Giusеppe Gambino (“Joseph Gambino”) was arrested on December 1, 1988, and released after executing a $1,000,000 bail bond, dated December 16, 1988, which was co-signed by certain individuals, including his wife, Maria Gambino, and secured by certain parcels of real property. Joseph Gambino also executed an additional $2,000,000 appearance bond on May 17, 1989. Giovanni Gambino (“John Gambino”) was arrested on January 4, 1990, and released the following day on a $2,000,000 personal recognizance bond, co-signed by his wife, Vittoria Gambino, and his eldest son, Tommy Gambino, and secured by certain real property.
On September 1, 1992, defendant Joseph Gambino failed to appear in court at a scheduled hearing in violation of his bail conditions. The Government also informed the Court at that hearing that John Gambino never appeared for his previously approved appointment with his hеart doctor in Houston on August 31, 1992 and, therefore, also had violated his bail conditions. At that time, the Court granted the Government’s application, issuing arrest warrants for these two defendants. On September 20, 1992, FBI agents arrested Joseph and John Gambino at a hotel residence in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
Pursuant to Rule 46(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Government has now moved the Court for forfeiture and entry of judgment against Maria Gambino, in her capacity as surety for defendant Joseph Gambino, for the $1,000,000 bond posted for Joseph Gambino and secured by certain property located in Staten Island. The Government has also moved for forfeiture and entry of judgment against Vittoria and Tommy Gambino, in their capacities as sureties for defendant John Gambino, for the $2,000,000 bond and the properties posted as collateral for John Gambino by these sureties. In response to this motion, the sureties for the defendants argue that certain actions by the Government have relieved them of their obligations under the bonds for Joseph and John Gambino. More specifically, the key issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the removal of the electronic bracelet monitoring devices from defendants constituted a significant change in the bail conditions and, if so, whether the sureties had notice of that occurrence. For the reasons stated below, the Government’s motion for forfeiture and entry of judgment as to these sureties is granted.
BACKGROUND
Joseph Gambino
Following his arrest on December 1, 1988, Joseph Gambino was remanded by the Honorable Kathleen Roberts, United States Magistrate Judge, Southern District of New York. Magistrate Judge Roberts held a detention hearing and, on December 8, 1988, issued her final opinion detaining Joseph Gambino as a danger to the community, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Magistrate Judge Roberts made a specific finding that the Government had established that Joseph Gambino, through his high-ranking stature in a multi-faceted narcotics and racketeering criminal organization, had the ability to command the criminal acts of others and, thus, posed a danger to the community.
Subsequently, counsel for Joseph Gambino requested that Magistrate Judge Roberts modify her order to permit him to reside at the now-defunct Manhattan House Community Treatment Center (“Manhattan House”). Over the Government’s objection, Magistrate Judge Roberts granted the motion on the basis of Joseph Gambino’s need to prepare for trial and consult with his attorneys and, therefore, ordered the release of Joseph Gambino to Manhattan House with electronic bracelet monitoring and authorized the Government to install a pen register on his phone. Magistrate Judge Roberts also allowed Joseph Gambino to have weekly outside visits to his attorneys and directed him to execute a fully-secured $1,000,000 bond.
The Government appealed Magistrate Judge Robert’s decision to the Honorable Milton Pollack, United States District
After repeated complaints from defense counsel that the Manhattan House was unduly restricting their ability to prepare for trial with their client, the Government consented to house arrest for Joseph Gambino with electronic bracelet monitoring, a pen register and wiretap authorization, and notice of visits. In February 1989, Joseph Gambino sought additional easing of the house arrest conditions. In recognition of the Court’s concerns about the lengthy pretrial delay, the Government agreed to permit Joseph Gambino to work at Fernandez Construction, and later at Ray’s Pizza in Manhattan. A second $2,000,000 personal recognizance bond was later signed by Joseph Gambino on May 17, 1989 and secured by real proрerty in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. 2
In September 1989, based on a new charge of witness tampering alleged in a superseding indictment against Joseph Gambino and based on surveillance of his activities, the Government sought to revoke Joseph Gambino’s bail. The matter was referred to the Honorable Whitman Knapp, United States District Judge, Southern District of New York. Joseph Gambino was released on bail pending decision on the Government’s bail revocation. After receiving affidavits from both sides and hearing argument on the issue, the Court found that willful violations had not been established and, thus, denied the Government’s motion for remand. Subsequent to these proceedings, the Court issued orders which specifically listed approved visitors, locations, and activities permitted for Joseph Gambino.
