United States v. Foy

1029 adequate- that the “court ing claims. and identity multiple false on their if it relevant the factors references ly at all of the addresses you And if look conduct, actually the in stole some of the considerations defendant least children, 3553(a)”). multi- identity of 30 some § over times, in the commission ple Here, explicitly refer- the district court therefore, And, I to scheme defraud. appropriate Sentencing the Guide- enced ap- are that sentences think consecutive lines, provided and reasoned basis case, my is in that propriate aggravated identity two of the ordering intention. Al- consecutively. to run theft sentences Transcript (emphasis at 85-87 (Sentencing the district court could have ex- though added).) issue, groupability the plicitly addressed explain required not to do so. United adequately

“A court must it was See 09-10247, sen impose Egu, consecutive its decision v. No. WL States I, 2010) (9th § 1028A. Lee pursuant 1972079, 17, May tences” at *3 Cir. I, the government at 781. In Lee F.3d (upholding consecutive sen- (unpublished) little that district court “did conceded the § as within tences for 1028A convictions con it ran the sentences explain” why discretion, district court’s even the sentence secutively. Id. We vacated the have though district could “[t]he that the we were “not convinced because specifically why addressed consecu- more the factors that court considered district appropriate despite sentences were tive to run inform decision whether must underly- groupability of Defendant’s concurrently § or multiple 1028A counts convictions”). Therefore, ing we conclude consecutively.” readily This Id. case is run the district court’s decision to I. Unlike in Lee distinguishable from Lee consecutively was reason- the sentences I, no refer where the district court made able. 5G1.2, § the factors in ence whatsoever to appli clearly here mentioned the the court III. her guideline implicitly based cable reasons, AFFIRM foregoing For we on at one of factors least those conviction and sentence. Dvorak’s of the crimes com noting the seriousness 5G1.2, by Dvorak. See U.S.S.G. mitted 2(B)(i) sentencing n. (permitting

cmt. “the nature and serious court to consider offenses”). underlying While ness of each explicitly court did not mention America, UNITED STATES 5G1.2, commentary to factor listed Appellee, require I that a Lee does not every factor contained court must recite rejected squarely guideline. have We FOY, Jr., Appellant. Earl analogous argument No. 09-3027. every single list required are courts 3553(a) sentence; imposing factor when of Appeals, States Court long as it is clear that court consid

so Eighth Circuit. factors, out. it need not list them ered April Submitted: 2010. Wood, F.3d See United Aug. Filed: Cir.2009) (stating that district to recite “mechanical required court is 3553(a) impos- factors

ly” all of the when

MELLOY, Judge. Circuit Foy, pled guilty

Earl Jr. three counts communications, mailing threatening 876(c), violation of 18 U.S.C. and two mailing counts of communica- threatening money, tions to extort in violation of 18 876(b). Foy subsequently U.S.C. moved plea. to withdraw his The district court1 ultimately denied motion and sen- him imprisonment. tenced to 480 months’ Foy appeals his sentence and the denial of the motion to withdraw plea. his We af- firm.

I. Background May Foy In charged was with sending threatening “S.K.,” letters to ex-girlfriend son, and the mother of his between November and December 2005. Foy prison was incarcerated in state at the time the letters All were sent. three let- against ters contained death threats S.K. and others. Two of the letters con- also tained demands for sums equaling thou- dollars, including sands of one demand for $90,000 S.K., a total approximately of from daughter, her and her friend. jury

A trial commenced April on 2009. At the of government’s close case, Foy pled guilty all charges without the benefit of plea agreement. The accepted plea, court2 finding Foy Angela L. Campbell, argued, Des was competent capable and of entering an Moines, IA, Esteves, M. Alexander on the plea, informed that he was aware of the brief, IA, City, appellant. Sioux for charges nature of the and the conse- quences plea, of Goodgame Rebecca and that he made Ebinger, argued, IA, plea Fletcher, I, knowingly voluntarily. and Rapids, Cedar Kevin Three Craig later, AUSA, days counsel, brief, Sioux, IA, through trial on the filed City, for a motion to withdraw plea ap- and to appellee.

