Julie Crystal Fronk pleaded guilty to one count of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3) and (d)(1). Fronk appeаls from her twelve-month sentence, arguing that the district court 1 erred in denying her an offense-level reduction for acceptаnce of responsibility and that her sentence is unreasonable. We affirm.
I.
From March 2002 to July 2008, Fronk worked for Best Care Home Health (Best Care) in Minneapolis, first as a registered nurse and eventually as the assistant director of nursing. Fronk’s duties included dispensing medicatiоn to clients. In May 2008, Best Care discovered that its clients’ controlled substance prescriptions were being refilled prematurely. In July 2008, a client reported that Fronk had taken some of her vicodin. Fronk admitted to Amanda Jackson, the director of nursing, that she hаd taken the vicodin. She further admitted to taking morphine and dilaudid from other clients. Fronk was terminated and later completed inрatient treatment for alcoholism.
Fronk entered into a plea agreement with the government, wherein she reserved the right to contest two offense-level enhancements that the government sought to apply: abuse of a position of trust pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 3B1.3, and vulnerable victims pursuant to § 3Al.l. The government agreed to recommend a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, which was conditioned upon Fronk’s refraining from acts inconsistent with her aсceptance of responsibility. The district court accepted Fronk’s guilty plea and allowed her to be releasеd until sentencing. Fronk violated a condition of her release by attempting to obtain refills of a vicodin prescription when none had been authorized. Following her violation, Fronk was detained until sentencing.
Fronk suffers from a number of medical conditions, including fibrоmyalgia, degenerative disc disease, and depression, and she takes numerous prescription medications. Before sеntencing, Fronk submitted a letter in which she wrote, “it is not that I lied about my numerous physical problems, I just needed a little more medication than I had which lead [sic] to my violation.” At sentencing, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing to resolve the disputed enhancements. Nursing director Jackson testified regarding Fronk’s duties, Best Care’s clients, and the harm that Fronk’s conduct had caused to clients. The district court applied the abuse of a position of trust and vulnerable victims enhancements and denied the acceptance of responsibility reduction because of Fronk’s post-plea attempted criminal conduct and the сontent of her letter to the court. The court concluded that the letter “does not indicate in any fashion any kind of acceptance” and that “[s]he has entirely not recognized her own situation and, as a result, ought not to be afforded the two pоints for acceptance.” After eal *454 culating Fronk’s advisory guidelines range to be ten to sixteen months’ imprisonment, the district cоurt sentenced Fronk as set forth above.
II.
A.
Fronk contends that the district court clearly erred by denying her the acceptance of responsibility reduction, arguing that the district court misconstrued her letter and that the violation of her release could not serve as a proper basis for the district court to deny the reduction. It was Fronk’s burden to demonstrate that she was entitled to thе reduction.
See United States v. Arellano,
A sentencing court may grant an offense-level reduction if “the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a). A guilty plea does not entitle a defendant to a reduction as а matter of right.
Id.
cmt. n. 3. A court may consider whether the defendant has withdrawn from “criminal conduct” in determining whether to grant the reduction.
Id.
cmt. n. 1 (b). Even minor and unrelated criminal conduct may make an acceptance of responsibility reduction inappropriate.
United States v. Ngo,
B.
Fronk argues that her sentence is substantively unreasonable because it was greater than necessary to promote the goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). She contends that the district court failed to properly weigh the § 3553(a) factors because it gave no weight to the fact that Fronk did not have a criminal history, largely ignored Fronk’s medical conditions, and disregarded the letters of support. We review a sentence for reasonableness in light of the § 3553(a) factors and reverse only if the district court abused its discretion.
United States v. Roberson,
Fronk’s arguments are belied by the record, which reveals that the district court was aware of, and considered, her lack of a criminal history, her medical conditions, the letters of support, and the § 3553(a) sentencing goаls. Fronk personally drew the court’s attention to her lack of criminal history. The district court explicitly mentioned Fronk’s medical сonditions: “I am sympathetic for the disabili *455 ties and the discomforts that you have suffered yourself.” The court acknowledged that it had received letters from a number of Fronk’s friends and that it had taken those letters into consideration. Fronk has failed to demonstratе that the court considered an erroneous factor, placed too much emphasis on a proper factоr, or committed a clear error of judgement in weighing those factors. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Fronk as it did.
III.
The sentence is affirmed.
Notes
. The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.