Lead Opinion
Vandemark was convicted of possession of 28 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The imposition of sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for two years. Twenty-two days later, Border Patrol agents, unaware of Vandemark’s status as a probationer, stopped the car he was driving, searched the trunk and found 284 pounds of marijuana. Vandemark was indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and his case was assigned to a different district court judge. He timely moved to suppress the marijuana upon the ground that his car was stopped without founded suspicion, but before the motion was heard, the government had the indictment voluntarily dismissed. Vandemark’s probation officer then moved to revoke probation before the district judge who had originally granted probation. At the probation revocation hearing, Vandemark moved to strike all testimony about events subsequent to the allegedly unconstitutional stop. After hearing evidence concerning the stop and search, the district judge stated that the search was probably illegal but held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to probation revocation proceedings. He revoked probation and imposed a two-year prison term, from which Vandemark appeals. We affirm.
Vandemark first argues that evidence derived from the allegedly unconstitutional stop and search should have been excluded at the probation revocation hearing. This precise question was recently before us. We held that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is admissible in probation revocation proceedings if, at the time of the search, the law enforcement officers did not know or have reason to believe that the suspect was on probation. United States v. Winsett,
Vandemark next argues that even if the district judge may revoke probation on the basis of illegally seized evidence, he may not consider that evidence in subsequently imposing a sentence. We disagree.
The prime purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct. “[T]he rule is a judicially-created remedy' designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” United States v. Calandra,
United States v. Calandra, supra, provides the analytical framework for determining whether the exclusionary rule should apply to sentencing after revocation of probation. In holding that the exclusionary rule did not apply in grand jury proceedings, the Supreme Court weighed “the potential injury to the historic role and functions of the grand jury against the potential benefits of the rule as applied in this context.”
The detrimental effect of the exclusionary rule upon sentencing is apparent. It deprives the district judge of information necessary to effectuate the federal policy of individualized sentencing. Williams v. New York,
A sentencing judge ... is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to determine the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined. Highly relevant — if not essential — to his selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics. And modern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial.
Id. at 247,
Further, without considering the underlying revocation, the judge is prevented from imposing a sentence commensurate with the wrongs committed. For example, Yandemark was originally convicted of illegal possession of 28 pounds of marijuana. His probation was revoked because he possessed 284 pounds, over ten times more contraband. Application of the exclusionary rule would prevent consideration of his deepening involvement in crime. Thus, the court could not impose a proper individualized sentence.
By contrast, the potential benefit from extension of the exclusionary rule is slight. In order to determine the benefits relevant to our balancing inquiry, we must return to the reason for the rule. The primary justification for exclusion is not that use of evidence tainted by an unconstitutional search aggravates the original constitutional violation. Nor is the rule intended to remedy the unlawful invasion of the defendant’s privacy. The Supreme Court has instead held that the prime reason for the rule is deterrence of future unlawful police conduct. United States v. Calandra, supra,
.Thus, after applying the balancing approach mandated by United States v. Calandra, supra,
However, Vandemark contends that we are foreclosed from this conclusion by our decision in Verdugo v. United States,
[Mapp v. Ohio,367 U.S. 643 ,81 S.Ct. 1684 ,6 L.Ed.2d 1081 ] may permit relaxation of the exclusionary rule when its enforcement would have no deterrent effect or the deterrent effect would be insubstantial. [Citation omitted.]
Assuming this, we would nonetheless conclude that exclusion was required in the circumstances of the present case.
Id. at 611 (emphasis added).
We conclude that where, as here, the use of illegally seized evidence at sentencing would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures, that evidence should be disregarded by the sentencing judge.
Id. at 613 (emphasis added). But, as stated above, we have concluded that, where the arresting officers did not know of the probationer’s status, “the use of illegally seized evidence at sentencing [subsequent to probation revocation] would [not] provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures.” Id. A comparison of this case with Verdugo will emphasize our reasons.
First, the illegal search in Verdugo was conducted after the defendant had been charged with the sale of three grams of heroin. The search turned up 371 grams of heroin which was suppressed at trial but considered in sentencing. The search itself was blatantly illegal. Conducted without a warrant, it lasted two and one-half hours. The agents ransacked the defendant’s entire house, removed light fixtures and punched holes in the wallboard. Id. at 609-10. By comparison, the stop of Vandemark, although alleged to be illegal, was not intrusive. Two Border Patrol agents stopped Vandemark’s car, checked under the cushions in the passenger compartment for illegal aliens and asked him to open the trunk. Vandemark then fled.
