Lead Opinion
Concurrence by Judge B. FLETCHER; Dissent by Judge BEA.
Thе panel has voted to deny the Petition for Rehearing. Judges Paez and N.R. Smith have voted to deny the Petition for Rehearing En Banc, and Judge B. Fletcher has so recommended.
The full court was advised of the petition for rehearing en banc. A judge requested a vote on whether to hear the matter en banc. The matter failed to receive a majority of the votes of the nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc consideration. See Fed. R.App. P. 35.
The petition for rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc are DENIED.
Concurrence Opinion
and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc:
Judge Bea’s dissent presents a distorted view of what this case is all about. It requires a response that can be part of the public record. Otherwise our panel’s reasoned response to the en banc call would remain hidden from public view.
At the time of our original disposition, the Supreme Court had not decided Arizona v. Gant, — U.S. -,
While Gonzalez’s petition for certiorari was pending, the Supreme Court decided Gant, holding that a number of state and federal courts, including ours, had improperly interpreted Belton. Far from announcing a new rule and overruling Belton, the Court explained that our precedent had misinterpreted Belton by ignoring that Belton is the progeny of Chimel v. California,
The Supreme Court granted Gonzalez’s certiorari petition, vacated our panel’s decision, and remanded to us “for further consideration in light of Arizona v. Gant.” Quintana v. United States, — U.S. -,
Judge Bea’s bold pronouncement that we disregarded Herring v. United States, — U.S. -,
Indeed, we followed the teaching of the Herring Court that “the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs.”
Krull, for its part, is inapposite. It concerns law enforcement’s reliance on a statute and not the interpretation of case law. The controlling authority for this case was United States v. Johnson,
Finally, the reader should bear in mind that this case deals with a defendant’s right to suppress evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search. It does not involve whether the officers who conducted the search are entitled to qualified immunity. The rights of the defendant, not those of the police, are at issue. The dissent persists in its view that discipline of police is at issue rather than individual rights. See Dissent at 1109 (“Here, the panel confuses the retroactive application of a Supreme Court decision in the area of individual rights (а jury picked without racial motivation) with what is an area of societal rights (suppression of evidence to discipline police).”).
I
The precedents that controlled our decision in Gonzalez were those dealing with retroactivity. All agree that when Gant was decided, defendant Gonzalez’s conviction had not yet become final. All agree that under Gant, the search in our case was unconstitutional. Looking to the Supreme Court’s precedents on retroactivity, we applied Gant, holding that the search was unconstitutional and that the evidence seized should be suppressed.
When the Supreme Court clarifies the boundaries of a constitutional search in one case, in fairness, that clarification must be consistently applied to all cases that are not yet final. That policy was applied in Johnson,
The question in Johnson was whether Payton v. New York,
The Government [relies] on [United States v.] Peltier's broad language: “If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment” (emphasis added). The Government reads this language to require that new Fourth Amendment rules must be denied retroactive effect in all cases except those in which law enforcement officers failed to act in good-faith compliance with then-prevailing constitutional norms.
... Under the Government’s theory, because the state of Fourth Amendment law regarding warrantless home arrests was “unsettled” before Payton, that ruling should not apply retroactively even to cases рending on direct appeal when Payton was decided.*1098 Yet the Government’s reading of Peltier would reduce its own “retroactivity test” to an absurdity. Under this view, the only Fourth Amendment rulings worthy of retroactive application are those in which the arresting officers violated preexisting guidelines clearly established by prior cases. But as we have seen above, cases involving simple application of clear, pre-existing Fourth Amendment guidelines raise no real questions of retroactivity at all. Literally read, the Government’s theory would automatically eliminate all Fourth Amendment rulings from consideration for retroactive application.
The Government’s [next] claim is that Peltier's logic suggests that retroactive application of Fourth Amendment decisions like Payton even to cases pending on direct review — would not serve the policies underlying the exclusionary rule....
If, as the Government argues, all rulings resolving unsettled Fourth Amendment questions should be nоnretroactive, then, in close cases, law enforcement officials would have little incentive to err on the side of constitutional behavior. Official awareness of the dubious constitutionality of a practice would be counterbalanced by official certainty that, so long as the Fourth Amendment law in the area remained unsettled, evidence obtained through the questionable practice would be excluded only in the one case definitively resolving the unsettled question. Failure to accord any retroactive effect to Fourth Amendment rulings would “encourage police or other courts to disregard the plain purport of our decisions and to adopt a let’s-wait-until-it’s-decided approach.”
Griffith — which was decided after the Supreme Court recognized the good-faith exception in United States v. Leon,
Judge Bea relies on United States v. Peltier,
Judge Bea also relies on Krull to argue against the exclusion of evidence in this case. Krull dealt with law enforcement reliance on a statute, which like most statutes, carries the presumption of constitutionality.
