United States v. HamptonUnited States v. Hampton
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 11th day of June, two thousand twenty six.
PRESENT: GERARD E. LYNCH, STEVEN J. MENASHI, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges.
United States of America, Appellee, v. Danielle D. Hampton, Defendant-Appellant.
For Appellee: SEAN C. ELDRIDGE, Assistant United States Attorney, for Michael DiGiacomo, United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, Rochester, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Geraci, J.).
Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART and REMANDED IN PART.
Defendant-Appellant Danielle D. Hampton appeals from a criminal judgment entered on October 10, 2024. A trial jury returned a guilty verdict against Hampton on a single count of maintaining a drug-involved premises in violation of
I
“On appeal from a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, ‘we review legal conclusions de novo and findings of fact for clear error.’” United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199, 208 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Bershchansky, 788 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2015)). The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
“[W]hen items outside the scope of a valid warrant are seized, the normal remedy is suppression and return of those items, not invalidation of the entire search.” United States v. Matias, 836 F.2d 744, 747 (2d Cir. 1988). We have reserved blanket suppression of evidence for cases in which “[g]overnment agents ‘flagrantly disregard’ the terms of a warrant.” United States v. Shi Yan Liu, 239 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Matias, 836 F.2d at 748). We have explained that “wholesale suppression is required only when (1) [the agents] effect a ‘widespread seizure of items that were not within the scope of the warrant,’ and (2) do not act in good faith.” Id. (quoting Matias, 836 F.2d at 748).
A
Before trial, Hampton moved to suppress phones and firearms seized from her home. See United States v. Hampton (Hampton I), No. 22-CR-6196, 2024 WL 2188586, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2024). Those items were seized when law enforcement entered the premises pursuant to a warrant. Hampton argued at the suppression hearing that the search of her home nevertheless violated the Fourth Amendment because the law enforcement officer who led the search—and the other officers who entered her home—did not read the warrant as it was issued by the judge. See id. The lead officer instead was involved in reviewing the application and proposing the warrant. See id. at *12.
B
Hampton presses similar arguments on appeal. She argues that “(1) because the search team was operating ‘blind’ in relation to the search warrant (since it had not been seen or discussed) and thus, in essence, functioning as if they were searching without a warrant and (2) because [one searching officer’s] stated attitude toward the Fourth Amendment’s requirements falls somewhere between disdainful at best and contemptuous at worst, the overall execution of the search evinces the ‘flagrant disregard’ that warrants suppression of the entire complement of items taken from Hampton’s apartment on November 18, 2021.” Appellant’s Br. 18-19.1 We disagree.
First, even if a searching officer’s attitude was “disdainful” or “contemptuous,” but see supra note 1, the attitude would not on its own qualify as
Hampton cannot make that showing. As the district court observed, the “language existing in the warrant authorized the seizure of cell phones because it authorized the seizure of electronic devices ‘used for the purposes of video and/or audio surveillance’ and ‘any device to store media, video, pictures, and images from cameras.’” Hampton II, 2024 WL 1526457, at *4. In fact, the warrant specifically identified cellular telephone devices as items that could be seized. See App’x 34-35 (“Electronic devices used for the purposes of video and/or audio surveillance to include surveillance cameras, video cameras, and any device to store media, video, pictures, and images from the cameras, to include digital video recorders, computers, laptops, wireless access devices, cellular telephone devices, or any other electronic devices used to store multimedia images, as well as the content of any such devices.“) (emphasis added).
The issuing judge crossed out parts of the warrant that would have authorized the police to search the “contents” of seized phones without an additional warrant. See id. at 33-34. But the seizure was authorized, so there was no widespread seizure of items outside the scope of the warrant.2 The government
Second, the mere failure to read a warrant before conducting a search—without more—does not render an otherwise reasonable search unreasonable. In United States v. Armstrong, 406 F. App‘x 500, 501 (2d Cir. 2010), the defendant argued that evidence should be suppressed because, “although a warrant for that apartment had been issued, the police officers, prior to conducting the search, did not have the warrant in hand, had not read the warrant, and had not had its terms read to them.” Id. at 501. We held that the failure to read the warrant did not undermine the reasonableness of the search because the “supervising officer had knowledge that the narcotics division had obtained a search warrant for crack cocaine at Brown’s apartment” and “the supervising officer informed the other officers of the warrant prior to the search.” Id. We concluded that the district court “properly held that such objective information allowed the officers to conduct a reasonable search that fell within constitutional parameters.” Id.; see also United States v. Perrone, 936 F.2d 1403, 1413 n.4 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting, in the course of upholding the denial of a suppression motion, that “the agents in fact did not read” the warrants), decision clarified on reh’g on other grounds, 949 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1991).
We agree with the district court and with the magistrate judge that this case resembles Armstrong. The district court recognized that the officers here, as in Armstrong, “had enough objective information to conduct a reasonable search within constitutional parameters” because the officer leading the search “reviewed the application and the proposed warrant before submitting it to Judge Randall.”
The Supreme Court has not “imposed a novel proofreading requirement on officers executing warrants” but has instead stressed that officers have only a “duty to ensure that the warrant conforms to constitutional requirements.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 n.6 (2004). “Normally, when an officer who has not been involved in the application stage receives a warrant, he will read it in order to determine the object of the search,” but it is not categorically unreasonable for officers “who directed the search, [and] knew what items were listed in the affidavit presented to the judge,” to “believe that the warrant authorized the seizure of those items.” Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989 n.6 (1984).
