*1 higher declared shipper in a (nor regula- to write any statute Nothing in the it to value, tariff called for as the carrier’s us) referenced says that the cited to agreement must be or have. declaration written specified in form lading, or a a bill
either immedi- simple suit between the This is a Indeed, majority opinion tariff. ship- and carrier —to parties shipper ate such that there is no recognizes implicitly lading. nonnegotiable bill of on a ment requirement. presented. Nothing more is involved or for the nevertheless holds majority case, wholly it seems such a unremarkable ground of law on a matter shipper express as to the clear and to hold someone require law failed the case the carrier does agreement, his written terms of “a reason shipper have had that the ment by expressly authorized and not violate or between two opportunity to choose able statute, party sophis- when that liability.” Hughes v. United more levels agreement and ticated understands 1407, 1415 Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d Van to him. options available Cir.1987), language, nor statutory Neither the (1988). This by majority, reported decision cited obviously rests requirement Accordingly, contrary holding. support its limited value statutory provision respectfully I dissent. circumstances under the reasonable “be re transportation.” That surrounding the sophistication shipper
quirement, to which rele potential has obvious
or absence al
vance, fairly as cannot be understood specified mandating particular some
ways necessary declaration written
form for agreement. or America, UNITED STATES lading, signed by the the bill of Here Plaintiff-Appellee, clear and ex- agent, contained a shipper’s the declared stating press provision VONTSTEEN, Skip Gerald a/k/a $5,000 the carri- ton and that value Defendant- greater limited unless a liability was so er’s Appellant. ap- provision declared. were value place immediately above the peared almost No. 89-2745. signature on the bill of shipper’s for the Appeals, States Court of majority held that lading. The Fifth Circuit. shipper would be commercial sophisticated, he knew or language if by this bound 7, 1992. Jan. declare a that he could have known should (and correspondingly pay a higher value rate), notwithstanding that the bill
higher special for blank lading did not have 11707(a)(1) liability provides property freight § 49 U.S.C. forwarder for such or carrier by damage property, written a value established is limited to carrier agree- shipper 11707(c) or written provides part: declaration in relevant § freight forwarder the carrier "(c)(1) ment between freight for- A common carrier and shipper be reasonable if that value would exempt from not limit or be warder surrounding the the circumstances (a) liability imposed of this under subsection transportation.” except provided subsec- section 10762(a)(1) provides in relevant § U.S.C. tion. ... publish shall part: "A motor common carrier containing tariffs the Commission file with "(4) its liabili- limit A common carrier may provide un- transportation it rates transported injury property ty loss or may pre- The Commission this subtitle. der of this title.” section 10730 common that motor other information scribe in their tariffs.” shall include carriers *2 Sokolow, Public Federal Asst. H. Michael Dahlin, II, Federal Defender, E. Roland Tex., defen- Houston, Defender, Public dant-appellant. Atty., Offenhauser, Asst. U.S. C. Paula Houston, Atty., Oncken, U.S. K.
Henry Tex., plaintiff-appellee. mail fraud con- court reversed 21), (Counts through vacated
victions
sentence,
for resen-
remanded
entire
tencing on Count
POLITZ,
Judge,
CLARK, Chief
Before
*3
Cir.1989)
Vontsteen,
granted F.2d 957 claim. 919 I. Vontsteen Gerald jury convicted counts of aid twenty-one on January 1988 (in of fraud violation abetting mail
ing
II.
1342)
count
and one
1341 and
18 U.S.C. §§
court’s
argues
that
(in
of
violation
goods
transporting stolen
of
North
process
due
violates
2314).
sen
district court
18 U.S.C. §
711,
U.S.
89 S.Ct.
Carolina
(1)
follows:1
five
tenced Vontsteen
(1969).
