Case Information
*1 Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: [*]
Mark Van Goetz was convicted following a bench trial on stipulated evidence of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine; possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine; carrying a firearm during drug trafficking; and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court determined Goetz was a career offender and sentenced him to 60 months of imprisonment for carrying a firearm during drug trafficking and to 120 months of imprisonment on the other counts.
Goetz argues that the district court erred in denying his
pretrial motion to suppress the evidence. Viewing the evidencе
in the light most favorable to the Government, we review the
district court’s ruling following a suppression hearing under the
clearly erroneous standаrd for findings of fact and de novo for
questions of law. United States v. Inocencio,
(5th Cir. 1994). Goetz argues that the arresting officers, members of a Fugitive Task Force comprised of deputy United States marshals and state and local law enforcement officers, did not have authority under federal or state law to arrest him without a Texas arrest warrant based on a California parole- violation warrant.
Assuming without deciding that thе task force members did
not have authority under either the California warrant or under
federal law to arrest Goetz, we conclude they hаd such authority
under Texas law. Texas state peace officers and United States
marshals and deputy marshals acting as private persons may arrest
a person “without a warrant upon reasonable information that the
accused stands charged in the courts of a State with a crime
punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year.” T EX . C ODE C RIM . P RO . art. 51.13, § 14 (West 2005) (Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act); see United States v. Johnsоn, 815 F.2d
309, 313 (5th Cir. 1987) (addressing secret service agents’
authority to arrest under art. 51.13, § 14, as private persons).
The record shows that the task force members had such reasonable
information. When they arrested Goetz, the task force members
had information from Deputy Marshal Casson that Goetz wаs wanted
on a California parole warrant for a felony offense and that
California would seek extradition if Goetz was arrested. Deputy
Casson had personally confirmed this information through the
National Crime Information Center (NCIC). “[T]he cases uniformly
recognize that NCIC printouts are reliable enough to form the
basis for the reasonable belief which is needed to establish
probable cause.” United States v. McDоnald,
The Government construes Goetz’s brief as arguing that the
arrest was in violation of the second part of article 51.13,
§ 14, because the task force members did not take him befоre a
Texas magistrate after his arrest, that the arrest violated the
Fourth Amendment because the officers did not have a physical
copy of the California warrant when they arrested Goetz, and that
the arrest violated Texas law because California did not seek his
еxtradition until after the fact. If Goetz did raise these
arguments, he did not brief them adequately, and we do not
address them. See Yohey v. Collins,
Goetz does not argue and, similarly, has waived any argument that the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. The district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, and Goetz’s conviction is AFFIRMED.
Goetz argues that he is not a career offender within the
meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (2003) because one of the
convictions, an assault-offense conviction for which he was
sentenced in 1986, occurred more than 15 years prior to the
instant оffense and he was not incarcerated on this conviction
within that 15-year period. We review the district court’s
interpretation and aрplication of the sentencing guidelines de
novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v.
Angeles-Mendoza,
Both parties agree that for the purpose of § 4B1.1, a defendant must have two рrior felony convictions for crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses which resulted in the defendant being incarcеrated during the 15-year period before the commission of the instant offense. See U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.2(e)(1), 4A1.1, comment. (n.1). After reviewing Government Exhibit 1, which listed Goetz’s Cаlifornia convictions and sentences and the “dates delivered/returned to institution, paroled/reparoled,” the district court found that thе dates Goetz was delivered or returned to prison and paroled or re-paroled all related to the assault offense.
This finding is not suрported by a preponderance of the evidence and is clearly erroneous. The same “dates delivered” section set forth under the paragraph describing the 1986 assault-offense conviction and sentence are referenced with a “same as above” with regard to convictions and sentences for a 1986 theft, a 1988 drug possession, and a 1989 vehicle theft. Except for the original revocаtion of the probation term imposed in 1983 which resulted in the three year sentence being imposed on the assault offense in 1986, Exhibit 1 does not mention any other parole revocation. Exhibit 1 does not show whether or to what extent, when Goetz committed a new crime while on parole, he was required to serve the remainder of the assault-offense sentence before serving the new sentence. Nothing in the record shows that any time was “served” on Goetz’s 1986 assault conviction after February 25, 1989, or that the 1986 sentence “resulted in the defendant’s being incarсerated” during the 15- year period. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e).
The Government does not assert that Goetz has any other qualifying convictions for the purpose of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Accordingly, Goetz does not have the two prior felony convictions required by § 4B1.1(a) to support the determination that he is а career offender. The district court misapplied this guideline, and Goetz’s sentence as a career offender is VACATED and his case is REMANDED fоr resentencing.
CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED.
Notes
[*] Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.