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United States v. Ginyard, Harry A.
215 F.3d 83
D.C. Cir.
2000
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 1997). legislative history and EPA’s

report Congress heavy substantiate the UNITED America, STATES impact pollution ozone has national Appellee, care and national agricultural health costs S.Rep. production. 101-228, at 8-9 No. Harry GINYARD, A. Scott, Brett a/k/a (J.A. 518). (1989); REPORTat 1-1 at And Ginyard, H. A. Brett a/k/a S. a/k/a rulemaking record propo- sustains the Ginyard, Ginyard, Brett Scott a/k/a majority sition that the large prod- Ginyard, Brett Brett D. a/k/a a/k/a regulated by ucts are rule distributed Scott, Douglas Scott, Ap- Brett a/k/a nationally, applied by and then end-users pellant. locations, multiple 48,- 63 Fed.Reg. 792, 48,804 confirmed, that are —facts No. 99-3113. stressed, by the Coatings Paint & National United States of Appeals, Court Association, see NPCA Br. at 24. District of Columbia Circuit. short, In none of the considerations that Argued March 2000. led the Congress’ Court to find wanting Lopez and Morrison has Decided June 183(e) application to section of the Clean Air Act. Virginia Hodel v. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n — a case approval by

cited with Supreme Court Morrison, Lopez

in both see Lopez, 1624; Morrison,

514 U.S. at 115 S.Ct. at S.Ct. 1748-50 — the Court declared “agree[d]

that with the lower federal uniformly

courts have pow found the

er conferred the Commerce Clause enough permit

broad congressional reg

ulation of activities causing air or water

pollution, or other environmental hazards may ‍​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‍have effects in more than one 264, 282,

State.” 452 U.S. 101 S.Ct. (1981). L.Ed.2d 1 Contrary to Allied’s

assertion, nothing contained the Court’s

recent Commerce jurisprudence Clause validity

casts doubt on the of that declara

tion here.

VII reasons,

For foregoing reject we

petitioners’ challenges architectural

coatings rule and petitions deny

review. *2 Roland, Federal Assistant G.

Sandra Defender, argued the cause Public Kramer, Federal Public appellant. A.J. Howard, A. Defender, was on brief. David Defender, en- Public Assistant Federal an appearance. tered Thapar, R. Assistant United Amul argued the cause for Attorney, States Lewis, A. States appellee. Wilma Roy and W. and R. Fisher Attorney, John III, At- McLeese, Assistant United torneys, were brief. EDWARDS, Judge, Chief

Before: ROGERS, Circuit HENDERSON Judges. PER court filed

Opinion for the CURIAM.
Concurring opinion Circuit filed ‍​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‍Judge KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON.