point new counsel. subsequently sub- LOKEN, BRIGHT, Before and pro mitted se memoranda which he MELLOY, Judges. Circuit maintained that he wished to withdraw the Bennett, Gritzner, 1. The Honorable Mark W. United The Honorable James E. Judge Judge States District for the States District for the Northern Southern District District Iowa, presided Foy's plea at the trial and at of Iowa. hearing. government plea, draw his letters sent to S.K. at because plea primarily trial that had been post-plea, reports disruptive evidence at work presented New counsel forged. with or tampered awaiting sentencing. while behavior The July, In eventually appointed June. court also admitted to the rec- Foy’s motion to the district court denied competency pre- ord a forensic evaluation plea. withdraw his pared prior Foy’s to trial as an indicator of health. Upon mental consideration of the proceeded sentencing. ease The record, agreed the court with the PSR’s (“PSR”) report calculated presentence advisory of an determination Guidelines adjusted base offense level Foy’s combined range, denied motion for a down- twenty-five. qualified as Because as variance, offender, in imposed career his total offense level ward thirty-two. variance, States creased See United him to 480 months’ Sentencing 4B1.1. The Guideline PSR imprisonment. The court achieved the against a two-level reduc recommended by running twenty- federal sentence 3E1.1(a) pursuant tion U.S.S.G. year statutory maximum sentences on the responsibility. Foy objected acceptance 876(b) consecutively, two counts with the against aceep recommendation an to the 876(c) § sixty-month sentences for tance-of-responsibility reduction. running concurrently counts to one anoth- history catego criminal computed PSR his 876(b) § er and to the counts. It also ry grounds: Foy’s as VI on two accumula ordered the federal to run con- twenty-one history points tion of secutively his incomplete state sentence. status as a career offender. Con and his 5G1.3(a). See U.S.S.G. The district Foy’s advisory sequently, the PSR scored subsequently sentencing court filed a sentencing range Guidelines as 210 to 262 memorandum addressing reasoning for imprisonment. months’ varying upwardly. sentencing, At court the district over- II. Discussion Foy’s objection receiving

ruled to not ac- credit, ceptance-of-responsibility a decision Guilty A. Withdrawal of the Plea3 appeal. that he does not The district court Foy argues that the district gave beginning also notice at the of the court should have him to withdraw allowed hearing vary upwardly that it intended to guilty plea. support position, his In of his object- from the Guidelines. counsel presents arguments he that he failed to to the lack of advance notice. The ed brings raise before the district court and listed several reasons it believed First, appeal. for the first time on he warranted a variance. Defense counsel responses during asserts that some of his history that argued response had plea colloquy demonstrate that his of mental health and substance abuse is- impaired mental state was at the time. To young age sues from a and a difficult presents he this argument extent mitigated against childhood that a substan- plea unknowing establish his or invol government tial sentence. The offered as Foy’s pro requests untary, cogni- evidence se to with- “such a claim would not be possibility post-conviction proceedings. also raises the of an ineffec- See United 868, (8th prior due to tive assistance claim counsel’s McAdory, v. States 501 F.3d 872 present argument to the district ("We failure to Cir.2007) ordinarily defer ineffective as- plea He acknowl- court on withdrawal. U.S.C. sistance of counsel claims to 28 2255 however, typical- edges, appeal that a direct is proceedings.”). We do not entertain it fur- ly inappropriate forum for such' a claim ther here. preserve requests that we issue for 1034 appeal charges], on direct where he failed to there a maximum possible

