*1 appeal claim this VDF’s second America, UNITED STATES of paid that Stiefel J & million
is that the $8.5 Plaintiff-Appellant, constituted ad for their stock J’s owners therefore royalties, a third of which vance Although Stiefel’s will were owed to VDF. WARNER, Defendant-Appellee. H. TY (as Stiefel’s pay price that ingness confirm) based on fore own documents No. 14-1330. royalty receipts from of J & J’s future cast Appeals, United Court of States CoffeeBerry, the license VDF sales of Seventh Circuit. royalties & limited the granted J J money owe VDF to
that J & J would Argued Sept. 2014. [CoffeeBerry] “based on the actual sale July Decided or its sublicensees Products Licensee actually by Licensee.” are collected which stock, CoffeeBerry owners sold
J & J’s Stiefel, rather J
products, million Stiefel
& J received company’s stock. VDF’s
paid for them royalty provision in
interpretation of the require corpo license would a seller of pay portion purchase of the
rate stock licensors, corporation’s por to the
price expected cash flow
tion estimated from the acquired corporate as exploiting
from See Ben generate
sets revenue.
McClure, into the Dividend Dis “Digging Model,” Investopedia,
count www.
investopedia.com/articles/fundamental/04/ 2015). (visited
041404.asp July Such a
requirement, involving complex and con estimations, an financial would be
testable impediment operation
other to the smooth corporate market in control.
of the short, merit, has no appeal, appealed from is therefore
the decision
Affirmed. *3 3553(a). Fullerton, Attorney, D. Michelle U.S.C. The court here did not
Stuart Petersen, Attorney, Office Of The Rather, Marie fully abuse its discretion. ex- IL, Attorney, Chicago, States United plained supported its decision Plaintiff-Appellant. reached an outcome that is reasonable un- unique der the circumstances of this case. Clement, Erin Attorney,
Paul D. Mur- We therefore affirm Warner’s sentence. PLLC, Attorney, Bancroft Mark E. phy, Matthews, Attorney, Caplin Drysdale, & DC, Shapiro,
Washington, Michael Samuel Background I. IL, Attorney, Scandaglia Ryan, Chicago, & Chicago born 1944 and Defendant-Appellee. grew up family. in a troubled He attend- FLAUM, KANNE, Before military high ed school Wisconsin and ROVNER, Judges. Circuit year spent College, at Kalamazoo *4 ultimately dropped out because he could KANNE, Judge. Circuit longer no afford tuition. To make ends Warner, Ty Defendant H. the billionaire meet, jobs, he worked a series of odd Babies, creator of Beanie evaded mil- $5.6 bellman, including busboy, stints as a by hiding lion in U.S. taxes assets in a Eventually, and a door-to-door salesman. pled guilty Swiss bank account. He to one selling plush he found his feet children’s evasion, restitution, count of tax made full toys Toy Company. for the Dakin Within paid penalty. and million civil $53.6 years, a few top he was Dakin’s salesman. Sentencing provided Guidelines a recom- imprison- mended 46- 57-month term of In plush Warner formed his own ment, judge gave but the district Warner Inc., toy company, Ty initially which he years’ more lenient proba- sentence: two by ran himself out of his condominium. service, community plus tion with big early His break came in the 1990s with $100,000 fíne government and costs. The toy the introduction of a new to the mar- claims his sentence is unreasonable be- success, Baby. ket: the Beanie A huge the it does not cause include a term of incar- Baby propelled Ty Beanie Inc. into a mul- ceration. ti-billion-dollar company and made Warner rich. His net worth at the time of sen- case, typical In a might agree. tencing roughly was billion. But this not a typical case. The district judge found charity Warner’s record of Indeed, “overwhelming.”
