UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose GONZALEZ-CAMACHO, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 06-4329
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Feb. 14, 2007
229
Submitted: Dec. 21, 2006.
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jose Gonzalez-Camacho appeals the sentence imposed by the district court following his plea of guilty to illegal reentry into the United States, see
I.
Gonzalez-Camacho entered the country illegally from Mexico in 1996. In October 2002, he was convicted of felony possession of cocaine in North Carolina state court, and a sentence of probation was imposed. Gonzalez-Camacho was removed from the United States in December 2002.
Gonzalez-Camacho reentered the country in May 2004. On April 5, 2005, he was
The presentence report (PSR) prepared by the probation office calculated Gonzalez-Camacho‘s guideline range as follows. To the base offense level of 8, the PSR added four levels for Gonzalez-Camacho‘s previous drug felony. See
Gonzalez-Camacho objected to the PSR, asserting that the addition of two points under
II.
Gonzalez-Camacho maintains that the sentence imposed by the district court violates the Sixth Amendment. We disagree. In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is violated when the district court, acting pursuant to a mandatory guidelines system, imposes a sentence greater than the maximum authorized by the facts admitted by the defendant or found by the jury. Gonzalez-Camacho maintains that the sentence imposed by the district court violated this principle because the grand jury did not charge, and he did not admit, that his reentry was a continuing offense that began before the April 11, 2005 revocation of his probation.
This argument fails. Under Gonzalez-Camacho‘s reasoning, he would have been assigned only six criminal history points, placing him in category III. This Criminal History Category, combined with an offense level of 12, see United States v. Evans, 416 F.3d 298, 300 n. 4 (4th Cir. 2005), would have resulted in a guideline range of 15-21 months imprisonment. As noted previously, the district court sentenced Gonzalez-Camacho to 15 months. Therefore, because the sentence did not exceed the maximum authorized by the facts charged in the indictment and admitted by Gonzalez-Camacho, Gonzalez-Camacho‘s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated.*
III.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm Gonzalez-Camacho‘s sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED.
