United States v. Gendron

STATES, Appellee, UNITED GENDRON, Defendant,

Daniel A.

Appellant.

No. 92-2003. Appeals, States Court of

First Circuit.

Heard 1993. Oct.

Decided Feb.

957 unconstitutional, govern-

statute is him, unlawfully entrapped ment and that the (for government’s search warrant tape house) constitutionally his defective. Af- considering ter these and other related claims, we affirm the conviction. I Constitutionality The Statute’s pornography The child statute reads as follows: (a) Any person who— receives, distributes, knowingly or any depiction visual that has been mailed, shipped or has been or trans- ported foreign in interstate or com- merce, or which contains materials which shipped have been mailed or so or trans- ported, by any including by means com- puter, knowingly reproduces any or visu- depiction al for distribution in interstate foreign by or any commerce in- means cluding by computer through or mails, if— Sales, by Appointment Jonathan S. (A) producing such visual de- Court, with whom The Law Office of William of piction involves use a minor en- Homans, Jr., MA, Cambridge, P. was on conduct; gaging sexually explicit brief, appellant. for Richardson, Robert E. with whom A. John (B) depiction such visual such Pappalardo, Attorney, United States conduct; Lang, F. James Assistant United At- Boston, MA, brief, torney, appel- on were

lee. punished provided shall be as in subsec- (b).... tion BREYER, BOUDIN, Judge, Before Chief 2252(a)(2) added). § (emphasis 18 U.S.C. POLLAK,* Judge, Circuit Senior District points out that the Ninth Circuit Judge. interpreted permitting has this statute as BREYER, Judge. Chief person conviction of a who does not know the child-pornographic nature the material re Daniel Gendron ordered and received a ceived, and, reason, for that has found videotape that contained child unconstitutional. See United States v. X- it, Though he did not know the firm that sent (9th Video, Cir.1992), Citement 982 F.2d 1285 him tape part of a law enforcement — U.S. -, granted, cert. operation designed pornogra- to catch child (1994). says 127 L.Ed.2d 536 He we should phy buyers. jury subsequently A convicted do the same. knowingly receiving pornog- Gendron of raphy through Circuit, the mails. 18 U.S.C. The Ninth 2252(a)(2). (9th Thomas, appeals Cir.), He now that convic- 893 F.2d 1066 cert. de tion, nied, 80, 112 claiming the child L.Ed.2d * Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. Of the Eastern District following “knowingly” the word (1990), scope of the stat words considered However, modify. “knowingly” “know is meant to “knowingly.” It held that

ute’s word simply more linguistic word “re fact reflects the statute’s ingly” modifies statements, (or parts “reproduces”), not subclause of state- basic fact ceives” (B). (A) Consequently, ments, meaning it “does not re from quite often derive their por defendant “knew knows that quire” that a context. The sentence “John a minor.” Spanish Tegucigalpa, ... received involved nography people speak he later, years Honduras,” itself, Two X-Citement capital at 1070. taken Id. is the Video, pointed out that the Ninth Circuit uncertain whether or not John leaves us statute, interpreted, permit con so capital Tegucigalpa is the of Hon- knows “knowingly receives” person who duras; but, of a story viction in the context of the which video, that the video does not know but appears, a context that includes the sentence that Because contains sentences, up may clear our uncertain- other permit of a interpretation would conviction ty with no doubt at all. and leave us mind, innocent state of the person with an Similarly, interpret courts crim when X- statute unconstitutional. court found the context, statutes, they upon draw includ inal Video, 1292; F.2d at see New 982 Citement ing purpose the statute’s and various back Ferber, 747, 765, 102 458 U.S. S.Ct. York v. ground legal principles, to determine which (child (1982) 3359, 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 accompany particular of mind which states must involve “some el pornography statutes Thus, of the offense. courts nor elements pass constitutional mus ement of scienter” mally prosecutor that not hold need ter). prove the defendant’s state of mind re con accept the Ninth Circuit’s We do not (for “jurisdictional example, spect to facts” unconstitutional, that the statute is clusion officer, was a that an assault victim federal agree because we do not with mail), moved in the what stolen checks statutory premise set forth Thomas. required mental state ever view, of all to have our the view courts E.g., crime’s other elements. United States since the the matter X-Citement considered Feola, 671, 676-86, 1255, v. 420 U.S. 95 S.Ct. Cochran, decision, v. see United States Video (1975); 1259-64, 541 Barnes v. 43 L.Ed.2d (3d Cir.1994); v. 17 56 United States States, 837, 847, 412 United 93 S.Ct. 92-CR-884, Edwards, 453461 No. 1993 WL (1973); 2357, 2363, L.Ed.2d 380 37 United (N.D.Ill. 4, 1993); v. Nov. United States (2d 329, Blassingame, States v. 330 (W.D.Ky.1993); Long, F.Supp. 582 Unit 831 denied, 945, Cir.1970), cert. 402 U.S. 91 S.Ct. Kempton, F.Supp. 826 386 ed v. (1971); 1629, generally 114 see 29 L.Ed.2d (D.Kan.1993); Prytz, United States v. 822 307, Cоng., S.Rep. No. 97th 1st Sess. 72-74 (D.S.C.1993), F.Supp. the statute’s word (1981). (what ordinarily Context counts “re “knowingly” modifies not the word behavior; why Congress bad the reason ceives,” description the statute’s but also facts; etc.), jurisdictional mentions addi pornographic con “receive[d]” material’s sentence, position in a tion to the of words say, That is to we understand the tent. how, when, helps to inter a court decide require statute to for conviction pret incorporating statutes as states of mind. prove only that not the defen See, e.g., Blassingame, 427 F.2d at 330. “knowingly material that he receive[d]” dant depiction” per knows contains a “visual background context here includes conduct,” sexually “engaging explicit son that, a criminal statute is the fact when but also that the knows that the defendant (as totally silent about state of mind is com person depicted Ed so is a minor. Accord case), monly courts nonetheless assume wards, *5; Long, 453461 at WL Congress require kind intended some 586; F.Supp. Kempton, F.Supp. at major guilty knowledge respect 389; Prytz, F.Supp. at major wrong-creating crimes. elements Stаtes, Liparota v. 471 U.S. auto- United We concede that one cannot know 2084, 2088, 85 L.Ed.2d matically, simply position from (courts sentence, criminal statutes as just of the should not read words in the rea”); “requiring Bldg. no mens United States Florida Coast & Constr. Trades Gulf Co., Gypsum Council, 568, 575, 438 U.S. 485 U.S. 108 S.Ct. (1988). 98 S.Ct. 67 L.Ed.2d 864 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1978) (in statutes, criminal “far more than If interpret we would a silent statute as simple appropriate omission of the imposing guilty requirement, state of mind phrase statutory from the definition is neces- Congress’s explicit how could use of the word justify sary dispensing with an intent re- “knowingly” eliminate it? It seems far more States, quirement”); Morissette Congress used the word “know- 246, 255-66, 263, ingly” to make clear that it did intend to (1952). 249, 96 L.Ed. 288 insist that a defendant child-porno- know the Thus, “knowingly” ap had word graphic nature of legisla- the material. The peared at all in the child stat history tive confirms this view. For exam- (while ute, insisting upon courts “knowl Roth, ple, Senator the author of the amend- edge” ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‍of the “interstate commerce” element original ment which extended the bill to dis- 958) offense, supra p. see would have production, tribution as well as was asked prosecutors prove insisted nonetheless that a whether the amendment meant that guilty respect state of mind to the nature the distributor or seller must have [either] thing, of the material. For one the fact that knowledge actual the materials do engaging the material shows a child in sexu contain pornographic depictions, child or ally activity explicit secondary, is not a or [that] he should have had such actual jurisdictional, aspect of the crime. It is the knowledge. moral and criminal heart of the matter. For responded: He thing, requirement, another without a such absolutely That is correct. This severely punish purely amend- the statute would in ment, reach, phrase limited as it is “know- example, nocent conduct. It would ingly,” insures that those post employee “knowingly office sellers and who dis consciously distributors who are nothing tributes” mail but knows of con and de- tents, liberately developer engaged film marketing or a who for some rea of undeveloped pornography thereby son returns an film are roll of to a active- Congress ly contributing customer. could not hаve to intended the maintenance of this 959-960, Pp. infra; subject these results. see form of child prosecu- Unit abuse are to Turkette, 576, 580, ed States v. 452 U.S. 101 tion under this amendment. 2524, 2527, (1981) 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1977) 33,050 Cong.Rec. (emphasis 123 add- (courts must construe statutes to avoid ab ed). language to which Roth Senator results); Ferryman, surd United States v. (with way referred found its into final law 584, (1st Cir.1990) (same). 897 F.2d Fi stylistic changes). Compare minor nally, as X-Citement Video itself demon (1977) (Senate 33,061 Cong.Rec. bill with strates, to read this criminal statute as “re amendment) 95-225, Roth with Pub.L. No. quiring (contrary Liparota, no mens rea” to (1978) (final version). 2(a), 7, 92 Stat. 7-8 2088) 426, at 105 S.Ct. at Furthermore, Department of Justice makes it unconstitutional. See New York v. Congress wrote letter which it told