More fundamentally, the fact remains that when the Supreme Court in Johnson was faced with precisely the question that confronted our panel, it held that the exclusionary rule applied to cases pending on direct appeal. Johnson directly controls. Until such time as the Court were to overrule Johnson, it is Johnson and not Krull that we must follow.
II
The panel’s decision is directly supported by Gant itself. In Gant, the Supreme Court interpreted Belton,
The Belton rule has been taught to police officers for more than a quarter century. Many searches' — almost certainly including more than a few that figure in cases now on appeal — were conducted in scrupulous reliance on that precedent. It is likely that, on the very day when this opinion is announced, numerous vehicle searches will be conducted in good faith by police officers who were taught the Belton rule.
Id. at 1728 (Alito, J., dissenting).
The majority, however, did
not agree with the contention in Justice Alito’s dissent ... that consideration of police reliance interests requires a different result. Although it appears that the State’s reading of Belton has been widely taught in police academies and that law enforcement officers have relied on the rule in conducting vehicle searches during the past 28 years, many of these searches were not justified by the reasons underlying the [search-incident-to-arrest] exception.... The fact that the law enforcement community may view the State’s version of the Belton rule as an entitlement does not establish the sort of reliance interest that could outweigh the countervailing interest that all individuals share in having their constitutional rights protected. If it is clear that a practice is unlawful, individuals’ interest in its discontinuance clearly outweighs any law enforcement “entitlement” to its persistence.
Id. at 1722-23 (footnote omitted). The Gant majority ruled as it did precisely because the “interest that all individuals share in having their constitutional rights protected” outweighs good-faith “police reliance interests.” In short, the Supreme
It is no answer to say, as does Judge Bea, that the majority and the dissеnt were arguing about stare decisis and not deterrence of “clear[ly] ... unlawful” searches. Gant,
That the majority and dissenting opinions should have clashed over the exclusionary rule is not surprising, for in Gant, the Arizona Supreme Court had not simply declared the search unconstitutional, but had also ordered the exclusion of thе evidence. State v. Gant,
III
The panel’s decision is compelled by the Supreme Court’s retroactivity precedents and dictated by Gant. The court was right to deny en banc rehearing.
Dissenting Opinion
with whom O’SCANNLAIN, KLEINFELD, GOULD, TALLMAN, BYBEE, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc:
I dissent from our denial of the petition for rehearing en banc, first, because the panel’s decision disregards the Supreme Court’s decisions in Herring v. United States, — U.S. -,
I. Introduction
The panel has decided that evidence seized by a police officer acting in good faith reliance on the predominant interpretation of Supreme Court precedent should be suppressed, despite the fact that suppression in this case cannot conceivably result in appreciable deterrence of future police misconduct. How does it deter police misconduct in the future to tell the police: “the evidence you seized legally, under the law, cannot be used because the law has changed, and now, what wasn’t misconduct at the time you acted has become misconduct”? The attentive policeman hearing this might well look blankly and ask: “Who knew? Am I supposed to guess? What am I supposed to do next time? Not follow the law as written by the
The panel’s decision is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Herring v. United States: “[T]he exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only where it results in appreciable deterrence [of police misconduct].”
Officer Garcia lawfully stopped a vehicle with four occupants. Defendant Gonzalez was riding as a passenger in the vehicle. After the vehicle was apparently secure against any risk to the officer, and the vehicle’s occupants had moved away from the vehicle, Officer Garcia searched the vehicle and discovered Gonzalez’s 9mm pistol in the glove compartment. It is undisputed that, at the time of the search, Officer Garcia was acting in the good faith belief that the law — the predominant interpretation of Belton — allowed him to make that search.
Defendant Gonzalez moved at trial to suppress evidence of the 9mm pistol that Officer Garcia seized during his search of the vehicle. The district court denied the motion to suppress; we affirmed.
The Supreme Court then announced its decision in Arizona v. Gant, — U.S. -,
On remand following the Supreme Court’s decision in Gant, the panel correctly held that the search was unconstitutional but, I believe, incorrectly held that the good faith exception did not apply, and therefore ordered the evidence suppressed.