zable is fine present $250,000, it to the district court in the first possible a maximum imprison- guilty a motion to withdraw his instance years.... ment of 5 On Counts 3 and 5 Washington, 876(b) plea.” United States 515 charges] a maximum [the there’s (8th Cir.2008) 861, (citing F.3d $250,000. possible fine of There’s a maxi- (8th Murphy, 899 F.2d possible imprisonment mum years of 20 Cir.1990)); see also United States v. prison[.]” There is no dispute that (8th Cir.1991). Young, 927 F.2d district court’s statements not explicit- did Second, contends that the district court he ly possibility alert to the of consecu- twenty-year failed to inform him that the tive sentencing. cites our decision in statutory maximum sentences Burney, United States v. 75 F.3d 876(b) could be run charges consecutive- Cir.1996), in support claim that ly. alleges He this omission was a viola- district court’s disclosure was insufficient. requirement tion of the in Federal Rule of In Burney, we stated that “[t]o extent 11 to him Criminal Procedure advise of the that court is obligated [in possible maximum penalty he faced. See accepting a plea agreement] to disclose the 11(b)(1)(H). Fed.R.Crim.P. Instances of possibility of consecutive ... noncompliance with may Rule 11 be raised we believe that the implicitly district court appeal, for the first time on but our review by telling did so [the ten defendant] Vonn, plain is for error. United States v. years was the maximum imprison- term of 55, 59, 535 U.S. 152 ment for each of the three counts.” Id. at (2002). L.Ed.2d 90 agree 445. We the district court’s statements were less clear than those in To plain succeed on error re However, Burney. even context, assuming, with- view a defendant must deciding, out that the district court should only show “not an error in the failure to case, have done more in this we do not follow Rule 11 but also a ‘reasonable believe a probability error, probability that reasonable exists that but for the he ” he would have would not have a continued with trial but for guilty plea.’ entered Garcia, 575, misstep. United v. the court’s States 604 F.3d (8th Cir.2010) (quoting 578 United States First, the Foy record indicates that ac- Luken, 741, (8th v. 560 F.3d 745 Cir. tually knew early on that consecutive sen- 2009)). “Even if he establishes such a tences could result in an even more oner- probability, discretionary relief is and ‘the ous total sentence than eventually the one court should not exercise that discretion imposed. According competency to the seriously unless the error affectfed] trial, report prepared prior Foy to told the fairness, integrity public reputation or evaluator that he would be incarcerated ” judicial proceedings.’ (quoting Id. Unit possibly fifty-five years for if convicted—a Olano, 725, 732, ed v. States 507 U.S. 113 by sentence achieved running the sen- (1993)). 1770, S.Ct. 123 L.Ed.2d 508 In consecutively tences on all five counts. determining whether a Rule 11 error af Moreover, Foy appear argue does not to fected a defendant’s substantial rights, that here the district court’s statements reviewing court considers the entire during plea colloquy confused his un- record, merely plea not proceedings. derstanding or actually misled him about Vonn, 74-75, 535 U.S. at 122 S.Ct. 1043. potential his as did the defendant in Burney. See at 444.

Regarding penalties, the maximum id. Nor has the district court part: thought twenty-year stated relevant asserted he a 847(c) 1, 2, “Under Counts and 4 [the sentence was the maximum absolute he

1035 reject this sum, Burney, 75 F.3d at 445. We the record In because receive. could possi- of the actually plea. aware his challenge was to shows any Rule sentencing, bility of consecutive impact his unlikely to

11 violation was Sentencing B. Issues Young, 927 guilty. See plead to decision the district argues first at 1062. F.2d gave insufficient notice of its intent prior notice Additionally, Foy had apply upward an variance. As the dis to of consecu sentencing possibility of the to noted, however, it correctly trict court object. The sentencing and did not tive provide advance notice required to consecutive PSR referred Irizarry v. vary upwardly. intent 5G1.2(d), which di to U.S.S.G. pursuant States, 708, 553 U.S. United beyond consecutive rects 2202-03, (2008); 2198, 171 L.Ed.2d 28 see maximum “to the extent statutory highest Levine, v. 477 F.3d also United States a necessary produce combined (8th Cir.2007); v. Sit United States as well as punishment,” to the total equal (8th Bear, ting 436 F.3d 932-33 Cir. 5G1.3(a). object to these did not Soldier, 2006); Long United court also The district portions of the PSR. (8th Cir.2005); 1120, 1122 F.3d of consecutive possibility addressed the Egenberger, 424 F.3d States 847(b) specifically sentences Cir.2005). explained, As we have sentencing hearing. during the charges 32(h) Rule of Procedure Federal Criminal attorney objected general Although Foy’s that under certain circumstances “provides lack advance notice of ly to the give the district court must notice to the variance, Foy nothing said about contemplating departure that it is a parties Rather, Foy alleged Rule violation. However, range. no guidelines from the during his allocution went on to indicate 32(h) required to Rule is not pursuant tice attempted to withdraw that he had adjustment to the sentence is when regretted pleading plea because he guilty variance, by rather than effected his deci plea agreement. without a Were Soldier, departure.” Long 431 F.3d closely tied to court plead guilty sion 1122; Irizarry, we think it also 2203- during plea colloquy, see error any likely he would have mentioned misun resulting from it in the district derstanding recognized has Supreme Court (“Had Garcia, 604 F.3d at 578 court. See in which the “there will be some cases plead guilty to decision [the defendant’s] will particular factual basis for a the mistaken closely dependent on been surprise a to a defendant or the come as a maximum of three

