OPINION
Defendant-Appellant Harvey Lloyd Napier appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C. *396 § 922(g)(8) for possession of firearms while subject to a domestic violence order. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM Napier’s conviction.
I.
The essential facts are not in dispute. 1 On January 30, 1999, Napier’s estranged wife called the Corbin, Kentucky, Police Department to report an assault by Napier. .When Napier’s vehicle was stopped, the officers found a 10 mm Glock Model 20 semi-automatic pistol and twenty-two rounds of 10 mm ammunition on the floorboard in the rear of the vehicle. Napier was arrested.
At the time of his arrest Napier was subject to two domestic violence orders. One domestic violence order was entered by the Harlan' County Circuit Court on December 9, 1996. The other domestic violence order was entered by the Whitley County District Court on September 28, 1998. Both domestic violence orders contained a finding that acts of domestic violence had occurred and may occur again, and restrained Napier from committing further acts of domestic violence against his spouse and their children. Both orders contained the following notice in boldface type: “Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § (section) 922(g), it is a federal violation to purchase, receive or possess a firearm while subject to this order.” Napier had received actual notice and had an opportunity to participate in both hearings prior to issuance of the orders.
Napier was indicted by a federal grand jury on two counts of possession of firearms by a person subject to a domestic violence order in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). 2 Count One of the indictment charged him with possession of a semiautomatic handgun on January 80, 1999, while he was subject to two domestic violence orders, and Count Two charged him with possession of twenty-two rounds of 10 mm ammunition on the same date, while he was subject to the same domestic violence orders.
Napier filed three motions to dismiss the indictment. In his first motion he argued that § 922(g)(8) violates the Second and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution and is an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power. In his second motion he argued that the underlying domestic violence orders were either void or did not qualify as predicate offenses. In his third motion he argued that the domestic violence orders do not fulfill the substantive requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(i) and (ii). The district court denied all three motions. On the eve of trial the government made two oral motions in limine to exclude evidence regarding the validity of the domestic violence orders and regarding Napier’s belief as to the existence of *397 the domestic violence orders at the time of the instant offense. The district court granted the government’s motions.
In light of the district court’s rulings, Napier entered a conditional plea of guilty to both counts of the indictment. He admitted that on January 30, 1999, in Knox County, in the Eastern District of Kentucky, he knowingly possessed the gun and ammunition. He further admitted that at the time he possessed the firearm and ammunition, he was subject to domestic violence orders in Whitley County, Kentucky, and Harlan County, Kentucky. Finally, Napier admitted that the firearm and ammunition he possessed at the time of the instant offenses were manufactured outside the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and therefore traveled in interstate commerce prior to coming into his possession. As a condition of the plea of guilty, Napier reserved the right to appeal the orders of the district court denying his motions to dismiss the indictment.
II.
We review the district court’s determination of the constitutionality of a federal statute
de novo. United States v. Baker,
Napier’s contention that § 922(g)(8) violates the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution are not unprecedented. This Circuit previously upheld § 922(g)(8) against similar attacks in Baker, supra.
“A fundamental principle of this court is that ‘[a] panel ... cannot overrule the decision of another panel. The prior decision remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.’ ”
United States v. Ables,
III.
Napier challenges § 922(g)(8) on due process grounds on its face because it fails to require notice of its prohibitions. Napier also challenges the statute as applied because he contends he did not in fact receive notice that his conduct violated federal law.
According to Napier, § 922(g)(8) is a technical,, obscure statute which punishes conduct that a reasonable person ordinarily would not consider to be criminal. In support of this contention, Napier relies on Judge Posner’s dissent in
United States v. Wilson,
We rejected just such a challenge to § 922(g)(8) in
Baker, supra.
The defendant in
Baker
argued that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could not convict him of violating § 922(g)(8) unless he knew that the law forbade him to possess firearms while subject to a domestic violence order.
Although the domestic violence orders entered against Napier contained the same bold print warning that was found adequate in Baker. Napier contends that his case is distinguishable from Baker because he never received a copy of either domestic violence order entered against him.
The defendant in Baker made a similar argument, which this court held was “of no moment.” Id. at 220 n. 6. Even if Baker had not received direct notice of his firearms disability, his prosecution under § 922(g)(8) would still not have resulted in a violation of his due process rights:
The fact that Baker had been made subject to a domestic violence protection order provided him with notice that his conduct was subject to increased government scrutiny. Because it is not reasonable for someone in his position to expect to possess dangerous weapons free from extensive regulation, Baker cannot successfully claim a lack of fair warning with respect to the requirements of § 922(g)(8).
