Glеnn Brown appeals from the judgment entered by the district court 1 upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of possession with intent to distribute phencyclidine, of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute phencyclidine, and of being a felon in possession of a firearm. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The Federal Bureаu of Investigation (FBI) discovered that a package containing a gallon of phencyclidine (PCP), a con *81 trolled substance, wаs to be delivered to one Jimmy Jones by Federal Express. An FBI undercover agent made the delivery at the address on the packаge, which turned out to be Brown’s apartment. Brown accepted delivery, signing his name as J. Jones. After the delivery, Brown placed the рackage in the trunk of his car and drove away, only to be stopped by law enforcement officers. FBI Agent Dunnam searched Brоwn’s car and removed the package of PCP. A search of Brown’s apartment disclosed several items, including a Smith & Wesson .357 magnum revolver, an Iver Johnson .32 caliber revolver, and numerous rounds of ammunition in various calibers.
A federal grand jury indicted Brown on the following cоunts: (1) possession of PCP with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (2) conspiracy to possess :PCP with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846; and (3) felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1). The jury found Brown guilty as charged. Brown’s post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal and for a new triаl was denied.
On appeal, Brown contends that the trial court erred in submitting a certain jury instruction and in denying his motions for a mistrial based upon the introduction of a nondisclosed oral statement and upon testimony regarding Brown’s oral statement regarding a prior arrest.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jury Instruction
The district court instructed the jurors that they could infer that Brown had the specific intent to distribute PCP if he possessed a large quantity of PCP. Brown argues that possession of a gallon of PCP does not support an inference of an intent to distribute. Brown maintains that two factors, the purity of the compound and its resale value, should have been considered instead. Brown contends that police officer Kelly, one of the government experts who testified about PCP, was unqualified as an expert to testify about these two factors. Brown alsо argues that the other government expert who testified about PCP, Harold Messier, failed to provide sufficient evidence of the рurity of the compound or its resale value to support an inference of intent to distribute. We reject both contentions.
We nоte that Brown failed to object to this instruction at the time of trial. Consequently, under Fed.R.Crim.P. 30, Brown has waived his right to challenge the instruction as error.
See United States v. Young,
Moreover, the evidence was sufficient to suppоrt the jury’s finding that Brown intended to distribute based on the quantity of PCP he possessed. Messier testified that the package confiscated from Brown contained a gallon can (about 3800 milliliters) full of ether and PCP, weighing eight pounds and two ounces. PCP is commonly ingested by smoking cigarettes that have been dipped in the substance and then dried. Ether, a highly evaporative liquid, is often mixed with PCP so that the dipped cigarettes will quiсkly dry. The entire gallon of liquid was therefore usable. According to Messier, the normal dosage unit would be the amount that would adhere tо one cigarette dipped in the liquid. Messier also stated that after he evaporated the ether for safety purposеs, the remaining PCP filled one third of the can. We find that this evidence supports the jury’s finding of intent to distribute.
See United States v. Sweeney,
B. Motions for Mistrial
Brown also argues that the trial court erred in denying his two motions for mistrial based upon two statements made during trial. The first statement occurred when counsel for the government asked officer Kelly on direct examination whether Brown had madе any statements when Kelly escorted him back to Brown's residence after the arrest. Kelly testified that he had asked Brown whether anyоne was in his apartment, to which Brown replied that no one lived there but his girlfriend, his kids, and himself. Brown’s counsel offered no objection to this tеstimony.
On cross-examination, Brown’s counsel asked Kelly whether he had told the prosecutor about Brown’s statement. Kelly testified that he had. Brown’s counsel thereupon moved for a mistrial, arguing that the government had substantially prejudiced Brown by not disclosing this statement pursuаnt to Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(A), which provides that the government shall disclose to a defendant “the substance of any oral statement which the govеrnment intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by the defendant whether before or after arrest in response to interrogаtion * * Brown argues on appeal that the nondisclosure of this statement prejudiced his defense because the statement constituted critical evidence in establishing Brown’s residence, the fact of which helped to establish his possession of the PCP.
The govеrnment argues that the language of Rule 16 requires only that the substance of the oral statement, not a verbatim recital, must be disclosed. The government contends that Dunnam’s testimony at the suppression hearing referred to the challenged statement; consequently, the substance of the statement was in fact disclosed. Whether Dunnam actually disclosed Brown’s statement during the hearing is unclear, however, for the record does not contain a transcript of the suppression hearing.
Regardless of whether the statement was disclоsed before trial, we conclude that its admission did not constitute reversible error. Failure to comply with Rule 16(a)(1)(A) is not grounds for reversаl unless the nondisclosure prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant.
See United States v. Ben M. Hogan Co., Inc.,
We find to be without merit Brown’s contention that reversible error occurred when officer Kelly testified regarding Brown’s prior arrest.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Notes
. The Honorable George F. Gunn, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.