220 F. 973 | E.D. Pa. | 1915
The defendants were indicted for a conspiracy to commit an offense against the laws of the United States. The offense to commit which they are charged to have conspired is that of fraudulent concealment by a bankrupt of his assets from his trustee in bankruptcy. The real question in the case is whether the offense was made out, or more particularly whether there was evidence upon which the jury were justified in finding a verdict of guilty.
The reasons for. a new trial are nine in number and cover the usual wide range. The first four have been characterized as formal, in the sensé that they appeal to the discretion of the trial judge. These may be disposed of with the observation that, if the evidence is sufficient in law to form the basis of a conviction,' there is nothing in. the case to call upon the court to nullify the declared judgment of the jury.
The argument of counsel for defendants goes almost to the length of the statement that the evidence must exclude the possibility of innocence. It does not, of course, go to this extent. The principle invoked must be accorded recognition as a principle of the administration of the criminal law. The real question is: What are its limitations ? They can be best traced through any one of many trite and commonplace, because familiar, illustrations. The possession of stolen property is consistent with a theory of guilt. It does not forbid a theory of innocence. If the scale of judgment is on an equipoise, a statutory or other authoritative creation of prima facie evidence would incline it. Slight circumstances may themselves incline it. If an inference of. guilt may be xamy drawn, the evidence meets the test of legal sufficiency, and its credibility and weight must be determined by a jury. The doctrine of presumption of innocence and that of rea
The jury in the case at bar were instructed in effect that although the facts as established by the evidence were consistent with the theory of guilt, and the, evidence as a whole by its preponderance led their minds to the inference of guilt, they might base an acquittal upon the mere fact of the existence consistently with the facts of a theory of possible innocence. They were also most emphatically told that if they did in fact entertain a doubt they must acquit. If the case was to be submitted to the jury at all, nothing more would have been said in relief of the defendants than was said. The complaint against the charge is therefore logically not a complaint against what was said, but of the omission to direct a verdict of not guilty. This brings us back to what' has been several times characterized as the real, and really the only, question in the case. Should the-jury have been given binding instructions?
The submission of the case would seem to 'have the support of the decided- cases. - The sufficiency of evidence and its weight are at times so'’nearly allied as to .become difficult.'of separation. We think the' real question here to be.radically different .from that ruled in Commonwealth v. Byers, 45 Pa. Super. Ct. 38. There was in that case no proof of a crime, and .none that the defendant was connected with it, if the commission of the crime was assumed. Here there was evidence, not only of the offense to be committed, but of the joint participation of the defendants in the acts by which the fraud has thus far been accomplished. Evidence of. aid: in the commission of an offense by assisting in the concealment.of it and having in possession the fruits of it isievideiice.of>.a.”cansp5racy, to have the-.offense committed. Proof
The motion for a new trial is discharged, and the United States has leave to move for sentence.