Under the circumstances here, the execution of the warrant was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and the officers did not show a flagrant disregard for the warrant requirement. We conclude that the district court properly denied the motion to suppress.
II
“‘We review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence,’ viewing ‘the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all inferences in the government’s favor and deferring to the jury’s assessments of the witnesses’ credibility.’” United States v. Zhong, 26 F.4th 536, 559 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 241 (2d Cir. 2010)). “A defendant, moreover, cannot prevail on a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge ‘if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 560 (quoting United States v. Kozeny, 667 F.3d 122, 139 (2d Cir. 2011)). “In
Hampton was convicted of violating
Hampton argues on appeal that the government proved only “that on four occasions in the latter part of 2021 someone sold cocaine to a confidential informant,” but the government did not prove “the identity of” the sellers or “the purpose of maintaining the premises.” Appellant’s Br. 22-23. Hampton concedes that “[w]e do know that Hampton lived in the house with her child and her grandchild,” but she argues that “[t]here was no witness who could provide even a single detail about what the purpose of maintaining the apartment was beyond that, much less provide evidence to assess the relative importance of any given purpose.” Id. at 23.
To obtain a conviction under
A rational trier of fact could have found Hampton guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. At trial, evidence demonstrated that a black female wearing pajamas sold narcotics to an informant from the premises, suggesting that the seller resided there. See Gov’t App’x 210-12. Hampton was the only adult resident
Additional evidence discovered during the search connected Hampton and her apartment to the sale of narcotics. Law enforcement officers found fifty baggies of crack cocaine, a loaded and cocked handgun, cash, and drug-packaging paraphernalia on a table that Hampton called “my table.” Id. at 312, 345; see also id. at 35, 85, 100, 111, 106, 123, 245. On that table, officers also found Hampton’s driver’s license, her cigarettes, her cellular phone, and her COVID mask. See id. at 85, 105-06, 197, 344. Officers found additional drug-packaging materials and a handgun holster in her bedroom. See id. at 128-31, 236, 337-38.
This evidence suffices to support the conviction. In United States v. Long, 678 F. App‘x 31 (2d Cir. 2017), “the jury was instructed to determine whether the drug activity at 35 Chi Mar Drive was a ‘significant or important reason’ why the Defendant maintained the premises.” Id. at 36. Our court upheld the judgment of conviction “[b]ased on the drug paraphernalia and firearms found at the Defendant’s premises along with a small quantity of drugs.” Id. That evidence supported the conclusion “that 35 Chi Mar Drive was being knowingly used to distribute controlled substances.” Id. The evidence here is more compelling than the evidence in Long.
In Facen, we vacated a judgment of acquittal. See 812 F.3d at 283. We held that “[t]he evidence was plainly sufficient for a rational jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Facen used 303 Lakeview for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance.” Id. at 290. We reached that conclusion based on the same types of evidence: (1) “Facen was the only person present in the house when the officers arrived,” (2) “[h]e was found in the largest bedroom on the second floor, unclothed on the bed,” (3) “[h]e was lying on top of a roll of currency, and additional currency was found behind the headboard,” (4) “[t]he currency found in and behind the bed totaled $1235,” (5) “officers also
Hampton suggests that the government failed to prove that she used the residence “for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing or using a controlled substance” because it cannot show “that the drug activity was a significant or important reason why the defendant used or maintained the place” in light of the other reasons why Hampton maintained the residence. Appellant’s Reply Br. 7 (alteration omitted); see id. (“Hampton’s apartment was not only her residence but also the residence of her child and grandchild: where Hampton fed them, clothed them, and provided them with comfortable rooms in which to sleep, play, and do schoolwork, among other things.“).
That is mistaken. As the jury instructions made clear, the government was “not required to prove that the drug activity is the defendant’s only purpose at maintaining the place” but only a significant or important one. App’x 149. The quantity of drugs and contraband suggest that it was. In neither Facen nor Long was there any indication that the defendants used the residence for drug activities alone. Nor did we suggest that such proof was required. We conclude that sufficient evidence supported Hampton’s conviction.
III
Both parties agree that we must remand in light of United States v. Maiorana, in which we held “that a sentencing court intending to impose non-mandatory conditions of supervised release, including the ‘standard’ conditions described in
In this case, the district court imposed thirteen standard conditions. See App’x 194. But “[t]he record of the sentencing proceeding is bereft of any oral pronouncement of these conditions, nor is there any language spoken at sentencing that incorporates these conditions by reference.” Appellant’s Br. 25 (citation omitted). The pre-sentence report does not identify the standard conditions. See id. The government does not dispute that Maiorana requires a remand. See Appellee’s Br. 21. We explained in Maiorana that “[t]he appropriate remedy for the district court’s error is a limited remand to address the thirteen conditions of supervised release that were not properly imposed, not a full resentencing.” 153 F.4th at 315 n.13. On remand, the district court may either “convene a hearing in the presence of the defendant” and “advise the defendant that those conditions will be imposed” or “strike them from the judgment.” Id. at 315.
* * *
We have considered Hampton’s remaining arguments, which we conclude are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment insofar as the district court denied the motion to suppress evidence and ordered a conviction and sentence supported by sufficient evidence. We remand for the district court to address the standard conditions of supervised release in accordance with Maiorana.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court