Although this language in
Baker
might be considered
dicta,
its reasoning was adopted in
United States v. Beavers,
Napier suggests that in considering whether the domestic violence order proceeding should have put him on notice that the government might regulate his possession of a firearm, the Court should consider the fact that domestic violence order proceedings are often informal and un-counselled.
While there are procedural differences between a domestic violence order and a misdemeanor conviction on a domestic violence offense, we do not find those procedural differences significant. As we pointed out in
Baker,
the nature of the proceeding is not what is important under the statute. It is the status of the individual as one subject to a domestic violence order.
The fact that Baker’s status makes him criminally liable for possessing a firearm does not imbue the process by which he attained that status with constitutional significance. Indeed, a legally relevant status under § 922(g) may arise in the absence of any formal proceeding. For example, § 922(g)(3) prohibits an individual addicted to controlled substances from possessing a firearm, yet an individual attains the status of a drug addict without a court proceeding of any kind.
Every circuit court which has considered a due process challenge similar to Napier’s has rejected it.
See, e.g., United States v. Kafka,
We find no basis for requiring actual notice of the gun prohibition. Napier was notified of the proceedings that led up to issuance of the domestic violence orders and did in fact attend those hearings. He was made subject to a domestic violence order. As we stated in Baker, whether or not he received or read those domestic violence orders is of no moment. His status alone, as one subject to a domestic violence order, was sufficient to preclude him from claiming a lack of fair warning with respect to the requirements of § 922(g)(8).
IV.
Napier contends the district court erred in granting the government’s motions in limine to exclude evidence at trial regarding the validity of the domestic violence orders and regarding Napier’s knowledge of the existence of any valid domestic violence orders.
Napier entered into a plea agreement which reserved his right to appeal the orders of the district court denying his motions to dismiss the indictment. He did not reserve the right to appeal the district court’s pretrial evidentiary ruling. Napier expressly admitted, in a document entitled “Factual Basis for Guilty Plea” that at the time he possessed the firearm and ammunition “he was subject to Domestic Violence Orders in Whitley County, Kentucky, and Harlan County, Kentucky.” Napier did not preserve the issue regarding the validity of the domestic violence orders for appeal.
Moreover, in light of our determination above that § 922(g)(8) does not require that the. defendant have actual knowledge of the firearm restrictions, the district court correctly concluded that the evidence Napier sought to introduce regarding his knowledge as to the existence of those orders was irrelevant.
V.
Napier also challenges the constitutionality of § 922(g)(8) on the basis that it represents an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause, Napier contends that § 922(g)(8) is an unconstitutional attempt to regulate domestic abuse, which is strictly a matter of state concern.
Our review of the Commerce Clause challenge begins with the recognition that congressional enactments are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. “[W]e invalidate a-congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.”
United States v. Morrison,
A similar argument relying on
Lopez
was made and rejected in
Baker, supra.
In
Lopez
the Supreme Court struck down a federal law prohibiting firearm possession in a school zone because it exceeded Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause.
3
One of the Court’s considerations was that the statute contained “no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.”
We determined in
Baker
that § 922(g)(8) did not suffer from the same infirmity because it contains the jurisdictional element that was lacking in
Lopez.
Section 922(g) only applies to firearms or ammunition that are shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or possessed in or affecting commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). With this jurisdictional element, § 922(g) “both explicitly relates to commerce and ensures only those activities affecting interstate commerce fall within its scope.”
Baker,
Baker
does not stand alone. In
United States v. Chesney,
Notwithstanding our determination in Baker that § 922(g)(8) is a proper exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, Napier contends that his case is distinguishable from Baker because Baker purchased a gun after he was subject to a domestic violence order. Napier, on the other hand, had possessed his gun for years before a domestic violence order was entered against him. He contends that any commerce involving the firearm had long since ceased, and the link between his conduct and the effect on commerce is too attenuated to come within Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. He contends that even if Congress has the authority to regulate persons who purchase guns when they are subject to domestic violence orders, it does not have the authority to regulate persons who already own guns before they become subject to a domestic violence order.
A similar argument was rejected in
Chesney.
Although there was no question that Chesney’s gun had moved in interstate commerce, Chesney argued that
Lopez
requires the government to prove that his possession of the gun in itself had a substantial connection to interstate commerce.
The same analysis applies to those subject to domestic violence orders.
See also Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis,
Napier suggests that the recent Supreme Court opinion in
Jones v. United States,
Jones
does not invalidate the
Chesney
analysis. In contrast to § 844(i), § 922(g) does not contain the “use” requirement that was at the heart of the
Jones
opinion. Nothing in
Jones
suggests that the Supreme Court is backing off of its opinion that § 1202(a), the predecessor of § 922(g)(1), required only “the minimal nexus that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce.”
