dеlivered the opinion of the court. After stating the facts as above, he continued:
In our opinion the court of claims committed no error in ..allowing the claim of thе contractor.
The language of the specifications is, perhaps, suscеptible of two meanings. According to one, it is as if it read that.“ the foundations and the briсk walls now standing;” so far as they “ were uninjured by the fire, will remain; ” • according to the other, that “ the. foundatiоns and brick walls now standing,” being such as “ were uninjured by the fire, will remain.” But, without going into any refinements of merely verbal interpretation, we think the meaning of the parties, explained by the circumstances' attending the transaction, is sufficiently plain, and determine satisfactorily their rеlative rights and obligar tions.
It must be conceded, we think, 'that it was intended that the old portiоn of the work was to remain as part of 'the new Structure only so far as it was in fact fit tо do so, having reference to the character and uses , of the. building, and that the-Unitеd States had the right to determine the fact of fitness. It was clearly its interest to do so, in advance of bidding, because if it' reserved the right to make the determination at any stage in the progress of the work, or even at - the time of final acceptance on its completion, the. whole risk of the contingency would be thrown upon the сontractor, who could only indemnify himself by an increase in the estimate of probable cost ;• *204 and the government would thus be compelled to pay for an uncertainty which could as well be resolved in advance. The United States having a right to determine the fact; it would be reasonable, having regard merely to its own interests, to do so bеfore letting, the contract. It would be equally reasonable and just to the contractor that the decision should be made at the outset; and as the right to make it belongs to the proprietor, the duty .follows to exercise it so that the contractоr shall not be misled- and injured.
Under the circumstances in the present case, and aсcording to the terms of the specifications, we think it was the duty of the officers acting for the United States, the right performance of which the government assumed, to pоint out to the bidders the parts of the foundations and walls which were in fact so far uninjured as to enter into the new structure, and that this was actually done by dismantling and stripping the burnt building, so that upon inspection of what was left standing the proposing contractor would be able by measurement to ascertain precisely what new work he was to do and be paid for. To require him to determine the fact for himself provisionally, subject аt any time before completion of the work to have his judgment reversed, and to be required in consequence to perform work which he could not -and did not provide for in his estimates, would be unreasonable and unjust. The inspection invited by the advertisemеnt was not for the purpose of assisting the contractor to determine subject to such a condition the question of the fitness of the standing walls to remain, but was, as we think, that he might see as part of the plan of the work what the authorized agents of the United Stаtes had designated as intended to remain in the permanent structure. It was the duty of the Unitеd States to point- out the work deemed to be sufficiently uninjured to remain, and this was performed by allowing it to stand, and by not directing it to be taken down. We lay no stress, as the court of claims did not, on what was said at the time to that effect by unauthorized subordinates. The foundation and walls themselves, as ',left standing by authority of the proper officers, constituted under the circumstances a representation on the part of the *205 United States that they had been adjudged to be so far uninjured by fire that they were to remain, upon the faith of which the intending contractor was entitled to rely for the purposе of estimating the probable cost of the work to be done.
Judgment in favor of the appellee was rendered by the court of claims upon two other claims fоr small amounts, in respect to which we do not deem it necessary to say more thаn that it-appears to us the allowance^was proper. The defence by reason of the statute of limitations, also for the reasons alleged in the opinion of that court, was, in our opinion, properly overruled.
The judgment of the court of claims is accordingly
Affirmed.