and benevolence A Warner’s Tax Evasion and At- judge remarked that Warner’s conduct tempted Disclosure unprecedented was through when viewed 1996, during early In period judge’s more-than-three decades on success, Beanie Babies’ Warner traveled to the bench. opinion, district court’s Zurich, Switzerland, opened an off- this and mitigating other factors—includ (“UBS”). account shore bank at UBS AG ing the uncharacteristic nature of War The record does not much disclose how crime, attempt his to disclose his ner’s money originally deposited Warner or account, payment of a ten from, where the funds came but within loss, times the size of the tax and the years several the account contained $93 government’s own request for a sentence advice, million. Consistent with their well the guidelines range justified below — instructed his not to bankers send leniency. enjoy District courts broad dis any correspondence destroy him and to all cretion to fashion an appropriate, individu alized in light years. of the factors in 18 account documents after five He did began to the Internal Rev- with an report investigation the account UBS. (“IRS”). Service enue April government indicted former UBS Bradley banker In February Birkenfeld. only American tax- Warner was not 2009 it filed a one-count information help payer hiding assets UBS. With against quickly UBS executed a de- division, of bankers UBS’s cross-border prosecution agreement, ferred under offshore accounts to many opened others in- wrongdoing avoid U.S. taxes. One the bankers which UBS admitted volved this fraudulent scheme agreed to hand over information on certain Schumacher, Hansreudi who serviced War- U.S. offshore clients. Several months la- ner’s account. After UBS entered into a ter, brought charges Qualified Intermediary Agreement with against former UBS and Schumacher (which in 2001 created certain tax the IRS Jeffrey client Chernick. In August 2009 reporting obligations), Schumacher left to Schumacher himself was indicted. join another Swiss bank. time, At the same en- followed him. In late couraged tax-evaders come forward on and, traveled to Switzerland their own announcing IRS offshore help, his funds Schumacher’s transferred voluntary disclosure program March from UBS to Zuercher Kantonalbank (the “OVDP”). program, Under the (“ZKB”), a smaller Swiss bank without a taxpayers voluntarily who disclosed their significant presence. placed U.S. He *5 offshore accounts could avoid criminal at ZKB in funds the name of a Liechten- taxes, interest, prosecution by paying back entity, “Molani stein shell Foundation.” penalties, including and 20% of the ac- he engage And instructed UBS “not to hand, peak count’s value. On the other any sort of communication with me re those who continued to hide their assets transfer,” but instead tó send all corre- heightened would face enforcement and ZKB, spondence to At Schumacher. War- penalties. Taxpayers severe had a six- grew ner’s account to over million. $107 28, September month window—until Warner did not disclose his offshore ac- (later extended) advantage take of the —to contrary, count to the On the he IRS. taxpayers OVDP. Thousands of were ad- reported on his annual tax returns that he program.2 mitted into the had no financial foreign account. And he government’s Warner was aware of the report pay did not or taxes on the interest UBS, investigation of assets, widely which was generated by income his offshore publicized, which to over and of Schumacher’s indict- amounted million $24.4 result, through 2007. govern- As says regretted ment. Warner that he his $5,594,877 in ment lost tax revenue —the open decision to the offshore account from second-highest among loss the former stuck; beginning but felt and that he prosecuted UBS clients who have been never withdrew or otherwise used the date. In funds the account. 2009 he contacted lawyer options, his to discuss his and his
In
Department
2008 the
of Justice
lawyer
Sep-
told him about the OVDP. On
program
aggressively
launched a
com-
18,
just
tax
program
original
bat offshore
evasión.1 The
tember
before the
2009—
generally http://www.justice.gov/tax/
pro-
1. See
on the 2009 disclosure
Information
(last
gram
and its successors is available on
offshore-compliance-initiative
visited
webpage
http://www.irs.gov/uac/
9,
IRS's
2015).
July
2009-Offshore-Voluntaiy-Disclosure-
9,
(last
2015).
Program
July
visited
OVDP). As far as
admitted’to the
to enter
he been
applied
deadline—Warner
him, however,
aware,
pay-
million
are
we
$53.6
Unbeknownst
program.
investigation;
penalty
under
FBAR
already
largest
ment
is the
he was
account in-
his
government
has collected to date. Warner
.obtained
2009, possibly from
in 2008 or
formation
restitution be-
both the
paid
investigation made
pending
UBS.
sentencing hearing.
his
fore
OVDP,
IRM
for the
see
ineligible
agreed-
an
plea deal included
(b)
9, 2004),
9.5.11.9(4)(a),
(Sept.
so
of
guidelines calculation. The base
upon
rejected
application.
million was
fense level for a tax loss
later,
2011,
jury
grand
years
Two
2T4.1(J).
§§ 2T1.1 and
24 under USSG
banking
offshore
subpoenaed Warner’s
to add 2 levels under
parties agreed
subpoena,
He resisted
records.
