Case Information
*1 UNITED STATES, Appellee v.
David J. A. GUTIERREZ, Technical Sergeant
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 13-0522 Crim. App. No. 37913 United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces Argued December 9, 2014 Decided February 23, 2015 BAKER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ERDMANN, STUCKY, RYAN, and OHLSON, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Kevin Barry McDermott, Esq. (argued); Captain Michael A. Schrama (on brief). For Appellee: Major Brian C. Mason, (argued); Lieutenant Colonel Katherine E. Oler and Gerald R. Bruce, Esq. (on brief). Amicus Curiae for Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan F. Potter, Captain Aaron R. Inkenbrandt, and Captain Amanda R. McNeil (on brief) – Army Defense Appellate Division. Military Judge: William C. Muldoon Jr.
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
Chief Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Contrary to his pleas, a military judge sitting as a
general court-martial convicted Appellant of offenses including
aggravated assault, in violation of Article 128, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 928 (2012). He was
sentenced to confinement for eight years, a dishonorable
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction
to the lowest enlisted grade. The convening authority approved
the sentence as adjudged, and the United States Air Force Court
of Criminal Appeals (CCA) affirmed. United States v. Gutierrez,
(Gutierrez I), No. ACM 37913,
I. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO FIND
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPELLANT COMMITTED
ASSAULT LIKELY TO RESULT IN GRIEVOUS BODILY HARM.
[2]
[1]
See United States v. Janssen,
Under Article 128, UCMJ, an assault includes an offensive touching. An aggravated assault includes the element that the assault was committed with “a dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm.” Article 128(b)(1), UCMJ. Applying a plain English definition of “likely,” as well as this Court’s precedent regarding aggravated assault outside the context of HIV, testimony that the means used to commit the assault had a 1–in-500 chance of producing death or grievous bodily harm is not legally sufficient to meet the element of “likely to produce death or grievous bodily II. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO FIND BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPELLANT COMMITTED ADULTERY.
III. WHETHER THE FACIALLY UNREASONABLE DELAY IN POST-TRIAL
PROCESSING DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHT
TO SPEEDY REVIEW, PURSUANT TO UNITED STATES v. MORENO,
BACKGROUND
Appellant and his wife participated in what trial testimony described as the “swinger[s’]” lifestyle, wherein they engaged in group sexual activities with other couples and individuals. These couples and individuals were civilians whom Appellant generally met over the Internet, and the sexual activity occurred at off-base meetings and parties organized for that purpose.
While stationed at Aviano Air Base, Italy in 2007, Appellant tested positive for HIV. In 2009, Appellant was ordered by his commanding officer to, among other things, “verbally inform sexual partners that [he is] HIV positive” and “use proper methods to prevent the transfer of body fluids during sexual relations, including the use of condoms providing an adequate barrier for HIV (e.g. latex).” Despite having received this order, Appellant did not inform his sexual partners of his HIV-positive status and, in some instances, did not use a condom.
Two of Appellant’s sexual partners testified at trial that they trusted his word that he did not have any sexually transmitted diseases because he was a member of the military. When asked at trial whether they would have engaged in sexual activity with Appellant had they known of his HIV-positive status, Appellant’s sexual partners responded in the negative.
HD, one of Appellant’s sexual partners, testified that in February 2010, her boyfriend found a document indicating that Appellant had tested positive for HIV. HD knew that Appellant and his wife planned to attend an upcoming swingers’ party, and informed the party’s organizer of her discovery. The organizer told HD that he would address the issue with Appellant as a rumor, and would allow Appellant and his wife into the party only if they could produce documentation proving that Appellant did not have HIV. In HD’s recollection, Appellant and his wife did not attend the party.
HD also informed RD -- HD’s ex-husband and a participant in the swingers’ lifestyle -- of her discovery. RD testified that, “for protection purposes,” he began to disseminate this information among the swingers’ community, and confronted Appellant. Appellant denied to RD that he was HIV positive.
Eventually, the staff judge advocate at McConnell Air Force Base contacted the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) to discuss Appellant’s conduct. AFOSI interviewed Appellant’s wife, who provided information regarding his participation in the swingers’ lifestyle and his HIV-positive status. Based on this information, AFOSI “looked at [the case] as an aggravated assault.” AFOSI investigated the matter and eventually apprehended Appellant.
