UNITED STATES v. GILLOCK
No. 78-1455
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued December 4, 1979—Decided March 19, 1980
445 U.S. 360
Solicitor General McCree argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Heymann, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, Jerome M. Feit, and Louis M. Fischer.
James V. Doramus argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were James F. Neal, James F. Sanders, and Hal Gerber.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits over whethеr the federal courts in a federal criminal prosecu
I
Respondent Edgar H. Gillock was indicted on August 12, 1976, in the Western District of Tennessee on five counts of obtaining money under color of official right in violation of
Before trial, Gillock moved to suppress all evidence relating to his legislative activities. The District Court granted his motion, holding that as a state senator, Gillock had an evidentiary privilege cognizable under
The Government appealed the pretrial suppression order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, see
On remand, the Government submitted a formal offer of proof and requested a ruling on the applicability of the legislative privilege to 15 specifically described items of evidence.3 The offer first detailed the evidence the Government proposed to introduce at trial in suppоrt of the count of the indictment charging Gillock with soliciting money from one Ruth Howard in exchange for using his influence as a state senator to block the extradition of Howard‘s brother, James Michael Williams. Williams had been arrested in Tennessee in November 1974, and was being held as a fugitive from Illinois. According to the offer of proof, in January 1975 Howard met in Memphis with her brother‘s attorney, John Hundley, who allegedly told her that he had a “friend” who could help her brother. A meeting between Gillock and Howard was arranged by Hundley, аnd Gillock agreed to exercise his influence to block the extradition for a fee.
The Government declared its intention to prove that on March 6, 1975, Gillock appeared at Williams’ extradition
In addition, the Government stated it intended to introduce at trial the transcript of a telephone call Gillock made to Howard on March 25, 1975. During that conversation, Gillock allegedly advised Howard that he had delayed the extradition proceedings, and could have blocked them entirely, by exerting pressure on the extradition hearing officer who had appeared before Gillock‘s senate judiciary committee on a budgetary matter. To corroborate that conversation, the Government indicated it would prove that on March 19, 1975, Gillock attended a meeting of the senate judiciary committee where the same extradition hearing officer who conducted Williams’ extradition hearing presented his department‘s budget request.
Next, the Government recited the evidence it proposed to introduce showing that Gillock used his influence as a member of the Tennеssee State Senate to assist four individuals in obtaining master electricians’ licenses valid in Shelby County, Tenn. According to the offer of proof, the four contacted Gillock in early 1972. Two weeks later, Gillock advised them that he could get legislation enacted by the General Assembly which would provide for reciprocity in licensing. Under his proposal, a person who received a license in another county could be admitted without a test in Shelby County. The prosecution represented it would offer еvidence that Gillock
The Government also represented that it would offer evidence that Gillock introduced reciprocity legislation in the senate and that he arranged for the introduction of a similar bill in the house. The Government further proposed to introduce statements made by Gillock on the floor of the senate in support of the bill. After the bill was passed by both branches of the legislature and forwarded to the Governor, several private persons, including union representatives, allegedly met with Gillock and voiced their opposition to the legislation. The Government intended to prove that Gillock replied that he could not financially afford to withdraw the legislation because he had already accepted “fees” for introducing it. Finally, the Government intended to prove that on April 13, 1972, Gillock moved to override the Governor‘s veto of the legislation, and stated that it would introduce into evidence any and all statements made by Gillock on the floor of the senate in support of his motion to override.
Based on this offer of proof, the District Court granted Gillock‘s renewed motion to exclude evidence of his legislative acts under
The Government again appealed the District Court‘s suppression order. The Court of Appeals by a divided vote held that “the long histоry and the felt need for protection of
II
Gillock urges that we construct an evidentiary privilege barring the introduction of evidence of legislative acts in federal criminal prosecutions against state legislators. He argues first that a sрeech or debate type privilege for state legislators in federal criminal cases is an established part of the federal common law and is therefore applicable through
It is clear that were we to recognize an evidentiary privilege similar in scope to the Federal Speech or Debate Clause, much of the evidence at issue here would be inadmissible. Recently, in United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 489 (1979), we reaffirmed our holding in United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525 (1972), that with respect to Members of Congress “[t]he Clause protects ‘against inquiry into acts that occur
The language and legislative history of
Moreover, the House Conference Committee Report on the Federal Rules of Evidence leaves little doubt that
III
Gillock argues that the historical antecedents and policy considerations which inspired the Speech or Debate Clause of the Federal Constitution should lead this Court to recognize a comparable evidentiary privilege for state legislators in federal prosecutions. The important history of the Speech or Debate Clause has been related abundantly in opinions of this Court and need not be repeated. See, e. g., Helstoski, supra; Brewster, supra; United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). Suffice it to recall that England‘s experience with monarchs exerting pressure
Our cases, however, have made clear that “[a]lthough the Speech or Debate Clause‘s historic roots are in English history, it must be interpreted in light of the American experience, and in the context of the American constitutional scheme of government rather than the English parliamentary system.” Brewster, 408 U.S., at 508. In deciding whether the principles underlying the federal constitutional speech or debate privilege compel a similar еvidentiary privilege on behalf of state legislators, the analysis must look primarily to the American experience, including our structure of federalism which had no counterpart in England.