«5 rooms, PER CURIAM: net chat electronic mail aliases, telephone. Using several Appellant Harry Ginyard рleaded guilty falsely initiated what he represented as of receiving depict- to one count materials relationship[s]” “committed and lied about sexually a minor ing engaged explicit background, his employment and income. conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. *3 Government’s Memorandum Statement of 2252(a)(2) § and one count of wire in fraud 1999). 10, 2 (May Facts At one point return, § of 18 violation U.S.C. 1348. Ginyard engaged marry was to at least the government agreed to a sentence of 18 two $63,464.88 different women and was months’ incarceration and involved in resti- Ginyard tution. “serious romantic guilty plea relationship^]” entered his with oth- pursuant plea agreement to a written with- ers. Status Tr. Call at 21. Gin- 11(e)(1)(C) scope in the of Rule yard took control of each woman’s finances Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. for his own financial benefit and forced at provisionally accepted The district court least one woman bankruptcy. into Follow- plea agreement pending review of the arrest, ing Ginyard’s the FBI searched presentence report. reviewing After the Ginyard’s computer files and discovered presentence report rejected the court approximately images 35 visual which he proposed prison accepted term but had through received an pro- internet chat parties’ subsequent agreement provid- oral gram depicting a female age under the of ing for a 24 month sentence. It then years engaged in sexually explicit con- Ginyard objection sentenced without to 24 8, duct. On December Ginyard was incarceration, $63,464.88 months’ restitu- indicted on seven of counts wire fraud in tion, special assessment and three $200 § violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343 and eight years’ supervised release. The court also of mail counts fraud in violation of 18 pretrial continued restricting its order Gin- 7, § May U.S.C. 1341. gov- On 1999 the yard’s computer telephone use and com- ernment a superseding filed information during munications his charging Ginyard receipt with of materials Ginyard challenges aspects two of his sen- depicting engaged a minor in sexually ex- tence, arguing that the district court vio- plicit conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. lated the Rule plea agreement 2252(a)(2). by imposing a term of May Ginyard agreed On to not authority included therein and lacked plead guilty to one count of computer to restrict his wire fraud and telephone use and one count of prison. receiving pornography. communications in child We conclude that although appears the district court to In return the agreed to a have in imposing super- erred the term of of imprisonment sentence 18 months’ release, and, $63,464.88 vised the error was invited restitution and agreed to re- event, does “plain not constitute error” quest of the remaining dismissal indict- on this record. Additionally, par- as both ment counts and bring not to additional agree, ties the district court’s restriction сharges. On that date the entered Ginyard’s computer on telephone use plea agreement into a written Rule under in prison beyond its and we plea agreement recited therefore portion vacate that of the sen- “justifiable as a depart reason[]” tence. Ginyard the sentence faced under Guidelines