Appellant was charged with aggravated assault. The charges encompassed protected oral sex, unprotected oral sex, protected vaginal sex, and unprotected vaginal sex. At trial, the Government’s medical expert, Dr. Donna Sweet, testified that to transmit HIV, “there has to be some seminal -- some fluid of some type.” According to Dr. Sweet, the risk of Appellant transmitting HIV during protected oral sex was “zero,” and the risk of transmission during unprotected oral sex was “almost zero as well.” As to the risk of HIV transmission during protected vaginal sex, Dr. Sweet testified that, when used properly, condoms protect against the transmission of bodily fluids “97 to 98 percent of the time.” On the risk of HIV transmission during unprotected vaginal sex, Dr. Sweet testified that:
[I]t is difficult data to come up with. It’s difficult to have a lot of evidence. But the quote is that it is somewhere between 10 and 20 positives per 10,000 encounters. That’s sort of the high-end. There are other people that would say 1 out of 10,000 to 1 out of 100,000 given encounters. . . . [I]f you [have sex] two or three nights a week then you’ve got a lot of exposure even though it’s a relatively low risk. . . . But somewhere between 1 and 10 per 10,000 exposures would become infected. During closing argument, the defense argued that “when you actually apply the elements of aggravated assault and the testimony of Dr. Sweet regarding the actual low risk of transmission in these cases, you will see that he is not guilty [of] aggravated assault[].” The military judge then acquitted Appellant of aggravated assault insofar as the specifications alleged protected oral sex. As a result, Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault encompassing unprotected oral sex, protected vaginal sex, and unprotected vaginal sex.
On appeal, the CCA looked to this Court’s 1993 decision in United States v. Joseph,
DISCUSSION
“[I]n reviewing for legal sufficiency of the evidence, the
relevant question an appellate court must answer is ‘whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
United States v. Oliver,
Article 128, UCMJ, defines aggravated assault: (a) Any person subject to this chapter who attempts or offers with unlawful force or violence to do bodily harm to another person, whether or not the attempt or offer is consummated, is guilty of assault . . . .
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who –– (1) commits an assault with a dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm . . . .
is guilty of aggravated assault and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
The question in this case is not whether HIV, if contracted, is likely to inflict grievous bodily harm. Dr. Sweet testified that, if HIV is left untreated, “the natural history is death within the first 12 to 15 years.” She testified that HIV can cut an individual’s life short even with treatment, and that treatment requires taking antiretroviral drugs “religiously” and maintaining a healthy lifestyle. The infliction of such a disease meets any reasonable definition of “likely” to inflict grievous bodily harm. Appellant has not argued otherwise.
The critical question in this case, however, is whether
exposure to the risk of HIV transmission is “likely” to produce
death or grievous bodily harm.
[3]
Put another way, “[h]ow likely
is ‘likely?’” United States v. Johnson,
There are at least two problems with this Court’s prior
analysis in Joseph. First, the Joseph court focused exclusively
on the likelihood that death or grievous bodily harm would occur
in the event of transmission, without consideration of whether
the risk of transmission was itself likely.
Second, Joseph adopted a definition of “likely” that
appears to be sui generis to HIV cases and is not derived from
the statute itself. “Likely” is not defined in Article 128,
UCMJ. But nowhere in the UCMJ, in the dictionary, or in case
law, is “likely” defined as “more than merely a fanciful,
speculative, or remote possibility” as it is in HIV cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Outhier,
It must be correct that “[t]here is only one standard:
Whether the means used [in the assault] were ‘likely to produce
death or grievous bodily harm.’” Outhier,
Thus, “likely” must mean the same thing in an Article 128,
UCMJ, prosecution for an aggravated assault involving HIV
transmission as it does in any other prosecution under the
statute. In determining whether grievous bodily harm is likely,
therefore, one conception is whether grievous bodily harm is the
“‘natural and probable consequence’” of an act. Weatherspoon,
As to unprotected oral sex, the expert testimony in this
case is that the risk of HIV transmission was “almost zero.”
According to Dr. Sweet’s testimony,
[4]
that risk does “[n]ot
really” change in the case of ejaculation. There should be no
question that a risk of “almost zero” does not clear any
reasonable threshold of probability, including under the rubric
this Court has heretofore applied in HIV-exposure cases, which
required that the risk must be more than “fanciful, speculative,
or remote.” Joseph,
In the case of protected vaginal sex, we have previously
concluded that “[t]he fact that a male uses a condom during
sexual intercourse is not a defense to [aggravated] assault.”
Klauck,
Turning to unprotected vaginal sex, Dr. Sweet’s testimony put the maximal risk at 20 out of 10,000, which equates to 1 in 500. She described this figure as the “high-end” statistic, and appears to have concluded in her own assessment that “between 1 and 10 per 10,000 exposures would become infected.” [6] In any event, accepting the high-end statistic of 1-in-500 exposures resulting in HIV transmission from unprotected vaginal intercourse consistent with our obligation to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution under Jackson, we conclude that HIV transmission is not the likely consequence of unprotected vaginal sex. This is so because, in law, as in plain English, an event is not “likely” to occur when there is a 1-in-500 chance of occurrence. As a result, Appellant’s conviction for aggravated assault by engaging in unprotected vaginal sex is legally insufficient under Jackson.
