After a series of meetings and secretly-taped telephone conversations between a confidential source employed by the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) and Antonio Frausto and his co-conspirators, Frausto arranged for the sale of one pound of high-quality methamphetamine to the confidential source. This purchase was consummated on January 8, 2009, in Omaha, Nebraska. On January 18, 2009, Frausto arranged for the two co-conspirators to travel to Council Bluffs, Iowa, and sell four additional pounds of methamphetamine to the confidential source’s fictitious partner. The co-conspirators were arrested at an apartment complex in Council Bluffs, and Frausto was arrested soon after in Omaha. DEA agents seized the four pounds of methamphetamine from the co-conspirators’ vehicle in the parking lot of the apartment complex. A search, pursuant to a warrant, of a home in Omaha *995 associated with the conspiracy resulted in the recovery of a loaded handgun and approximately $60,000 in cash, including $23,500 of prerecorded DEA funds used in the January 8 transaction.
Frausto pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine, a violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1), and 846 that subjects Frausto to a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. With respect to the calculation of Frausto’s advisory sentencing guidelines range, the quantity of drugs attributable to Frausto resulted in a base offense level of 38. The district court 1 imposed a two-level enhancement for Frausto’s role as an organizer or leader in the offense, see U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(c), and then reduced the offense level by two for acceptance of responsibility, see § 3E 1.1(a). The district court refused to apply a two-level enhancement for the use of a dangerous weapon pursuant to § 2Dl.l(b)(l) and refused to grant Frausto safety-valve relief pursuant to § 501.2(a). Frausto’s resulting total offense level was 38, and his criminal history category was I, which led to an advisory guidelines range of 235 to 293 months. The district court sentenced Frausto to 240 months’ imprisonment. Frausto now appeals his sentence.
“In reviewing a defendant’s sentence, we first ensure that the district court did not commit significant procedural error[;] ... then, absent significant procedural error, we review the sentence for substantive reasonableness.”
United States v. Jenkins,
Frausto first argues that the district court procedurally erred by imposing a two-level enhancement for his role in the offense “based on the clearly erroneous fact that Appellant was the speaker in the recorded phone calls.” Frausto, however, ignores the testimony of DEA Agent Dustin Wernli — who recorded a number of the conversations between the confidential source and Frausto and testified as to the authenticity of the recordings and translations — and the testimony of Jose Rigoberto Frausto-Diaz, Frausto’s nephew and one of his two co-conspirators — who identified Frausto as a speaker on the recordings. Additionally, a search of Frausto’s cell phone revealed two phone numbers used by Agent Wernli and the confidential source programmed into the phone’s directory. As such, the district court did not clearly err when it determined that Frausto was a speaker on the taped telephone conversations.
Frausto also argues that, even if he was a speaker on the taped telephone conversations, the district court still erred when it found him to be an organizer or leader in the offense pursuant to § 3Bl.l(c). “[T]o apply an enhancement under Section 3Bl.l(c), the district court
*996
must find that ‘the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity.’ ”
United States v. De Oliveira,
[T]he exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others.
United States v. Adamson,
The taped phone conversations reveal that Frausto twice planned and organized the delivery of the methamphetamine to the confidential source by using his two coconspirators to consummate the transactions. After numerous phone conversations, Frausto arranged for the sale of methamphetamine to the confidential source and then orchestrated a meeting on January 8, 2009, at which the confidential source paid Frausto’s two co-conspirators $24,000 in exchange for one pound of methamphetamine. During a phone conversation on the following day, Frausto asked the confidential source if he was satisfied with the transaction. On January 12, 2009, after the confidential source spoke with Frausto again, Frausto arranged for another sale of methamphetamine. On January 18, 2009, after a meeting between Frausto, his two co-conspirators, and the confidential source at an Omaha restaurant, Frausto directed the co-conspirators to travel from Omaha to Council Bluffs and deliver four pounds of methamphetamine to the confidential source’s fictitious partner in return for $98,000. In light of this evidence, we conclude that the district court did not err in concluding that Frausto qualified as an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of the offense.
Frausto next argues that the district court procedurally erred when it denied his request for safety-valve relief. To qualify for safety-valve relief, among other requirements, a defendant cannot be “an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(4);
see also
§ 501.2(a)(4). Because the district court did not err in determining that Frausto qualified for the § 3Bl.l(c) enhancement, it also did not err when it refused Frausto’s request for safety-valve relief.
See United States v. Bonilla-Filomeno,
Lastly, Frausto argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. “We will not reverse a sentence as substantively unreasonable absent a showing of abuse of discretion by the district court.”
United States v. San-Miguel,
Frausto primarily argues that the district court’s sentence “perpetuate[d] unwarranted sentencing disparity” between Frausto and three defendants in unrelated cases.
See United States v. Salas-Barraza,
Frausto’s argument fails because he is not similarly situated to any of the defendants in the cases he cites. Unlike Frausto, the defendant in
Salas-Barraza
provided substantial assistance to the government and received a sentence reduction pursuant to § 5K1.1.
See Salas-Barraza,
Without providing any analysis or development in his briefs, Frausto suggests that the disparity between his sentence and the sentences of his two co-conspirators also is unwarranted. Because Frausto has made no arguments in support of this assertion, he has “waived his argument ... because the issue was not developed in his briefs as required.”
See United States v. Peterson,
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Frausto’s sentence.
Notes
. The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Nebraska.
. Puzzlingly, Frausto also suggests that he should not have received a two-level increase in his offense level for the use of a dangerous weapon pursuant to § 2D 1.1 (b)(1) and that he should have received a decrease in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to § 3 El.l. However, contrary to the recommendations in the Presentence Investigation Report, the district court did not apply the dangerous weapon enhancement and did, in fact, reduce Frausto's offense level by two for acceptance of responsibility.
. Without providing support or elaboration, Frausto's brief asserts that the district court also violated his "constitutional rights to due process.” Because Frausto has not developed this issue in his briefs as required, he has waived this argument.
See Peterson,