(b)(2)
offense
§ 2T1.1
because the
USSG
ultimately
comply.
him to
required
means,
subtract
sophisticated
involved
Jury
Special Feb. 2011 — 1 Grand
Sub
re
un
acceptance
responsibility
levels for
12, 2011,
Sept.
Dated
poena
3El.l(a),
more
der USSG
subtract
—
(7th
denied,
Cir.2012), cert.
U.S.
3El.l(b)
under USSG
because Warner’s
-,
855
3553(a)(2).
§
For the rea-
tion.
Id.
The sixth factor is
prison
term.
not include
follow,
disagree.
that
“the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
sons
disparities” among similarly situated de-
starters,
re-
expressly
no statute
For
3553(a)(6).
§
fendants.
Id.
The others
to send
the district court
quired
available,
types
are:
the
of sentence
sen-
violated, 26
The law that Warner
prison.
statements,
tencing policy
and the need for
7201,
impose
§
the court to
permits
U.S.C.
(7).
3553(a)(3),(5),
§
restitution.
Id.
instead,
And
which it did here.
a fine
under 18
eligible
probation
Ultimately, it falls on the district
§
U.S.C. 3561.
weigh
court to
and balance the various
factors and to “make an individualized as
to the dis
up
It was therefore
appropriate
presented.”
sen
sessment based on the facts
trict court to select
Gall,
50,
586;
in accordance with the factors
18
tence
856 A. may presume ap- on Procedural Reasonableness sentencing judge, we within-guidelines sentence is peal that a government primarily While the takes Rita, 341, at 551 U.S. 127 reasonable. sentence, aim at the substance of Warner’s may presume But S.Ct. 2456. we it also claims in several footnotes the guidelines range the a sentence outside judge procedurally by district erred over Gall, 51, at 552 U.S. 128 3553(a) unreasonable. § looking two of the factors: Instead, we must decide wheth- S.Ct. 586. need to deter other tax-evaders and to justification is er the district court’s suffi- avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. cient, Setting question aside the whether applying a deferential abuse of dis- government preserved argument, this see 40, 586; Id. at cretion standard. 128 S.Ct. Gordon, 1044, Harmon v. 712 F.3d 1053 Molton, at 743 F.3d 484. We will not (7th Cir.2013) (“[A] party can waive judgment substitute our for that of the argument by presenting only it in an unde Wachowiak, at district court. 496 F.3d - footnote.”), veloped reject it on the 751. For we are mindful that substantive merits. occupies range, reasonableness “a not a id.,
point,”
sentencing judge
and that “the
3553(a)
§
Failure to consider the
position
apply
is in
best
adequately
factors or to
explain the choice
3553(a)
§
factors to the individual defen-
can
procedural
amount to
er
Omole,
dant,”
586. court need not Thus, uphold we will a variant comprehensively discuss each of the fac (i.e., outside-the-guidelines) tors,” sentence so Villegas-Miranda, United States v. (1) 798, (7th Cir.2009), long reasoning as the district court’s 579 F.3d 801 or march evidence, fashion, “in through explic them checklist rests on reliable United States v. (7th itly articulating its Cir.2009); regarding conclusions England, 555 F.3d Shannon, one,” (2) each United States v. Molton, 3553(a), is consistent with (7th Cir.2008). F.3d (3) 484; yields F.3d at a sentence range objectively “within the broad rea The district court here addressed circumstances,” sonable sentences 3553(a) explained factors and their Wachowiak, 496 at F.3d 750. A variant sentence, exactly relevance to Warner’s as likely pass sentence is most muster if it supposed particular, to do. In particular is based on considerations to the court expressly addressed both deterrence case, opposed defendant or the to “nor (which sufficient) it found sentencing mal judge’s incidents of the offense or the disparities (finding variety compar “the disagreement guide wholesale with the isons unhelpful made both sides” be Wachowiak, lines.” F.3d “very unique”). cause Warner was general, á disagreement about much how government’s complaint real is that 3553(a) weight give each factor does not, view, adequate district court did in its Molton, not warrant reversal. See 743 ly arguments. address its But that issue 485; F.3d accord United States v. Fer goes to the substance of Warner’s sen nandez, (2d Cir.2006) matter, tence. procedural As a the court’s (“The weight to any given be afforded explanation was more than sufficient. argument pursuant made to one of the B. Substantive Reasonableness firmly factors is a matter com
mitted to the discretion of
sentencing
brings
That
us to the heart of this
judge....”).