To reach its result in favor of suppression, the panel holds that a police officer’s reliance on settled case law is somehow different from a police officer’s reliance on a reasonable warrant (Leon) or statute (Krull). But, the panel does not explain either in its opinion or its concurrence from the order denying rehearing en banc, and I can fathom no possible reason, why it found a difference between a rule applicable to a magistrate’s warrant, later found inadequate (Leon), or a statute later found to be unconstitutional (Krull), and circuit court case law, later found to no
The Supreme Court, moreover, has already said so: “[U]nless we are to hold that parties may not reasonably rely upon any legal pronouncement emanating from sources other than this Court, we cannot regard as blameworthy those parties who conform their conduct to the prevailing statutory or constitutional norm.” Peltier,
Suppose that at the next opportunity to consider the matter, the Court were to determine that automobile stops on objectively reasonable bases- — e.g., expired license plate registration tags, burnt out rear lights, etc. — but actually motivated by police officers’ desire to investigate the cars’ occupants and interiors, were no longer constitutionally valid, thereby overruling Whren v. United States,
The predictable effect of the panel’s decision will be to undermine police officers’ ability to catch and prosecute criminals. First, the panel’s decision will deprive prosecutors of inculpatory evidence supporting numerous prosecutions and convictions of criminals whose cases were pending at the time Gant was decided. As the Gоvernment contended in its petition for rehearing en banc: “[I]t is important to recognize that Belton searches were a fixture in law enforcement prior to Gant. The panel’s decision thus has the potential to disrupt numerous convictions and ongoing prosecutions that rely on evidence obtained in Belton searches conducted consistent with the decisions of this Court.” Second, the panel’s opinion will generate ongoing uncertainty among police officers about their ability to follow the decisions of this court, or even the Supreme Court, without finding that their work has been for nought. This uncertainty will most likely cause police officers to act overly
If there is a silver lining to the panel’s decision to flout Supreme Court case law in Herring and Krull, it is that the panel has set the stage for the Supreme Court to review the scope of the exclusionary rule in light of the circuit split we have now created. The panel’s opinion reaches a conclusion directly contrary to that of McCane,
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
Officer Garcia lawfully stopped a vehicle with four occupants. One of the passengers, Silviano Rivera, had several outstanding warrants for his arrest. Garcia placed Rivera in custody and the other passengers exited the vehicle. Officer Garcia searched the vehicle and discovered a loaded 9mm pistol in the unlocked glove compartment. The two female occupants of the vehicle told Garcia the firearm belonged to the fourth occupant, defendant Ricardo Gonzalez. Gonzalez was arrested and charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. At trial, Gonzalez moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the officer’s search. The district court denied the motion. A jury found Gonzalez guilty of the firearm possession charge, and he was sentenced to 70 months’ imрrisonment.
Gonzalez appealed his conviction and sentence, contending in part that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The panel affirmed, holding the search was lawful under Belton,
The Supreme Court then decided Arizona v. Gant, — U.S. -,
On rеmand, the government conceded the search was unconstitutional under Gant. United States v. Gonzalez,
III. The Fourth Amendment, the Exclusionary Rule, and the Good Faith Exception.
Although it is undisputed here that the search turned out to be unconstitutional under Gant, finding the search unconstitutional does not automatically invoke the exclusionary rule as to the evidence unearthed by the search. As in Herring, the finding of unconstitutionality is only the first step in a two step analysis.
The second step is to decide whether such evidence should be suppressed. Leon,
“When evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.” Krull,
Suppressing evidence of Gonzalez’s firearm here would not result in any appreciable deterrence of police misconduct. As the Supreme Court explained in Peltier, there is nothing wrong with police officers acting under the authority of settled case law, including case law from courts other than the Supreme Court.
Although this cost-benefit calculation is an inherent component of the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court has explained that when police officers aсt in good faith when conducting a search, their objectively reasonable belief is sufficient to show the balance tilts away from suppression. See Herring,
It is, however, the second category of cases that is more relevant here; this category includes cases where law enforcement officers conduct a search under a statute that was later determined unconstitutional. See Krull,
In Krull, the State of Illinois appealed the trial court’s order suppressing evidence discovered during an administrative (i.e., warrantless) search pursuant to Illinois’s statutory regime which regulated the sale of automobiles and automobile parts. A police officer conducted an administrative search of the records of an automobile wrecking yard and discovered three stolen vehicles on the property. The following day, a federal district court held the Illinois statute authorizing such administrative searches was unconstitutional. The state trial court agreed and ordered the evidence suppressed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, and the State appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding the good faith exception applied to searches conducted pursuant to a statute that was not “obvious[ly]” unconstitutional.
