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United States v. Franklin D. Lampley
573 F.2d 783
3rd Cir.
1978
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*2 WEIS, 1974, а felony, Circuit in violation of Before GIBBONS and 18 U.S.C. MEANOR,* Judge. 875(c) District Judges, making repeated and with harass- ing interstate calls May between OF THE COURT OPINION and February offense, a petty violation of ap- On MEANOR, Judge. District *3 pellant’s motion, the case was transferred Appellant, Lampley, appeals Franklin D. from the Western District of Wisconsin to judgment a conviction entered in of the Eastern of Pennsylvania District on Court for the United States District 20, May 1975. Pennsylvania on one District of Eastern 17, 1975, On June threatening appellant making of a interstate filed a count of 18 motion to dismiss II of telephone call violation U.S.C. count the indictment 875(c),1 making vague. anonymous one count of insufficient and The Govеrn § harassing calls in telephone agreed interstate viola- ment II count was inartfully 223(1)(B) of and seven August 26, tion 47'U.S.C. drawn. Accordingly, 1975, § a harassing making interstate tele- counts 16-count superseding indictment was re ensued in calls which conversation phone by grand turned a jury the Eastern Dis 223(1)(D).2 47 violation of We § U.S.C. trict of Pennsylvania charging violations of counts, appellant’s on all affirm 18 875(c) U.S.C. and § U.S.C. we discuss contentions appellant’s but 223(1)(B) (1)(D). and §§ Specifically, constitutionality to the and construction I, charged counts II and V threatening calls the propriety of a U.S.C. and § to Richard Hatlen in violation of 18 U.S.C. conjunc- charge in lesser-included offense 875(c). charged § Count IV a threatening with an on 18 tiоn instruction U.S.C. call to the Attorney in the Western 875(c). § Wisconsin, District of also in violation of 875(c). VI, III, VII, VIII, IX, X, § Counts XII, XIII, XV charged repeated and XVI 1975, harassing calls 13, to Richard and February grand On federal Elizabeth Hatlen in violation 223(1)(D). in the Western District of Wisconsin of U.S.C. jury § repeated Count XIV charging charged harassing a two-count indictment3 returned threatening Simmons, with to Mrs. appellant making Mary tele- contrary to August 5, charged call to Richard Hatlen XI anonymous Count * Meanor, (C) Judge H. Curtis District makes or causes of anoth- Jersey, sitting by desig- repeatedly continuously ring, er for the District of New or to with any person intent to harass nation. the called number; or (D) calls, repeated telephone during makes 875(с) provides: 18 U.S.C. § 1. ensues, solely which conversation to harass any Whoever transmits in interstate commerce any person number; at the called or containing any kidnap communication threat to (2) knowingly permits any telephone under injure any person any or threat any purpose pro- his control to be used for another, $1,000 shall be fined more than or not section, by hibited this shall be fined not imprisoned years, not five or more than both. imprisoned $500 more than or not more than provides: months, U.S.C. six or both. Whoever— represented 3. This indictment the second time (1) in the District of Columbia or in inter- charges brought criminal have been foreign state or communication meаns of against appellant telephone. misuse of for telephone— 7, July 1971, Attorney On the United States comment, (A) request, suggestion makes the Western Wisconsin District of filed a crimi- obscene, lewd, proposal or lascivi- against charging nal him information conduct ous, indecent; filthy, or subject similar is the to that which of the in- call, (B) whether or makes a Lampley’s Upon agreement stant case. ensues, disclosing conversation without his making harassing undergo cease calls and to abuse, identity annoy, psychiatric treatment, with intent the United States Attor- threaten, any person ney of harass at the called caused that information to be dismissed on number; September 5, 1972. 1975, through March an made of 47 in violation Hatlens calls to the week average per of 10-12 calls to the 223(1)(B). Hatlen home. I, II III counts On October speedy trial. operator make Lampley for lack would often as- were dismissed granted the calls, court operator and while the placed March sisted On pursuant to U.S.C. call, motion he would Government’s shout obscenities over On competency determination. 