Appellant was convicted by a jury in the Northern District of Mississippi on one count of transporting a stolen automobile in intеrstate commerce (18 U.S.C. § 2312) and one count of concealing that automobile (18 U.S.C. § 2313). A third count — charging appellant with escape from custody (18 U.S.C. § 751) after be *1030 ing arrested for a separate and earlier Dyer Act violation arising in Louisianа— was severed prior to trial.
On appeal, Smith raises three claims: (1) all pending charges against him from Louisiana and Mississiрpi should have been transferred to the Southern District of Indiana where he was apprehended following his escaрe from custody; (2) incurable error was committed when a representative of the vehicle owner inquired at the clоse of his testimony if he could ask the appellant “where he got the car”; and (3) the district court erred in admitting into evidence a car-key-making kit seized inside appellant’s rented mobile home in Mississippi when he was arrested. We find no merit in any оf the contentions.
Appellant argues that his removal from the Southern District of Indiana to be tried in the Northern District of Mississipрi violated his “right” to obtain a transfer under Fed.R.Crim.P. 20. Appellant requested a transfer of the earlier pending Dyer Act charges from Louisiana and the Mississippi escape charge. The United States Attorney for the Southern District of Indiana, however, did not agree, informing Smith’s counsel by letter that “the attempt to obtain disposition of these two cases in this District is impractiсal inasmuch as several other charges against this defendant are being considered in Mississippi” (i.
e.
the instant charges as wеll as possible firearms violations). Rule 20 specifically requires the consent of the United States Attorney for each district involved, and we find nothing arbitrary or unreasonable about the refusal in this case. A defendant has no unilateral right to a transfеr. See United States v. Zink,
Smith next claims that he was incurably prejudiced by the following occurrence at the conclusion of redirect examination of Mr. Charles Jordan, sales manager of the Ford dealership from which the vehicle in question wаs stolen:
Q. All right. Thank you. Excuse me. Do you have further explanation?
A. Could I ask him where he got the car?
THE COURT:
No, you can’t ask him.
MR. KILPATRICK [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, we are going to objeсt to that.
THE COURT:
Yes. The jury is to disregard the question.
MR. KILPATRICK:
Your Honor, may I be heard on a matter briefly?
THE COURT:
Yes.
MR. KILPATRICK:
I would like to address the Court in chambers.
THE COURT:
All right. I will see you in chambers.
(Chambers)
THE COURT:
All right, sir.
MR. KILPATRICK:
If Your Honor please, comes now the defendant, Harold Smith, and moves the Court to declare a mistrial on both Count 1 and Count 2 of the indictment charged against him on the highly prejudicial statement of the witness, Charles E. Jordan, in front of the entire jury panel when he asked the defendant where he got the car.
THE COURT:
Well, the Court will deny the motion. The Court instructed the jury to disregard the question and there was no prejudice done. It was obviously an improper comment from the witness, but the prosecution is not responsible. I *1031 do not think it had any effect whatever on the jury.
In submitting the case to the jury, the district court cautioned the jury in his general charge, as follows:
Now the law does not compel a defendant in a criminal case to take the witness stand and testify. And, no presumption of guilt may be raised, and no inference of any kind may be drawn from the failure of a defendant to testify. The law does not impose uрon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.
Under these sрecific circumstances, we conclude that no prejudice resulted from the witness’ inquiry.
Finally, appellant claims that a kit for making car keys, which was seized by the police during his arrest in Mississippi, should have been suppressed. The facts are these: On May 10, 1974, FBI agents arrested Smith at his rented mobile home in rural Winston County, Mississippi, on a warrant based upon an earlier Dyer Act indictment from the Western District of Louisiana. The agents had received information that appellant was armed аnd accompanied by at least one other person. At the trial, the arresting agent testified, as follows:
Q. What did you do thеn when you arrived at the trailer where you had located Mr. Smith?
A. Well, we surrounded the trailer, had access to the front doоr, and the rear door, and we had information that he was armed, so we all hid behind cars, took shelter behind cars and cаlled to him and had a bull horn and used a siren and waited until finally he opened up the back door of the trailer.
Q. And how long did that take?
A. Approximately fifteen minutes.
Q. And what did you do then when he opened the door?
A. Well, prior tо that time, I had ran up to the front door of the trailer and kicked the door open and gone back, behind the car, and told him to come out again and, at this point, he came out the back door. Then, as he did, there were three of us that went in the front door.
Q. All right, sir. Was anyone else present in the trailer at the time you entered it?
A. Yes, his brother was there.
The agent went on to describе what he observed on entering the trailer:
Q. I believe you told us that you arrested Mr. Smith at the door and entered the trailer аt that time. Isn’t that correct, Mr. Warberg.
A. Yes.
Q. Just tell us what you did when you entered the trailer.
A. We entered the trailer. As we did, as we walked in the front door, there was just kind of a living room and a kitchen, and on it — there was a kitchen table right there and on the table was this kit and it was open.
Q. On the table?
A. Yes.
In addition, a loaded shotgun was recovered from the trailer. In light of the high potentiality for danger surrounding the arrest, we conclude that the entry into thе trailer was allowable for the purpose of making a cursory safety check. Only once before, in United States v. Lоoney,
Reviewing the record in this case and noting appellant’s concession in his brief that the evidеnce “was, in fact, marginally sufficient to support a conviction on both counts,” we are of the opinion that there was substantial evidence from which the jury could determine credibility and guilt and that there is no reason to disturb its findings. The judgment is therefore, affirmed.
Affirmed.