Two interrelated rationales underlie the Speech or Debate Clause: first, the need to avoid intrusion by the Executive or Judiciary into the affairs of a coequal branch, and second, the desire to protect legislative independence. Eastland v. United States Servicemen‘s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502-503 (1975). Cases considering the Speech оr Debate Clause have frequently arisen in the context of a federal criminal prosecution of a Member of Congress and have therefore accented the first rationale. Only recently in such a case, we re-emphasized that a central purpose of the Clause is “to preserve the constitutional structure of separate, coequal, and independent branches of government. The English and American history of the privilege suggests that any lesser standard would risk intrusion by the Executive and the Judiciary into the sphere of protected legislative activities.” Helstoski, 442 U.S., at 491. Accord, Johnson, supra, at 180-181. The Framers viewed the speech or debate privilege as fundamental to the system of checks and balances. 8 The
The first rationale, resting solely on the separation of powers doctrine, gives no support to the grant of a privilege to state legislators in federal criminal prosecutions. It requires no citation of authorities for the proрosition that the Federal Government has limited powers with respect to the states, unlike the unfettered authority which English monarchs exercised over the Parliament. By the same token, however, in those areas where the Constitution grants the Federal Government the power to act, the Supremacy Clause dictates that federal enactments will prevail over competing state exercises of power. Thus, under our federal structure, we do not have the struggles for power between the fedеral and state systems such as inspired the need for the Speech or Debate Clause as a restraint on the Federal Executive to protect federal legislators.
Apart from the separation of powers doctrine, it is also suggested that principles of comity require the extension of a speech or debate type privilege to state legislators in federal criminal prosecutions. However, as we have noted, federal interference in the state legislative process is not on the same constitutional footing with the interference of one branch of the Federal Government in the affairs of a coequal branch. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). Cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489-492 (1965) (federal court may enjoin state-court application of a clearly unconstitutional statute).9 Our opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), is not to the contrary. There, we held that a federal statute regulating the wages of state
The absence of a judicially created evidentiary privilege for state legislators is not, however, comparable intervention by the Federal Government into essential state functions. First, Gillock‘s argument, resting on the Tenth Amendment, has no special force with regard to state legislators; on the rationale advanced, state executive officers and members of the state judiciary would have equally plausible claims that the denial of an evidentiary privilege to them resulted in a direct federal impact on traditional state governmental functions. Moreover, we recognized in National League of Cities that the regulation by Congress under the Commerce Clause of individuals is quite different from legislation which directly regulates the internal functions of states. Id., at 840-841. Although the lack of an evidentiary privilege for a state legislator might conceivably influence his conduct while in the legislature, it is not in any sense analogous to the direct regulation imposed by the federal wage-fixing legislation in National League of Cities.
The second rationale underlying the Speech or Debate Clause is the need to insure legislative independence. Gillock relies heavily on Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), where this Court was cognizant of the potential for disruption of the state legislative process. The issue there, however, was whether state legislators were immune from civil suits for alleged violations of civil rights under
“We cannot believe that Congress—itself a staunch advocate of legislative freedom—would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general language [of § 1983] before us.” Id., at 376.
Accordingly, the Court held that a state legislatоr‘s common-law absolute immunity from civil suit survived the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.10
Although Tenney reflects this Court‘s sensitivity to interference with the functioning of state legislators, we do not read that opinion as broadly as Gillock would have us. First, Tenney was a civil action brought by a private plaintiff to vindicate private rights. Moreover, the cases in this Court which have recognized an immunity from civil suit for state officials have presumed the existence of federal criminal liability as a restraining factor on the conduct of state officials. As rеcently as O‘Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), we stated:
“Whatever may be the case with respect to civil liability generally, ... or civil liability for willful corruption, ... we have never held that the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivations of constitutional rights. ... On the contrary, the judicially fashioned doctrine of official immunity does not reach ‘so far as to immunize criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress ...’ Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627 (1972).” Id., at 503 (emphasis supplied).
We conclude, therefore, that although principles of comity command careful consideration, our cases disclose that where important federal interests are at stake, as in the enforcement of federal criminal statutes, comity yields. We recognize that denial of a privilege to a state legislator may have some minimal impact on the exercise of his legislative function; however, similar arguments made to support a claim of Executive privilege were found wanting in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), when balanced against the need of enforcing federal criminal statutes. There, the genuine risk of inhibiting candor in the internal exchanges at the highest levels of the Executive Branch was held insufficient to justify denying judicial power to secure all relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding. See also United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (No. 14,694) (CC Va. 1807). Here, we believe that recognition of an evidentiary privilege for state legislators for their legislative acts would impair the legitimate interest of the Federal Government in enforcing its criminal statutes with only speculative benefit to the state legislative process.12
The Federal Speech or Debate Clause, of course, is a limitation on the Federal Executive, but by its terms is confined to federal legislators. The Tennessee Speech or Debate Clause is in terms a limit only on the prosecutorial powers of that State. Congress might have provided that а state legislator prosecuted under federal law should be accorded the same evidentiary privileges as a Member of Congress. Alternatively, Congress could have imported the “spirit” of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), into federal criminal law and directed federal courts to apply to a state legislator the same evidentiary privileges available in a prosecution of a similar charge in the courts of the state. But Congress has chosen neither of these courses.
In the absence of a constitutional limitаtion on the power of Congress to make state officials, like all other persons, subject to federal criminal sanctions, we discern no basis in these circumstances for a judicially created limitation that handicaps proof of the relevant facts. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom MR. JUSTICE POWELL joins, dissenting.
For the reasons stated by Chief Judge Edwards in his opinion in this case for the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, I would affirm the judgment of that court.