United States v. George Darden

605 F. App'x 545

6th Cir.

2015

Check Treatment

Docket

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George DARDEN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-5537.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

July 6, 2015.

2015 WL 4072048

Before: SUTTON and DONALD, Circuit Judges; ZOUHARY, District Judge.

to an adverse employment action when she was terminated, and was qualified for the position. The court held that Ross failed to rebut the company‘s legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for her discharge. The court also held that Ross failed to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether her termination was in retaliation for engaging in protected activity under the THRA because the alleged events either were not protected activity or were not causally related to her discharge. The TPPA and common law retaliatory discharge claims failed for similar reasons. In addition, the court rejected other acts evidence in support of Ross‘s gender discrimination claim because the nonparty employees were not similarly situated to Ross. Finally, the court rejected Ross‘s argument that the magistrate judge wrongfully denied her motions to compel discovery because Ross was not diligent in attempting to comply with the scheduling order and failed to show good cause for her untimely motions. She appeals these rulings.

We have thoroughly reviewed the record, the applicable law, and the parties‘s arguments, and, like the district court, we cannot find evidence of illegal motives behind FRS‘s actions. We therefore hold that the district court correctly concluded that Ross failed to meet her burden of proof as to each of her claims for the reasons stated in its exhaustive order granting FRS‘s motion for summary judgment, and find nothing to add to its substantial ruling. We also hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ross‘s motions to compel. We AFFIRM on the basis of the district court‘s March 17 and May 23, 2014 opinions. See Ross v. Fluid Routing Solutions, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-01269-JDB-egb, 2014 WL 2168168 (W.D.Tenn. May 23, 2014).

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

George Darden received a career offender enhancement under United States Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.1. At issue is whether one of Darden‘s previous convictions qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2). See Appellee‘s Br. 7. In Johnson v. United States, No. 13-7120, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, — L.Ed.2d —, 2015 WL 2473450 (U.S. June 26, 2015) (slip op. at 10, 15), the Supreme Court held that the identically worded residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act is void for vagueness. Compare U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). We have previously interpreted both residual clauses identically, see United States v. Ford, 560 F.3d 420, 421 (6th Cir.2009); United States v. Houston, 187 F.3d 593, 594-95 (6th Cir.1999), and Darden deserves the same relief as Johnson: the vacating of his sentence. Indeed, after Johnson, the Supreme Court vacated the sentences of offenders who were sentenced under the Guidelines’ residual clause. United States v. Maldonado, 581 F. App‘x 19, 22-23 (2d Cir.2014), vacated, 576 U.S. —, — S.Ct. —, — L.Ed.2d — (2015); Beckles v. United States, 579 Fed.Appx. 833, 833-34 (11th Cir.2014), vacated, 576 U.S. —, — S.Ct. —, — L.Ed.2d — (2015). The same relief is appropriate here.

For these reasons, we vacate the judgment and remand for reconsideration in light of Johnson v. United States.

Notes

The Honorable Jack Zouhary, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.