MEMORANDUM OPINION
Denying The Plaintiff’s Motion To Strike; Denying The Plaintiff’s Request For Default Judgment; And Denying The Plaintiff’s Request For A Deoree Of Forfeiture
I. INTRODUCTION
If a bull gores a man or a woman to death, the bull must be stoned to death, and its meat must not be eaten. But the owner of the bull will not be held responsible. 1
*101 This in rem civil forfeiture 2 matter is once again before the court on the motion of the government (“the plaintiff’) to strike the claim of Latonya Curtis (“the claimant”) and its related requests for a default judgment and a decree of forfeiture. Because the claimant’s verified claim satisfies the requirements of Supplemental Rule C(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court denies the plaintiffs motion to strike the claimant’s claim and, correspondingly, denies the plaintiffs pendent requests for a default judgment and a decree of forfeiture.
II. BACKGROUND 3
A. Factual Background
In February 1999, a joint task force, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, initiated an investigation of a large heroin-trafficking organization run principally by the claimant’s significant other, Mr. Earl Garner, Sr. 4 Compl. at 4, 6. The investigation allegedly revealed that the claimant assisted Mr. Garner in various aspects of his drug-trafficking operation. Id. at 6. Court-authorized telephone monitoring of several ■ members . of the drug-trafficking organization allegedly indicated that the claimant, in addition to serving as Mr. Garner’s confidant and ad-visor, stored contraband and/or drug proceeds at her residence in North Bethesda, Maryland. Id. Despite these allegations, and after considering the evidence against the claimant at trial, the jury returned a verdict acquitting the claimant. 5
B. Procedural Background
Although this case is still in its infancy, it has managed to assemble a rather lengthy procedural history. On December 21, 2000, the plaintiff filed a verified complaint for civil forfeiture in rem against the seized funds totaling $41,091.86. 6 The plaintiff alleges that these funds constitute proceeds traceable to violations of Title II of the Controlled Substances Act, as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq., and the anti-money laundering provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Id. at 2.
On. January 25, 2001, the claimant responded to the plaintiff’s verified com *102 plaint by filing a claim to the seized funds. According to the plaintiff however, the claimant’s claim failed to comply with the governing requirements of Supplemental Rule C(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Pl.’s Mot. to Treat as Conceded at 3. On March 5, 2001, the plaintiff sent a letter to the claimant and the attorney representing her in the related criminal matter, stating that the claimant’s verified claim was defective and that the February 14, 2001 deadline for filing an answer had passed. Id. In that same letter, the plaintiff proposed to extend the claimant’s filing deadline to March 19, 2001. Id.
Thereafter, on March 12, 2001, the claimant’s attorney responded to the March 5, 2001 letter, alerting the plaintiff to a recent surgical- procedure undergone by the claimant and requesting that the claimant have through April 15, 2001 to file her answer. 6 Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. V. Oddly enough, in a March 16, 2001 facsimile to the plaintiff, that same attorney stated that he did not represent the claimant in the civil forfeiture matter at bar. Id. at 4 & Ex. VII. On April 27, 200Í, 12 days after the claimant’s requested deadline of April 15 had passed, the claimant filed a motion to late-file her answer, explaining that her surgery and its attendant recovery period caused her filing delay. Cl.’s Mot. to Late File at 1.
On May 1, 2001, the court granted the claimant’s motion to late-file her answer. Order dated May 1, 2001. That same day, the claimant filed both an amended verified claim, which asserted that she owned the defendant funds, and an answer, reasserting that she was an innocent owner of the defendant funds. Cl.’s Am. Verified Claim at 1; Cl.’s Answer at 1-4.
Also on that same day, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the claimant’s claim. The claimant, however, failed to respond. Consequently, on June 25, 2001, the plaintiff filed a motion asking the court to treat the motion to strike as conceded, enter default judgment, and issue a decree of forfeiture. Pl.’s Mot. to Treat as Conceded at 5.