Scarborough v. United States,
We accordingly reject Napier’s contention that he could not be convicted under § 922(g)(8) unless the government could show that his continued possession of the gun had a substantial connection to interstate commerce. There is no question that the firearm and ammunition possessed by Napier had previously traveled in interstate commerce. That is sufficient to establish the interstate commerce connection.
Napier also argues that
Baker
should not control the disposition of this case because the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
United States v. Morrison,
In Morrison the Supreme Court struck down the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, on the ground that it exceeded Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. The Court rejected the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 1754. The Court expressed concern that if the Commerce Clause could be satisfied by following a but-fór causal chain from a crime to every attenuated effect it had upon interstate commerce, it would obliterate the constitution’s distinction between national and local authority. Id. at 1752. It would even give Congress authority over “family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant.” Id. at 1753.
*402 Napier contends that the domestic disputes of a married couple addressed in domestic violence orders are precisely the type of purely intrastate activity, typically regulated by the state’s police power, that the Supreme Court was concerned about in Morrison.
We are not convinced by Napier’s argument. The
Morrison
Court began its analysis of the Violence Against Women Act by noting that § 13981, like the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in
Lopez,
contained no jurisdictional element establishing that the federal cause of action was in pursuance of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce.
Id.
at 1751. Section 922(g)(8), by contrast, does contain a jurisdictional element that establishes that it was enacted in pursuance of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce in firearms and ammunition. In addition, the Violence Against Women Act is regulating a purely intrastate activity. Nothing in
Morrison
casts doubt on the validity of § 922(g), which regulates a product of interstate commerce.
See United States v. Wesela,
VI.
Finally, Napier contends that § 922(g)(8) violates his individual right to bear arms under the United States and the Kentucky Constitutions.
In contrast to the Due Process and Commerce Clause issues discussed above, this Court has never addressed a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(8). That is not to say that this Court enters this territory without substantial guidance.
The Second Amendment provides:
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
U.S. Const. Amend. 2.
In
United States v. Warin,
Since the Second Amendment right “to keep and bear Arms” applies only to the right of the State to maintain a militia and not to the individual’s right to bear arms, there can be no serious claim to any express constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm.
Id.
at 106 (quoting
Stevens v. United States,
*403
Napier has made no effort to show that § 922(g)(8) has some impact on the collective right of the militia. He argues instead that the Second Amendment grants him an individual right to bear arms. He does not contend
Warin
has been overruled by an en banc decision of this Court, nor does he cite any inconsistent decisions of the Supreme Court authority that would require modification of
Warin.
He merely argues that
Warin
was wrongly decided and lacks the benefit of the impressive Second Amendment scholarship that has developed in recent years. Recent scholarship, however, does not provide a sufficient basis for overruling an earlier decision of this Court.
See Abies,
The case law subsequent to
Warin
overwhelmingly suggests that our holding in
Warin
was sound. It is well-established that the Second Amendment does not create an individual right. Since
Miller,
“the lower federal courts have uniformly held that the Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather than individual, right.”
Love v. Pepersack,
Although the Supreme Court noted in
Staples v. United States,
Every circuit court which has had occasion to address the issue has upheld § 922 generally against challenges under the Second Amendment.
See United States v. Chavez,
The only case Napier has cited in support of his contention that § 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment is
United States v. Emerson,
Emerson
stands alone in holding that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to bear arms. Even a sister district court in Texas declined to follow
Emerson,
choosing instead to follow the majority path.
See United States v. Spruill,
We find no reason to retreat from our determination in Warin that the Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual right to bear arms, and we accordingly hold that § 922(g)(8) does not violate the Second Amendment.
Napier’s argument that § 922(g)(8) impermissibly violates his State constitutional right to bear arms is also unavailing. The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky provides in pertinent part:
All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned:
Seventh: The right to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the State, subject to the power of the General Assembly to enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons.
Ky. Const. § 1.
This state constitutional provision, however, is trumped by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const, art. VI. “Thus, as has been clear since the Supreme Court’s decision in
M’Culloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.), 316,
An argument similar to Napier’s was rejected in
United States v. Minnick,
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision to overrule Napier’s various challenges to his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
Notes
. The factual predicate for the plea is contained in the transcript of the plea proceeding on November 18, 1999, and in a document entitled “Factual Basis for Guilty Plea” signed by the Defendant and his counsel on November 11, 1999.
. The statute makes it unlawful for any person
(8) who is subject to a court order that—
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury;
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
. The Gun-Free School Zones Act struck down in Lopez was formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(l)(A).
. Although we have not had occasion since
Warin
to rule on the scope of the Second Amendment right to bear arms, we have followed
Warin
in subsequent cases. We noted in
Peoples Rights Organization, Inc.
v.
City of Columbus,