John Gambino
Defendant John Gambino was arrested on January 4, 1990 and charged in a superseding indictment herein with narcotics аnd racketeering activities. At a detention hearing on January 5, 1990, the Government argued that John Gambino was a major organized crime figure and drug dealer who posed a significant danger to the community. However, in light of the previously unsuccessful efforts to detain Joseph Gambino, the Government consented to the release of John Gambino on strict bail conditions. On that same day, John Gambino was released on a $2,000,000 personal recognizance bond co-signed by Vittoria Gambino and Tommy Gambino, and secured by certain real property.
3
Certain conditions were specifically incorporated into the bond by reference and attached to the bond on a handwritten sheet. The bond was conditioned on house arrest, electronic bracelet monitoring, and the installation of a pen register on the phones in his home and at work. The terms of the releаse permitted John Gambino to work, visit his attorneys, attend religious services and medical appointments, and visit with pre-approved individuals at his home. In
Removal of the Electronic Bracelet Monitoring
On July .7, 1992, the Government, in response to complaints by the Pretrial Services Agency (“Pretrial Services”), submitted a letter to the Court requesting permission to cease the electronic bracelet monitoring of both Joseph and John Gambino. In the letter, the Government noted that it had conducted a meeting with Pretrial Services concerning general problems with the electronic monitoring program. More specifically, the Government and Pretrial Services had concluded that the bracelet system was ineffective with respect to these defendants due to the frequent and lengthy “blackout” periods permitted to Joseph and John Gambino under the terms оf their release, including visits to attorneys, physicians, employment, etc. The Government stated in the letter that its request was based on the fact that the electronic monitoring was “largely ineffective” and the numerous "on” and "off” transitions required by defendants’ frequent approved visits placed an “enormous burden” on Pretrial Services. On July 8, 1992, this Court endorsed the Government’s letter allowing removal of the bracelets. 4
Violation of Conditions of Bail
On August 24, 1992, the Grand Jury returned an eighth superseding indictment in the case. The new indictment added a new murder charge naming both Joseph and John Gambino, while dropping six predicate acts of murder and an obstruction of justice allegation against Joseph Gambino. Moreover, the new indictment also named John Gambino in the “continuing criminal enterprise” charge for the first time. The Court scheduled the arraignment in the new indictment for September 1, 1992. On August 31, 1992, the Government submitted a letter to the Court stating its intention to move to remand Joseph and John Gambino following arraignment on the superseding indictment. The letter noted that the Government had informed defense counsel of this intention during the previous week. In addition, the letter noted that John Gambino was to be in Houston on Monday, August 31, 1992, for an appointment with his heart doctor.
Joseph Gambino failed to appear in court on September 1, 1992. At that time, his attorney, Edward S. Panzer, Esq., informed the Court that he had spoken by telephone with a woman he believed to be Joseph Gambino’s wife who told Mr. Panzer that she had last seen Joseph Gambino leaving for work early that morning. The Government also informed the Court that it had contacted John Gambino’s heart doctor in Houston and learned that John Gambino had never appeared for his scheduled doctor’s appointment. The Court then granted the Government’s application аnd issued arrest warrants for these two defendants.
5
On September 20, 1992, FBI Agents arrested Joseph and John Gambino at a hotel residence in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The Government has moved for forfeiture and entry of judgment against surety Maria Gambino with respect to the bail securing the release of defendant Joseph Gambino in the sum of $1,000,000
6
and against Vittoria and Tommy Gambino in the sum of $2,000,-
DISCUSSION
I. The Legal Standard
The sureties argue that the removal of the electronic bracelet monitoring devices from defendants Joseph and John Gambino without notifying the sureties was a modification of the conditions of the bond that discharged them of their obligation under the bond. The sureties rely heavily on a Supreme Court decision,
Reese v. United
States, 9 Wall. (76 U.S.) 13,
Any change in the contract, on which they are sureties, made by the principal parties to it without their assent, discharges them, and for obvious reasons. When the change is made they are not bound by the contract in its original form, for that has ceased to exist. They are not bound by the contract in its altered form, for to that they have never assented. Nor does it matter how trivial the change, or even that it may be of advantage to the sureties. They have a right to stand upon the very terms of their undertaking.