appeal.
begin
We
our review for substan-
*10
by
1.
stating
tive reasonableness
the obvious:
Characteristics
the
of Defendant
guide-
well
sentence is
below
3553(a)(1)
Section
instructs the
recommendation. He received both a
lines
sentencing judge to consider “the history
(24
rather than 46 to 57
shorter
and characteristics of the defendant.” A
months)
lighter
(probation
and a
one
rath-
defendant’s
of charity may justify
record
above,
prison). Although,
er than
as noted
lenient
Though
sentence.
our earlier
eligible
probation
Warner was
under 18
required
cases
“exceptional”
works,
good
3561,
§
im-
guidelines
U.S.C.
advised
United States v. Repking, 467 F.3d
prisonment
probation
rather than
due to
(7th Cir.2006)
curiam),
(per
the Su
length
sentencing range.
of his
See
preme
“rejected]
Court has since
... an
5Bl.l(a).
USSG
appellate
requires
rule that
‘extraordinary’
must decide whether
the district
We
justify
circumstances to
a sentence outside
justifies
explanation
court’s
Warner’s sen
Gall,
range,”
Guidelines
at
U.S.
tence, including magnitude
of its devia
128 S.Ct.
Accordingly,
to survive ap
Molton,
guidelines.
tion from the
review,
pellate
good
defendant’s
works
disputes
F.3d
484. No one
that he
justify
must be sufficient to
the variant
below-guidelines
deserved a
sentence.
sentence,
necessarily
need not
be
dispute
The
centers instead on how far
exceptional.
below the
the court should have
gone.
requested probation.
The
Relying mainly on Warner’s letters of
government proposed
year
over a
and a
support, the district court found his chari-
day in prison
would have made
—which
table
generosity they
works and the
be-
credit,
eligible
good-time
likely
speak
overwhelming indeed, unprece-
—
reducing his actual time
served
less
judge’s
dented
the district
experience.
3624(b)(1).
year.
than a
See 18 U.S.C.
primary
This was the
mitigating factor
strictly
by
While the court was not
bound
that drove the court toward a lenient sen-
recommendations,
their
it was well within
government
tence. The
attacks the court’s
range
the court’s discretion to use that
grounds.
assessment on two
Gall,
49-50,
a benchmark. See
552 U.S. at
First,
(directing
questions
Did the district court choose yet the source of the letters and found govern- between those alternatives? The specifi them sincere and credible. And says argues ment no. It that in analyzing cally generosity found that Warner’s went 3553(a) factors, nu- court made many years, back motivations ultimately put merous errors and much too sincere, trying were and that he was not weight on Warner’s charitable contribu- system or create a (factor game record use 1), support tions and letters of us, sentencing. Given the record before too little weight on the seriousness of his (factor 2(A)), findings clearly offense these are not erroneous. general deterrence (factor Gordon, 2(B)), sentencing disparities See United States (factor 6). (7th Cir.2008). address each in turn. We factor challenge government was free to
Second, argues that to no more than the district court’s assessment Warner’s charity amounts below, in- donating excess will not disturb “writing checks character but we [and] *11 “nothing unique” consid- ventory,” findings appeal. is As we which the court’s on Though wealth.” above, support his “enormous ering they ample have stated million, says he donated clearly $140 Warner erroneous. the record and are worth, government his net the about 8% of by placing court err as Nor did the district million, is figure the correct asserts charac- weight much as it did on Warner’s The govern- his net worth.3 2% of about might giv- ourselves have Though ter. we dispute below a foot- raised this ment weight compared less en this factor understandably note, court so the district others, court did not abuse its discre- the it. did not resolve Gall, 51, 128 tion. See 552 U.S. at S.Ct. (“The court appellate fact that the be, figure may the the correct Whatever reasonably have concluded that might point misses the of the district in- appropriate is different sentence was Although praised War- remarks. court’s district justify of dol- sufficient to reversal of the giving away many millions ner for (com- Fernandez, court.”); lars, not focus on the number at 32 the court did F.3d wrote or their dollar the mitting assignment weight of checks Warner the on what It focused instead War- sentencing judge’s amounts. factors to the discretion). acts reveal about his char- ner’s charitable 3553(a)(1) acter, exactly is what which with the Our conclusion is consistent example, For us to consider. directs Repking by government, cases cited from Ms. court read Vasilakos letter Vrdolyak, 593 F.3d and United States v. entirety, though and in its even first (7th Cir.2010). Repking, we vacat- $20,000 donated for her treatment Warner substantively ed as unreasonable below- relatively was a small sum. What one-day a bank sentence for helped that Warner a to- remarkable was misappropriated funds. 