UNITED STATES v. FIVE GAMBLING DEVICES ETC.
NO. 14.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Argued October 12, 1953.---Decided December 7, 1953.
346 U.S. 441
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE MINTON join.
These cases present unsuccessful attempts, by two different procedures, to enforce the view of the Department of Justice as to construction of the Act of January 2, 1951,1 which prohibits shipment of gambling machines in interstate commerce but includes incidental registration and reporting provisions. Two indictments charge Denmark and Braun severally with engaging in the business of dealing in gambling devices without registering with the Attorney General and reporting sales and deliveries. Both indictments were dismissed. The other proceeding is a libel to forfeit five gambling machines seized by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents from a country club in Tennessee. It also was dismissed.
The three cases, here on Government appeals, are similar in features which led to their dismissal and which raise constitutional issues. The indictments do not allege that the accused dealers, since the effective date of the Act or for that matter at any other time, have bought, sold or moved gambling devices in interstate commerce, or that the devices involved in their unreported sales have, since the effective date of the Act or at any other time, moved in interstate commerce or ever would do so. The libel does not show that the country club‘s machines were at any time transported in or in any way affect interstate commerce.
Section 2 of the Act prohibits transportation of gambling devices in interstate commerce except to any state
The information requirements are not expressly limited to persons engaged or transactions occurring in interstate commerce or conditioned on any connection therewith. Neither does the Act by any specific terms direct its application to transactions such as we have here.
Appellees contend, first, that the Act should not be construed to reach dealers, transactions or machines
The Government answers, first, that the statute, literally read, reaches all dealers and transactions and the possession of all unreported devices without reference to interstate commerce; second, to make effective the prohibition of transportation in interstate commerce, Congress may constitutionally require reporting of all intrastate transactions; and, third, while Congress, by oversight, left an inappropriate and confusing phrase in the Act, the defect is not fatal inasmuch as the Attorney General has power to supplement the Act by regulations which will cure its indefiniteness.6
Of course, Congress possesses not only power to regulate commerce among the several states but also an inexact power “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution” its enumerated powers. In some instances Congress has left to an administrative body, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission or the National Labor Relations Board, the power to decide on a case-to-case basis whether the particular intrastate activity affects interstate commerce so as to warrant exercise of the power to reach into intrastate affairs.8 Decisions under this type of legislation give the Government no support, for no such determination is required by this Act, and the Government asserts no such finding by anyone is necessary. In other statutes Congress has set up economic regulations which lay hold of activities in interstate commerce but also include intrastate activities so intermingled therewith that separa-
The principle is old and deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence that this Court will construe a statute in a manner that requires decision of serious constitutional questions only if the statutory language leaves no reasonable alternative. United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41. This is not because we would avoid or postpone
This Court does and should accord a strong presumption of constitutionality to Acts of Congress. This is not a mere polite gesture. It is a deference due to deliberate judgment by constitutional majorities of the two Houses of Congress that an Act is within their delegated power or is necessary and proper to execution of that power. The rational and practical force of the presumption is at its maximum only when it appears that the precise point in issue here has been considered by Congress and has been explicitly and deliberately resolved.11 But the presumption can have little realism when responsible congressional committees and leaders, in managing a bill, have told Congress that the bill will not reach that which the Act is invoked in this Court to cover.
We do not question that literal language of this Act is capable of the broad, unlimited construction urged by the Government. Indeed, if it were enacted for a
Judges differ as to the value of legislative history in statutory construction, but the Government often relies upon it to sustain its interpretation of statutes. However, in this case its reference to legislative history is conspicuously meager and unenlightening.13 On the other hand, for what it is worth, appellees point out much that was reported by responsible committees and said by proponents of this antigambling-device legislation to indicate that Congress did not intend to raise the issues
No committee appears to have anticipated this, for the then Attorney General informed the committee, and it reported itself in agreement with the view, that “Actually enforcement against those people who gamble or use these machines wrongfully in the States is left with the States, and with the local officials, and there is absolutely no intention on the part of the Federal Government, express or otherwise, in this bill or anything that accompanies it, to get us into a prohibition era.”16 It is
As we have indicated, the present indictments and libel are so framed as to apply in extreme form the most expansive interpretation of this Act. All that we would decide at present is a question of statutory construction. We think the Act does not have the explicitness necessary to sustain the pleadings which the Government has drafted in these cases. On this ground alone, we would affirm the judgments below.
