a claimant‘s failure to meet the criteria under the other three methods. See Wilson v. Benefits Review Board, 748 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.1984). Thus, the claimant‘s failure to meet the criteria under the first three methods of invoking the presumption would not bar his invoking of the presumption under the fourth method. Claimant relied on his own testimony together with the report of Dr. Joel Bechtel to invoke the presumption under the fourth method. The administrative law judge, however, correctly found that claimant had not produced sufficient evidence to invoke the presumption under the fourth method.
Dr. Bechtel‘s report does not support total disability due to pneumoconiosis. Dr. Bechtel‘s diagnosis was mild chronic bronchitis. He found claimant‘s disability to be mild based on the objective medical tests.
Claimant seeks to combine his testimony of total disability with the physician‘s finding of pneumoconiosis to equal totally disabling pneumoconiosis. This evidence is not sufficient to invoke the presumption. The regulation specifies that the medical evidence must establish the claimant‘s total disability. Lay testimony alone cannot establish total disability. Cf. Peabody Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 581 F.2d 121 (7th Cir.1978) (lay testimony alone will not set a date of disability).
We note that on appeal, claimant attempted to present additional evidence in the form of an updated report by Dr. Joel Bechtel. Evidence not presented originally to the Benefits Review Board cannot be considered on appeal.
The judgment of the Benefits Review Board is AFFIRMED. See 10th Cir.R. 17(b).
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
William P. Sellers, Peter B. Clark, and Barbara N. Bandfield, Trial Attys., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Daniel J. Sears, Denver, Colo., for respondent.
Harold A. Haddon, Haddon, Morgan & Foreman, Denver, Colo., for parties in interest-respondents.
Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
LOGAN, Circuit Judge.
The court held a hearing during which it heard testimony of prospective government witnesses Jett and Steele; another prospective government witness, Katherine Williams; the witnesses’ attorney, Neil Lee Thompson; and defendants’ investigator, R. Jon Foster. The district court then ordered that defendants be permitted to take the depositions of Jett and Steele in the presence of their attorney and the government‘s counsel. The court based its order on findings of fact that the prosecutors’ statements, advice and conduct discouraged the witnesses from communicating with the defense, “at least strongly implied that the witnesses should decline the requested defense interviews,” and “substantially chilled these witnesses’ previously expressed willingness to discuss the facts with the defense.” Memorandum and Order at 10, 11, Hearing Transcript 7/22/86 at II, 3. Accordingly, the court concluded that the order was necessary, pursuant to
The government petitioned this court to issue a writ of mandamus vacating the district court‘s order on the grounds that the order exceeded the court‘s authority under
I
Does a district court have authority in a criminal case, in any circumstances, to order pretrial depositions of the prosecution‘s witnesses by a defendant? In searching for this power we must consider these sources:
“A majority of the Conferees believe it is not in the interest of the effective administration of criminal justice to require that the government or the defendant be forced to reveal the names and
addresses of its witnesses before trial. Discouragement of witnesses and improper contact directed at influencing their testimony, were deemed paramount concerns in the formulation of this policy.”
In our view, the only possible source for the district court‘s authority to make the order it did in the present case is in its inherent power to control and supervise its own proceedings. Cf. Fischel, 686 F.2d at 1091. As a sanction for government misbehavior, can the trial court order the depositions of specific government witnesses by defendants?
Against finding that the court had the inherent authority to make this order is the scheme of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provide detailed rules for essentially all aspects of criminal trials and contain no explicit statement that the trial court has such power. Those rules authorize certain explicit sanctions for particular infractions:
On the other hand, the courts have long recognized that trial judges must be able to control their own proceedings to ensure the fair administration of justice within the confines of the law. We have recognized the principle that witnesses in a criminal prosecution belong to no one, and that, subject to the witness’ right to refuse to be interviewed, both sides have the right to interview witnesses before trial.
“As a general rule, a witness belongs neither to the government nor to the defense. Both sides have the right to interview witnesses before trial. Callahan v. United States, 371 F.2d 658 (9th Cir.1967); United States v. Long, 449 F.2d 288 (8th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1972). Exceptions to this rule are justifiable only under the ‘clearest and most compelling circumstances.’ Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966).”