467 president who stranger “generosity that his went tal judge’s F.3d at 1091-92. The district off- court simply donating.” further than ‘good “unspecified handed reference to insistence that highlighted also Warner’s ” “entirely consistent works’ that were publicize Hunger Fund not Children’s development plan” with a bank’s business as well as Warner’s kind- philanthropy, leniency. justify did not such Id. employees. to his None of the court’s ness among 1096. This case is different: other money on the amount of comments fixated facts, mitigating specified the district court involved. struck the court was What with reference to the record what detail displayed “humanity such and con- good works did and what cern for the welfare of others” and acted him The court person. revealed about as a intentions,” purest with “the often found, moreover, that was moti- Matt. “quietly privately.” 6:3— Cf by genuine benevolence rather than vated 4(RSV) (“[W]hen alms, you not let give do ulterior aims. your your right left hand know what hand below-guide- Vrdolyak, we reversed doing, your may alms be so secret.”) conspiracy sentence for probationary lines which, according figure value includes donations for 3. Warner’s includes retail also charities; him, tax toys he did not claim deductions on his he donated returns; government's figure toys valued at their does not in- claims those should be figure the defendant. clude those additional donations. actual cost to fairly to commit mail and wire fraud. 593 F.3d lenient approach to punish- The defendant there had “a histo- 684. ment. It charged him a single count misconduct,” ry of ethical but the district of tax evasion for a single year and elected it; ignored court it also overlooked the to treat years his conduct in the other as Warner, Id. at defendant’s wealth. sentencing relevant purposes rather contrast, history apart a clean from has charge than to them separate crimes. evasion, his tax and the court rec- district Additionally, above, as we noted gov- ognized both his crime and his wealth. sought ernment a sentence well below the Moreover, Vrdolyak proce- because was a guidelines range. Both decisions were challenge, expressed dural “no view on within government’s prosecutorial dis- *12 proper awhat sentence would be.” Id. at cretion, second-guess and we do not them. precisely question 684. But that is But started the district court down a now; Vrdolyak speak before us does not to path leniency. toward it. It was reasonable for the district court allowing Nor are we to use his path follow that here. For a sentencing card,” “getout-of-jail wealth as a id. at judge only must consider not the serious- the government charges. as The district ness but also the “nature and circum- court looked behind the numbers War- stances of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. ner’s character and found him to abe 3553(a)(1). § The court noted several mit- genuinely person. benevolent A non- igating circumstances in Warner’s case. wealthy defendant who showed similar His crime was isolated and uncharacteris- qualities would be entitled to similar treat- kept only tic: he had one offshore account (all being equal). ment else And a rich (about 6%) containing “a small fraction” of gave large gifts defendant who without old, his total years wealth. He was 69 others, real concern for or who did so prior history, no criminal posed no cynically give argument himself an danger to society. particular, the court sentencing, would not deserve the same found, “no question there was of him vio- leniency. lating the tax laws in the future.” More- over, cooperated by pleading guilty he 2. Seriousness of Offense promptly paying both full restitution and Section demands “a sentence true, the FBAR penalty, although, it is his sufficient, greater necessary, but not cooperation incomplete (e.g., he resist- comply purposes” with the of sentenc- government’s subpoena ed the and did not ing. purposes One of those “to is reflect assets). disclose the source of his offshore offense, the seriousness of the to promote law, respect provide just for the and to The district court also appropriately 3553(a)(2)(A). punishment.” 18 U.S.C. took into account attempt Warner’s to en- recognized The district court here War- September ter the OVDP in It is ner’s crime as “a serious one” and respect true already that Warner knew about the According for the law as “fundamental.” investigation UBS in- Schumacher’s however, government, to the this was mere dictment, so he was on notice of some service, lip for Warner’s sentence does not probability that his own account would be justly punish convey him or the serious- mitigating discovered. That lessens the of evading ness million in taxes. attempted force of his disclosure but does case, Many justice
In another
eliminate it.
other offshore-
might demand a
sentence,
notice,
similarly
harsher
but here it
accountholders were
on
does not. To
with,
begin
given
widely publicized prosecu-
itself took a
the IRS’s
res-
efforts;
payment
on
yet many
part
the defendant’s
and enforcement
tions
SEC).
to the
penalty
titution and a civil
eventually
into the
admitted
them were
fact, in the
The salient
anyway.
