Robert Garcia contends the district court should have suppressed evidence obtained from a search of his residence. He argues the authorizing warrant was invalid because (1) it was stale and (2) the address on the warrant did not match his residence. The warrant was executed beforе it became stale and within the time constraints of the federal rules. And, because the warrant adopted the supporting affidavit’s unambiguous description of the residence, the address mismatch is of no consequence. We affirm.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A reliable confidential informant told Agent Hiram Latin of the Alаmogordo Department of Public Safety’s Narcotics Enforcement Unit about “a quantity of methamphetamine consistent with trafficking in Robert Garcia’s possession.” (R. Vol. I at 34.) The informant said the methamphetamine could be found in Garcia’s residence and described the residence аs a single-wide mobile home 1 without an address but bearing the number 32 on its west end. Latin included this description as well as a photograph of the residence in the affidavit and application for a search warrant he presented to a state judge. Unfortunately, he mistakenly identified the residеnce as 1220 Mescalero Street. On August 7, 2009, the state judge issued a warrant to “search forthwith the person or place described in the Affidavit.” (R. Vol. I at 31.) Although it commanded police to conduct the search “forthwith,” the search of Garcia’s residence did not occur until August 16, 2009 — nine days after the warrant issued.
Agent Michael Mirabal supervised the execution of the warrant. In preparing to for execute it, he discovered 1220 Mescale-ro Street was not the mobile home described (and pictured) in the affidavit but an “actual structure house.” (R. Vol. Ill at 69.) However, the discrepancy did not trouble him because mobile homes in the area are often addressed with unit numbers, such as “1220 Mescalero Number 12,” so he assumed the residence described and pictured might merely be 1220 Mes-calero # 32. (R. Vol. Ill at 69.) In addition, several days prior to execution of the warrant, Agent Latin аccompanied Mira- *1194 bal to the area to point out the mobile home at issue.
The police executed the search against the single-wide trailer bearing the number 32 as depicted in the photograph in Latin’s affidavit, even though that residence was not 1220 Mescalero Street. When they entered the residence, officers observed Garcia “crouching near the kitchen sink” and found several bags of methamphetamine in the garbage disposal. (R. Vol. 1 at 49.) In the end, officers “found sixteen bags of methamphetamine (approximately 54 grams of methamphetamine in total), marijuana, pills, around $30,000 in cash, drug paraphernalia, security cameras, ledgers, and other drug-related items inside the home.” (R. Vol. I at 50.)
Garcia moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. He relied on a variety of rationales in the district court, including the two advanced on appeal: (1) “the search wаrrant ... was stale by the time it was executed because it was executed nine days after it was issued;” and (2) the search was invalid because the “warrant was for a different address.” (R. Vol. I at 5, 8.) After an evidentiary hearing, the judge denied the motion. He concluded (1) the warrant was timely executed аnd (2) the photograph and description of the premises in the supporting affidavit, combined with the knowledge of the executing officers, were sufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.
Garcia then entered into a plea agreement, which allowed him to apрeal from the denial of his motion to suppress. He pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B). He was sentenced to the statutory minimum 60-month term of imprisonment with four years of supervised release to follow.
DISCUSSION
On review of the denial of a motion to suрpress, the ultimate determination of whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred is a matter we consider de novo.
United, States v. Madden,
A. Staleness
Garcia’s stale warrant argument has two different, but related, rationales. First, he argues, the warrant was stale because the statements of the confidential informant did not provide probable cause to believe the items police sоught would still be in his home when the search was conducted. Second, it was stale because the issuing judge commanded the police to execute the warrant “forthwith” and the police failed to justify their nine-day delay. We are not persuaded.
1. Probable Cause
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution restricts the circumstances under which a search warrant may issue:
[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence teaches that a warrant remains valid only as long as the information in the oath or affirmation supporting its issuance provides probable cause to believe the items sought will still be found in the place to be searched at the time the search is conducted.