4244 for a or operator’s you ready voice ask “Are a psychia- talk,” on the basis speak March my daughter, “Can I Lampley judge trial found addition, report, trist’s Judy.” place would stand trial. competent to “my wife, Lamp- collect calls to Elizаbeth ley,” when Hatlen Elizabeth refused to post- numerous July On after accept charges, she could hear the request at the the trial date ponements of speaking background. defense, trial proceeded case *4 through of the indict- XVI counts IV Hatlen, on husband, Richard Elizabeth’s and grant- were acquittal of Judgments ment. Simmons, mother, Mary Elizabeth’s also be- IV, X, and XIII. On XII counts to appellant’s spleen. came the focus of the 1976, guilty 2, jury the returned August 1974, 5, August appellant placed On the a counts, convicting remaining the verdicts on call to the Hatlens wherein Richard heard V, count, felony and count a Lampley on appellant operator, the shout over thе “I VIII, XIV, VII, IX, XI, VI, XV and counts have hired wife to your you.” been kill Judge Becker September XVI. On This appel- threat constituted the basis of year a five term appellant the to sentenced lant’s on V. count like count V and concurrent probation of on In 1974 and Mrs. received Simmons remaining the terms on probationary harassing a of calls the multitude counts. Rock, appellant her home in Hollow Ten at 9,1975, January Lampley nessee. On called II m., a. her at least three times—1:30 2:05 a. a The in this ease constitute bizarre facts m. 2:10 a. m. Each time Lampley and in tale of a romantic obsession. Simmons, spoke a few and Mrs. words Tennessee, Nashville, appellant briefly the voice, hung up. his recognizing After the her Elizabeth Hatlen before mar- dated call, her third Mrs. Simmons took off terminating riage, after a relationship their the This calls was the basis hook. series of an relationship The had endur- few weeks. appellant’s of conviction under count XIV. however, appellant, ing the for in effect on defense, own Taking the stand in his in the summer of he called Elizabeth testified after 1971 he had that Wisconsin, Evansville, where she lived with Hatlens, one call made to the one and their four her Richard Hatlen husband August 5, to Richard on but he denied appellant told her that he children. The The threatening Richard’s life. thrust of mind, he her out of his that get could not prosecution Lampley’s defense was that his rough 17 for which she spent years a had part was of a plot the result on of the that he wanted to see her fault and Hatlens, Attorney, the United States refused, he told that she her again. When Department Justice, of the Federal Bureau life make miserable for her. he would Investigation, of and the United Dis- appellant launched from his Thereupon, trict expos- Court silence his activities in telephonic Pennsylvania home a assault ing corruption government. others, a unleashing and Hatlens barrage subsequently incessant and abu- of Ill continued, with calls which sive intermission, During 1975. The has raised several into periods of questions question appeal, May constitutionality this and period First, he January construction of through December harassing of the Since that is violative conversation asserts is save the necessary to section from specify it fails to unconsti Amendment because First tutionality, since the proscription requisite ensuing conversation to harass in intended which no abusive harassing Without language. contain must is language is consistent with .used both reasons, may be requirement, he one such congressional intent and language mere communi- attempt for a convicted 223(1)(D), district court re properly speech, right violation of the free cate in appellant’s request fused to charge on the therefore, charge and, the court’s failure harassing necessity language. require- harassing is conversation reversal. ground to conviction is ment section’s specific The re intent quirement unconvincing renders appellant’s claimed, nor could has not 223(1)(B) second claim that (D) §§ so, beyond the successfully do it is he unconstitutionally vague. It long has been Congress criminal impose power true that s interstate placement on the sanction Court, indeed, recognized has [t]he harass, or annoy. calls to abuse requirement specific of a intent to do speech enjoys protection all Not prohibited may act avoid those conse- amendment, Chaplinsky Hamp v. New first quences accused which may other- shire, vague wise render or indefinite statute enacting (1942), and in L.Ed. . invalid. . . the punish- [W]here Congress compelling had a interest ment imposed only for an knowing- act *5 from protection of innocent individuals ly done with the purpose of doing that fear, annoyance abuse or at the hands of prohibits, the statute the accused who not to persons employ telephone, the cannot said to be suffer from lack of communicate, unjustifiable but ‍‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‍for other warning knowledge or that the act which H.R.No.1109, See Interstate and motives. he a does is violation of law. Committee, Commerce Foreign U.S.Codе States, 91, Screws v. United 325 U.S. 101- Admin.News, (1968); and Cong. p. 1915 02, 65 (1945). S.Ct. 89 L.Ed. 1495 Darsey, F.Supp. States v. 311 United appellant The cannot claim confusion about (E.D.Pa.1972). proscribed where, the conduct here, the appellant argues The that precisely specifies § statute that the actor require harassing perform read to must must be the use of intend acts of