As the Court could discern no deterrent effect that suppression would have on officers, it turned to the question whether suppression would deter legislators from enacting statutes that ignored or subverted the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 351,
In McCane,
First, the Tenth Circuit held that its precedent was well-settled that vehicle searches incident to arrest were lawful under Belton, even if the arrestee was secured and offered no danger to the arresting officer at the time of the search. The court then held the good faith exception applied because suppressing evidence discovered during a search that was constitutional under settled law, as it existed at the time of the search, would not deter law enforcement officers from conducting unconstitutional searches. The exclusionary rule is meant to “deter objectively unreasonable police conduct” and “to deter misconduct by law enforcement officers, not other entities.” McCane,
In Jackson, the defendants were all searched at a highway checkpoint that prior Fifth Circuit cases had deemed a functional equivalent of the border, thus excepting police searches from the warrant requirement. Id. at 854-55. In an en banc decision, the Fifth Circuit disapproved its earlier cases and held the checkpoint was, indeed, not a border equivalent. Warrantless and no-probable — cause searches could not there be performed. Id. at 854. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the defendants’ convictions, based on the evidence seized during warrantless searches, because the “searches were conducted in good faith reliance upon [the Fifth Circuit’s] earlier decisions.” Id. The court held “[t]he reasoning of Leon fully applies to the case at hand.” Id. at 866. The court noted that it had upheld searches at the checkpoint numerous times — i.e., the law was well-settled — and that there was no suggestion the Fifth Circuit was “inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Leon,
Despite these cases, the panel held the good faith exception did not apply because Krull was limited to searches conducted under statutory authority and did not extend to searches conducted under wеll-settled case law precedent. Of course, Krull dealt only with a statute-based search. The Court said nothing about a search based on settled case law, nor that its holding could not be extended to the latter. The panel provides a curious reason for its disregard of Krull; it chooses to follow a pre-Leon case before the “good faith exception” was developed, Johnson, rather than a post-Leon “good faith exception” case. But the panel gives no reason why we should treat our decisions as lesser law under the good faith exception than statutes or administrative regulations.
To clear away any confusion, the existence of a relevant court ease supporting an officer’s search does not automatically prove he was acting in good faith where that case is later overruled. A police officer must still prove that his reliance was objectively reasonable. That problem, however, is no different from the problem
IV. Retroactivity Cases Do Not Apply Because Here the Rule to Be Applied Retroactively (Gant) Does Not Eliminate the Good Faith Exception (Leon, Krull)
Because the panel held that Krull, and the other cases applying the good faith exception, did not control, the panel instead relied on United States v. Johnson,
Therefore, it is simple to reconcile Johnson with Krull. Johnson holds that defendants, whose cases are pending at the time of a law-changing decision, should be entitled to invoke the new rule. Id. at 545,
Nothing in Gant suggests suppression is the necessary result of invoking the new rule. There is no suggestion the Arizona state prosecutors ever raised the good faith exception before the U.S. or the Arizona Supreme Court. See Gant,
Unfortunately, the panel’s concurrence to the order denying rehearing en banc takes the Supreme Court’s analysis of “police reliance interests” in Gant completely out of context. First, reading Gant, it is not obvious that “police reliance interests” have anything to do with police officers’ good faith reliance on settled law. The Supreme Court did not define “police reliance interests,” but, in context, those interests appear to have more to do with the cost of retraining officers than anything related to the good faith exception. See Gant,
Moreover, Johnson is consistent with applying the good faith exception in this case. The Court in Johnson argued that suppressing evidence seized in a search conducted under “unsettled” law might have a deterrent effect on police, even though suppressing evidence seized in a search conducted under “settled” law would not.
Therefore, the panel’s concurrence to the order denying rehearing en banc errs in likening Gant to Payton; the panel’s concurrence overlooks that law may be settled by courts other than the Supreme Court. Peltier,
It is clear the Johnson Court adopted the reasoning of Peltier, approving of the underlying rationale behind the good faith exception, when it held: “Peltier suggested only that retroactive application of a
If there is any support for the panel’s opinion it can be found only in Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Krull. She wrote: “I find the Court’s ruling in this case at right angles, if not directly at odds, with the Court’s recent decision in Griffith.”
Y. Conclusion
Under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, courts keep vigil over police officers’ power tо search and seize. The panel treads over the line between vigilance and punishment. Not only does the panel negate the dutiful — at the time done — investigatory work of Officer Garcia and all similarly situated officers, but it hamstrings all police officers, who must now worry that every search they conduct under permissible circumstances- — remember Whren — may later be rendered worthless by a change in the law as found by a later court, no matter how foreseeable or not. We should not put the police in the business of foreseeing how courts will change their views of the Fourth Amendment. We should expect them to follow the law, and when doing so, to be able to use the evidence so procured.
Notes
. Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent in Herring, offered alternative justifications for applying the exclusionary rule, but those justifications have not been adopted by the Supreme Court. See
. Although decided before Leon and not using the good faith exception language, DeFillippo denied suppression of evidence where the search was executed under a local ordinance that was later found to be unconstitutional.
. I do not think this circuit is any more inclined to subvert the Fourth Amendment than is the Fifth Circuit.
. In Griffith, the Court held that Batson v. Kentucky,
. Justice Alito, in his dissent, makes a passing reference to evidence seized in good faith reliance on well-settled case law; he cautions Gant will result in the suppression of such evidence,