I. (Guidelines) spare Ginyard’s the desire to Between 1991 and made consеquences victims adverse from tri- contact with through plea hearing May various women inter- al.1 At the held 6B1.2(c) Statement)) According (Policy section of the Guide- merits the district court (Standards Acceptance Agree- “may accept lines plea] agree- of Plea the [Rule in this case will The sentence COURT: par- informed both the district months twenty-four accept be a sentence “preрared it was ties that custody. to a [it] binds any plea at 5. months.” Id. eighteen sentence forward, come he DEFENSE: Should provision- Nevertheless, Honor? Your pending accepted the ally report as al- presentence receipt of sorry. Yes, I am he should. COURT: 11(e)(2). Rule under lowed There custody. Twenty-four months reviewing after August On period will be a court re- report, presentence special There will be years. three declaring that jected resti- There will be assessment $200. protect did “not *4 18 months’ believe, is, the tution, under this I and time period of the maximum public for the well, $63,464.88, of plea for.” protected it could be that will have department probation the and government then The Tr. at 31. restitution. details of the out the to work be court the district would asked whether the court also continued Id. at 36-37. if plеa “appellant accept the willing to Ginyard prohibited order which pretrial within a to be sentenced willing were him, and computers allowed using from asked the Ginyard at 33. range.” Id. with contact telephone imprisoned, while to guidance as for “some only. ad- and counsel family members be comfortable it would what sentence Ginyard during dition, the court prohibited The district at 34-35. with.” Id. having contact from suрervised release conscience good that “could responded an entering of his victims or any with twenty-four figure the live with him to use and chatroom allowed internet The court then Id. at 35. months.” real es- only professional for computer parties the could hearing so cessed the objection Ginyard made no purposes. tate After the recess negotiate the sentence. He оf his sentence. aspect to below exchange occurred: following the compo- release appeals supervised the now Honor, Ginyard Your Mr. DEFENSE: sentence, that it is claiming of his nent month twenty-four take a to prepared is as well as the plea the aliunde we say, I should sentence and plea, or dur- telephone and restrictions computer hearing. another to have can no need ing at this go forward to prepared We are time. II. the And COURT: does as well? agree to that Ginyard challenges Yes, ‍​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‍Your Honor. PROSECUTOR: provi vary to court’s Howard, 11(e)(1)(C) plea agree I think under Mr. of the Rule COURT: sions your supervised Procedure of Criminal a term of by imposing the Rules ment although im right speak, to client has to the sentence addition that I am not sure there given agreements specified and prisonment restitution just make But anything change. object can to to the failed in. Because below, com- completely Rules are we supervised sure imposition I with, speak if do he wishes United plied plain only. for error review Blackwell, right that he has the under 694 F.2d believe v. States (D.C.Cir.1982) Rules. of defen Federal error review (plain that dis not raised below decline, argument Your dant’s We Honor. DEFENSE: range justifiable reasons.” guideline ... that if the court satisfied ment applicable departs agreed from the sentence trict court agreement); eventually Ginyard “breached” stated that he was Watley, “prepared see also United States v. 987 F.2d to take a twenty-four [sic] (D.C.Cir.1993) (plain n. 6 error month plea.” Id. at 36.3 Had it been unobjected review of district court’s to fail clear tendering were ure to inform defendant of re specified only a 24-month term prior accepting plea agreement). incarceration, lease imposi- district court’s sentencing plain A error is “where it tion of a term of release would obvious under settled law and would result have been error.4 Supervised release is in grave prejudice jus or a miscarriage punishment, Gilchrist, see United States v. (3d if appeal.” Cir.1997) tice nоt corrected on United 130 F.3d (quoting (D.C.Cir. Drew, Dozier, (3d States v. 200 F.3d v. States 119 F.3d 239 2000) (internal quotation Cir.1997)), and quota marks part therefore of the “sen- omitted). tion tence” within meaning of Rule Jamison, See United Ginyard entered into the (D.C.Cir.1991) (“sen- 934 F.2d 373-74 11(e)(1)(C), pursuant to Rule which pro- tence” in statute authorizing imposition of government “agree vides that the that a supervised release, 3583(a), 18 U.S.C. specific sentence or sentencing range is inсludes both super- appropriate disposition of the case.”2 release). *5 vised Rule also plea agreement The binding “is on the agreed-to makes clear that the sentence accepted court once it by is the court.” case, constitutes the “disposition” of the 11(e)(1)(C). Fed.R.Crim.P. precluding imposition the of additional accept The court may reject or Thus, punishment. if supеrvised release is 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement Rule “may or specified not as part of the in a sentence defer its as to acceptance decision the or 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement, Rule it cannot rejection until an opportu there has been imposed. be nity to consider presentence report.” the Here, however, the district court’s ac- 11(e)(2). Fed.R.Crim.P. may court ceptance of the 24-month term ambig- was not, however, “participate any in discus hand, uous. theOn one the district court sions parties between the concerning could have understood the parties to have such plea agreement.” Fed.R.Crim.P. agreed a guideline sentence that includ- May plea At the 12 hearing normally-attendant ed the term of super- the district court deferred its decisiоn to 5Dl.l(a). vised § release. See U.S.S.G. accept plea the agreement pending review Under interpretation this of the court’s presentence report. August At the acceptance, it did not breach the plea sentencing hearing, 3 reviewing after the agreement. presentence report, the district court re jected plea agreement. the hand, See Sentenc thе other On the record ing Tr. at 32. The court provides Ginyard’s district some support view 8/3/99 parties then allowed the to confer on an that agreed the had not to a term alternate supervised sentence of they and release when amended 2. Rule light was amended effective De comfortable conversation" in of Rule 1, 11(e)(1). appeal pend cember 1999 while this was at Tr. 8/3/99 ing. quote apрly We from and the rule as holding amended since our would be the government’s 4.The failure to include both the Landgraf same under either See version. v. supervised special release and the assessment Prods., USI Film 275 & n. U.S. components, Applica- § see U.S.S.G. 5E1.3 & (1994). 114 S.Ct. 128 L.Ed.2d 229 2A; plea tion Note 18 U.S.C. in the agreement, acknowledged which it at oral correctly argument procedure, troubling 3. The district court indicated that its standard is is participation arriving acceptable may astray in at an and sen- have led the district court tence under the was "an un- the first instance. ..., the court by a district tence ordered and plea Rule the authority to im- lacked ac- court the court’s district interpretation this under restriction.”). Accordingly, we by agreement pose it did breach ceptance, impos- the sentence portion the sen- part as a term vacаte such imposing and ambiguous Ginyard’s telephone on ing the record restrictions Because tence. In all other re- say prison. cannot use computer we point, this on however, affirmed. Assuming, Ginyard’s sentence spects, plainly court erred. amend- erroneously that the district So ordered. varying the plea ed agreement, Gin- parties’ terms without HENDERSON, LeCRAFT KAREN he solicited when the error yard invited in part: Judgе, concurring Circuit accept- opinion an court’s the district did district court I agree While through negotiated, then sentence able re- imposing err plainly re- counsel, the restrictions the error was lease, I do not believe at 34-35 Sentencing Tr. lease. See Case, F.3d In re Sealed invited. (DEFENSE: know if the court “I don’t (D.C.Cir.1997) may (“Appellant 372, 374 guidance us some giving comfortable feels claims is he now in what acquiеsced have be comforta- would to what sentence it.”) (citing error, invite he did not it would but with, guess I but otherwise ble Harrison, F.3d of a to sort bid- come down would be—it (D.C.Cir.1997)). say After we come back where ding process agreement, Gin- something rejected months, twenty-two, or twenty discus- pro- input in if the court could seek its yard So did of that nature. (DE- the district court response, at 43 id. sions. guidance.”); vide some erroneously,1 maybе luctantly, were nevertheless if the court but “And FENSE: *6 in good it “could conscience the internet to that [Ginyard’s] use of declared restrict twenty-four that a of during [sentence] to real estate live with matters related at 35. release], may Sentencing Tr. then that months.” [supervised period however, (which invited), If a was ground.”). This middle error be a reasonable sepa- court’s district to the error the did not extend district invitеs defendant after supervised release court, complaining imposition rate is he “barred term of v. Har- to the ‍​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‍Ginyard agreed 24-month appeal.” it on United States about (D.C.Cir.1997); the rison, 986, id. at 36. Once 992 See 103 F.3d cf. release, 1018, imposed supervised F.2d Wiggins, v. 530 court United States but, con- (D.C.Cir.1976). object again, his important, Ginyard Gin- did not More than acquiescence court’s object to the district duct resembled failed to mоre yard and, release, as- supervised imposition of invitation. so, doing court erred in suming the district at all court erred Whether plainly