harassment culpable. in order to language to avoid the be unconstitutional of mere to commu- attempts criminalization Next the appellant raises questions However, requires that that nicate. section meaning as to the of the ensuing element of the punishable conduct be made with intent under conversation He § assеrts the “solely any person harass at called that requirement the conversation cannot actual number.” Whether or not the con- be met speaks unless caller language harassing may versation contains party verbally called responds. Thus, ap question relevant to the of intent. How- pellant operator-assist contends that on an ever, the nature of the conversation can call, only if the operator speaks, there bearing constitutionality have no on the ensuing has been no conversation within require- since its the section narrow intent meaning 223(1)(D), and that it was precludes proscription ment mere error for the trial court to refuse appel communication. to this charge4 lant’s effect. you requested charge spoken by text of the is as follows: I further instruct words operator attempting an determining call make the whether “conversation ensued” ensuing” during repeated would not constitute “conversation each of the calls in count, during repeated telephone you Lampley a call. must find Mr. So for exam- each spoke during ple, operator call and if an said “Collect Mr. himself call from by person Lampley” person that he was heard some the called or “Person to call Mr. words, Lampley” per- number. other similar and the multiplicitousness. operator places Under that doctrine an clear that when

It is caller, operator appellate may court avoid the at the behest resolution of call legal agent affecting of the caller issues less than acting as the all of the contacting party called. counts in an indictment where at least one purposes of upheld intent count has been acts with sole and the the caller sentences Where agent, are harass, spoken through Hirabayashi his concurrent. the words v. United States, 85, 81, readily 1375, attributable operator, (1943); Congress intention of L.Ed. 1774 was not the United States v. Cury, him. It 337, (3d telephonic 1963). who abuses 313 F.2d Cir. permit The doc- liability under trinе clearly discretion, to evade involves a matter communication States, placing only Barnes v. 223(1)(D) by the device of United necessary, operator-assisted (1973), calls. Nor is n. 93 S.Ct. 37 L.Ed.2d 380 suggests, recipient applied that the call and should not be where there is a operator’s significant to the words. verbally respond greater risk of adverse collateral consequences to constitute from multiple Communication sufficient convictions. operator occurs when the v. Daley, “conversation” States 564 F.2d listening recipient. (2d 1977). to the n.2 speaks Cir. That the doctrine has continuing vitality seems very clear. It has point to the In his final directed recently apрlied been by Supreme 223(1)(D), construction of § Court, States, Barnes v. United supra,5 and single of what constitutes a raises issue ago while recognized short “repeated telephone calls.” He offense this court any question without as to its urges charging many the indictment Keller, validity. United 512 F.2d repeated harassing calls to the counts of (3d 1975).6 185 n.8 Cir. multiplicitous, reasoning Hatlens was below, judgments Under charged separate counts was the conduct felony stands convicted of a in violation of nature, repetitious continuing 875(c); petty one offense “repeated tele prohibits since the statute 223(1)(B) violation of 47 U.S.C. and seven calls,” all such conduct should have petty offеnses in violation of 47 U.S.C. subject single of a count. For this been *6 we appre- Because can see no § appellant argues the that the trial reason ciable greater risk of collateral conse- denying require in his motion to court erred quences flowing eight rather than among to elect from the the convictions, petty three offense we choose 223(1)(D) counts. § to exercise our discretion under the concur- that the indictment was conclusion rent sentence doctrine and do not reach the in multiplicitous charging appellant with multiplicitousness. issue of We add that 223(1)(D) arising than one more offense § not prejudiced at the trial out оf his calls to the Hatlens would result from the count treatment of his judgment a below to in modification the_ Hatlens, the for whether this con- two convictions for reflect not seven but alleged counts, duct was ‍‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‍in one or several 223(1)(D) involving the violation of § —one government’s evidence would have been arising the Hatlens and one out of calls to Thus, the same. all of the convictions un- sen- Lampley’s the calls to Mrs. Simmons. 223(1)(D) der will be affirmed. § all concurrent and under the tences were may concurrent sentence doctrine we exer- Finally,7 appellant’s we turn to cise our discretion not to rule on the issue of contention that in instructing jury on hung telephone up apрlied 6. The doctrine son at the called number was not as a matter of within discretion. would not constitute “conversation” this meaning of this law. arguments 7. We shall not discuss four raised Romano, 5. See also United States v. 382 U.S. appellant’s upon brief because consideration (1965). 86 S.Ct. 15 L.Ed.2d 210 totally we find them to be devoid of merit. (1) These contentions are as follows: that

