112 U.S. 645 | SCOTUS | 1884
UNITED STATES
v.
GREAT FALLS MANUFACTURING COMPANY.
Supreme Court of United States.
*652 Mr. Solicitor-General and Mr. John S. Blair for appellant.
Mr. Benjamin F. Butler (Mr. Charles F. Peck was with him) for appellee.
*653 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court. He recited the facts as above stated, and continued:
The articles of agreement of November 20, 1862, between *654 the Secretary of the Interior and the Great Falls Manufacturing Company, made ample provision for the protection of the public interests; for, the right was reserved to the party dissatisfied, to proceed by suit in equity in the proper court of this District, for the purpose of having the award set aside or changed, and of obtaining such a decree, subject to review by this court, as was just and equitable. There is no doubt of the good faith of the effort of the parties to accommodate their differences, or that it was of the highest importance to the government that the obstacles should be removed to the successful completion of the work, upon which large sums had been expended. In the opinion of the court below, and in the arguments of counsel, the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to make the government a party to that agreement is discussed. But, in the view we take, it is unnecessary to determine that question. Our decision may be satisfactorily placed on other grounds.
From the report and documents transmitted to Congress by President Fillmore, it appears that, in the judgment of the Engineer Department, the best mode of supplying the cities of Washington and Georgetown with wholesome water, was by an aqueduct from the Great Falls of the Potomac; also, that such a plan necessarily involved the construction of a dam at that point in the river. Ex. Doc. (Senate) No. 48, pp. 2, 35, 48, 32d Cong. 2d Sess. By the annual report, under date of December 4, 1863, of Mr. Usher, Secretary of the Interior, Congress was informed that "certain parties having from time to time made claim to heavy damages for the diversion of the water from the Potomac River," his immediate predecessor, "with a view to settle and end this claim, entered into an agreement of arbitration with the claimants." The parties referred to were the present claimants, as appears by the agreement of arbitration, by the official documents submitted to Congress, and by the proceedings in the courts of Maryland for an assessment of the damages which the proposed dam should cause to the Great Falls Manufacturing Company. The Secretary said: "Pursuant to this agreement, the arbitrators met from time to time, and finally submitted their award, by which they adjudged in *655 favor of the claimants upon each and all of the plans and modes submitted to them, being three [four] in number, for the construction of the dam across the Potomac, and also $12,000 for their own fees as arbitrators, and $761.84 for the expenses of arbitration. The sums being large, I did not feel justified in applying the existing appropriation for the completion of the aqueduct to the payment thereof, preferring to submit the whole matter to Congress for its determination. It appears from the report of the experienced engineer in charge of the work, as must be obvious to every observer, that an ample supply of water for the use of the cities of Washington and Georgetown, for many years to come, can be obtained from the Potomac by the erection of a tight dam, extending from the Maryland shore to Conn's Island, to a height which will give a head of six feet in the aqueduct, and yield a daily supply of 65,000,000 gallons," etc. After expressing the opinion that such a dam could not work injury to the proprietors of the water rights claimed at the Great Falls, the Secretary recommended that a reasonable sum be appropriated to pay the expenses of the arbitration, and that the cost previously estimated of a dam across the main channel be diminished to that of the proposed dam over the east channel.
In conformity with that recommendation, Congress, by the act of July 4, 1864, made the appropriation of $150,000 for the purpose of constructing the proposed dam of solid masonry, and for paying the existing liabilities and the expenses connected with the engineering, superintendence, and repairs of the aqueduct. Immediately thereafter a contract was made for the construction of that dam. In his next annual report, under date of December 5, 1864, the Secretary informed Congress that the work upon the dam and the aqueduct required the expenditure of the additional sum of $51,945. For that amount an appropriation was promptly made. With the Secretary's report was transmitted to Congress that of the engineer in charge, who stated that "the question of land damages and water rights at the Great Falls still remains unsettled." The dam was completed to its present height in 1867, and is used as an indispensable part of the system by which the cities *656 of Washington and Georgetown have been supplied with water. Beyond doubt, the land and the water rights and privileges in question have for nearly twenty years been held and used by officers and agents of the government, without any compensation whatever having been made therefor to the claimant. By what authority have they appropriated to public use the property of the claimant? The answer to this question will determine whether the present demand of the claimant arises out of an implied contract, and, therefore, enforceable by suit against the United States in the Court of Claims.