United States v. Shomo,
Even though the search here oсcurred nine days after the warrant issued (and perhaps as many as twelve days after the confidential informant made his statement), there was probable cause to believe drugs and items related to drug distribution would continue to be found in Garcia’s home. As the district court explained, “people who use or sell drugs generally keep a ready stash in their house, in addition to other types of evidence that cannot be easily disposed of, and these items were likely to be found in the house, even after nine days.” (R. Vol. I at 58.) Indeed, Latin’s affidavit said the amount of methamphеtamine the confidential informant observed in Garcia’s home was consistent with “trafficking.” (R. Vol. I at 34.) Based on his law enforcement experience, Latin told the issuing magistrate “persons who use and deal in drugs normally maintain a supply of drugs in their residence along with other evidence of use аnd distribution.” (R. Vol. I at 35.) The affidavit’s statements regarding continuous criminal activity situate this case within the case law making the passage of time less critical.
See Shomo,
2. “Forthwith”
The state-issued warrant to search Garcia’s residence directed the state officers to execute the search “forthwith.” (R. Vol. I at 31.) Garcia argues this was a command to police to perform the search with special haste. He assumes that, if the warrant were not executed “forthwith,” he would be entitled to exclusion of the evidence obtained from the search.
In federal prosecutions, we gauge the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment by federal law.
Elkins v. United States,
The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause to persist from the issu-
*1196
anee of a search warrant to its execution.
See United States v. Gerber,
Prior to its amendment in 1972, Federal Rule of Criminal Proсedure 41 required the execution of search warrants within ten days from the time of issuance and required search warrants to include a command to officers to perform the search “forthwith.”
See
Fed.R.Crim.P. 41 advisory committee’s note. Historically, most federal courts interpreted both comрonents as substantively significant; they interpreted the 10-day time-limit as an outside limit and the term “forthwith” as a requirement for officers to execute the search as soon as they reasonably could.
See, e.g., United States v. Nepstead,
Given this move away from interpreting “forthwith” as a substantive command, we read the term instead as “a belated echo of a medieval royal command.”
United States v. Dunnings,
The only colorable time constraint, aside from the requirement of continuing probable cause, was the 10-day limit in Rule 41. 3 Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e)(2)(A)®; accord N.M.R.A. 5-211(C) (adopting the same 10-day limit). Thе nine-day delay here did not exceed this limit or run afoul of the staleness concerns that animate it. Garcia is not entitled to exclusion of the fruits of the search. 4
*1197 B. Proper Premises
With respect to the mismatched description and address of the place to be searched, Garcia emphаsizes the officers’ knowledge of the inaccuracy well before the search and their considered choice not to obtain an accurate warrant. Obtaining a corrected warrant may have been the better choice, particularly since there was amplе time to do so, but the error does not warrant suppression of the evidence. Regardless of the error concerning the address, the issuing judge clearly intended for the officers to search the residence described and depicted in the warrant application. There was nеver any doubt about which residence police should search; this practical reality outweighs the technical error in the warrant.
United States v. Dorrough,
The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement ensures searches do not exceed the scope of the probable cause justifying them.
See Voss v. Bergsgaard,
Here, both prongs of this test are satisfied. Thе photograph and description of Garcia’s home in the affidavit, combined with the knowledge of the agents involved, enabled the executing officers to locate the premises without difficulty or confusion and virtually eliminated the possibility of searching the wrong residence.
See United States v. Brakeman,
The district court did not err in denying Garcia’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. The informant also told Agent Latin the residence "was located at the corner of Mesquite and Collins.’' (R. Vol. I at 45.)
. The fоcus on federal law resists the pull of local impulse, regardless of its direction:
In determining whether there has been an unreasonable search and seizure by state officers, a federal court must make an independent inquiry, whether or not there has been such an inquiry by a state court, and irrespective of how any such inquiry may have turned out. The test is one of federal law, neither enlarged by what one state court may have countenanced, nor diminished by what another may have colorably suppressed.
Elkins,
. Rule 41 was amended to provide for a 14-day limit effective Dеcember 1, 2009. The search here occurred before this amendment, when the prior 10-day limit applied.
See United States v. Nick,
. Moreover, Garcia has failed to make a pri-ma facie case for exclusion based on a violation of the terms of the warrant or Rule 41. Violations of either the instructions in a warrant or Rule 41 require exclusion only when they are prejudicial or intentional.
Sims,