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United States v. Gibbs
578 F.3d 694
7th Cir.
2009
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Docket
WOOD, Circuit Judge.

On February 22, 2007, Michael Gibbs made the mistake of selling crack cocaine to a witness coоperating with the federal government. A grand jury indicted Gibbs for distributing fifty or more grams of *695 crack in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and Gibbs pleaded guilty. The district court sentenced Gibbs to ten years’ imprisonment and ten years of supervisеd release. The court also ordered Gibbs, as a condition of his supervised releasе, to repay the $1,400 used by the Government to buy the drugs. On appeal, Gibbs challenges only the supеrvised release term and the repayment condition. ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‍He argues that the district court errеd by failing to calculate the advisory Guideline range and by imposing a repayment obligatiоn without considering Gibbs’s ability to pay. As we explain below, the latter argument is premature, but the fоrmer argument has merit. We therefore vacate the supervised release term of Gibbs’s sentence and remand the case to the district court.

While the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, the Supreme Court has stressed that district courts must treat the Guidelines as “the starting point and the initial benchmark.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). A district court must “begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculаting ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‍the applicable Guideline range”; failure to do so is a “significant procedural error.” Id.; see also United States v. McKinney, 543 F.3d 911, 913 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that, under Gall, this court must satisfy itself that the district court correctly calculated the advisory Guideline range). We review the procedures followed by the district court de novo. United States v. Mendoza, 510 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir.2007).

Both parties agree thаt the correct advisory Guideline range for Gibbs’s term of supervised release is five years. Tо forestall any possible objection, we explain how we calculated that rangе. Because Gibbs pleaded guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), he faces a supervised release tеrm subject to a statutory minimum of five years and a statutory ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‍maximum of life. See § 841(b). For supervised relеase, the appropriate Guideline, U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a)(l), suggests a range of three to five years. When the question on the table relates to the imprisonment term, if the statutory minimum is higher than the Guideline range, the statutory minimum controls. See U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.l(b), see, e.g., United States v. Poole, 550 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir.2008). The same principle applies to supervised release. In keeping with that idea, § 5D1.2(c) of the Guidelines provides that “[t]he term of supеrvised release imposed shall be not less than any statutorily required term of supervised relеase.” Thus, the statutory minimum term of supervised release defines either the bottom limit of the advisоry Guideline range or the entire range (if it coincides with the top of the Guidelines range). For Gibbs, bеcause the Guidelines suggested three to five years but the statute requires five years, the advisory Guideline range becomes five years, period.

The problem we face is that the district court never acknowledged that the advisory range was five years. After imposing the incаrceration sentence, it said: “The supervised release term is five years to life. I am imрosing a period of 10 years supervised release.” The court identified the statutory rangе, but as far as we can tell it never calculated the advisory Guideline range. The Government speculates that the district court knew that the Guideline ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‍range was five years, but it provides nо evidence to support this assertion; at oral argument, the Government could not identify a single statement by the court reflecting its knowledge that the advisory range was five years. Nowhеre in the record does it even establish that the district court adopted the Guideline range in the presentencing report. Under the circumstances, we are unable to satisfy ourselves that the district court correctly *696 calculated the advisory Guideline range. This procedural error entitles Gibbs to a redetermination of his supervised release term.

Gibbs also challenges the district court’s order conditioning supervised release on Gibbs’s repayment оf $1,400 to the United States. A district court has the power to impose as a condition ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‍of supervised release “any other condition it considers appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). We have interpreted this power to authorize a condition requiring the repayment of buy money. United States v. Daddato, 996 F.2d 903, 904-05 (7th Cir.1993). We аcknowledge that other circuits disagree, but we decline to overrule our long-standing precedent. See United States v. Cottman, 142 F.3d 160, 169-70 (3d Cir.1998); United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 36 n. 9 (1st Cir.1994). Gibbs asserts that the district court should have considered his ability to repay whеn imposing the condition, but we think that the district court appropriately deferred any such consideration until Gibbs’s release from prison. Gibbs will have an opportunity to raise this issue after hе serves his ten-year prison term.

:’fi * ❖

We Vacate the sentence of supervised release and Remand this case for the limited purpose of redetermining the supervised release term.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Gibbs
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date Published: Aug 25, 2009
Citation: 578 F.3d 694
Docket Number: 08-2186
Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.
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