Furthermore, the defendant in Verdugo was the object of a continuing investigation by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The investigation had already resulted in sufficient untainted evidence for conviction. Id. at 612. Our opinion expressly relied on the agents’ incentive to seize evidence illegally in order to enhance the defendant’s sentence.
The incentive for the search was strong. The range of possible penalty was wide — five to twenty years. The length of Verdugo’s sentence would be quite different if it could be shown that Verdugo was involved in the narcotics traffic on a large scale rather than merely as the seller in a single small transaction.
It might be suggested that police officers are unlikely to be concerned with the sentence ultimately imposed, and, therefore, that excluding evidence at the sentencing stage cannot serve as a substantial deterrent. But this cannot be said, even now, of “the highly specialized unit which deals with specific kinds of offenses, such as those associated with narcotics, which are very serious in nature, where the investigation task is difficult, and where offenders are likely to be recidivists. Here, there may, indeed, be a specific police objective of lengthy incarceration, since the specialized unit may consider premature release of the offender back into the community as making more difficult their job.” Ohlin & Remington, Sentencing Structure: Its Effect upon Systems for the Administration of Criminal Justice, 23 Law & Contemporary Problems, 494, 501 (1958). And even if it were true that there is now no general consciousness of the potential utility of illegally seized evidence to enhance sentence, we could not ignore the fact that an*1024 nouncement of an exception to the exclusionary rule would inevitably produce it.
Id. at 612 (footnote omitted). Vandemark, on the other hand, was not under continuing investigation by the Border Patrol agents. The Border Patrol of course is specialized, but supervision of probationers is not within its area of expertise and the object of the search here was not to have a severe sen ^ence imposed upon Vandemark but to check for illegal aliens.
Most important, in Verdugo we expressly distinguished searchers whose sole object is to obtain evidence of a single offense with which the defendant is charged. In the case before us, the arresting agents were unaware that Vandemark was a probationer still subject to sentencing upon revocation of probation. The object of their search could only have been to obtain evidence to support a single charge, precisely the situation we distinguished in Verdugo:
Quite different considerations would apply if the object of the search were to obtain evidence to support a single charge on which the defendant was later convicted. If the additional evidence was necessary to obtain any conviction at all, the danger of exclusion at trial would afford a substantial deterrent to an illegal search. If the additional evidence was not required for conviction, both the deterrent effect of the exclusion of illegally seized evidence of the same offense at sentencing and the incentive to conduct legal searches to obtain such evidence would appear to be minimal.
Id. at 612 n. 21. See United States v. Schipani,
Subsequent to Verdugo, we have never held that it must be given the broad interpretation advocated by Vandemark. Indeed, until now, the question has not been presented to us. Although we have commented on the issue, we have done so only in dicta. In United States v. Weston,
Indeed, a narrow, not a broad, interpretation of Verdugo may be required by our most recent decision re-examining that case:
Compare Verdugo v. United States,402 F.2d 599 , 612 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.*1025 denied,397 U.S. 925 ,90 S.Ct. 931 ,25 L.Ed.2d 105 (1970), in which this court applied the exclusionary rule to sentencing proceedings where the police were familiar with past narcotic violators and current suspects and had a personal stake in seeing not only that a violator was convicted, but also that he receive a lengthy sentence. The court reasoned that in the absence of the exclusionary rule an officer would have an incentive, given the proper circumstances, to lawfully obtain only so much evidence as is necessary to assure conviction of the defendant of a single offense, and then proceed to unlawfully obtain evidence of additional offenses which would ensure a long sentence.
United States v. Winsett, supra,
Thus, we conclude that in this case Verdugo does not prevent the sentencing judge from considering the evidence secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Absent that restriction upon us, we have been sensitive to the conflicting constitutional tugs but in applying the balancing test mandated in Calandra, we hold that justice is better served by not extending the exclusionary rule to either probation revocation or subsequent sentencing where the searching officers are unaware of the probationer’s status.
Affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring):
I concur, albeit reluctantly. Absent this court’s recent decision in Winsett, I would opt for a flat rule outlawing such use of illegally secured evidence. The wisdom of my choice is demonstrated, I suggest, by the considerable emphasis that the main opinion is compelled to place upon the fact that here the unlawful invasion was considerably less intrusive than the “blatantly” illegal search revealed in Verdugo.
Courts ought to be afforded clear guideposts whenever reasonably possible and should not be required to nicely calculate the degree of the misconduct and perhaps the motivation of the government’s lawless officers.