Ferber, 747, 765, 3348, 458 U.S. 102 S.Ct. Congress that the 3359, (1982) (criminalization 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 “knowingly” use of the word in subsection of child must involve “some ele 2252(a)(1) appropriate to make it clear part ment of scienter on the of the defen apply that the bill does not ... to innocent dant”); Ohio, see also Osborne v. transporters knowledge who have no 103, n. n. they nature or character the material (same; 109 L.Ed.2d 98 “reck transporting. are suffices). interpretаtion lessness” Such an S.Rep. Cong., duty therefore No. 95th 2d Sess. 29 interpret violates courts’ (1978), reprinted they federal statutes so that in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. are consistent added) possi (emphasis “Report”]. the federal Constitution whenever [hereinafter E.g., Thus, Corp. Department ble. Edward J. DeBartolo and the amendment’s (statement Goldwater); 33,051 id. at point of the statute’s Sen. agreed

author Hatch). (statement light “knowingly” lies in In of this the word Sen. explicit use nature of background, of that word to the the statute’s application we conclude contents, “knowingly” age not to the nature of applies to as well as word the material’s so, receipt. being conduct. That we find no constitu- its distribution application obstacle to of the statute tional said, Department also true that It is (We note that while this the case before us. context, a different circulating among in draft form opinion was it was not the intention of We assume panel, panel of of this another members require the Government the drafters reached the same conclusion. See this court knew the child prove thаt defendant Gifford, 471-73 merely age prove but sixteen was under Cir.1994).) was, fact, age than less that the child sixteen. II

Id., (emphasis add- 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. ed). this, however, Depart- saying Entrapment statutory referring ato ment was different penalized production, provision—one in this ease demonstrated The evidence Congress responded And not distribution. convincingly that Gendron ordered rather “knowingly” from the by dropping the word videotape that he knew con- and received statute, but not production section pornography. Consequently, tained child H.R.Conf.Rep. section. from the distribution strongest claim Gendron’s evidence-based Cong., reprinted 2d Sess. No. 95th deny having engaged his in conduct does not 69, 69; compare Pub.L. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. Rather, argues he that violates the statute. (1978) 2251(a), 7, 95-225, § 92 7 Stat. No. government that the evidence shows the “en- prose- (knowledge required production in trapped” doing him into so. Gendron notes cution) 2252(a), § 92 Stat. at 7-8 with id. entrapment parts: defense has two (knowledge required in distribution or re- (1) government’s the “inducement” of crimi- ceipt prosecution). (2) behavior; nal a defendant who was point that at the Finally, we concede See, “predisposed” e.g., commit the crime. suggests that there be Department’s letter 809, Rodriguez, knowledge requirement respect no with (1st Cir.1988) (setting 812-15 forth elements prosecutions. It age, for distribution even evidentiary entrapment of and relevant bur- said, dens). Although court the the submitted situation, legislative clarify his- To jury, entrapment issue to the which found that the defendant’s