The leading case in the Second Circuit on this issue is
United States v. Egan,
The Second Circuit interpreted Reese narrowly on the grounds that the bonds in Egan specifically authorized the court to issue orders relating to defendants’ appearance and “[t]here is nothing in the bonds which call for notice to the surety if any such order or direction is issued, nor was there any enlargement of the limits of the bail.” Id. at 266. The Court found such facts differ from the situation in Reese where a condition of the bail bond was actually modified without notice to the surety. Moreover, having found that the surety had notice of the modification in Egan, the Second Circuit noted in dicta:
If the Government moves the court for a modifiсation of the terms of the bond, it should give reasonable notice of the motion to the defendant and the surety. If it is the defendant in custody of the surety who moves for a modification of the bail terms, as in the present case, the surety must look to the defendant for notice of the motion or discover it itself from checking the court docket.
Id. at 267.
The only case in this Circuit which has attempted to interpret the dicta in
Egan
is
United States v. Robinson,
However, the Court then held that, despite this authority, the
Egan
dicta sets “a minimal duty on the Government to notify the surety when its risk has been significantly increased and the surety is not likely to be aware of this fact.”
Egan recognizes that a surety can not be expected to be constantly in court to monitor the proceedings. It also implicitly recognizes that neither the defense attorney nor the defendant can be counted upon to notify the surety when in many cases such notice will result in the surrender of the defendant by surety. Rather, Egan stands for the notion that the surety must be notified when the Government becomes aware that the risk of flight has increased. The burden on the Government is a minuscule one and only arises when there has been a significant change in the bond.
Id. (emphasis added).
Applying these principles, the Court found that, with respect to the increase in
The interpretation of the Egan decision set forth in Robinson is persuasive. Accordingly, a modification in the conditions of bond will not relieve the surety of its obligation under the bond unless: 1) the modification in the conditions of bond constituted a change in the bond that significantly increased the risk of flight; and 2) the sureties did not have notice of the modification. The Court refuses to read Egan as requiring notice of any change in the bond conditions. The basic purpose of notice of modifications in the bond is to afford the surety an opportunity to withdraw as surety where the modification materially increases the risk of flight. Accordingly, where the modification is trivial and does not materially increase the defendant’s ability to flee, notice of such modifications is simply not required under Egan. Sureties cannot circumvent their obligations under the bond agreement by pointing to the failure to notify them of an insignificant modification in the bond conditions which had no practical effect on the risk of flight. Similarly, even when notice is required, the Government need not show direct knowledge by the surety, but rather the Court can draw obvious inferences from the particular facts of the case.
Decisions in several other circuits provide added support for this conclusion. In
United States v. Jones,
Similarly, in
United States v. Casey,
Finally, in
United States v. Hesse,
II. Significant Increase in the Risk of Flight
The sureties argue that the removal of the electronic bracelet monitoring from defendants Joseph and John Gambino required notice to the sureties. 8 The Court finds that, under the circumstances of the instant case, the removal of these bracelets did not significantly increase either of the defendants’ risk of flight and, thus, notice was not required.
It is a common misconception among the public that electronic bracelet monitoring allows the Government to pinpoint a bailed defendant’s precise location at all times as if by some type of radar or scanning device. The actual capabilities of these bracelets are far less extraordinary. The purpose of the device is simply to notify law enforcement when the defendant has left his home without prior authorization from the Government.
The Court was provided with details as to the operation of the electronic bracelet monitoring by Pretrial Services Officer Evans Kavallines, who is the officer principally responsible for the supervision of such monitoring in this district and was also the officer assigned to the pre-trial supervision of Joseph and John Gambino.
See
Affidavit of Evans Kavallines, sworn to on November 16, 1992 (“Kavallines Affidavit”). When a defendant is subjected to electronic bracelet monitoring, a device is usually placed around the defendant’s ankle. The device transmits an encoded signal by radio frequency to a receiver located in the defendant’s home and the receiver is capable of transmitting a signal by telephone to a computer at a central monitoring office at
If the company fails to receive a signal from the defendant and is unable to verify that there has been a technical malfunction, the private company contacts a Pretrial Services Officer. The officer then attempts to contact the defendant’s home by telephone. If the defendant answers the telephone and circumstances indicate there is an equipment malfunction, then the officer must travel to the house to make repairs or provide new equipment. If the defendant does not respond to the telephone call or there is a busy signal, the officer must report to the home to see if the defendant is there. If it is determined that the defendant is not home, law enforcement agents are contacted so that the search for the individual can begin and an arrest warrant can be sought. Kavallines Affidavit, at 1111 2, 3.