view that he faced Irizarry, 128 S.Ct. at 2203. Government.” release, it we believe years’ supervised cases, appropriate more In those “[t]he up in the likely spoken that he would have response” for the district court “to con- is of the court” where he had notice district party a continuance when a granting sider opportu release and period supervised claiming that the legitimate has a basis for heart, object). Foy’s argu At nities to Here, Foy’s Id. surprise prejudicial.” a belief that appear ments state attorney objected to the lack of advance him as court should have warned district notice, request did not a continuance but sentences could be to how consecutive Furthermore, indicat- respond. counsel eventu used to achieve the exact sentence that the court was surprised he was not ed however, not, ally imposed. Rule does an variance and did considering to know right a defendant the guarantee identify any specific prejudice result- not pleading guilty. his actual sentence before 3553(a) § ing timing from the the notice. On of the factors. United States v. facts, Jarvis, (8th Cir.2010). resentencing these we conclude is 606 F.3d required based on a lack of notice. Here, the district court recognized argues that also the district top variance from the of the Guidelines varying upwardly erred 480 range was substantial and stated that the procedural by Absent a error months. 3553(a)(1) (2) factors outlined in pri court, “failing district such as to calculate marily drove its decision. The court was (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines by concerned nature of criminal range, treating the Guidelines as mandato conduct, which includes unscored assaults 3553(a) ry, failing to consider the fac juvenile as a and several other violent tors, selecting clearly a sentence based on adult, young crimes as a number of them facts, failing adequately erroneous or women; against with interference official sentence,” explain the chosen we review acts, such as assaulting officers and fleeing substantive reasonableness under arrest; from and assaultive conduct and abuse-of-discretion-standard. rules, of prison violations some which oc Feemster, 572 F.3d curred awaiting while he was Cir.2009) (en banc). To determine wheth on the instant charges. The court also discretion, er a district court abuses its we noted twenty-one had accumulated “(1) broadly consider whether it fails to history points by criminal age of twen consider a relevant factor that should have ty-seven, substantially more than the mini (2) significant weight; gives sig received mum points number of associated with ca weight improper nificant to an or irrele status, reer offender see U.S.S.G. (3) factor; vant only ap or considers 4Al.l(a), eight points over the num propriate factors but in weighing those ber history needed to reach criminal cate judg factors commits clear error of gory result, VI. As a the court concluded omitted). (quotation ment.” Id. are “[W]e objective measurement, to take totality into account the of the Guidelines did not adequately account for circumstances, including any the extent of history. Additionally, range.” variance from the Guidelines Id. court found a gave Guidelines sentence omitted). (quotation not, mayWe howev substantially weight too little to the nature er, consider sentence outside the range and circumstances of charged, the crime presumptively unreasonable. Id. In con particular because had threatened to variance, sidering the extent of a give we S.K., kill multiple people, including who “due deference to the district court’s deci had been the victim of prior some of his 3553(a) factors, whole, sion that the on a assaultive conduct. The court character justify the extent of the variance.” Gall v. Foy ized a society” as “menace to and States, 38, 50-51, 552 U.S. only stated its belief that it a was “matter (2007) S.Ct. 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (noting a Foy of time” before would kill someone. major deviation from a Guidelines sentence Our careful review of the record leads us should be supported by significant “more to conclude that the district court’s con one.”). justification than Finally, a minor justified. cerns were we note that a when district court achieves As for the need for the sentence im- through variance consecutive posed, the court reiterated the serious na- sentencing, why it must indicate the above- sufficient, ture of the offenses Foy’s disrespect Guidelines and sentence is but not greater 3553(a), for the necessary § than law as evidenced his criminal under why history. and imprison Although consecutive terms of the court a believed ment § are reasonable under in light lengthy unlikely sentence was to deter recidivism, long government a sen- than what the often recom- it determined Foy’s giving a provide