tory might reflect Gendron, against argues that the evidence he age not an knowledge child is says support jury’s verdict. He did not of of offense, but that the bill is element of the government that it did not allow the to rebut apply trans- not intended to to innocent “inducement,” his claim of nor was suffi- knowledge the nature portation doubt) with no (beyond a his cient to show reasonable of material involved. or character of the “predisposition” crime. to commit the Con- sequently, says, particularly light of a he 29, 1978 at 64 Report, supra, at U.S.C.C.A.N. Supreme accepted added). recent Court case nothing in (emphasis We have found arguments, rather similar Jacobson v. United history, legislative howev the statute or the — States, -, 112 118 U.S. S.Ct. er, Congress adopted suggest this (1992), requires judg- L.Ed.2d 174 the law contrary, legis To the recommendation. acquittal. of ment history congressional aware lative reveals important constitutional differ ness of may evaluating pornography, help It Gendron’s adult and child

ences between simplified significance age, argument if we set forth terms constitutional understanding entrapment defense constitutional need for a our and the concomitant (For comprehensive respect elements. more guilty requirement mind its state of (1977) 33,048 accounts, see, S.Rep. See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra; age. Cong.Rec. e.g., 123 (1981); difficult, Cong., prove impossible, 1st Sess. 118-30 stop No. 97th or certain Scott, seriously activity, particularly LaFave & Substantive Criminal Law criminal activi- (1986); Seidman, ty involving drugs, corruption, Louis M. The 5.2 Su- or other Court, preme Entrapment, participant crimes which no direct Our Crimi- wants 111.) Dilemma, Sup.Ct.Rev. Hampton nal the crime detected. See Justice v. United States, Supreme Court has described that de- 495 n. 96 S.Ct. (1976) resting upon assumption (Powell, J., an 1653 n. fense L.Ed.2d 113 statutes, Cоngress, enacting concurring judgment); when criminal United States v. (1st Cir.1987). apply Bradley, does not the statute to to viola- intend (1) arising government’s tions out of “inducement,” improper An “abuse” of crime its “detection” and law “en- goes beyond providing ordinary “opportu an by “instigati[ng]” forcement” efforts — Jacobson, nity to commit a crime.” U.S. “lur[ing]” criminal behavior and to commit at -, 112 S.Ct. at 1541. An “inducement” (2) persons the crime who are “otherwise “opportunity” consists of an plus something States, innocent.” Sorrells v. United typically, pressure by excessive else— 210, 215, 77 L.Ed. 413 government upon gov the defendant or the added). (emphasis Consequently, the taking advantage alternative, ernment’s of an entrapment punishment doctrine forbids type “sting” non-criminal of motive. A person an “otherwise innocent” whose “al- ordinary opportunity combines an with these leged product offense” is “the the creative extra catching elements runs the risk of activity” officials. Id. at the law enforcement ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‍net not those who added). (emphasis As the might well have committed the crime else stated, Supreme reсently has Court (in sting), where the absence of the but also quest When the Government’s for convic- (in absence) likely those who would never apprehension tion leads to the of an other- have done so. Insofar as the net catches the who, law-abiding wise citizen to his if left latter, beyond it stretches its basic law en devices, likely own would have never run purpose. forcement law, afoul of the the courts should inter- examples improper Some “inducement” vene. may help. Courts have found a basis for — Jacobson, at -, 112 U.S. S.Ct. at 1543 (or sending entrapment jury issue to the added). (emphasis Since the Court has re finding entrapment established as a matter peatedly expressed gov concern about both law) (1) government where officials: used powers ernment “abuse” its enforcement against “intimidation” and “threats” a defen (or like) law-abiding the “otherwise Becerra, family, dant’s v. 992 (or like), surprising citizen” it is not (9th 960, (2) Cir.1993); every F.2d 963 caked parts, defense has two one that focuses day, “began defendant, threatening” the upon government “inducement” and the oth Groll, belligerent, were United 992 States upon “predisposition.” er the defendant’s (7th (3) 755, Cir.1993); engaged 759 “inducement,” describing courts “dogged “forceful” solicitation and insistence distinguished proper have capitulated,” Rodriguez, between and im until [defendant] 858 (4) proper 815; played law enforcement activities. It upon is F.2d at defendant’s “inducement”) (i.e., proper sympathy not an for the for informant’s common narcotics government “sting,” to use a experience symptoms, at least where it and withdrawal Sher man, (5) providing 821; amounts to a defendant with an 356 at U.S. 78 S.Ct. at “opportunity” E.g., played upon to commit a crime. Sor sentiment of “one former war rells, 212; buddy 287 U.S. at 53 at get liquor (during S.Ct. Sher ... for another” States, 369, 372, Sorrells, 440-41, man v. United 356 prohibition), U.S. 78 287 at U.S. (6) (1958); 212; S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 848 “repeated suggestions” United S.Ct. at used Coady, States v. 809 F.2d Cir. which succeeded when defendant had 1987); Espinal, job money United States v. 757 F.2d lost his and needed for his fami (1st Cir.1985). Kessee, rent, ly’s Without this kind of food and United States v. (9th weapon, Cir.1993); law enforcement it would often 992 F.2d told whether, (the govern- simply ask without the agent) was suicidal not she defendant activity, would money, present ment’s the defendant dеsperate need likely the crime when he did. Sullivan, have committed n. 1419 & all, government’s having without the Cir.1990). After (10th background and con- The defendant, opportunity, no presented that gov- example possible illustrate of each text likely not “predisposed,” how having matter “overreaching” acted ernment —of simply ask acted then. Nor can we have unfairly by employing have acted sim- the defendant would whether persuasion or inducement methods ilarly at some other time had he simi- risk that such create a substantial faced circumstances, present since his behavior lar by persons committed will be an offense compels answer to virtually an affirmative ready who are to commit than those other way. phrased in this question it. 2.13(1)(b). § Model Penal Code way question, it right The to ask the seems us, away— from —to assume is to abstract entrapment part of the The second they present circumstances as defense, somewhat more “predisposition,” is insofar overreaching. That is to reveal Supreme understand. Some difficult say, the defendant we shоuld ask how (and Model Penal Code’s Court Justices ordinary opportu to an would have reacted