Case Information
*1 Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from a 41-month sentence for conspiracy to possess counterfeit currеncy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and making counterfeit currency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 471, imposed as the result of a plеa agreement. On appeal Defendant Claude Foster ("Foster") argues that 1) the district court erred in failing to grant a downward departure because the government engaged in sentencing manipulation; and 2) the district court erred in enhancing Foster's sentence because it erroneously considered Foster's knowledge of printing to be a special skill and assessed him a two-level upward adjustment under section 3B1.3, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1997) ("U.S.S.G.").
We have fully reviewed the record and the briefs and have carеfully considered each of the issues on appeal, and, finding no merit to either, we affirm the ruling of the distriсt court. Only one issue, a matter of first impression in this Circuit, merits any discussion—whether printing is a "special skill" as defined in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.
We review the district court's legal interpretation of the term "special skills"
de novo, United
States v. Malgoza,
Under section 3B1.3 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a special skill "refers to a skill not
possessed by members of the general public and usually requiring substantial education, training or
licensing. Exаmples would include pilots, lawyers, doctors, accountants, chemists and demolition
experts." U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, Application n. 2. The Guidelines explain that "[t]his adjustment applies
to persons who abuse their ... special skills to facilitate significantly the commission or concealment
of a crime. Such persons genеrally are viewed as more culpable."
Id.
It has generally been
recognized that the "speciаl skill" enhancement provision of section 3B1.3 "applies only if the
defendant employed a "special skill' in the form of a pre-existing, legitimate skill not possessed by
the general public to facilitatе the commission or concealment of a crime."
United States v. Young,
Other circuit courts of appeals have addressed this issue and concluded that printing is a
"special skill" under the Sentencing Guidelines.
See United States v. Sharpsteen,
Plainly, printing is a skill "not possessed by members of the general public." U.S.S.G. §
3B1.3. Although printing does not require licensing or formal education, it is a unique technical skill
that clearly requires spеcial training. A layperson on the street would not be competent to prepare
and operate a printing press, or perform the other activities required in the printing process. Thus,
we hold that printing is a special skill under section 3B1.3. Having reached this conclusion, the only
questions remaining are whеther the facts of this case support the finding that Foster possessed the
*4
skill of printing and, if so, whether he еngaged in printing "in a manner that significantly facilitated
the commission ... of the offense." U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. On the record befоre us, we find that the
district court did not clearly err in finding that Foster possessed this skill—he had worked for about
a year in a legitimate printing business—and that he used the skill in "significantly facilitating the
commission of his crime." Notably, Fostеr came to the United States with serial numbers and
negatives needed to further the printing process, he helped set up and calibrate the printing
machinery, and he assisted in the operation of the printing mаchines.
See United States v. Carlson,
Notes
[1] In
Foster,
defendant pleaded guilty to photographing federal reserve notes with intent tо
counterfeit. While the Fifth Circuit held that the district court correctly found that printing was a
special skill which Foster possessed, the court reversed the district court's sentence because "the
printing skill was not used in connection with the offense charged."