789 V,8 felony on 18 predicated States, count Sansone count 85 875(c), wrongfully the trial court S.Ct. (1965). L.Ed.2d 882 U.S.C. § Govern request Virgin for a lesser-in- ment of appellant’s Carmona, denied Islands v. charge (3d 47 U.S.C. F.2d 1970). cluded offense under Cir. Sansone pro 223(1)(B). prohibits The latter statute vides that § dis- making call without . a case where some of the [i]n threat- closing identity one’s with intent to elements charged crime themselves en. crime, constitute a lesser defendant, if the evidence justifie[s] it . . . [is] 875(c) proscribes the transmission Section entitled to an instruction which would any “in communi- interstate commerce [of] permit finding guilt of the lesser kidnap any any cation threat containing . . (Citation offense . omitted) person injure threat A lesser-included offense in- 223(1)(B) provides another.” that it Section is only struction proper where call, is a wheth- crime “make charged greater requires offense the jury ensues, er or not without dis- conversation a disputed to find factual element which closing identity and with intent [one’s] required is not for conviction of the less- abuse, threaten, annoy, any per- or harass er-included offense. at number.” The son the called maximum 875(c) $1,000 is a sanction under fine 349-50, at 1009. A under years’ imprisonment, five while that lesser-included offense charge is inappropri- 223(1)(B) is a fine and six months’ where, $500 upon ate examination of the rele- imprisonment. The defense a re- submitted statutes, appears vant the offense quest charge9 the lesser-included of- be claimed to lesser-included contains an rejected grounds fense which was additional element part of the allegedly there was no evidence of the dis- “without inclusive offense. Government of Virgin closing 223(1)(B). identity” element of § Parrilla, Islands v. (3d F.2d Cir. 1977); Government of Virgin Islands v. agree We was not enti- Smith, F.2d (3d 1977). Cir. requested tled to the offense lesser-included charge. The which determining test The appellant 223(1)(B) asserts that § is may 31(c), verdicts a return jury 875(c). under Rule lesser-included within However, thus, F.R.Cr.P., and, should offenses the former offense element, contains an charge, included set forth of identity, non-disclosure which is not re- judge erroneously appellant’s although trial denied the his § convictions upon prosecutor’s motion for a mistrial proba- have been affirmed because violation of attempt during summation to draw an adverse subject appellant considerably tion would ato inference from the defense’s call a fаilure to greater prison felony term for the than for the witness; (2) court-appointed certain 223 offenses. to call counsel’s refusal certain witnesses *7 appellant important whom deemed his de- to following request 9. The defense made the to incompetency fense constituted enti- counsel charge: tling trial; (3) appellant to new the regard V, you With to Counts IV if and trial; right speedy was denied his to a left with a reasonable doubt whether the (4) judge disqual- that the trial should have allegedly spoken by words Mr. against ified himself on account of bias the by recited indictment were in fact said appellant. argu- We the note latter three him, but that he made both by ments wеre raised counsel for the question California, 738, calls in in pursuant interstate commerce and to Anders v. 386 U.S. 1396, disclosing identity (1967). 87 L.Ed.2d did so without S.Ct. 18 493 his with the threatening person intent the at the called 8. The concurrent sentence doctrine does number, (if you then find each of these ele- operate jurisdictional bar to consideration of beyond doubt) you may ments a reasonable convictions, challenges although to him of convict an offense 47 under one valid sen conviction is and concurrent )(B) 223(1 “Making which I shall refer to as imposed. Mary tences have been Benton v. Telephone A Call With The Intent To Threat- 784, land, 787-91, 2056, 23 395 U.S. 89 S.Ct. en.” (1969). appropriate L.Ed.2d 707 Here it is to challеnge felony appellant’s consider to the 790 by submit, argu- holding, indefensibly I that the Appellant’s latter. the