authors) argued “predisposition” have — Jacobson, nity to commit the crime. See Rather, they thought that not even relevant. at -, 2, 112 By n. at 1540 n. 2. S.Ct. only upon govern focus the defense should “ordinary,” op using the we mean an word impropriety, preventing law enforce ment portunity special that lacked those features might using from methods ment officers of it government’s conduct that made law-abiding astray, ordinary citizens lead “inducement,” “overreaching.” or an Was an particular defendant whether or not respond “predisposed” defendant affir See, e.g., crime. “predisposed” to commit the improper, matively proper, to a not to an Sorrells, 2.13; Code Model Penal lure? (Roberts, J., joined by at 217 Stone, JJ., concurring) (arguing Brandeis & way looking This at the matter seems to defense); “objective” view of the for this way Supreme flow from the which the Sherman, at 823 356 U.S. at “objec- Court has resolved the clash between (Frankfurter, J., joined Douglas, Harlan “subjectivе” entrapment— tive” and views of (same). Brennan, JJ., concurring) & if looks' at that at least resolution itself, however, rejected has Supreme Court simply denying the defense to one whom it is entrapment defense It saw the this view. namely designed help, the kind of police a sanction used to control so much (without might “sting”) who well defendant conduct, protection of the ordi but rather a committing that a be out crimes of the sort against government nary law-abiding citizen Russell, “sting” stop. 411 seeks to See U.S. Consequently, it no need overreaching. saw Further, at 93 S.Ct. at 1644. our effort advantage to take permit to a defendant “predisposition” through to define reference unless he himself was such that defense government of the conduct to the nature Sorrells, See, at 53 e.g., citizen. 287 U.S. that, descrip- despite partial the fact reflects Sherman, 376-77, 215; 356 at at U.S. S.Ct. upon primarily tions that focus the defen- Russell, 823; v. 411 78 at United States S.Ct. mind, government dant’s state of misconduct 433-35, 1637, 1643-44, 93 36 U.S. S.Ct. entrapment at the heart of the defense. lies (1973). upshot The is that we L.Ed.2d 366 simply the issue the Were not so—were just per that “innocеnt find out who must defendant’s state of mind —the law would law-abiding is the “otherwise son” is. Who to raise permit an innocent minded defendant have com citizen” who would not “otherwise” private person entrapment an claim when a mitted the crime? (through “induced” him similar “over- conduct) But reaching” to commit a crime. question’s difficulty lies in the word The the defense requires the law does not authorize That word us to ab- “otherwise.” circumstances, “outrageous” however present can- those stract from circumstances. We — Russell, at -, E.g., logues. private person’s conduct. S.Ct. at the 1643; Second, government’s soliciting at 1538-39. the (7th Jones, Cir.1991); depicted 950 F.2d 1309 letters sometimes their senders (1st Bradley, speech” lobbying organizations 820 F.2d “free and Emmert, Cir.1987); fighters “right United States v. for the to read what we de (9th Cir.1987); sire”; they “fight against United States v. asked Jacobson to F.2d 805 (6th McLernon, Cir.1984); censorship infringement 746 F.2d 1098 and the of individual States, at -, rights.” Whiting v. United Id. S.Ct. at Cir.1963). Third, government’s provide effort to an buy “opportunity” pornography to child Finally, phrasing question way this years. stretched out over two and a half automatically, prevents concluding one from together, might Taken find in these simply from the fact that the defendant com- graduated three sets circumstances —the crime, “predisposed” that he was mitted the response, long period, appeal time to time, to it. the same if the commit At an- (free proper speech) motive —a substantial question phrased swer to the so is affirma- inducing ordinary law-abiding per risk of an tive, the defendant would seem to be the sort Indeed, gov son to commit the crime. (and person in this his conduct instance ernment conceded in Jacobson that its meth conduct) that the criminal the sort of statute amounted, entrapment purposes, ods is, words, punish. intends to He other improper an “inducement.” Id. at - n. someone who would commit the crime 112 S.Ct. at 1540 n. 2. and for the reasons under the circumstances importance, Jacobson’s concerns crime, normally and who associated with “predisposition” part entrapment poses society therefore of threat the sort evidence, defense. The Court held that the control, that the statute seeks to and which law, required acquittal as a matter of because government, “sting,” through seeks jury a reasonable would have had to doubt stop. predisposition. Jacobson’s evidence States, We turn now to Jacobson v. United (1) predisposition consisted of two facts: child recent case where the before the became involved Ja Supreme entrapment Court found as a mat- private mailing cobson was on a bookstore’s law, upon heavily ter of which Gendron photos; list for dubious he re agents relies. found Jacobson’s Government sponded affirmatively government’s to the mailing name on a bookstore list that indicat- fact, wrote, solicitations. The first the Court photos ed that the store had mailed of naked predisposition showed little about a to act agents children to Jacobson. Government zrolawfully ordering photos because then sent Jacobson letters from fictitious — -, lawful at the time. U.S. at people organizations, soliciting orders for second, orders, placing S.Ct. at 1542. The respects, child In three how- could not show how Jacobson would have ever, they provide ordinary did than an more acted had the solicitation lacked the three First, opportunity buy pornography: mentioned, just namely, the im elements we psychologically the solicitations reflected motives, proper appeals anti-censorship “graduated” responses set of to Jacobson’s graduated response, lengthy and the time responses, beginning own noneriminal -, at 1542-43. frame. Id. at S.Ct. progressing innocent lures frank and to of- government to The therefore failed show government fers. The a started with “sexual doubt). “predisposition” (beyond a reasonable questionnaire,” gen- attitude which elicited a it) (as That means we understand sex”; “pre-teen in eral interest it followed government’s evidence did not show how Ja containing general, nonexplicit with letters cobson would have acted had he been faced implying possibility por- references a of child ordinary “opportunity” commit the with an to nography; per- it then sent more Jacobson special crime rather than a “inducement.” (but and, correspondence; finally sonal after correspon- Jacobson had discontinued case is similar to Jacob Gendron’s dence), pornography respects. government it him in ini- sent child cata- son’s two The sham, pretend foreign name on a “naked letter from another a

