UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Herbert Harvey ROTH, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher KEPHART, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 71-1436, 71-1437.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Aug. 16, 1972.
466 F.2d 1111
Certiorari Denied Dec. 4, 1972. See 93 S.Ct. 540, 546.
Shelby Gott, Asst. U. S. Atty. (argued), Robert H. Filsinger, Joseph A. Milchen, Asst. U. S. Attys., Harry D. Steward, U. S. Atty., San Diego, Cal., for appellee.
Before BARNES and MERRILL, Circuit Judges, and BYRNE, Jr., District Judge.*
Defendants Roth and Kephart appeal from a conviction in a jury trial for conspiracy, transportation and smuggling of marihuana under
Appellants contend that prejudicial error resulted from the Government attorney‘s improper and incorrect statement of the law in closing argument and the court‘s refusal to give a corrective instruction as requested.
The Government presented evidence to establish that the defendants and two other co-conspirators were engaged in smuggling marihuana, dangerous drugs and narcotics into the United States from Mexico and subsequently transporting them from Southern California to Oregon. In their testimony, Roth and Kephart each admitted possession and sale of the marihuana and dangerous drugs in Oregon during the time alleged in the indictment. They both acknowledged awareness that they had violated the criminal laws of Oregon. However, each defendant testified that he did not know that the marihuana or drugs had been illegally imported into this country and denied any knowledge of their foreign origin. Both defendants disavowed participation in any conspiracy to smuggle marihuana. Roth denied knowingly dealing in heroin.
While testifying, Roth pointed to the presence in the courtroom of two peace officers from the State of Oregon whom he believed were “monitoring” his testimony.
In closing argument, Roth‘s attorney referred to the presence of the Oregon officers and stated that as a result of defendants’ testimony, both Roth and Kephart had incriminated themselves under Oregon law and would undoubtedly be prosecuted.1 Counsel then suggested that if the defendants were acquitted, they would not be “getting away with something” because whatever happened in the federal case, they would be prosecuted and convicted for the Oregon offenses.2
Kephart‘s counsel argued that his client‘s testimony should be believed since in order to testify to the truth about this case, he had been willing to incriminate himself and be subjected to prosecution in Oregon.3
Defendants’ objection to the statement concerning double jeopardy was overruled by the trial judge who was of the opinion that the prosecutor was merely suggesting possibilities other than the certainty of prosecution and conviction in Oregon.4 A subsequent motion for mistrial upon the same grounds was also denied.
In D‘Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 367 (9th Cir. 1951), this court said, “The trial judge had an opportunity far superior to that afforded us to judge whether the remarks of counsel in the setting in which they were given constituted such misconduct as to require a more emphatic admonition or instruction to the jury to disregard. . . . Our system of jurisprudence properly makes it a matter primarily for the discretion of the trial court to determine whether prejudicial misconduct has occurred. An appellate court will not review the exercise of the trial court‘s discretion in such a matter unless the misconduct and prejudice is so clear that it can be said that the trial judge has been guilty of an abuse of discretion.” We find no such abuse of discretion in this case. The record indicates that any possible error was planned and invited by Roth and counsel for each defendant. The defendants were not prejudiced by these invited and peripheral remarks of the prosecutor. See Ochoa v. United States, 167 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1948); United States v. Horne, 423 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1970); Keeble v. United States, 347 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1965). It was not error to refuse the defendants’ requested jury instruction to the effect that double jeopardy was not a bar to successive state and federal prosecutions. The court clarified the matter for the jury by properly instructing them that they were not to be concerned in any way whether a defendant might be subject to prosecution in a state court. The judge who heard what was said and saw what was done is better qualified than we to prescribe adequate remedy.
Appellants make a further contention that the court order requiring them to provide handwriting exemplars under threat of contempt citations violated their rights under the
Securing exemplars of handwriting or handprinting from a defendant does not violate his right against self-incrimination. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1953, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967); United States v. Beshers, 437 F.2d 450, 451 (9th Cir. 1971) (handwriting); United States v. Rudy, 429 F.2d 993, 994 (9th Cir. 1970) (handprinting). The post-indictment procedures used to obtain these exemplars, which included a court hearing, do not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights. United States v. De Palma, 414 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1969); See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969); United States v. Long, 325 F.Supp. 583 (W.D., Mo. 1971).
Affirmed.
MERRILL, Circuit Judge (dissenting):
I disagree with the majority on the matter of the Government‘s closing argument. To me it was not invited, was clearly improper, misleading and wholly prejudicial. There was no opportunity to respond to it. In my judgment it demanded a clarifying instruction. I would reverse and remand for new trial.