This is an appeal from the lower court’s order denying defendants’ motions to dismiss the indictment on the ground the indictment constitutes double jeopardy. The court’s order is appealable. Abney v. U. S.,
I. The dоuble jeopardy claims in this case involve five distinct instances of possible former jeopardy.
1. Apрellants were indicted on September 13, 1977 on various drug-related charges. With the exception of Santiаgo Casinao, Jr., Joseph Gonzalez Alvarado, Jr. and Juventino Salinas Munoz, they negotiated a plea bargain with the government. But when the District Judge refused to accept the sentences recommended by the gоvernment as part of the plea agreement, the appellants withdrew their guilty pleas. Then, because of a superseding indictment for the same offenses, the District Judge granted the government’s motion to dismiss the original indictment. Appellants now argue that the second indictment places them in double jeopardy.
The law is settled in this area. . The Supreme Court has stated consistently that a prosecution does not sufficiently “jeopardize” a defendant for purposes of the Double Jeopardy clause until the defendant is
2. Casinao and Gonzalez Alvaradо, also named in the original indictment, did not plea bargain. Their trial was scheduled to begin in February, 1978. The jury was selected on January 6, but was never sworn. Both defendants were named in the second, superseding indictment of Januаry 31, and the trial on the original indictment was cancelled when the Court dismissed that first indictment.
As we said earlier, the Suрreme Court has said that jeopardy does not attach in a jury trial until the jury is empaneled and sworn. Crist v. Bretz, supra. Since the jury in the trial of these defendants had not yet been sworn, jeopardy did not yet attach in the original prosеcution and the second prosecution was not double jeopardy.
3. Appellant Julian Jerrera Mеndoza was tried in 1976 on the charges of importing marijuana and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. He was acquitted on the importation charge and convicted on the possession charge.
In the instant prosecution Mendoza has been charged with, among other things, conspiracy offenses apparently related to the previously prosecuted substantive offenses. While conspiracy is normally a sufficiently distinct offense from an underlying substantive offense so that the Double Jeopardy clause does not bar prоsecution of both, U. S. v. Jasso,
We do not reach that question in this cаse because we find that the offenses of conspiracy to import and to possess marijuana with the intent to distribute and the substantive offenses of importation and possession with intent are sufficiently distinct, with eaсh involving the proof of a fact not required for conviction of the others, Blockburger v. U. S.,
4. Appellant Tamez, tried in 1974 on a similar drug charge, contends the instant prosecution places him in double jeopardy. We agree with the District Court that the instant prosecution dоes not violate the Double Jeopardy clause because it does not charge the same оffense tried in 1974.
5. Tamez also claims that an indictment against him in Oklahoma for a related offense makes thе instant prosecution double jeopardy.
This claim fails on two grounds. First, the Oklahoma indictment charged a diffеrent offense — conspiracy to distribute drugs; as opposed to the importation and possession conspiracies charged in the instant prosecution. Second, the lower court apparently found, based on evidence in the record (R. 142.), that the Oklahoma indictment was dismissed before the accused wаs put to trial before the trier of fact. This finding was not clearly erroneous.
The order of the lower court is affirmed.