tially found Gendron’s list, government mailing company, spoke and the of “hard to obtain children” pornography wrote, solicitations over him child sent erotica.” He (one long period of time fairly a very part I am interested the other of companies was also involved Ja- “sham” your very services that are difficult to cobson). are, however, two critical There my country.... becoming I obtain am differences. very pornography.... bored with adult I First, any governmental very young girls only “over and like color videos. reaching” you help here was less extensive than Can me. government “gradu The neither Jacobson. responded explicit The firm with an sham (from to responses innocent lure ated” pornography catalogue, child and Gendron offer) nor, exception, frank with one did (Again ordered several of titles. any appeal to motive other than the desire to order.) government did not fill the A few exception con see child government months later the sent Gendron a (also present one solicitation in Ja sists of explicit pornography catalogue. third child cobson) government’s in which the sham sent back an and a Gendron order check. “hysterical company referred to nonsense” later, again, asking Two months he wrote if pornography, why gov asked about order, “forgotten” making the firm had his “spending was millions of dollars to ernment type clear that he still wanted “this of edu censorship while tons exercise international materials,” stating, worry, cational “don’t I country “easily.” drugs” enter the None any way am not connected in with law en theless, government disguise here the did not forcement,” adding Hurry.” “Please rights” lobbying organiza itself as a “sexual (This government time the filled the order tion, Congress seeking lobby remove prosecution.) with the video that led to this funding through restraints and its efforts correspondence, Unlike Jacobson’s Gendron’s pornographic catalogue sales. Nor did the correspondence reveals a desire to view government ask to commit pornography; nothing child it contains like — principle. crime as a matter See U.S. urging Jacobson’s of a “counter attack” at -, -, 1538-39, 112 S.Ct. at against those “who are determined to curtail “overreaching” here was far Since — at -, our freedoms.” Jacobson, less extensive than there is less (See Appendix at 1538. for a detailed chro government reason to believe “over case.) nology of the events Gendron’s “inducement”) (i.e., reaching” improper an evidence, together, This taken reveals a person could lead an “otherwise innocent” opportunity defendant who met an initial Gifford, 17 commit the crime. See enthusiasm, buy who 469-70. responded to each further initia- Second, the record contains substantial ev- order, who, purchase tive with a unlike mind; state of that evi- idence of Gendron’s Jacobson, particular showed no interest in an (induce- permits dence the conclusion that evidence, anti-censorship campaign. This not) “predisposed” was ment or he to commit said, permits jury (beyond we have to find In late when Gendron first crime. doubt) a reasonable that Gendron would have verbally explicit pornogra- “child

received responded affirmatively ordinary to the most government’s phy” catalogue from the sham and, hence, opportunities, “predis- placed accompanied by company, he an order posed” to commit the crime. We therefore ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‍said, in which he letter jury’s entrapment find the decision lawful. finally I have found the kind of educational dreaming possessing material I’ve been Ill I ... quite [am some time. excited so] your

that I have decided order two Search and Seizure titles.... order, agents fill not but Government searched Gendron’s did house, years primary piece of evi- responded three later to a and seized the Gendron

965 (the lesser, videotape), pursuant protection against ato warrant. unreasonable inva- denee (1) privacy. authorized a search of sion of a citizen’s That warrant As one commen- it, put tator has Gendron, of Daniel A. 105 the residence Street, Rehoboth, Winthrop general proposition Massachusetts as a put the facts for- 02769; justify ward to anticipatory issuance of an warrant are more establish that (2) a videocassette labeled PTL “VHS probable cause will exist at the time of the (1)” items; delivery by and related “after typical search than the warrant based sole- by receipt mail to and Daniel Gendron” of a ly upon prior the known location of the specifically parcel (containing the described place items be searched at the to be (ten tape) expiration until the of the warrant searched. issuance). days its concedes after Gendron LaFave, Wayne the warrant meets the Constitution’s 2 R. Search and Seizure (2d 1987). 3.7(c), requirements: § its two basic issuance was at 97 ed. “anticipa Were unlawful, supported by “probable tory cause” believe that warrants” law enforcement activity agents trigger evidence of criminal would exist wоuld have to wait until the occurred; delivery tape; ing then, his house after the and event if time did not “particularly place permit application, they describ[es] it to be a warrant searched, search, things forego legitimate or, ... to be and the seized.” have to more Const, likely, simply (justified amend. IV. He claims that it is by conduct the search circumstances”) “anticipa “exigent any nonetheless invalid because it is an without war Louisiana, tory adequately speci at warrant” which fails rant all. See Vale v. 30, 34-35,

fy 1971-1972, time at which it will take effect. Gen- 26 (1970); LaFave, support dron cites in a recent case decided L.Ed.2d supra, 6.5. court, panel surprised of this different United We are not that courts have found Ricciardelli, warrants,” “anticipatory 998 F.2d 8 Cir. considered as a 1993). class, perfectly consistent with the Constitu 10-11; E.g., tion. 998 F.2d Ricciardelli general, simple fact that a Garcia, 882 F.2d “anticipatory” i.e., warrant that it takes — (2d Cir.1989); Goodwin, United States v. effect, issuance, upon specified not at a but (4th Cir.1988); F.2d United States v. future time —does not invalidate a warrant or (9th Hale, Cir.1986); 784 F.2d 1468-69 suspeсt legally make it somehow disfa Glen, People v. 30 N.Y.2d 331 N.Y.S.2d specify they vored. Warrants often do (1972). 282 N.E.2d upon will take effect issuance. But the Con imposes requirement. argues, stitution no such Rather, says “delivery by it that a search must not be the warrant’s reference to mail “unreasonable,” receipt by and that warrants must be to and Daniel Gendron” does not Const, supported by “probable clarity “triggering cause.” U.S. describe with sufficient event,” i.e., nothing particular amend. IV. There is unreasonable when it time will tomorrow, authorizing agree about a search for not take effect. We with Gendron that a today, clearly say when reliable information indicates warrant must when takes ef that, house, say, marijuana agree says will reach the fect. We also that a warrant that now, upon but then. Nor does it seem auto it takes effect the occurrence of a fu matically greater ambiguity unreasonable to tie the warrant’s ture event risk of runs a authority search to the future specific event that than a warrant that refers to a (as month, brings probable (e.g., day, yeаr ordinary with it the cause do search warrants). “delivery large time package why required of a brown That is cometshave Y”). addressed to X with upon anticipatory return address that the conditions Ricciardelli, clear, In principle, “explicit, at 10-11. warrants become effective be “triggering help narrowly the use event” can drawn.” Ricciardelli 703-04). Garcia, place only (quoting assure that the search takes when at 12 F.2d at cause”; justified said, however, by “probable anticipato any That we do not find fatal ry may thereby greater, description. warrants offer flaw in the warrant’s includes,