It seems clear that these property rights have been held and used by the agents of the United States, under the sanction of legislative enactments by Congress; for, the appropriation of money specifically for the construction of the dam from the Maryland shore to Conn's Island was, all the circumstances considered, equivalent to an express direction by the legislative and executive branches of the government to its officers to take this particular property for the public objects contemplated by the scheme for supplying the capital of the nation with wholesome water. The making of the improvements necessarily involves the taking of the property; and if, for the want of formal proceedings for its condemnation to public use, the claimant was entitled, at the beginning of the work, to have the agents of the government enjoined from prosecuting it until provision was made for securing, in some way, payment of the compensation required by the Constitution upon which question we express no opinion there is no sound reason why the claimant might not waive that right, and, electing to regard the action of the government as a taking under its sovereign right of eminent domain, demand just compensation. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 374. In that view, we are of opinion that the United States, having by its agents, proceeding under the authority of an act of Congress, taken the property of the claimant for public use, are under an obligation, imposed by the Constitution, to make compensation. The law will imply a promise to make the required compensation, where property, to which the government asserts no title, is taken, pursuant to an act of Congress, as private property to *657 be applied for public uses. Such an implication being consistent with the constitutional duty of the government, as well as with common justice, the claimant's cause of action is one that arises out of implied contract, within the meaning of the statute which confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims of actions founded "upon any contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States."
This case is materially different from Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341. That was an action in the Court of Claims against the United States to recover for the use and occupation of certain lands and buildings to which the claimant asserted title. It there appeared that, throughout the whole period of such occupation and use, the title of the claimant was disputed by the government, and that possession was taken and held by its agents in virtue of a title asserted to be in the United States. The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims was attempted to be sustained upon the ground that the government, in taking and using the property of an individual, against his consent and by force, could not, under the relations between it and the citizen, commit a tort, but was under an implied obligation, created by the Constitution, to pay for the property, or for the use of the property so taken. This proposition was held to be untenable under the facts of that case, for the reason that, while individual officers of the government might be guilty of a tort, if the property so held by them was in fact private property, yet, if the government never recognized the property as private property, taken by its agents for public use, it could not be held liable for its value as upon implied contract. In the same case it was said: "We are not prepared to deny that when the government of the United States, by such formal proceedings as are necessary to bind it, takes for public use, as for an arsenal, custom-house, or fort, land to which it asserts no claim of title, but admits the ownership to be private or individual, there arises an implied obligation to pay the owner its just value. It is to be regretted that Congress has made no provision by any general law for ascertaining and paying this just compensation. And we are not called on to decide that when the government, *658 acting by the forms which are sufficient to bind it, recognizes the fact that it is taking private property for public use, the compensation may not be recovered in the Court of Claims. On this point we decide nothing."
The question thus reserved from decision is substantially the one now presented. In the present case there were, it is true, no statutory proceedings for the condemnation of the claimant's property rights. Such proceedings, as has been stated, were instituted by the United States in one of the courts of Maryland, in which the property rights of the claimant were expressly recognized. But they were abandoned. One reason, perhaps, for such abandonment was that, in the judgment of the officers of the United States, a fair assessment of damages could not be had in the mode prescribed by the Maryland statute. Be this as it may, it is clear, from the record, that the government did not assert title in itself to this property, at the time it was taken.
Having abandoned the proceedings of condemnation, the proper officers of the government, in conformity with the acts of Congress, constructed the dam from the Maryland shore to Conn's Island, the doing of which necessarily involved the occupation and use of the property, as contemplated in what was called the fourth plan for bringing water from the Great Falls to Washington and Georgetown. In such a case, it is difficult to perceive why the legal obligation of the United States to pay for what was thus taken pursuant to an act of Congress, is not quite as strong as it would have been had formal proceedings for condemnation been resorted to for that purpose. If the claimant makes no objection to the particular mode in which the property has been taken, but substantially waives it, by asserting, as is done in the petition in this case, that the government took the property for the public uses designated, we do not perceive that the court is under any duty to make the objection in order to relieve the United States from the obligation to make just compensation.
In reference to the title which the government will acquire, as the result of this suit, there would seem to be no difficulty. The finding of the court is that the claimant exhibited to the *659 arbitrators a valid title to the lands in question. It does not appear that the company has ever parted with that title; and the finding is that no title except that of the claimant is asserted.
What has been said is sufficient to dispose of the case, and requires An affirmance of the judgment. It is so ordered.