During the following 12 months, the claimant remained silent and inactive, making no filings. Accordingly, on June 18, 2002, the court granted the plaintiffs motion to strike, entered default judgment, and issued a decree of forfeiture.
United States v. Funds From Prudential Sec.,
On June 20, 2002, the claimant filed a motion, followed by three additional motions on June 27, 2002, each asking the court to alter or amend its June 18, 2002 ruling.
7
Mindful of the heightened duty of care owed to
pro se
litigants, the court vacated its prior ruling and allowed the claimant to respond to the plaintiffs motion to strike and related requests for entry of default judgment and issuance of a forfeiture decree.
United States v. Funds from Prudential Sec.,
*103 On March 10, 2003, the claimant filed her response, 8 along with an attached document styled as a verified claim. 9 Accordingly, the court must once again address the plaintiffs motion to strike, and its related requests for default judgment and a decree of forfeiture.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the Claimant’s Claim
1. Legal Standard for a Motion to Strike a Claim in Civil Forfeiture
Supplemental Rule C(6j sets forth the governing standards and procedural requirements that a putative claimant must satisfy in order to perfect a claim in a federal in rem forfeiture action. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. R. C(6); 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A); 21 U.S.C. § 881(b). The rule states in pertinent part:
The claimant of property that is the subject of an action in rem shall file a claim ... verified on oath or solemn affirmation, and shall state the interest in the property by virtue of which the claimant demands its restitution and the right to defend the action.
Id.
“To contest a forfeiture action [under Supplemental Rule C(6) ], an individual bears the burden of demonstrating an interest in the seized item sufficient to satisfy the court of his standing.”
United States v. $47,875 in United States Currency,
2. The Court Denies the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the Claimant’s Claim
The plaintiff asserts that the court should grant its motion to strike because the claimant’s claim fails to satisfy the *104 requirements of Rule C(6). 10 PL’s Opp’n at 8. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the claimant’s claim is defective because she has failed to verify it “on oath or solemn affirmation” and it avows only that the claimant is the owner- of the defendant funds, thereby failing to “state the interest in the property by virtue of which [she] demands restitution and the right to defend the action.” Id. at 2-3; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. C(6).
Before addressing the alleged deficiencies in the claimant’s claim, the court takes a moment to consider Rule C(6) and the ways in which other courts have interpreted it. As an initial matter, the court recognizes that the rule’s underlying goal is to prevent frivolous claims by ensuring that putative claimants come forward as quickly as possible after the initiation of forfeiture proceedings so that the court may hear all interested parties and resolve the dispute without delay. Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. C(6) advisory committee’s note;
United States v. Various Computers & Computer Equip.,
The plaintiff urges strict compliance with Rule C(6), a construction that denies the claimant standing for any failure to comply with the Rule. PL’s Opp’n at 2. As one court has stated, “[i]t is not an abuse of discretion for the district court to require strict compliance with Supplemental Rule C(6).”
United States v. $104,674.00,
In stark contrast to the strict-compliance approach, numerous courts interpret “pleadings and procedural practices under the Supplemental Rules liberally enough” to allow for an appropriate degree of discretion in cases where the underlying goals of Rule C(6) are not frustrated to ensure that courts decide controversies on the merits.
United States v. $80,760.00 in U.S. Currency,
Against this backdrop of disparate interpretation, the court turns to assess the alleged deficiencies, in the claimant’s claim sub judice. First, the court addresses the plaintiffs allegation that the claimant’s claim is defective because it is “void of any verification on oath or affirmation.” 11 Pl.’s Opp’n at 2-3. The claim states:
I[,] LaTonya Curtis, am the claimant in the above entitled action. I have read *106 the foregoing complaint and know the contents thereof. The contents of my response are true to my own knowledge except as to matters therein stated to be alleged upon information and belief, and as to those matters[,] I believe them to be true as laid out in my response.