quired under element is not expiration petitioner’s that the non-disclosure the sentence ment 223(1)(B) offense for a required always appeal the from the criminal mooted con lesser-in- hence, 223(1)(B) can be and, conviction, tempt though govern even convincing. judge The trial is not cluded Pierre testify ment intended to force St. to to request defense’s refused properly grand jury, thereby raising before another charge. possibility subsequent Hirabayashi, In and sentence. Court from will be af- judgment appealed deciding avoided whether American citizens firmed. by military рlaced could order be in concen GIBBONS, (concurring in Judge Circuit camps solely tration because of their race or part). dissenting part and nationality. The Court held that because defendant, the American citizen a senior at majority’s opinion except to join in the I University Washington, had received that we should not that it holds the extent a concurrent whether the counts sentence for violation of a question reach order,1 the Hatlens are repeated unnecessary calls to curfew it was alleging lawful to respectfully I dissent ‍‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‍from multiplicitous. failing consider whether his conviction for majority’s upon Hirabayashi reliance report tо camp to concentration was 1375, States, 320 63 S.Ct. U.S. United Hirabayashi’s valid. The merit of con (1943), dispose of that L.Ed. 1774 87 that, holding by current sentence resort Moreover, I have considered contention. device, ing to that the Court avoided the multiplicity contention appellant’s explicitly overruling worse courses of Ex Therefore, I dis- it to be meritorious. find 2, parte Milligan, (4 Wall.) 71 U.S. 18 L.Ed. affirming Lamp- judgment sent from the (1867), explicitly endorsing or of 281 ley’s conviction on all of counts. power military authorities place camps American citizens concentration I. THE CONCURRENT SENTENCE on account of their race or national ances DOCTRINE try. Term, 1942, not a vin The October With a return normalcy, the twin dis Suрreme jurispru tage year for the Court’s were, Hirabayashi asters of St. Pierre and rights process individual and due dence of submit, LaVallee, repudiated in Carafas v. Preoccupied with a threat of law. 234, 1556, 391 U.S. 88 S.Ct. 20 L.Ed.2d 554 security, the Court coun country’s external York, 40, (1968), and v. New 392 Sibron U.S. liber many assaults on individual tenanced 1889, (1968). 917 88 S.Ct. 20 L.Ed.2d Their which, hindsight, with the benefit of we ty anticipated demise was in Fiswick v. United and unnec know were both intolerable now States, 211, 224, 67 91 S.Ct. L.Ed. exam essary. Among egregious the more (1946), v. Morgan, United States temporary yielding the Court’s ples of 247, 502, (1954), 98 L.Ed. 248 U.S. S.Ct. Pierre v. hysteria were decisions St. States, 354, and Pollard v. United U.S. States, U.S. (1957). 77 S.Ct. 1 L.Ed.2d 393 Each of (1943), Hirabayashi v. Unit L.Ed. 1199 recognized by these cases that when a con States, 63 S.Ct. person viction a brands a Pierre, (1943). peti L.Ed. 1774 St. criminal, is affected months imprisoned tioner had been for five branding and thus should be heard to com refusing divulge to a contempt for *8 plain, whether or not the conviction result whose grand jury the name of the distinguished ed in custody. The Court St. money he embezzled. The avoid had Court Hirabayashi by presuming Pierre Judges Je sharp ed the conflict between legal consequences collateral would ‍‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‍flow scope Frank and Learned Hand on the rome against self-incrimination from the mere existence of a conviction. privilege part upholding 1. Even that of the Court’s decision the curfew validity. order is of dubious York, v. (1973), significance Sibron New U.S. 88 L.Ed.2d 380 Sеe the ma (1968). jority 20 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. attaches to it. The Supreme Court, in reviewing convictions, federal exercises a Lampley may In the instant case chal- discretionary jurisdiction, certiorari and its lenge ap- criminal conviction on direct any interest in granting certiorari is primarily can peal government unless the overcome respect with particular issues. The dis show presumption “that there is cretionary application of the concurrent possibility legal no collateral con- any sentence doctrine in case of discretionary sequences on the imposed will be basis of justification review is no for its application challenged conviction.” 392 U.S. by a court in which review is a matter of showing 88 S.Ct. at 1900. No such has been right. I can think of no reason which Indeed, compared here. when with a made would justify its application case, in this conviction, single several convictions for vi- discretion, even as a matter of when as olating 223(1)(D) could certainly U.S.C. § recently as 1975 we declined do so. Unit legal consequences have different Keller, (3d v. 512 F.2d 182 Cir. Lampley proba- future. If should violate 1975). Even exercises of discretion should incarcerated, tion and be the number of principled. his eligibility convictions will affect for pa- Moreover, role. convictions II. THE MULTIPLICITY CLAIM might count of purposes multiple-of- for through Counts III XIII оf the supersed- again