OYDP
downplay
now tries to
view,
that
came
district court’s
claiming repre-
it
penalty,
FBAR
knew the IRS had
forward
he
before
liability
of the
he
only
sents
a fraction
investigation.
or that he was under
name
According
government,
to the
faced.
a miti
to consider this
It was reasonable
charged
separate
could have
Tenzer,
gating fact.
United States
Cf.
his account.
year
for each
he hid
(2d Cir.2000)
(treating
42-43
statute,
assuming
Even
relevant
attempt
failed
mitigating
defendant’s
5321(a)(5)(C)-(D),
allow
would
U.S.C.
voluntary
pro
an IRS
disclosure
to enter
six-year
lim-
separate
penalties,
annual
gram).
restricted the
period
itations
would have
recovery
maybe
to two or
government’s
circumstances,
proba-
we think
In these
5321(b)(1).
years.
three
31 U.S.C.
See
sufficiently
serious sentence.
tion was
addition,
government would have
inus Gall
Supreme
Court reminded
violations were
prove
had to
involves a “substantial re-
probation
5321(a)(5)(C). Moreover, if
Id.
willful.
freedom,”
court
and faulted the
striction
*13
insufficient,
govern-
million were
discounting
$53.6
that fact. 552 U.S.
for
below
more
ment could have insisted on
before
48,
years
For
War-
character
ters),
a low risk of recidivism.
not abuse
Because the district court did
“par-
These factors were
F.3d at 745-47.
discretion,
AFFIRM
we
its considerable
to the individual circumstances
ticularized
sentence.
Warner’s
Id. at
were Warner’s.
of the case”—as
though
might
we
have been
750. Even
FLAUM,
concurring in
Judge,
Circuit
harsher,
concluded that
the district
judgment.
range
fell within the
court’s decision
judgment
sep-
I concur in the
and write
Id. at 754-55.
reasonable sentences.
my
unease
arately
express
to
considerable
Supreme Court’s decision Gall
and the
appeal
with the outcome of this
pled
The defendant there
also instructive.
may
how the
signal that
send about
participation
ecstasy
in an
guilty to limited
wealthy
justice system
criminal
treats
tax
ring.
judge
The district
sen-
distribution
view,
my
evaders.
Warner’s commend-
years’ probation, well
him to three
tenced
spirit
able charitable
does not obviate
guidelines range of 3037 months
below the
of incar-
appropriateness
period
of some
41-45,
at
prison.
552 U.S.
S.Ct.
purposely sought
deprive
ceration. He
judge emphasized
de-
government of millions of dol-
the federal
history,
significant
fendant had no
criminal
simply
of tax revenue
to amass more
lars
voluntarily withdrawn from the con-
Judge Koeor-
of his enormous wealth. As
spiracy,
“doing everything
and was
in his
it,
put
“go[]
acts
es-
power
forge
new life.” Id.
I
govern
of how we
ourselves.”
sence
Additionally, a
S.Ct. 586.
“small flood” of
and, therefore,
wholeheartedly,
agree
War-
good
letters attested to his
character.
Id.
regardless
ner’s non-custodial sentence —
Eighth
period me, day”). and a For these two
year discretion, prosecutorial of debatable acts case, toward an affirmance this
point uniquely limiting context provided judge’s exceptional district exercise
for the leniency. backdrop, this I Without to vacate the sentence
would be inclined resentencing. and remand for
imposed
However, jurist’s light veteran
thoughtful thorough consideration of case, compelled I am to conclude that
Warner’s sentence falls within a sentenc- band of
ing judge’s broad discretion.
Gregory TAYLOR, Scott
Petitioner-Appellee America,
UNITED STATES
Respondent-Appellant.
No. 14-1269. Appeals,
United States Court of
Eighth Circuit. Feb. 2015.
Submitted: July
Filed: 2015.
Rehearing En Rehearing Banc Sept.
Denied