According to Pretrial Officer Kavallines, the system “has not proven an effective means of preventing flight” due to several systemic flaws. Kavallines Affidavit, at II 6. First, the system is subject to frequent technical malfunctions and “false alarms” caused by, inter alia, defendants straying to remote areas of the home, battery failure, or a malfunction in the telephone line, including a busy signal. Id. at II2. Most alerts to the Pretrial Services turn out to be false alarms. Id. at 11 3. Thus, both the private monitoring company and Pretrial Services take certain steps when the alarm is triggered, such as calling the defendant’s home by telephone, to try to determine if there has bеen a false alarm. Id. at II3. These false alarms cause confusion within the monitoring system and delay in the response time.
Second, as noted earlier, the bracelet does not have a radar or scanning device that allows law enforcement to trace the defendant’s precise location, but rather simply provides notification that the defendant may have left the house without prior approval and allows law enforcement to travel to the defendant’s house to ascertain the situation. However, the various steps taken when an alarm is triggered — i.e. receiving the alarm, ascertaining if it is a false alarm, notifying Pretrial Services, and then travelling to the defendant’s house— provide the defendant with a significant “headstart” if such defendant has indeed fled. Officer Kavallines stated in his affidavit that “[i]t is fair to say that a defendant outfitted with an electronic bracelet who decides to flee will usually obtain a sufficient headstart to have reached an airport before law enforcement agents can begin the search for that defendant.” Kavallines Affidavit, at II3.
The third, and perhaps most significant flaw, is that many defendants placed on electronic monitoring are also entitled to lengthy “black-out” periods under the terms of their release. During these periods, the bracelet is turned “off” and the defendant is free to travel to work, restaurants, lawyers’ offices, doctors, religious ceremonies, etc. Thus, if these “black out” periods are lengthy, the defendant can simply flee during a long “black out” period and further augment the headstart inherent in the bracelet monitoring, as described above. 9 Kavallines Affidavit, at 1Í 4. ■
It was primarily this problem with “black out” periods that led the Government to request the removal of the electronic bracelets as to defendants Joseph and John Gambino in the summer of 1992. In a letter to the Court, dated July 7, 1992, the Government informed the Court that the electronic bracelets were ineffective and requested that the Court order their discontinuance. After first recognizing there were many problems with the electronic monitoring program in general, the Government noted
The Court finds that, where the release conditions of Joseph and John Gambino permitted the electronic bracelets to be off for extended periods each day (usually over eight hours), the removal of such bracelets clearly did not significantly increase the risk of flight. The inability of the electronic bracelets to prevent flight in the instant case is perhaps best illustrated by the circumstances which led to flight by these two defendants. According to his сounsel, prior to Joseph Gambino’s failure to appear at the September 1st hearing, he was last seen leaving for work, which would have been a lengthy “off” period under electronic monitoring. Similarly, at the time John Gambino fled, he was allegedly travelling to visit a physician in Texas and, therefore, his entire multi-day trip would have been an “off” period under electronic monitoring. These facts provide a clear illustration as to why the bracelets were considered ineffective in preventing flight given the bail conditions in the instant case.
Moreover, despite the removal of the bracelet, the Government left all of the other bail conditions in place including receiving advance daily schedules from both Joseph and John Gambino and approving all movement by them outside the home. Thus, any significance as to the removal of the bracelets is further minimized by thе existence of the other stringent bail conditions that remained in effect. The Court emphasizes that it is not ruling that, in every case, the removal of the electronic bracelets would not constitute a significant increase in the risk of flight. Instead, the Court holds that under the specific circumstances of the instant case, which include lengthy “black out" periods, as well as stringent reporting requirements aside from the bracelet monitoring, the removal of the electronic bracelets did not significantly increase the risk of flight such that failure to notify the sureties of this modification discharged them of their obligation on the bonds.
In addition to the claim regarding the removal of the electronic bracelet, Maria Gambino, surety for defendant Joseph Gambino, also argues that the Government’s failure to notify her of the scheduled arraignment on the superseding indictment, or to notify her of the Government’s intention to seek detention of Joseph Gambino at the arraignment, discharged her obligation under the bond. These two contentions raised by Maria Gambino do not concern situations where the terms of the bond were actually violated in any way, but rather simply relate to notification of the surety as to scheduled court appearances by the defendant, as well as the subject matter of that appearance. However, there was no requirement in Joseph Gambino’s bond that the Government notify the sureties of such events. Therefore, the Government argues that surety Maria Gambino cannot argue that there has even been a technical violation of the bond agreement.
