This proceeding was instituted by the government of the United States for the purpose of appropriating a number of lots and parcels of land required by the government for military purposes, and to enlarge Ft. Worden. A special venire was issued for jurors, from whom 12 were selected and impaneled in the ustial manner of selecting jurors, and sworn to determine all disputed questions of fact as to ownership of the property, and fix the valuation thereof, and assess any damages resulting to the owners from the taking of their property. As provided by the act of congress authorizing the condemnation of land re
The price which a purchaser pays for one piece of property is not a fair criterion by which to determine the value of an adjoining tract several years after the transaction, for the reason that the necessity of the purchaser, the disposition of the vendor, and peculiar circumstances and conditions may be such as to oblige a purchaser to submit to severe exactions in order to consummate a purchase without delay. Therefore evidence of a particular transaction is likely to be misleading unless all the circumstances and conditions are explained, and it is not practicable for parties to be ready on the trial to produce witnesses to explain transactions not involved in the issues. It was for this reason that the court excluded the testimony offered by the defendants, and I believe now, as I believed at the time, that the evidence was incompetent. It is not shown by the affidavits filed that the jury were misinformed with respect to the identity of the land to and upon which they were conducted
It is contended on the part of the defendants that a statute authorizing the appellate court to determine finally the amount to be awarded as compensation for property condemned to public use is contrary to section 16, art. i, of the constitution of the state of Washington, and to the seventh amendment of the constitution of the United States. It does not help their side to argue that the act ox the legislature is unconstitutional. Its provisions are separable, ami i lie court must uphold the validity of the statute as to all of its provisions which are not repugnant to the constitution, and only disregard the particular provisions which are repugnant; and this statute, in so far as it authorizes an appeal to the supreme court of the stale of Washington, and in. so far as it authorizes that court to consider the propriety and justness of the amount of compensation awarded by a verdict, is not unconstitutional, and it confers the same power upon an appellate tribunal which the defendants arc urging this court to exercise without statutory authority. If the appellate court cannot, by its decree, increase or reduce the amount of compensation without violating the constitution, then a serious question must arise as to the proper method and means by which ¡lie court may exercise its power to pass upon the propriety and reasonableness of the award. Upon that question this court does noc have to express any opinion. It is enough to say that the difficulty which may be encountered in the appellate court may or may not be insurmountable, but it is safe to assume that, if the power to order a new trial exists at all, it belongs to the tribunal to which aggrieved parties who may have ground:; for disputing the propriety and justness of the amount of damages awarded to them by a jury are authorized to appeal. The national government does not have to submit this controversy to the decision of the supreme court of the state, but hiere is an appellate court to which the case may be appealed; and, as congress has adopted the procedure prescribed by slate laws, the practice of the appellate court as well as this court must be governed thereby, and the parties must be concluded by the verdicts unless they can be avoided by the judgment of that court.
Motions denied.