general deterrence to mends” and defendants with tence would lengthy history “demonstrated recidivist of similarly persons. situated See 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(B). importantly, against Most the violence and violence women” a impri- “very day.” that would bad The court also used found a sentence court during was in Foy strong language hearing for most of his adult life and son public. Foy’s See id. its written order to characterize necessary protect 3553(a)(2)(C). history public. The court criminal and threat to the considered 3553(a) however, It remaining improper, factors and deter- was not for the best, type “at neutral.” court to consider the and nature of mined them be activities, Foy’s prior of relevant fac- weighing Based on its and the tors, clearly analysis court believed that the sentence court did so within its 3553(a)(1) (a)(2) and imposed greater was sufficient but not factors. necessary. acknowledges post-Booker further that than sentencing scheme has bestowed wide lati- Foy argues that the district court erred judges tude to individual district court in fully give and suffi- by failing to consider weighing relevant Accordingly, factors. in weight “mitigating” to the factors cient in sentencing some variation will result history. disagree. his We The district depending identity on the of the sentenc- expressly considered his mental court Booker, ing judge. See United States v. health, disagreed but with as to its 220, 263, 543 U.S. on his case. In- significance impact (2005)(“We L.Ed.2d 621 cannot and do not case, the court found helping stead of claim that the use of a ‘reasonableness’ a anti- high the record indicated level of provide uniformity will standard placed Foy “top in the social behavior secure.”). Congress originally sought to 2,500 defen- approximately 5 or 10” of the case, any “personal dants the court had sentenced. The court In we do not think “substantially mitigating” crime, asserts, the lack did find for the as distaste” he parental guidance supervision ultimately improperly influenced the dis- a child and his introduction at received as in analysis trict court’s this case. Not- and alcohol. It young age drugs statements, its withstanding district determined, however, that factors these permitted Foy opportunity a full sufficiently dispel a belief that a did not argue engaged for a different necessary. was We 480-month sentence clarify Foy’s posi- with defense counsel to cannot say the court in its consider- erred tion, Foy’s acknowledged factors back- mitigating Foy’s history. factors in ation ground significant mitigators, and ul- were timately main arguments addressed his lengthy Foy next claims that his written order. The record reflects the product was the of the district serious, court’s decision was the result of against or “bias” “predisposition” court’s consideration of factors for and reasoned offenders, particularly violent those with a against lengthy sentence based on probing In history of domestic abuse. individual circumstances. prejudiced by a lack of whether said, variance, being That the extent of the vari- upward notice of an advance length with the of the resul- frankly acknowledged history coupled its own ance court in gives pause tant sentence us this case.4 “being [sic] of harder on violent defenders Cir.2007) (affirming upward degree 4. We that the of variance F.3d 532 note of in our case in and of itself is unheard See, Gnavi, e.g., law. United States entitled, however, compelling support We are not under our the degree of the (internal omitted)). quotations review to overturn a variance.” sentencing deferential might reasonably decision because we have sentencing guidelines, Foy Under the appro- concluded a different sentence was (17.5 years-21 faced a 210-262 month Feemster, priate. 572 F.3d at 462. Our month) years, 10 sentence. The district determination that the district court did imposed a sentence of 480 months in not abuse its discretion this case is (40 years), approximately double First, bolstered two factors. the dis- guideline range. recommended The provided precedent trict court “as our re- justified district court forty-year sen- quires, insight substantial into the reasons mostly tence on the nature and circum- (quota- for its determination.” Id. at 464 Foy’s present stances of crime and his omitted). Second, tion we believe dis- history. justifications trict explicit court’s rest The court considered the 18 U.S.C. largely on “the kind of defendant-specific 3553(a) factors, but the record does not determinations that are within the special support this variance of two times the competence sentencing courts.” Id. guideline range. The district court ex- omitted). (quotation We conclude the sen- pressed Foy’s the most concern over crimi- procedurally