First, meaning. at requirement the with re word’s The context law’s warrant, least, be one of specificity of time must the rest which de- spect to Glen, specificity. house, 331 N.Y.S.2d at that reasonable scribes Gendron’s makes clear (warrant 661, should at 619 re the.object 282 N.E.2d of the search is a video that will “reasonably contempora to quire search be mail, by and mentions arrive at house contraband); 2 La with arrival of neous” “delivery by mail” to that house. Common- 3.7(c), Fave, (citing § n. 103 supra, аt 99 & by suggests “receipt sense the words Glen). specificity a can how One understand receipt at that Daniel Gendron” also refer to time, to like those in requirement respect house, at receipt and not to downtown or “things or respect “place to to be searched” (to Office, Post use our own farfetched Const, TV, seized,” might amend. to be example) in Okinawa. enforcement offi limit the discretion of law recognize possible to logically We that it is and where and what to cers to decide when “receipt” word if it to read the referred search, general thereby avoiding the “hated receipt somewhere other than at Gendron’s pre-Revolutionary assistance of writs of logical’fact house. But that does not make Glen, 659, times,” at 331 N.Y.S.2d any specific. logical less fact the word assuring the existence N.E.2d at and undoubtedly people that the world contains LaFave, 3.7(c), § supra, “probable cause.” “Daniel than de named Gendron” other 4.5, 4.6(a), 99; 207; § at at id. at id. 236. does the war fendant here not mean that justification But we know оf no stricter event, triggering “delivery by to rant’s mail respect specificity time standard in to than Gendron,” receipt by ambigu and Daniel is respect (constitutionally to the two other specify it ous because does not referenced) Ricciardelli, parameters. search “Daniel Gendron” whom it refers is the to stating that the contraband must be on while residing at the searched. address be place to the a “sure and irreversible course” Despite logical post possibility searched, pur did not to be 998 F.2d at might tape accidentally office deliver the requir port any special to set forth new rule Gendron, apparently other Daniel thus some time, than, specificity rather ing more where warrant, fulfilling the literal terms of the sky, place, contrary, is issue. To the per adequately specific warrant is as to the says Ricciardelli that a warrant’s restrictions tape. Specificity son to receive the does not place time be respect should “simi writing deny lie in words that all unintended lar.” Id. at Rather, logical possibilities. it lies in a com Sеcond, tells us that we the law are context, language bination of which to (and descriptions in to read warrants their clear, gether permit communication documents), “hypertechni supporting simple Any negate direction. all effort eal[ly],” but a “commonsense” fashion. logical possibilities through unintended Ventresca, 102, 109, v. produce linguistic word alone written (1965); 13 L.Ed.2d 684 see complication point and confusion to the Bianco, also, e.g., United States F.2d warrant, practice, where a would fail to (2d Cir.1993); 1116-17 In re Grand very give point. the clear direction that is its (9th Jury Subpoenas, 926 F.2d Cir. why reading That is we war must avoid Antone, 1991); States v. United language “hypertechnically.” rant’s See Ven (5th Cir.1985); tresca, 380 U.S. at 85 S.Ct. at 746. Charest, Cir.1979). Ricciardelli, it not for we would end Were fashion, in a the war Read commonsense concede, here. how- the discussion We must specific seem and clear. rant’s words Gen ever, unlawfully am- Ricciardelli found “receipt,” dron takes the word from virtually biguous a warrant identical phrase “delivery by receipt mail to and language, namely, triggered language that Gendron,” аrgues that Daniel upon the warrant fatally ambiguous might because it mean “re delivery by receipt by mail ceipt” anywhere, say, or at to and Steven downtown But, out, containing pointed package Post Office. Ricciardelli of the ... as we have see supra p. videotape. helps provide context significant that 998 F.2d at 9. We find a differ- lieve” evidence criminal conduct will house; ence, in the factual context which be “located” in the and that the warrant was issued. The Ricciardelli surveillance will commence from the time panel referred to what it considered a critical parcel placed delivery for [at the fact: Office] Rehoboth Post and continue until parcel has been delivered to 105 Win- (apparently significant) chance that the St., Rehoboth, MA, throp package not be delivered to Ricciar- possibility at that probable [the

delli’s home all—a arising only cause to search postal inspectors] undeniably had envi- parcel premises” “after the has entered the added). Moreover, trial, sioned. (еmphasis at postal inspector testified opinion Id. at 17. The also makes clear that Florida, if Mr. Gendron was in we aren’t “delivery by by special delivery mail” was parents’ entitled to search his house or his receipt,” postal with a and that the “return house. Once it was delivered into the inspectors “contingency plans” had in the house, then the search warrant became package event that Ricciardelli received the effective. 9, 17 than Id. at somewhere other his home. (As He added that the house was under surveil- happened, n. 9. it the “letter carrier & lance because package” tried deliver the but Ricciardelli home, postman so left a notice”

was “the important piece if was to us that post that he could “collect the item at the delivered, get you didn’t don’t execute the office,” Ricciardelli, fact, pick up did search warrant. Office, package at the Post not at his added). (emphasis Tr. at 115-16 Conse- 9-10.) home. Id. Ricciardelli, quently, nothing unlike in the suggests background record here in which facts, light background In can these words, adequately specific the warrant’s why panel might have understand warrant, could, prac- the context of the as a context, thought “receipt,” in the word was matter, convey meaning. tical a different ambiguous receipt might as to where the all, place. highly specific take After even the reasons, distinguish For these we Ricciar- language describing in this case the item to delli and find that it does not control the seized, namely be “VHS videocassette la- outcome here. To make certain that our (1),” thought ambiguous beled PTL could be correct, however, reading of the case is we background if the of this case had revealed a opinion have circulated a draft of this to the possibility (imagine serious two such items concurring judge in entire court. The Ric that Gendron had worked for a firm called ciardelli, (Torruella, J., 998 F.2d at 17 con Realty “PTL Co.” and had taken home a curring) believes that his views there would videos). series of demonstration This is sim- require holding in Gendron’s favor here. ply say background facts can some- But, majority agrees of the court with our hypothetical possibilities, turn times such as reading distinguishes Ricciardelli receipt ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‍delivery wrong in Okinawa or to the See, e.g., that case from this one. Gendron, practical possibilities Daniel into Rivera, 950-51 States v. that, context, might reading mean that one Cir.1993). accept We therefore do Gen- a warrant in a “commonsense” fashion would dron’s Fourth Amendment claim. significant ambiguity. find nonetheless IV