2072,
In Pearce
light ix, of the time 4 (Wiley, Standards Review § 1.1 at loses suffered light personal 1986). parties’ [sic] failure to brief and divorce, light of his from the argue properly appropriate standard regard to his heart problems with health wrong may lead choose *6 prison.... gotten worse has party power standard. But no has the to as lenient as for the Court to be And A control standard review. review Mr. certainly sentence possible. And approach ing reject parties’ court both four five no more than to v. to to the standard. See Show Vontsteen ASCAP Inc., Channel, years. 912 F.2d time/The Movie (2d Cir.1990). party If neither request asserts that Vontsteen standard, re appropriate suggests years or satisfies four five proper viewing court must determine request disagree. The Rule We Cordrey v. see Euc own, standard leniency; general plea simply of a (6th Cir.1990), kert, 917 F.2d put the not district sufficient it was U.S. -, of Vontsteen’s on notice court States (1991); claim. (9th Booth, 1235-36 Cir. government, hearing from the After parties 1981), or the court ask counsel, him- and Vontsteen Vontsteen’s did before specifically, the issue as we brief sen- self, court announced its the district rehearing this case en banc. objected spoke No there- one tence. adjourned the after, court and the district ordinarily have the discretion to opportunity to hearing. timely Vontsteen had the legal not issues decide sentence, yet stood silent. Giovannetti, United States object raised. II) adequate objec- (Giovannetti Cir.1991) not make an (7th did Vontsteen F.2d 225 preserve his 51 to claim under Rule There the this discretion. illustrates argue error for government error failed was harmless. of the district court C. whether appellate court addressed argue harmless er government’s fail failure argues next Vontsteen argument ror a waiver of contemporaneous objection operated make ure so, always such and, if “whether a waiver by the related omission excused at 226. court court.” Id.. did raise binds the government government. could government waive II concluded Vontsteen argument Vonts- oral until not “obvious” cannot constitute the was arguments, but harmless-error plain error. a failure overlook had “discretion to undertake argue harmlessness” sentence that is harsher second The court at 227. Id. sponte. the task sua qua non” of a is the “sine the first Rule 2’s mandate ability on this grounded claim. Hardwick v. Doolit- procedure, fairness simplicity “to secure Cir.1977). tle, With- the elimination in administration showing, “there can be claim out such delay.” Fed. expense and unjustifiable resentencing.” upon of vindictiveness at all agree circuits with 2. Other R.Crim.P. Schoenhoff, States v. Cortes, 949 States principle. United Here, Cir.1990). (1st Cir.1991) (agreeing 532, 542-43 all Vontsteen on originally sentenced twen- principle not artic- but with Giovannetti years to ten counts of conviction ty-two test); Pryce, ulating a years probation; plus imprisonment five 1347-48, (D.C.Cir.1991) remand, him to ten resentenced the court (same). 22 alone. imprisonment on Count years contem Here, to make a failed Vontsteen Thus, sentence on Count while relegates poraneous objection. failure probation to years five 52(a). plain error review Rule him to imprisonment, his overall sen- years ten oral ar government waited until That the did not increase. We deter- tence bring this to our attention gument to mine, then, whether Vontsteen’s second unfortunate, We have ad not fatal. but obviously “more severe” than sentence is for the review raised dressed standards the first Pearce. Flor argument before. time at oral first at 2081. Ass’n, Inc. v. United Peach ida Growers controversy in this is some There 120, 127- Labor, 489 F.2d Dept. how to determine other circuit courts about Moreover, severity of successive multi- the relative prejudice, cannot now claim purposes. The for Pearce count sentences specifically brief requested parties Seventh, First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth appropriate standard “aggregate package” ap use an Circuits en banc. we took this case *7 compare the total proach, where courts total sentence after original sentence D. resentencing. v. Pi See United States Cir.) 9, (1st mienta-Redondo, 15 874 F.2d finally he argues (en banc) 493 (plurality), cert. U.S. plain apply if we prevail should even (1989); 890, 233, 185 110 error of review standard “ (3d 15, Neubert, F.2d 16 