Cl.’s Verified Claim. While the claimant’s claim is “self-verified,”
12
applicable precedent does not require otherwise.
See $9,020.00 in United States Currency,
The court now turns to address the plaintiffs remaining argument that the claimant’s claim is defective because it fails to “state the interest in the property by virtue of which [she] demand[s] restitution and the right to defend the action.” PL’s Opp’n at 2-3; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. C(6). In her claim, however, the claimant avers that she is the “sole owner of the four bank accounts seized by the government and that she is the sole owner of the $50.00 global express money order which was taken from her purse.” Cl.’s Verified Claim at 1. In addition, the claimant insists that “[t]hese funds [were] derived from legitimate sources of income and are in no way sources of drug trafficking as alleged by the plaintiff.” Id. The plaintiff maintains that this unsubstantiated declaration of ownership fails to satisfy Rule C(6)’s requirements. Pl.’s Opp’n at 11.
Courts have, however, considered an affirmation or statement under oath that one is the owner of seized property sufficient to establish standing to contest a forfeiture.
E.g., Torres v. $36,256.80 U.S. Currency,
Conversely, other courts indicate that the claimant must come forth with some evidence of ownership interest in, order to establish standing to contest a forfeiture.
E.g., United States v. Twenty One Thousand Two Hundred and Eighty Two Dollars, in U.S. Currency, 47
F.3d 972, 973 (8th Cir.1995) (declining to disturb the district court’s decision to strike the claims and answers of a claimant asserting merely a “possessory interest” in the seized funds);
$38,570 U.S. Currency,
the seized property.
United States v. U.S. Currency, $81,000.00,
In the case at bar, the government alleges that it seized funds in the amount of $41,041.86 from several bank accounts “in the name of LATONYA CURTIS,” the claimant. Compl. at 2. Furthermore, the government acknowledges that the FBI seized a $50.00 money order “in connection with the execution of a search warrant of claimant LATONYA CURTIS’s residence.”
Id.
at 2. These allegations coupled with the claimant’s affirmation that she is the solé owner of the defendant funds satisfies Rule C(6) by allowing other interested parties to “reasonably ... define the extent of the interest claimed to determine the viability of [the][c]laimant’s right to defend the action.”
See $40,000 in U.S. Currency,
3. Breakdown in the Adversarial Process
At this juncture, the court gives pause to consider the tangled web that this case has become, focusing particularly on the adversaries’ lack óf diligence in accurately and comprehensively addressing legal precedent. Indeed, if the claimant or, for that matter, the plaintiff 14 discussed the legal precedent addressed herein, the adversarial process would have saved the court from issuing its June 18, 2002 ruling and, consequently, would have prevented the court from having to reconsider that ruling. But alas, this breakdown in the adversarial process has left the court’s prior decisions vulnerable to its own scrutiny.
As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, a fundamental premise of our adversarial system is that courts do not sit as self-selected forums of “legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them.”
Carducci v. Regan,
B. The Plaintiffs Requests for Default Judgment and a Decree of Forfeiture
The government’s remaining requests for relief require little discussion, for the allowance of such relief depends on a favorable ruling on the government’s motion to strike the claimant’s claim. Because today’s ruling denies the government’s motion to strike, it naturally follows that the court must deny the government’s pendent requests for default judgment and a decree of forfeiture,
IY. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court denies the plaintiffs motion to strike and requests for entry' of default judgment and a decree of forfeiture. An order directing the parties in a manner consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued this 29th day of January 2004.
. Courts have noted that forfeiture is an ancient penalty with its origins tracing back to Biblical times.
See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
Notes
. “Civil forfeiture actions are brought against property, not people. The owner of the property may intervene to protect his interest.... In exercising
in rem
jurisdiction, the court ... may adjudicate claims of ownership.”
United States v. All Funds in Account No. 747.034/278,
. The court adopts portions of the factual and procedural background from its prior rulings of June 18, 2002 and February 6, 2003.