it did not err. ambigu- the my opinion, not on depends, accep- the district court’s nature of that the ous Finally, parties agree both my as col- plea agreement tance of the statutory to lacked district court 6-7, believe, Op. Per Curiam telephone leaguеs Ginyard’s computer and restrict wording of Rule but on during Appellee’s use confinement. holding “the n.5; I that our is agree n.ll; Unit While Reply 21-22 Br. Br. & version,” id. at 6 n. either Sotelo, same under 1040-41 94 F.3d ed States our review is Cir.1996) (“[Bjeeause only because (7th that so there no fed is is agree I But do not plain error. authorizing law an incarceration-com eral change a has not effected version sen- amended part as munication restriction concerning any such 11(e)(1)(C) ("The tween 1. See Fed.R.Crim.P. agreement.”). be- participate in discussions shall not could, depending language that on the it from imposing the “compo- unaddressed nent” of the sentence. agreement, change the results appeal. require Guidelines a district court supervised “order term of release to Under the unamended version of Rule follow when a sentence of 11(e)(1)(C) government may agree imprisonment of more year than one specific appropriate “that a sentence is the imposed.” U.S.S.G. 5D1.1. The district disposition of the case.” This is the ver- may depart from the mandate of sion under which was sentenced if, alia, only section 5D1.1 inter supervised and, recognized, as we have see United required is not protect “to Jamison, Stаtes v. 934 F.2d 373-74 Id., public Application welfare.” Note l.3 (D.C.Cir.1991), because Here the district court finding made no sentence, part of the the district court’s release was necessary not acceptance Ginyard’s protect public welfare. Cf. (as amended) bound the court to its terms. Atkins, States v. 116 F.3d 1572 n. 8 Blackwell, See United States v. 694 F.2d (D.C.Cir.1997) (“[A] departure from the (D.C.Cir.1982). I agree therefore applicable range Guidеlines sup must be that, my with colleagues “assuming the ported by ‘specific explaining reasons ..., district'court erred it did not plainly ”) extent of departure.’ [the] (quoting err,” 8,Op. Per I Curiam therefore Perkins, United States v. 963 F.2d join in affirming the district court. (D.C.Cir.1992)) (citation omitted) (em added).4 phasis But Rule now par- contrary, allows the On the the fact that the court restricted agree Ginyard’s comput ties to instead that a “particular er use and contact with his provision during victims ... Guidelines supervised release manifests is or is applicable to the case.”2 With thought supervised release necessary. was respect to language, advisory this com- to, With no reason not the district court state, mittee notes “the would have required impose been super ... actually defense agree[ ] on what Therefore, vised release. hаd Ginyard appropriate amounts to an sentence or been sentenced under Rule agree[] specified to one compo- amended, I believe that the district court’s 11(e) nents.” advisory Fed.R.Crim.P. imposition of supervised release after im (1999) added). (emphasis committee’s note *7 prisonment would not have been error.5 If fails to address a specific provision Guidelines, partic- оne,