See generally United States v. Egan,
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Craft,
The Court finds the reasoning in
Craft
to be persuasive in the instant case. However, even assuming that the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis is incorrect and the
Robinson
and
Egan
rule applies to the scheduling of the arraignment in the instant case, this Court finds that the new indictment against Joseph Gambino did not significantly increase the risk of flight such that notice was required. The eighth superseding indictment simply dropped six murders against Joseph Gambino and added one new murder. Under both the seventh and eighth superseding indictments, Joseph Gambino faced mandatory life imprisonment. Thus, the Court finds that the superseding indictment did not significantly increase defendant Joseph Gambino’s risk of flight.
See United States v. Casey,
III. Notice Requirement
Finally, even assuming that the removal of the electronic bracelets was a significant increase in the risk of flight that required notice to the sureties, the Court finds that notice to the sureties can be inferred from the facts in this case. As the Court noted in
Robinson,
the Government has a duty “to notify the surety when its risk has been significantly increased and
the surety is not likely to be aware of this
The Court finds that the surety’s-knowledge of the removal of the bracelet can reasonably inferred in the instant case. First, the sureties in the instant case are immediate members of the defendants’ family — the wife, Vittoria, and the eldest son, Tommy, of defendant John Gambino, as well as the wife, Maria, of defendant Joseph Gambino. Second, the electronic bracelet had been strapped to the respective defendants’ ankle and the absence of such bracelets would be readily apparent to immediаte family members.
Moreover, as the Government has noted, John Gambino was not subjected to electronic bracelet monitoring for almost eight months prior to his flight. See Kavallines Affidavit, at ¶ 7. Similarly, with respect to Joseph Gambino, a two-month period elapsed between the removal of the electronic bracelets and Joseph Gambino’s flight. Given the lengthy period of time that elapsed between removal of the bracelets and the flight of both defendants, the Court can reasonably infer that the sureties, as immediate family members of the defendants, “were likely to be aware” that the respective defendants were no longer wearing an electronic bracelet strapped to their ankle. 13 This is a fairly obvious inference and there is no requirement that the Government provide direct evidence of actual knowledge by the sureties.
The same reasоnable inference of notice can be drawn with respect to the Government’s intention to arraign Joseph Gambino on a superseding indictment and to move to remand him at the September 1st hearing. Since Joseph Gambino knew of these developments prior to flight, it can be inferred that Maria Gambino, as Joseph Gambino’s spouse, was “likely to be aware” of the hearing and its subject matter. As the Second Circuit has noted, “ ‘[jjudges are not required to exhibit a naivete from which ordinary citizens are free.’ ”
United States v. Cicale,
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Government’s motion for forfeiture and entry of judgment against sureties Vittoria Gambino and Tommy Gambino in the sum of $2,000,000, and against Maria Gambino in the sum of $1,000,000, hereby is granted. The stay of entry of judgment against Maria Gambino hereby is lifted.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. With respect to Maria Gambino, the property at issue is located at 419 Woods of Arden Road, Staten Island, New York.
. In 1990, the United States and Joseph Gambino entered into an agreement permitting him to sell the property located in Cherry Hill, New Jersey and, thus, it no longer serves as security for the $2,000,000 bond.
. The properties at issue are: (1) the property located at 8007 Narrows Avenue, Brooklyn, New York in the name of Vittoria Gambino; and (2) the property located at 7502 18th Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, in the name of Tommy Gambino.
. The Court notes that, even prior to this Order discontinuing this practice, John Gambino’s electronic monitoring was not in effect. Indeed, John Gambino was not outfitted with the electronic bracelet at all in 1992. See Affidavit of Evans Kavallines, sworn to on November 16, 1992, at ¶ 7. After a Court order restoring him to bracelet monitoring in January, 1992, Pretrial Services was unable to outfit John Gambino with the bracelet because he was hospitalized due to illness. During the months after his return from the hospital, John Gambino was reporting by telephone to Pretrial Services and was without a bracelet at the time the Court ordered the discontinuance of the bracelets as to these defendants on July 8, 1992. Id.
. Both defendants also failed to appear at a hearing on September 3, 1992.
. By letter to the Court, dated December 1, 1992, the Government corrected an error in its initial moving papers by noting that the Government is only seeking judgment in the amount of $1,000,-000 against Maria Gambino. Maria Gambino was not involved in the additional $2,000,000 bond that subsequently was posted by Joseph Gambino.