United States v. Funds From Prudential Sec., 209
F.Supp.2d 259, 260-61 (D.D.C.2002);
United States
v.
Funds from Prudential Sec.,
. On January 5, 2001, defendant Earl Garner, Sr. plead guilty to the following offenses; (1) Conspiracy to Distribute and to Possess With the Intent to Distribute Heroin and Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(l)(A)(i); (2) Continuing Criminal Enterprise, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(a), (b); and (3) Money Laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).
United States v. Funds From Prudential Sec.,
. The government charged the claimant with one count of Conspiracy to Distribute and to Possess With the Intent to Distribute Heroin and Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(l)(A)(i). Compl. at 5.
. The claimant’s seized funds include $18,019.54 from Prudential Securities account # OGS257128-06; $13,500.54 from Allfirst Bank account #910334325; $3,068.62 from Allfirst Bank account # 536-8671-2; $6,453.16 from Strong Fund accounts #0631201014490 and #052120101454; and a $50.00 Global Express money order. Compl. at 2-3.
. The claimant reports that on March 7, 2001, she underwent surgery with an expected recovery time of three to ten weeks. Cl/s Mot. to Late File at 1.
. The claimant styled her June 20, 2002 motion as a "motion to request reconsideration of default judgment and decree of forfeiture.” She referred to her June 27, 2002 motions as (1) a “motion and incorporated memorandum to reverse the court’s decision granting the plaintiff's motion to treat as conceded its motion to strike claimant's claim and motion for default judgment, granting plaintiff's request for a decree of forfeiture”; (2) a "motion requesting dismissal of forfeiture action against funds”; and (3) a "motion to request reconsideration of default judgment and decree of forfeiture.” ■
. The claimant titles her filing as a "response to plaintiffs [sic] opposition to Latonya Curtis’s motion to late file her answer to the complaint and motion to strike Latonya Curtis’s claim and incorporated motion to set aside the default judgement [sic]. against the funds and for their return.”
. Treating the March 10, 2003 filing as an amended verified claim, the court considers this document as the operative claim to which the plaintiff’s motion to strike applies.
. The court need not address the claimant's considerable difficulty in complying with Rule C(6)’s time restrictions because it has already done so in its prior ruling.
See Funds II,
. Rule C(6)'s verification requirement is an “essential element of any claim because of the substantial danger of false claims.”
United States Currency in the Amount of $103,387.27,
[bjoth the court and the [gjovernment were aware of the source of [the claimant's] interest in the property and the basis for his claim of ownership. Thus, the verification would not have added to the authenticity of [his] petition.... We do not believe that we may equitably deny [his] standing where his actions have not thwarted the goals of Rule C(6).... .To dismiss [his] claim for failure to include a verified statement would contradict[] both old-fashioned common sense and the time-honored admiralty principle that pleadings and procedural practices in maritime actions should be applied liberally.
Id. at 585. .
. The claimant's claim appears at first glance to be subscribed to and sworn before a notary public. Upon further study, however, it becomes clear that the document is "self-verified'' because it was the claimant herself that notarized the document "as true to [her] own knowledge.” See Cl.'s Verified Claim. The validity of the document’s notarization, however, has no bearing on the court's ruling, and the court therefore puts the issue to one side.
. The liberal construction afforded to
pro se
filings by our court of appeals further buttresses the court’s decision to recognize the claimant's standing.
See Sparrow v. United Air Lines Inc.,
. The plaintiff failed to cite any law supporting its blanket assertion that the claimant has "indisputably failed to comply with ... Rule C(6) by failing to file a verified claim setting forth an interest in the defendant funds ..." Pl.’s Opp’n at 8.
. The D.C. Circuit’s indulgent treatment of
pro se
litigants "does not constitute a license for a plaintiff filing
pro se
to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Moore v. Agency for Int’l Dev.,