tence was sound and substan- history. nal That record reflects that over tively reasonable. decade, past in engaged several altercations, leading to various assault III. Conclusion charges. He also has been cited for sever- reasons, For the foregoing we affirm. al minor offenses. His most serious crimes include third-degree second- and BRIGHT, Judge, dissenting. Circuit burglary. question, Foy’s Without crimi- respectfully I dissent. history nal lengthy. is But his offenses excessively are not majority extraordinary The severe or acknowledges that the ex- justify what variance, amounts to a life sentence. coupled tent of the with the length of the gives pause. it Foy’s difficult childhood should be Maj. op. 1037-38. But it reasons that it weighed against his criminal background. cannot overturn the sentence because the presentence report documents a tur- court did not abuse its discretion. bulent and Foy’s par- unstable childhood. ents were never married and suffered

I disagree. support While I the district history from a substance abuse. discretion, court’s and hold this mother, absent from much of his child- particular judge highest I regard, hood, played little upbringing. role agree imposition cannot with the of such At age eight, Foy boys’ moved into a an excessive sentence on the record before home, beginning juvenile a series of place- this court. The substantively sentence is By nine, age ments. receiving started unreasonable because the variance from psychiatric treatment for problems, includ- guidelines lacks sufficient ing adjustment disorder and mild retarda- justification. See United States v. Feem tion. ster, (8th Cir.2009) (en 572 F.3d

banc) (holding that a district court must professionals Mental health diag- later “consider the extent of the deviation and nosed him with conduct disorder of adoles- justification ensure that the sufficiently is cence impulse control disorder. Pro- months). advisory range variance to 120 months from Guide- lines of 63 to 78 subject Foy that he could be him inform recently diagnosed more fessionals and At years’ imprisonment. disorder personality forty with antisocial Foy’s men- traits. court personality hearing, the district change-of-plea borderline magnified “[ujnder 1, 2, concerns were tal health 4 ... stated that Counts Foy began problems. abuse substance possible imprison- a maximum [Foy faced] twelve, marijuana age at smoking years” and that Counts 3 “[o]n ment of 5 the substance on year, he used within one ... possible a maximum and 5 there’s consuming alco- Foy began daily a basis. years prison.” in imprisonment of snorting admits to age fourteen and hol inform that the district court did not cocaine. run consec- twenty-year sentence could be find the lack of court did not The district utively twenty-year to another sentence. and substance abuse guidance parental notice of the district Had received At the time of “substantially mitigating.” vary significantly from court’s intent so twenty-eight nearly sentencing, could have sentencing guidelines, he high He had never finished years age. evidence that the record did introduced here is an African we have school. What an extreme variance. support not Cf. much man who did not receive American 817, Rutherford, 599 F.3d United education, many he received nor has of an Cir.2010) (affirming a sentence life for him- to make a useful opportunities on consecutive sentences because based to his forty-year sentence Adding his self. change-of-plea the district court at for the crime of sec- existing incarceration possi- to the hearing alerted defendant likely amounts to a burglary ond-degree sentencing and suffi- bility of consecutive life sentence. sentence). ciently justified the in essence judge The district decided Moreover, rests on heavy Foy had led a worthless that Mr. twenty years for consecutive sentences of Thus, to do so. life and would continue and 5. Those counts recite extor- counts 3 principle—jail him adopted court crimes, Foy, prison, in in tion which while key. away and throw now S.K., threatening to kill letters to wrote with the district court disagree I paid money. him her and others unless she threaten- mailing the crime of committing let- serious crimes. Yet these These were forty-year warrants ing communications transactions, part of related ters were Foy’s background. even with two weeks of written and delivered within offense, it did not this is a serious While other, prison and the terms were each another individ- physical in harm to result hearing. at the same imposed imposed long- ual. Yet the district relationship such a It would seem many murder- than that which er sentence for concurrent usually would call crimes receive. might ers sentences. not re- the district court was Although case, dealing with a diffi- In this we are notice that it intended to quired provide Certainly subject: the dis- cult recidivism. range, see guideline from the vary upward experience more on possesses trict court States, U.S. Irizarry v. in judges. But subject appellate than this 171 L.Ed.2d 28 specialized knowl- experts case with case, (2008), in this where I comment that may have aided the recidivism edge about that of the is almost double the sentence Foy. This rec- district court have im- range, notice would guideline justification enough provide ord not does The rec- sentencing process. proved I forty years prison. to sentence court did ord reflects that the district the sentence. The case would vacate

should be remanded so that and the may government opportunity have an testimony expert addressing introduce risks of recidivism. UNIVERSITY, INC.,

CAPELLA Appellee/Cross-Appellant, EXECUTIVE RISK SPECIALTY COMPANY,

INSURANCE Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Gallagher Co.; Arthur J. Arthur J. Gallagher Management Services, Risk

Inc., Appellees/Cross-Appellants. 08-2382, 08-3673, 08-3675, Nos. 09-1121. Appeals, States Court of

Eighth Circuit. Submitted: Oct. 2009. Filed: Aug.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Foy

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Date Published: Aug 20, 2010

Citation: 617 F.3d 1029

Docket Number: 09-3027

Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.