UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Melvin HERNANDEZ-MALDONADO, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 14-1444.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
July 17, 2015.
793 F.3d 223
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court‘s denial of qualified immunity on Morales‘s Fourth Amendment claim against Donaghy on the ground that the law was clearly established in 2009 that an ICE agent required probable cause to issue an immigration detainer. We dismiss Donaghy‘s appeal on his Fourth Amendment argument regarding the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the detainer and his Fifth Amendment equal protection argument for want of jurisdiction. We also affirm the district court‘s denial of qualified immunity on Morales‘s Fourth Amendment supervisory liability claim against Chadbourne and Riccio. We remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
debate that a supervisor who either authorized or was deliberately indifferent to his subordinate‘s issuance of a detainer without probable cause could be held liable for violating the Fourth Amendment. See Hall, 817 F.2d at 925 (“The fact that no court had put these pieces together in the precise manner we do today does not absolve defendants of liability.“).
Rosa Emilia Rodriguez-Velez, United States Attorney, Nelson Perez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and Tiffany V. Monrose, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
Before TORRUELLA, LYNCH, and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges.
LYNCH, Circuit Judge.
Melvin Hernandez-Maldonado pled guilty in October 2013 to being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm, in violation of
He now seeks to vacate his plea because the district court did not warn him that he could not withdraw his plea if the court did not follow the parties’ sentencing recommendations, as required by
We affirm Hernandez-Maldonado‘s conviction and sentence. Hernandez-Maldonado has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for the district court‘s failure to advise him that he could not withdraw his plea if it did not follow the government‘s recommendation, he would not have entered the plea. Furthermore, the sentence the district court imposed was procedurally and substantively reasonable.
I.
We confine our discussion of the facts to those necessary to frame the issues on appeal. The relevant facts are not in dispute. On March 23, 2012, a woman told two Puerto Rico Police Department agents that a man was being robbed and pointed to him. The agents observed three individuals in a 2001 Ford Explorer SUV wearing masks. When the individuals in the SUV saw the agents, they left the scene, first in the SUV and then on foot. The agents pursued the individuals and saw the driver was carrying a firearm. One agent saw the driver toss the firearm and then remove his mask and shirt as he ran. The agent recovered the firearm—a pistol with an attached “chip,” which allowed the pistol to fire automatically. The driver was later identified as Hernandez-Maldonado. The investigation revealed that the SUV was stolen and that Hernandez-Maldonado had previously been convicted on two occasions of crimes punishable by more than one year imprisonment. One of these convictions was for murder. Hernandez-Maldonado was on probation for that crime when he was arrested.
Hernandez-Maldonado, through different counsel, seeks to vacate his guilty plea because the district court failed to meet the requirement of
[2] Because it is clear that the defendant has established the first two prongs, this case turns on the third prong of the plain error test, effect on substantial rights. See Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d at 17. To meet the third prong of the plain error test, “a defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83. Hernandez-Maldonado has failed to make this showing.
We look to the full record. Id. at 80 (citing Vonn, 535 U.S. at 74-75). Relevant factors include, inter alia, the defendant‘s statements at the colloquy, “the overall strength of the Government‘s case and any possible defenses that appear from the record,” and the inclusion of the warning in the plea agreement. See id. at 84-85.
Hernandez-Maldonado signed a plea agreement, which itself contained the required warning. He stated that he had time to consult with his attorney and was satisfied with the attorney‘s services. Further, he acknowledged that under the plea agreement, he surrendered the right to appeal if the court sentenced pursuant to the recommendation—suggesting Hernandez-Maldonado understood he could appeal if the court did not sentence according to the recommendation.
Whether or not Hernandez-Maldonado subjectively believed he had a strong case, the question is whether he has met his burden of showing a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty if the missing warning had been administered. See id. at 83. Hernandez-Maldonado has not come close to meeting that burden. He is no neophyte to the criminal justice system. He voluntarily entered into a plea agreement and received the benefit of a 92-month sentence recommendation from the government, below the maximum penalty. This “plea agreement ... specifically warned that he could not withdraw his plea if the court refused to accept the Government‘s recommendations. This fact, uncontested by [Hernandez-Maldonado], tends to show that the Rule 11 error made no difference to the outcome here.” Id. at 85.
III.
Hernandez-Maldonado also argues that the district court‘s 115-month sentence, at the top of the guideline recommendation and five months below the 120-month maximum, was unreasonable. He contends
We review sentences for procedural and substantive reasonableness. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d at 225-26. The district court‘s sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.
To the extent Hernandez-Maldonado challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, that claim fails. Cf. United States v. Crespo-Rios, 787 F.3d 34, 37 n. 3 (1st Cir. 2015) (“The lack of an adequate explanation can be characterized as either a procedural error or a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.“). Procedural reasonableness includes “that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
Hernandez-Maldonado‘s sentence was also substantively reasonable. “[T]here is almost always a range of reasonable sentences for any given offense.... [T]he linchpin of a reasonable sentence is a plausible sentencing rationale and a defensible result.” United States v. Santiago-Rivera, 744 F.3d 229, 234 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, reversals in substantive reasonableness challenges are “particularly unlikely when ... the sentence imposed fits within the compass of a properly calculated [guidelines sentencing range].” Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d at 228-29 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Vega-Salgado, 769 F.3d 100, 105 (1st Cir. 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Hernandez-Maldonado has prior convictions, including one for murder. When he was on probation,2 he was in a stolen vehicle, in a mask, in possession of a machine gun. In an attempt to evade the
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm Hernandez-Maldonado‘s conviction and sentence.