Lampley fender statutes if convict- ing indictment charge appellant with ed. violations 223(1)(D), of 47 U.S.C. § which of presumption legal While the collateral provides: consequences by device which Whoever Supreme Court rid itself the embarrass- (1) in interstate Hirabayashi, ments of St. Pierre and communication by telephone— means me an presumption seems to unnecessary (D) makes repeated telephone calls, complication. sanctioning system In any during ensues, which conversation sole- review, provides appellate a de- ly to any person harass at the number ought fendant to be able assert the inval- called . idity any charge sovereignty that a has shall be fined not more than or upon laid $500 him. The executive branch has imprisoned months, than not more six system judicial resorted to the to brand the both. wrongdoer and has defendant received judiciary’s participation the benefit of the (emphasis added). the majority As opinion branding. in that While discloses, other parts of make criminal stands, the legitimating judici- effect of the single use of an interstate telephone, as ary’s concurrence remains. I would much long as the acted defendant with the requi-

prefer speculation to eliminate about collat- site specific intention. distinguishing Thus, legal consequences. eral I would hold feature of proscribes is that always that a has standing defendant use, e., i. a course of conduct —and not challenge appeal validity con- single Lampley calls. contends that realists, legal suggest, viction. For that is government’s arbitrarily indictment divided really what v. York Sibron New means. the single proscribed course of conduct But possible ‍‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‍even if we search for collateral separate statute into eleven courses of legal consequences, consequences such conduct. readily apparent Accordingly, here. we contention, Pursuant to that multiplicity challenge should consider the brought a compel motion to merits. to elect among multiplicitous counts under Nor am I we should Multiplicity convinced that attach refers to the prac States, tice charging to the footnote in Barnes single commission n.6, 37 offense in more count. than one See Unit *9 Corp., v. Allied Chemical Second, repeated States calls must be made (E.D.Va.1976). should F.Supp. 122 It be “solely to harass” and merely not to “an- is the distinguished duplicity, which abuse, threaten, noy, or harass” as in the single of two offenses in a count. joining case anonymous phone of call under Starks, v. United States F.2d See 223(1)(B). (3d 1975). n.5 Cir. The vices of 116 & v. Darsey, United States 342 F.Supp. (1) may result in are: that it multiplicity (E.D.Pa.1972). offense; (2) sentences for the same Of the eleven charging repeated counts may have an psychological that adverse telephone case, calls in the instant all re many that jury by suggesting on the effect ferred calls from a telephone Down in place, see Federal Wright, took offenses ingtown, Pennsylvania. All but one re (1969 and Procedure Practice specific (608- ferred to calls to a number (3) negative that it ed.); and creates more 4976) Evansville, in Wisconsin. The re 992— produces of convictions record and thus maining count referred to calls to a differ legal likelihood of conse greater collateral (901-986-3160) Rock, ent number in Hollow A multiplicity problem usually quences. The Tennessee. Hollow Rock engaged when a defendant has arises belongs Simmons, number to Mrs. continuing repeated illegal or conduct Hatlen, mother Elizabeth object attempts in indictment its Lampley’s peculiar obsession. The Evans sepa that course of conduct into to divide Wisconsin, ville, number distinguishable belongs to Eliza illegal acts. If the rate agree beth Hatlen. with majority that the acts consti court finds defendant’s XI, conduct, that Count illegal charging repeated one course calls tuted number, Mrs. remedy compel prose is to Simmons’s appropriate sets forth a dis multiplicitous to elect among cution tinct offense. But all of the other counts Seе, g., e. Univer repeated counts. refer calls to Mrs. Hatlen’s Corp., I. T. Credit 218, 220, sal C. 14, 1974, number May between and March 227, 229, (1952) (§ 15 16, L.Ed. 260 Except III, for Count punishes Fair Labor of the Standards Act “repeated” charges calls May “on or about separate of conduct “course rather than 1974,” on or May 16, about each course”). such items in dealing of the counts with “repeated” calls to the Evansville number refers to such a statute explicitly When refers to a calls on or about a specific Nothing date. offense, course of conduct as the the test in the superseding suggests indictment why multiplicity obviously be even should calls on regarded these dates were sepa stringently applied more in contexts than episodes. rate The evidence establishes such as Fair Labor Act. No Standards many there were other single isolated call could be a calls on dates not mentioned