. At a hearing on September 3, 1992, the Court orally declared a forfeiture of the bail as against both Joseph Gambino and John Gambino pursuant to Rule 46(e)(1) and entered a written order entering judgment against these two defendants, dated October 5, 1992. On October 2, 1992, a second hearing was held, on notice to the sureties, at which time the Court heard from the parties аnd set down a briefing schedule with respect to the Government's motion for forfeiture and entry of judgment against sureties Maria Gambino, Vittoria Gambino and Tommy Gambino. Surety Maria Gambino did not make a formal appearance at this hearing, but the Court was informed that she was in the process of obtaining counsel. Therefore, in an Order, dated October 5, 1992, the Court agreed to stay execution of judgment once a notice of appearance and opposition papers to Government’s motion was filed on behalf of Maria Gambino. Such notice of appearance and opposition papers were subsequently filed and, thus, the Court has stayed the execution of judgment against Maria Gambino pending the Court's decision on the Government’s motion.
. As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the bond agreement signed by Maria Gambino did not specifically contain the electronic bracelet monitoring as a condition of bond. The bond that Maria Gambino signed expressly stated, "This Bond is being Co-signed as of 12/16/88, even before the defendant's bail conditions are finalized, as per order of Judge Pollack." Maria Gambino argues that the Government’s failure to incorporate the original bail conditions into the bond at the time of execution discharges her obligation under the bond. As noted above, the agreement signed by Maria Gambino specifically states that the bail conditions were not yet finalized. Given the plain terms of the agreement, the Court finds this argument to be without merit.
On this same issue, the Government argues that, since the bracelet was not a special condition of the bond executed by Maria Gambino, the removal of the bracelet is not a breach of the plain terms of the bond agreement and Maria Gambino has no grounds upon which to attack the Government’s conduct.
See, e.g., United States v. Egan,
. In his affidavit on this issue, Pretrial Officer Evans Kavallines noted that “in light of the extraordinary burdens placed on Pretrial Services by the electronic bracelеt monitoring requirements, with little assurance that a defendant would not flee, Pretrial Services, after consultation with the United States Attorney’s Office, recommended that such monitoring be opposed in the Southern District of New York.” Kavallines Affidavit, at ¶ 6. Officer Kavallines also noted that "[o]ne of the most compelling cases for discontinuing the electronic bracelet system was the case involving the Gambino brothers, whose bracelets were constantly being turned on and off and provided little assurance that they would not flee.” Id.
. The defendants could also travel out-of-state if they obtained prior approval from the Government, as illustrated by the Government permitting John Gambino to travel to Texas for an appointment with a heart doctor.
. The Agreement of Forfeiture signed by the sureties in the instant case contains almost the exact language concerning court аppearances found in the bonds at issue in Egan. See Affirmation of James B. Comey in Support of Judgment of Default on Forfeiture of Bond, dated September 4, 1992, at Exhibits A and B.
. The court distinguished Egan and Robinson on the grounds that in those cases the terms of the bond were actually changed while, in Craft, the issue related to a scheduled hearing, which did not occur because the defendant fled, and no terms of the bond were ever modified. The circumstances in the instant case, with respect to the September 1st hearing involving arraignment on the superseding indictment and the Government seeking revocation of Joseph Gambino's bail, can be similarly distinguished. The arraignment on the eighth superseding indictment as to Joseph Gambino did not take place because the defendants fled prior to the hearing and, thus, the bond was not transferred to the eighth superseding indictment.
. With respect to Vittoria Gambino, there is additional evidence which suppоrts the inference that she knew that John Gambino was not being required to wear his electronic bracelet. Pretrial Services Officer Kavallines stated in his affidavit that, after a court order restored John Gambino to electronic bracelet monitoring in January 1992, he visited John Gambino’s home to outfit him with the bracelet, but was informed that Gambino was in the hospital. When visiting the home, Officer Kavallines spoke with Vittoria Gambino about his attempt to outfit John Gambino with the bracelet:
The night before my visit, I called the Gambino home to inform them that I would be arriving the next day to affix the bracelet to Mr. Gambino. When I arrived on January 23, 1992, I spoke with Mrs. Gambino and informed her of my visit and she informed me Mr. Gambino was in the hospital. During the months after his return from the hospital, Gambino was reporting by telephone to me without a bracelet until this Court issued an order in the early summer of 1992 removing John Gambino from electronic monitoring at the joint request of my agency and the United States Attorney’s Office.
Kavallines Affidavit, at ¶ 7.