Here, however, background no fact created significant ambiguity. contrary, On Arguments Other postal inspector’s specified that affidavit arguments, further makes three Gendron parcel placed delivery” “will be routine requires none of which extended discussion. Service, “through the U.S. Postal Rehoboth, MA”; Jury ar parcel that after the “is Instruction. Gendron specifi gues mail trial court should have delivered and taken into the resi- dence,” cally jury that it must find he “probable there will be cause to be- instructed the fact, tape contains the relevant cata- depicted on the the record person

knew the logue descriptions, did not ask which read as follows: age of 18. Gendron under the object to charge, nor did he the for this 13, from # 6 E-2 NANCY: and her friends judge gave, required which instruction the impish year-old, An a delicate THROB. character find that he “knew the jury to the fetching blonde of and a 10 with her Nonetheless, material.” the and nature hide-and-seek, tumble, playmate of 7 of judge’s “plain.” says the “error” was that he romp. 52(b); generally see Arrieta- Fed.R.Crim.P. pretty pubescents I: Two J-6 KIMONO States, Agressot v. United taught geishas. how to become From are Cir.1993). however, context, we be In make-up nudity. full costume and Some judge gave made the charge the lieve the censoring. now makes. Estelle point that Gendron See argument centers on the absence Gendron’s — U.S. -, - & McGuire, n. phrase “having sex” in the actual of the 4, 116 482 & n. L.Ed.2d 385 descriptions. (in jury charge, ask evaluating a court should instance, prosecutor In the other the de- is a reasonable likelihood ‘“whether there pornographic tape gov- scribed the the challenged in jury applied the has containing ernment Gendron as sent way that violates the struction in a Constitu year girl explicit depictions of a 9 to 11 old tion,” light “the context of the instruc abused, being sexually being raped, record”) (quot a and the trial tions as whole teenage boys an adult male. 370, 380, ing Boyde California, 494 U.S. fact, tape depictions In does not contain (1990)). 1190, 1198, 108L.Ed.2d 316 110 S.Ct. rape (although, of forcible as the jury fully aware that the issue was The out, depictions points engaging of a child remainder of the child The “statutory rape”). (In sex amount to charge frequently to children. referred child.) deed, depicted year film a nine old agree with We Gendron likelihood, Thus, it understood the in all prosecutor’s wrong statements were and that encompass and nature” to words “character she should not have made them. We cannot age explicit sexual acts. as as Since well however, agree, they entitle Gendron for no more and we can find Gendron asked a new trial. That is because Gendron did not prejudice, is significant no likelihood there object to the statements the time. Had he plain Arrieta-Agressot, 3 F.3d at no error. so, done we are certаin that the district court 528. correction, would have ordered a and a cor any by point rection would have cured harm Closing Statement. Gendron ing out the facts. In the an absence of points prosecutor’s in the to two statements objection, normally we will not or that, says, factually closing argument he are der a new trial unless there is a “substantial significantly prejudicial. erroneous and jury chance that error absent the instance, prosecutor described or, reason, acquitted,” have for some other had ordered from the item that Gendron “miscarriage justice.” we fear a (sometime catalogue private order be mail 1, 15, Young, States v. 1985) follows: fore as (1985); 84 L.Ed.2d Arrieta- Nancy. Nancy I think the title of was is Agressot, 3 F.3d at 528. no such We see and her friends from No. described miscarriage, any significant nor likelihood of prepubescenee. pretty Two and No. 6 is acquittal, here. prepubescents taught are how to become year old, Nancy, geishas. strong, This 10 and her The in this ease was evidence friends, year having perhaps overwhelming. jury pоr a 10 old sex with a saw year year having tape, portrays blond at sex tions of a nine old delicate seek, playmate, girl engaging sexually explicit hide with her com- old activities this, bat, says teenage is his and adult men. rock. What interest gentlemen? nothing suggest tape any ladies and Children. Female leaves children. unlawful of its con- doubt about the nature Thus, case, particular in this we do tents. APPENDIX single “rape,” not think the use of the word Chronology events in the Gendron case: is, any signifi forceful as it could have had November, agents 1984: Government dis- prejudicial impact jury beyond cant on the cover Gendron’s name on mailing list of impact tape question itself. The Midge, suspected Milton videotape descriptions, because of their Midge’s distributor. records indicate that “predisposition” relevance to the element of Gendron had videotape ordered a entitled defense, entrapment Gendron’s little “Nancy,” description whose reads: “NANCY: But, described, supra p. closer. as we have 13, and her friends from # 6 THROB. An predisposition very of the evidence was impish year-old, a delicate blonde of strong. misdescrip We do not believe the fetching and a 10 with playmate her of 7 original tion of the mail order would hide-and-seek, tumble, romp.” and any practical jury’s have had effect on the Spring, 1986: Post Office entrapment” finding, particularly oper- “no initiates an be involving ation the fictitious “Far Eastern description cause the correct was admitted Trading Company” and sends a flier to Gen- jury. into evidence and to the In available (and others) asking dron those interested in light strength government’s of the ease information (“an “youthful about Far Eastern’s important considering factor in the like coupon material” to return a with the cus- ly rhetoric,” effect of borderline name, address, signed tomer’s affirma- Mejia-Lozano, States 829 F.2d tion that the customer is not a law (1st enforce- Cir.1987)), whether we consider the two ment officer in “entrapping interested Far separately together, misstatements Trading Company, agents Eastern or cus- they “plain.” “error” reflect is not