Cir. v. 898 Kelly which, error when is claim.4 ‘Plain error’ Busic, 1990); v. United States case, of the context entire examined in the Cir.1981); 940, (3d 951 n. 12 United States that failure substantial is so obvious and (4th Cir.1988); 138 Gray, v. the fair it affect would notice correct F.2d Bay, v. States United judi ness, reputation of integrity public or Cir.1987); (9th Hagler, v. States United stated, Alternatively proceedings.... cial Cir.1983). (9th If the is latter F.2d legal is raised or a new factual when former, the is greater than the sentence plain error appeal, on the first time under Pearce. Un “more severe” deemed to consider failure occurs where our ” approach, Vonts aggregate” “total der injustice.’ this in ‘manifest question results not “more se teen’s second sentence was Lopez, F.2d v. vere”; not the district court did increase omitted). Cir.1991) (citation con (5th original of ten error, sentence any, if total court’s clude that district court." 52(b) of the Fed.R.Crim.P. "[pjlain [district] errors or attention provides that 4. Rule rights 52(b). be no- affecting substantial defects brought although they were not ticed standard of review plain error apply a proba- we years plus five imprisonment years re- sentence on that Vontsteen’s hold tion. obviously more severe mand was modify Circuits Eleventh Second It sentence. follows original approach. package aggregate total plain impos- not commit error did court the district court’s compare courts These sentence. ing its second on sentence non-reversed aggregate original sen- appeal with after counts III. same counts before on those imposed tence summary, conclude the defen- we In Markus, F.2d v. States appeal. United objected have when the district should dant Cir.1979); v. (2d States the re- imposed its new sentence at court Cir.1983). Monaco, hearing. contemporaneous sentenced were example, if a defendant For necessary preserve was objection re- court appellate counts but on five re- claim for our full vindictiveness on three the convictions versed made, we Because no was view. compare counts, these courts only for court’s the district actions only the aggregate plain here. find no error error. We plain after both before remaining two counts this “remainder resentencing. Under Accordingly, AFFIRM the sentence second approach, Vontsteen’s aggregate” court. severe” because was “more (in CLARK, this Judge, counts with whom Chief on'the non-reversed JOLLY, five 22) POLITZ, increased and E. GRADY case, KING just Count dissenting: imprisonment. years Judges, join to ten probation Circuit years decision-making in jurisprudence appellate The text own circuit's Our case, in North Carolina is, admittedly, today’s a bit muddled. found subject Henry in United States states: en banc implicated then, in dicta that suggested law, requires that process of Due a defendant’s defendant against when of a multicount single count even a his first successfully attacked having resentencing. 709 F.2d sen- play conviction conviction panel in Unit And 315, 323 trial. new receives tence Cataldo, ed of such vindictiveness fear since the dicta, but Henry Cir.1987) questioned the ex- a defendant’s unconstitutionally deter by the Cataldo collateral- appeal statement ercise contrast, panel in Paul conviction, process due dicta. itself ly his first attack n. 3 States, freed that a defendant requires also *8 again, advocated Cir.1984), yet retaliatory in mo- dicta a such apprehension of of Henry. citing sentencing without approach, Henry of the part the tivation Forester, judge. denied, 493 U.S. Cir.), of such the absence In order assure (1989), the L.Ed.2d 110 S.Ct. motivation, concluded have we a aggre total the to endorse seemed severe a more imposes judge a whenever subject this is approach; package gate newa upon a defendant after sentence however, the doubt, some doing so must trial, for reasons the a Pearce error claimed the reviewed affirmatively appear. Those standard. plain error informa- objective upon must be based on conduct concerning identifiable the for us resolve unnecessary is It occurring after defendant part today, and we methodologies conflict pro- original time of the as to no view intimate so. to do We decline upon data factual ceeding. And sentence relative would determine how is based sentence the increased question should the severity Pearce record, so that of the be made Today plenary review. presented be B. the in- legitimacy of the constitutional fully