ularly a mandatory the district court’s

acceptance of a Rule not, view, my would prohibit ed). 2.Rule amended also departure, allows the A howev- er, "agree specific 5D1.1, that a ... sen- governed by Application section tencing range appropriate disposition Note 1. (amended language emphasized). the case” refers, "Range” my opinion, only to the Application ‍​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‍3. Note 1 four other includes bаses term of See U.S.S.G. on release, impose which decline to § lBl.l(g) (Application to "deter- Instruction applicable none of which is here. guideline range mine corresponds ... history to the offense level criminal cate- holdings 4. and Perkins Atkins involved (h) gory”) (Application & Instruction to deter- departures is, "range,” from the Guidelines "[f|or particular guideline range, mine ... applicable imprisonmеnt period. sentencing requirements options supra 2.n. conditions”); supervision lated 5A, ("The Application U.S.S.G. Note 1 in- Interestingly, Ginyard challenge 5. tersection of did the Offense Level and Criminal history Category displays Range the Guideline district court's failure to advise him of the imprisonment.") (emphases mandatory supervised months add- before ac- term KALKA, Appellant,

Ben al., Appellees. HAWK, et

Kathleen

No. 98-5485. Appeals, Court

United States Circuit.

District Columbia 11, 2000. Jan.

Argued 23,

Decided June *8 circumstances.”); record, see some also lines under According cepting plea. his Watley, 987 F.2d n. to mention both court failed ("The (D.C.Cir.1993) government concedes per mandatory $100 assessment lease and the entirely overlooked one that the district felony condition- before court's conviction accepting 11(c) specification hearing. [before May plea Rule acceptance at the al ("Before did not infоrm 11(c)(1) guilty plea]; that the court accepting See Fed.R.Crim.P. ..., supervised release term Watley he the defen- court must address receive.”). might Had two conditions open personally inform dant Per of, set in the the defen- been out and determine that defendant n.4, might Op. at 7 the court well court is re- Curiam dant understands them to before condi- sentencing have recited any applicable quired to consider guilty plea. accepting tionally his guide- may depart those guidelines but

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Ginyard, Harry A.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Date Published: Jun 16, 2000
Citation: 215 F.3d 83
Docket Number: 99-3113
Court Abbreviation: D.C. Cir.
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