tomers.” argues Erotica. Other Gendron October 1986: Gendron fills out the allowing, coupon that the court in erred as evidence and returns it to Far Eastern. (but reply, “predisposition,” of various “child Far Eastern erotic” sends Gendron a cata- illegal) logue items seized at his home. materials available for He order. Each description clearly item’s seriously argue, does not that the indicates that it — depicts sexually Jacobson, explicit involving items were not activities relevant. See at -, minors. (stating S.Ct. at 1542 “by similar material itself’ was not sufficient December 1986: Gendron sends a Rather, predisposition). says show he ordering handwritten letter to Far Eastern outweighed by their usefulness was their ten videotapes. two The text of letter is: dency prejudice jury. Fed.R.Evid. 12-29-86 issue, however, balancing 403. The is for FROM court, the district not this court. United Mr. Daniel A. Gendron Williams, [address] Cir.1993). might reasonably The court have Hi Peter: concluded, light of the nature of the basic (the itself), very happy I’m videotape you very evidence the case to know happy finally I to know that have found nature the additional child-erotic kind of educational signifiсant material material I’ve been prejudicial made no dif dreaming possessing quite ference. some We find no abuse of discretion in sorry say time. I’m I have never had this determination. any delightful experiences I which find arguments Gendron’s additional are with- your catalogue. out merit. getting very just I reading was excited your material. excited that I So have de- reasons, judgment For the above your cided to order two of titles VHS the district court is format, LOLITA’S SEX LESSON 119.95 AND CHILDREN A SEX ORGY 129.95 Affirmed. sexually explicit portrays minors in activi- ties. COD 249.90 PLUS OF TOTAL submits an December 1989: Gendron CHARGES. child-pornographic to Artistes for four order only pick question why I could two I along reading videotapes, with a notation TI- Also the TEENS titles. LOVELY more and materi- “Please send order forms you prices Do had no listed. have TLES als,” order and a Christmas card. The larger quantities any specials buying on filled. tapes. I also like know of VHS tapes places 1990: an order you have color March more about whether American,” company, a third sham “Can many long minutes with sound how videotapes descriptions clearly for two whose they. you. Thank are child-pornographic their content. indicate Daniel Gendron /s/ 4,May 1990: Gendron writes a letter to fill the order. did not delay complaining about the Can American is found April, 1988: Gendron’s name on letter filling his order. The text of the is: N.M.P.C., mailing list of a Gentlemen: in Miami. distributor you forgotten my order of Have March October, 1989: sham A new 4,1990. you May It now I sent 17th. is a Internationale,” “Artistes sends a company, good pay tape check for to for 149.90 (and from flier to Gendron others PTL(l) LVM(2). mag and one list) mailing indicating that it car- N.M.P.C. time to clear is Sufficient for a check two erotica,” “extremely hard to obtain but ried you It has If can- weeks. been 7 weeks. mentioning pornogra- child specifically promised my as cancel not deliver then interested in phy. The flier asked those my you if order and return check or have by reply letter. more information to already a cashed it send me refund. sends a letter October 1989: Gendron don’t to take other force me action Please requesting information about to Artistes my money worry, I get to Don’t am back. letter pornography. child The text оf the is: in any way with law not connected enforce- 10/16/89 ment. This is time I have the first ever A. Daniel sought type obtain this educational [address] my materials I wanted it for small [sic]. library Gentlemen Hurry. of video collections. Please I am a 6883 Bird customer of N.M.P.C. Dan Gendron /s/ Miami, # 102 33155 who Rd. Florida has May 1990: Law enforcement officers they part stated that have contracted anticipatory an search warrant from obtain you they handle services that can [sic] Alexander, Magistrate Joyce London many like the U.S.A. Well like others me authorizes a of Gendron’s search house very part I am in the other interested tape delivered after the Can American your very diffeult [sic] services that are him. my country. obtain May post 1990: The office delivers the very becoming [sic] I am board thereafter, Shortly tape to Gendron. law pornograpy always adult [sic] and have execute the search war- enforcement officers something owning dif- been interested in house, seizing and search rant Gendron’s you I if I mean. am ferent know what tape American and various related Can years as single age with low income items. janitor. only very young girls I like POLLAK, Judge you help color Can me. Thank H. District videos. LOUIS (concurring). you Daniel Gendron /s/ judgment in the of the court I concur wrought catalogue. carefully in the court’s and illumi- reply, Artistes sends Gendron addresses, com- description clearly nating opinion. opinion Each item’s indicates that detail, prehensively painstaking and in all of Second. The fact pur- that the methods presented. by government agents I questions sued the substantial offer Gendron tempting only opportunity to commit add a few words. a crime were not successful but have been found clear, opinion First. As the court’s makes view) by (correctly, this my court not to constitutional difficulties of serious dimension i.e., have been not to have crossed unlawful — child-pornography would attend the statute the line into the entrap- forbidden realm of if, prosecutions knowing receipt of a not, my judgment, ment —does signify that depiction” engaged “visual of “a minor enforcing those methods of this sort of stat- conduct,” sexually explicit 18 U.S.C. something ute are рroud to be of. 2252(a)(2), phrase “knowingly receives” requiring govern- were not construed as establish, beyond

ment a reasonable

doubt, depiction” the “visual was one involve, just

which the defendant knew to

pornography, but child These

potential constitutional difficulties are obviat- persuasive

ed the court’s demonstration of “congressional important awareness America, Appellee, UNITED STATES of constitutional differences between adult that, pornography,” with the result ZAPATA, Walter DeJesus concludes, proper reading the court Defendant, Appellant. Congress what wrote is “that the statute’s ‘knowingly’ applies age word as well as No. 93-1349. conduct.” Appeals, United States Court of bar, appellant the case at Gendron con- First Circuit. pertinent aspect tends that the charge Heard Feb. 1994. given namely the trial that court — government required prove was that Gen- Decided March dron “knew the character and nature of the say material” —was deficient did not

expressly that the had to have

proved that Gendron knew one ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‍of the depicted in videotape

actors was a minor.

But, notes, as the court Gendron did not Moreover,

request such an instruction. shows, highly unlikely

the court it is

jury could have failed to understand that the charge

central focus of the was eager acquire, through gov- good ultimately acquire,

ernment’s offices did videotape depicting say,

That is to the case bar the fact that give

the trial court did not particu- the more charge appellant request

larized did not realistically

cannot supposed be to have af- jury’s

fected the deliberations in a fashion appellant.

detrimental In future trials statute, presum-

under this defendants will

ably request, surely give, and trial courts will particularized

a more of what statement

“knowingly” comprehends.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Gendron

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Date Published: Mar 2, 1994

Citation: 18 F.3d 955

Docket Number: 92-2003

Court Abbreviation: 1st Cir.