reviewed be sentence creased agrees that majority apparently in the record nothing to this court known affirmatively discloses of Vontsteen’s case the increased sen- at the time [N]either increasing the trial court’s reasons Pearce, upon nor at tence was years’ pro- 22 from five on Count sentence corpus proceed- habeas any stage in this imprison- ten-year sentence to a bation any reason or offered ing, has the State fol- Judge Hittner It be that ment. beyond the justification approach and aggregate-package lowed impose it.... power to naked reason sentenced Vontsteen for that 711, 725, 726, omitted.) (Footnote original- imprisonment ten-year sentence only 21 reversed counts. ly imposed might have im- speculate he can also imprison- years’ of ten posed the sentence A. initially had been ment because that what with the difference point of My initial punishment for proper he decided was the requirement is its majority opinion of the transporting 22 crime of stolen the Count contemporaneous that Vontsteen make of 18 U.S.C. 2314. goods violation § resentenced he was objection at the time opinion first which remanded This court’s review of his plain error to avoid order the trial resentencing expressly left to that, in the words of appeal of a sentence the determination court’s discretion “unconstitutional” could be on Count whether Vontsteen’s not hold that a does Pearce “vindictive.” greater or a lesser or should be “the same speak reasons into required to judge is trial originally.” 872 than he received Rather, requires no not, however, the record. opinion did at 632. That for an reason prerogative more than that the court the leave to the trial affirmatively appear” ei- greater “must sentence without impose solely some Based stage showing required or at Pearce. in the remand record ther shows, today the record before us majority on what says of collateral review. judge possible that the trial equally it is in the rule laid down that “must” was used should not bene- determined “general feature.” merely in Pearce as of the sentence securing fit from reversal compulsory, obliga- its If it not used in was original imposed on all but one definition contained tory connotation—the sentencing decision be This counts. holding loses every dictionary —Pearce’s Such vindictive unconstitutional. meaning. more Much requires we possibility is reason impli- is orderliness economy appellate assumption vindictiveness. assume justice appearance cated. any aspersion on trial does not cast seen, justice can be root of Pearce. Unless protect written judge. injustice presumed. must be appeal when a record was silent right of purpose explains, an As Pearce so, requires re- To it reasons. do showing to free a defen- explicit presume record compelled to vindictive- view retaliatory requires apprehension presumption dant from the An ness. unrebutted *9 chill remand for could sentence or overturn the motivation that otherwise require illogical to clarification. It object to what defendant to C. illogic is rein- record fails to show. would allow
forced the fact that from those different Albeit showing of rea- required majority, this resolution applied by affirmative review. a decision of No not necessitate to made on collateral does sons be ap- resentencing count issue. aggregate sentence was objection at the time is Pearce’s turn- pearance necessary. this before The record ing point. says our appearance. Pearce
creates affirmatively demonstrate must record Because decision. for a basis judge’s
trial not, no basis there is record does this becloud- now of the issue
resolution Resolution past decisions.
ed in only be- aggregate if the decision necessary to our come ap- aggregate showed
record increasing the basis proach count. single affirmed on a
D. why Judge out to find easy for us It is practical From he did. acted
Hittner why understand it is standpoint, difficult expe- simple choose does not dis- sending case back dient can, in all explanation for an trict court
likelihood, give. readily justification
Because reason power naked beyond the imposed, appears in the it, affirmatively impose us, dissent respectfully I before
record of a sentence the affirmance to be unconstitutional presumed vindictive. America,
UNITED STATES
Plaintiff-Appellee, SHERBAK,
Eugene Defendant-
Appellant. America,
UNITED STATES
Plaintiff-Appellee, SALIH, Douglas Defendant-
John
Appellant. 91-8128, 91-8130
Nos.
Summary Calendars. Appeals, Court
Fifth Circuit. 8, 1992.
Jan.