That Appellant’s conviction for aggravated assault is legally insufficient does not mean that Appellant’s conduct is beyond the reach of military criminal law. Unlike several other jurisdictions that have created statutory crimes of HIV nondisclosure, Congress has not criminalized HIV nondisclosure in the UCMJ. Thus, prosecutors have relied on generally applicable punitive articles to litigate these cases. See Derek J. Brostek, Prosecuting an HIV-Related Crime in a Military Court-Martial: A Primer, Army Law., Sept. 2009, at 29 (“The most common methods of charging HIV-related misconduct under the UCMJ are aggravated assault under Article 128, violation of a ‘safe-sex’ order under Article 90 or 92, and conduct that is prejudicial to good order and discipline and/or service discrediting under Article 134.”) (footnotes omitted). There is nothing improper regarding the government’s reliance on generally applicable statutes to prosecute criminal conduct, but in cases involving HIV exposure, the government will be held to its burden of proving every element of the charged offense in the same manner that is required in other cases invoking the same statute. As Judge Wiss wrote in his separate opinion in Joseph:
[W]hen the Government comes before a court of law and tries to fit a round peg of conduct into a square hole of a punitive statutory provision, it is not the proper function of the court to reshape the hole so that it will accept the peg and, in the process, distort the hole’s character. Rather, it is the proper limit of the court’s function to consider whether the hole -- politically determined -- already is large enough so that the peg fits within it.
Judge Wiss’s concern that the law should not adopt a sui generis standard in cases involving HIV exposure should have governed in Joseph, and similar concerns guide our decision today. On this record, the Government failed to prove that any of Appellant’s acts were “likely” to transmit HIV, i.e., that HIV transmission was “likely” in the sense of applying plain English in the context of the facts and circumstances presented in this case. Thus, Appellant’s conviction must be reversed as to each specification of aggravated assault.
In the place of aggravated assault, the Government urged this Court at oral argument to affirm offenses of attempted aggravated assault. The Government has not proven the elements of that offense. An attempt requires “specific intent to commit [the] offense,” Article 80(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 880(a) (2012). Thus, an attempted aggravated assault charge may lie when an accused knew he was infected with HIV and, using a syringe of his blood or intentionally using his body as a weapon, specifically intended to inflict grievous bodily harm as demonstrated by the evidence at trial. No evidence of specific intent to inflict grievous bodily harm was presented in this case.
The question remains whether the evidence is legally
sufficient to affirm a lesser included offense of assault. The
offense of assault consummated by battery requires that the
accused “did bodily harm.” MCM pt. IV, para. 54.b.(2). “‘Bodily
harm’ means any offensive touching of another, however slight.”
MCM pt. IV, para. 54.c.(1)(a). Here, Appellant’s conduct
included an offensive touching to which his sexual partners did
not provide meaningful informed consent. See R. v. Cuerrier,
[1998]
CONCLUSION
We expressly overrule United States v. Joseph,
Notes
[2] We also granted for review issues concerning Appellant’s conviction for adultery, and the appellate delay that occurred in this case:
[3] At the threshold, Appellant contends in his brief that he has never been validly diagnosed with HIV, and submits post-trial affidavits challenging his diagnosis. Appellant did not challenge the fact of his HIV diagnosis at trial, and is not entitled to relitigate an essential fact of the case before this Court, which is limited to reviewing “matters of law.” Article 67(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(c) (2012).
[4] We note that Dr. Sweet’s testimony is consistent with information on HIV transmission risk published by the Centers for Disease Control. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/policies/law/risk.html (last updated July 1, 2014).
[5] Arguing from Klauck,
[6] This Court is cognizant that the experts in these cases are dealing in magnitudes of probability, not mathematical certainty. The legal question in all aggravated assault cases remains whether the infliction of grievous bodily harm is “likely” to come about.
[7] The conviction for adultery is legally sufficient, and
affirmed. Adultery requires that the accused (1) wrongfully had
sexual intercourse with a certain person; (2) that, at the time,
the accused or the other person was married to someone else; and
(3) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused
was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed
forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces. MCM pt. IV, para. 62.b. In this case, Appellant’s
conduct was wrongful because he violated his commanding
officer’s order to obtain informed consent and use protection
prior to engaging in sexual activity. For these same reasons,
Appellant’s conduct falls outside of the constitutional liberty
interest recognized in Lawrence v. Texas,