Defendant-appellant Bernstein, a physician, was indicted on seventy-nine counts of *110 Medicare fraud. After plea negotiations, he pleaded guilty to fifteen misdemeanor counts. He was sentenced to serve sixty days in jail, followed by three years’ probation. After sentencing, substituted counsel moved pursuant to F.R.Crim.P. 35 for reduction of sentence. From denial of this motion, Bernstein appeals, raising two general grounds of error: (1) substituted coun- • sel was allegedly not allowed to see the presentence report; and (2) the sentencing court failed to consider various factors such as the “miniscule” amount of money involved, the advantages of imposing volunteer service rather than jail time, and defendant’s exposure to extrajudicial punishments from his profession.
Bernstein’s trial counsel was permitted to inspect the presentence report and at the sentencing hearing informed the court that the report was correct in all respects. After sentence was imposed, appellant retained new counsel to file a motion to reduce sentence, Fed.R.Crim.P. 35. The trial court did not allow appellant’s new counsel to see the presentence report and denied the Rule 35 motion. Appellant complains of this failure to disclose his presentence report at the time of the Rule 35 motion. Rule 32(c)(3)(A) states that “[bjefore imposing sentence the court shall upon request permit the defendant, or his counsel if he is so represented, to read the report of the presentence investigation . . . .” Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(A). The Rule requires disclosure of the presentence report before sentencing and was complied with by the trial court. It was not error to refuse to disclose the presentencing report to new counsel after sentence had been imposed.
As for appellant’s complaints about his punishment, “A sentencing court exercises broad discretion which is not subject to appellate review ‘except when arbitrary or capricious action amounting to a gross abuse of discretion is involved.’ ”
United States v. Gamboa,
Appellant entirely fails to show any such gross or outrageous abuse of sentencing discretion as would warrant a modification or vacation of the sentence by this court.
AFFIRMED.