violation Nor would series indictment. The Hat isolated, testimony lens’ Judge strongly suggests unrelated calls suffice. they regarded has as fol- phone Newcomer construed all calls between 1974, March, May, lows: including calls on dates not indictment, mentioned in the First, “repeated”. calls must be continuing as one harassment. Hatlen repeated court takes Mrs. this to mean always testified that there enough were ten proximity close to another about per to twelve calls week. Trial rightly single episode, Transcript, called a and not at 107-08. Mr. Hatlen by periods years. or testified that separated of months calls ten repeated- averaged condition both calls a requires throughout This week cogniza- period. as an element Trial legally Transcript, ness at 120. charge, Many and at placed ble the same time insures of these calls were as “collect” courts will not with be flooded to “Elizabeth Lampley” “Judy complaints growing single out un- Lampley” of a and thus did appear pleasant acquaintance. call with some Lampley’s telephone bills. The evidence *10 appear which did not that the calls was unable to suggests prepare an effective defense. bill for his Down Lampley’s telephone government on The would have us construe Pennsylvania, telephone bridged ingtown, Lampley’s vagueness motion as a motion to the dates select intervals between the time duplicitous cure a complaint and thus as a separate prosecu government concession that he had made multiple sepa- separate The dates set forth tion. rate offending series of phone calls. For separate epi of the indictment counts two reasons I cannot accept govern- nothing more than the dates of sodes argument. First, ment’s it misstates the Lampley’s billed to number. thrust of Lampley’s vagueness motion. Second, even if permitted finding government’s Clearly argument the evidence accurately calls a week between average an of ten characterized Lampley’s motion, of 1975 May of 1974 and March constituted the fact that he made the motion would not illegal proscribed by course of conduct an relieve the of its burden of nothing But either in the in- charging and establishing how many sepa- suggests the record or in dictment rate courses of place. conduct took courses of Lampley engaged in several con- Since the court charged, that the jury Hatlen directed toward Mrs. rather duct should treat each series of calls separately, appearing just than one. The dates on jury never considered whether there do not turn a continu- Lampley’s phone bill single was a course of conduct. But the ing separate course of conduct into court charge did that in order to convict the distinguishable acts. If there had been a count, defendant jury had to significant lapse of time between series of find calls and a sole intent to ha- calls, if the motivation for one series rass. Thus the verdict necessarily required had differed in some manner from the moti- finding on all the elements of another, objects vation for or if the 223(1)(D) offense. Ordinarily, because of different, might harassment had been the possibility jury prejudice arising possible separate to treat the series of calls from more charges, numerous the remedy separate episodes. But here the motiva- for the failure grant a motion to elect tion, Lampley’s obsessive fixation Mrs. among multiplicitous counts would be a affection, object Hatlen as an was con- new instance, trial. In this however, the addition, constantly stant. the calls fo- same evidence of calls would object as the cused on Mrs. Hatlen have been admissible even if the election harassment, they By never ceased. motiоn granted. had been Lampley’s only contrast, way the calls to Mrs. Simmons defense was that he did not make the calls. her rather her were intended harass than Under these circumstances I would con- Thus, daughter. grew while those calls out clude that while his convictions on more the same diseased fixation as the calls to than one stand, count should not Hatlens, they part were not same one such conviction can survive and no new illegal course of conduct. required. trial is government urges that we should judgment would vacate the of sentence Lamp- the district court’s denial of consider 223(1)(D) counts, on all but two of the ley’s among motion to elect the counts in but would otherwise affirm. superseding indictment because he had moved earlier to dismiss Count II of the

original indictment. That count had

charged making with harass- defendant

ing phone May calls to the Hatlens between February argument

based his motion on the wording

from the of the indictment he was pattern

unable to determine the of conduct charged

with which he had been and thus

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Franklin D. Lampley
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Feb 10, 1978
Citation: 573 F.2d 783
Docket Number: 76-2502
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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