United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980); accord United States v. Pinto, 755 F.2d 150, 152 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Walton, 602 F.2d 1176, 1179-80 (4th Cir.1979). This view is bolstered by the American Bar Association‘s Standards for Criminal Justice § 3-3.01(c), providing that the prosecutor will not discourage or obstruct communications between prospective witnesses and defense counsel and that it is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to advise a prospective witness to decline to give the defense information that person has a right to give. See also Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(f).
Additionally, a number of cases, including at least one from this circuit, while denying relief on various grounds, assume that the district court has the power, at least in unusual circumstances, to order the taking of adverse witnesses’ depositions in criminal cases. See Pinto, 755 F.2d at 152; Cook, 608 F.2d at 1180-82; cf. Walton, 602 F.2d at 1180 (duty of court to ensure defense counsel access to secluded witness under controlled arrangements). The factual circumstances of the case before us, as found by the district judge, echo those of Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C.Cir.1966), in which the appellate court found, on direct appeal after conviction, that prosecutorial interference with a de-
Although the question is a close one, we cannot find the order entered here as a sanction for the government‘s interference with a defendant‘s access to potential prosecution witnesses to be wholly beyond the district court‘s jurisdiction. See Dalton, 733 F.2d at 716. An order merely to cease such interference, after the fact, might be insufficient because the witnesses’ free choice might have been already perverted and the witnesses likely to refuse voluntary interviews. Accordingly, we are unwilling to issue a writ of mandamus on this ground.
II
Did the district court so clearly abuse its discretion in making an order requiring government witnesses be deposed by a defendant as to constitute a usurpation of power? See Dalton, 733 F.2d at 716. The court found that government prosecutors “by words, implications or non-verbal conduct of the prosecutor, either intended or unintended” informed the witnesses that the government did not want them to talk to the defense, and “substantially chilled” their prior willingness to do so. Memorandum and Order at 8, 11. As we hold above, the district court has the power in extraordinary circumstances to permit the taking of an opposition witness’ deposition. These findings constitute such extraordinary circumstances. Whether the court so abused its power as to warrant issuance of a writ of mandamus turns then on whether we may reject the district court‘s factfinding that the government actively interfered with defense counsel‘s access to these witnesses. When the court acts within its jurisdiction, the threshold showing necessary to secure a writ of mandamus is higher than mere error, even error that might lead to reversal on a direct appeal. See Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35-36, 101 S.Ct. 188, 190, 66 L.Ed.2d 93 (1980); Varsic v. U.S. District Court, 607 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir.1979). The trial court‘s action must be so clearly without proper basis as to amount to a usurpation of power.
Had we been the triers of fact we might well have ruled differently than did the district court, but we cannot say that the court‘s findings of fact are clearly erroneous. The district court explicitly found the testimony of the defendants’ investigator, R. Jon Foster, and the witnesses’ attorney, Neil Lee Thompson, most credible. The district court expressly relied on Foster‘s testimony that witnesses Jett and Steele told him that government representatives told each of them they could not or should not talk with defense representatives. To the extent that Foster‘s testimony was hearsay, the government made no objection.
While both Steele and Jett denied telling Foster that government representatives had advised against speaking with defense representatives, neither could recall many of the details of their conversations with Foster and with government counsel. Steele did not deny that he was considering contact with the defense before his meeting with government counsel, and Jett corroborated Foster‘s testimony that Jett had earlier intended to meet with defendants’ counsel but had changed his mind. Jett testified that he could not recall whether government counsel had emphasized not speaking with defense representatives, and he also testified that he changed his mind after he obtained his own counsel and was granted immunity.
Attorney Thompson testified that the prosecution had effectively communicated to him, Jett and Steele its preference that the witnesses not meet with the defense. He also corroborated Jett‘s willingness to meet with defendants’ counsel earlier, and Jett‘s change of mind in the context of negotiations for Jett‘s immunity from prosecution. Thompson testified that he changed his own advice, which would have permitted Jett to give defense counsel an oral statement, after government prosecutors offered to provide the defense with a copy of Jett‘s statement to the government.
The case is not compelling for finding improper governmental interference with the defense‘s access to these witnesses, particularly in view of denials of government interference by the witnesses themselves. But the district court is the factfinder. Moreover, this is a petition for a writ of mandamus, requiring that we find the district court so clearly abused its discretion as to constitute usurpation of power. The Supreme Court in United States v. Will, 389 U.S. 90, 96-98, 100 n. 10, 88 S.Ct. 269, 274-75, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967), strongly suggested that an even higher standard than in civil cases is required for grant of the writ in criminal prosecutions. “This is not to say that mandamus may never be used to review procedural orders in criminal cases.... But this Court has never approved the use of the writ to review an interlocutory procedural order in a criminal case which did not have the effect of a dismissal.” Id. at 97-98, 88 S.Ct. at 274-75. Although Will is distinguishable on its facts, the Court‘s comments there support our reluctance to rule that this district court so clearly abused its discretion as to constitute a usurpation of power.
Petition DENIED.
JOHN P. MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
While I do not disagree with the legal principles set down by the court in this case, I cannot agree with the court‘s analysis of the record. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
The court here indicates a trial judge has authority to fashion expedient remedies in a criminal case when it is disclosed that the government has interfered with a defendant‘s right of access. I agree with that rule as a general proposition, but this is not a case for its application. Here, the evidence simply does not support the conclusion upon which the trial court determined to apply that remedy. Because I believe the trial judge misconstrued the evidence, he ultimately usurped his authority by granting relief beyond the purview of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. I would, therefore, grant mandamus.
This court‘s determination that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering oral depositions turns upon the conclusion that the evidence supports the trial court‘s finding that the government interfered with the defendants’ right of access to prosecution witnesses.1 While suggesting that were we to decide the facts we might even have reached the opposite conclusion, the court nevertheless follows the traditional course which yields to factual determinations made by the trial court. I have no quarrel with that tradition; indeed, its underpinnings are sound and not to be ignored. Consequently, I do not lightly state it is wrong to follow tradition here.
Yet, I am troubled deeply that by adhering to the trial court‘s analysis of the evidence we have placed our imprimatur on an action that my judgment tells me is unfounded. My chief difficulty with the find-
The court avoids dealing with this problem on the simple ground that the government made no objection. Unfortunately, we thereby beg the question. When a case is made to turn on the credibility of a witness, the nature and implications of his hearsay testimony cannot be shrugged off simply because no objection was made. The concern here is not whether Mr. Foster‘s testimony was admissible, but whether it is by definition unreliable and thus an improper basis for determining credibility.
The credibility of testimony depends on the perception, memory, and narration of the witness. [See
The issue of reliability has been given another spin in this case because the fact finder used hearsay as a basis for determining credibility. The problem of reliability is thus enhanced because, in reality, it is not the credibility of the witness which is gleaned from his testimony but that of the declarant. See, Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 957, 958 (1974). Here the trial judge listened to Mr. Foster say, in effect, that the witnesses told him the government did not want them to grant
Recognizing that the standard of review here is whether the trial court‘s findings are clearly erroneous, I believe the standard is met in this case. I cannot perceive a justification of any kind for the finding that Mr. Foster was the more credible witness. I ascribe no misdeed to his testimony, for we must presume he was simply relating his recollection of what others told him. Yet, because the evidence upon which the trial court relied consisted only of that recollection, the inherent unreliability of the hearsay testimony undermined Mr. Foster‘s credibility. Thus, when the trial court hinged its findings on the credibility of Mr. Foster, those findings became clearly erroneous.3
The trial judge in this instance perceived a wrong which he thought should be averted. His motives are laudable and unassailable, but his remedy was not lawful. He usurped authority not granted by the Rules of Criminal Procedure because he believed justice required his intervention. Indeed, in a perfect world we would all aspire to do justice and follow the law, but when circumstances indicate it is impossible to do both, judges are bound to the latter course.
JOHN P. MOORE
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
Charlotte Louise WILSON, individually, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Darold Floyd Wilson, and as Guardian of Jolene Kay Wilson, Craig Allen Wilson and Jerry Todd Wilson, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, Gail L. Clay, individually, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Norman Lee Clay, and as Guardian of Karri Lynn Clay and Boyd Lee Clay, Plaintiff, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.
Nos. 85-1381, 85-1400
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
Nov. 10, 1986
Rehearing Denied Dec. 22, 1986