Judgments affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins, concurring.
I concur in the judgment, but regret my inability to agree with the reasons for affirmance expressed in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE JACKSON. The language of § 3 of the Act on which the charges rest requires dealers to report “all sales and deliveries of gambling devices. . . .” No other language in the Act, and nothing in its legislative history, indicates to me that Congress was not here hitting at “all sales,” including purely intrastate ones. In this situation I do not feel at liberty to read intrastate sales out of the Act, even if constitutional questions could thereby be avoided.*
Section 3 requires a gambling device dealer to register with the Attorney General “his name or trade name, the address of his principal place of business, and the ad-
Nor can a criminal statute too vague to be constitutionally valid be saved by additions made to it by the Attorney General. Of course, Congress could have prescribed that reports should be made at reasonably accessible places designated by the Attorney General. Cf. United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677. But the Act under consideration did not do this. The Attorney General did promulgate an attempted clarifying regulation under the purported authority of R. S. § 161,
MR. JUSTICE CLARK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE REED and MR. JUSTICE BURTON concur, dissenting.
I.
I agree with MR. JUSTICE BLACK on the question of statutory construction, that § 3 of the Act means just what it says: “every manufacturer of and dealer in gambling devices” is required to register with the Attorney General and file with him certain records, without reference to interstate commerce. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON‘S opinion states that “this Court will construe a statute in a manner that requires decision of serious constitutional questions only if the statutory language leaves no reasonable alternative.” I agree; but I think that the statutory language involved here leaves no reasonable alternative. It would be difficult for Congress to be more explicit than to direct the statute‘s mandate, as it has here, to “every” manufacturer and dealer without qualification. In United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689 (1948), the Court dealt with a highly analogous situation; the opinion of the Court there was that “A restrictive interpretation should not be given a statute merely because . . . giving effect to the express language employed by Congress might require a court to face a constitutional question.” 332 U. S., at 693.
If by legislative history or otherwise it could persuasively be shown that Congress intended that the word “every” be given other than its plain meaning, we should likely consider such evidence in interpreting the statute.
For these reasons I am unable to agree with the solution of these cases offered by MR. JUSTICE JACKSON.
II.
I am also unable to agree that the statute is unconstitutionally vague.
Section 3 requires that at specified times “every manufacturer of and dealer in gambling devices shall register with the Attorney General his name or trade name, the address of his principal place of business, and the addresses of his places of business in such district,” and that there be filed monthly with the Attorney General “an inventory and record of all sales and deliveries of gambling devices as of the close of the preceding calendar month for the place or places of business in the district.”
I do not mean to suggest that these provisions are models of clarity; when words are left in a statute by oversight, exemplary draftsmanship hardly results. But our function is not to discipline Congress for its failure to dot the i‘s and cross the t‘s. It is rather to make certain that the conduct required has been made sufficiently clear that to impose sanctions for ignoring the statute‘s requirements will not violate due process of law.
Appellees’ complaint, according to their brief, appears to be not that the statute does not tell them what to file, but that it does not tell them where to file it. As I read the Act, several things are at once apparent: (1) the registrant must register with someone his name and the addresses of all his places of business, designating the principal one if he has more than one; (2) he must file monthly an inventory and record of all sales and deliveries of gambling devices; (3) this registration and filing must be done with the Attorney General---for the Act provides in clearest terms that he “shall register with the Attorney General his name” etc., and that he “shall file with the Attorney General an inventory” etc. I take it that, aside from
The Constitution requires that a statute must not be too vague to allow the citizen to ascertain what course of conduct he must follow to put himself safely within the bounds of the law. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, supra. No doubt the forgotten words in the Act provide room for quibbling; and the lawyer who is looking for litigation, or whose client seeks to avoid compliance with the law, can paint a picture of uncertainty and frustrated effort to fathom the unfathomable intent of Congress. But to me it is certain that, with or without the regulations, a person honestly seeking to comply with this law would inevitably have succeeded, without undue mental strain in determining the statute‘s import and without uncertainty as to his chances of remaining within the bounds of the law. The certainty required by the Due Process Clause is not tested from the would-be violator‘s standpoint; the test is rather whether adequate guidance is given to those who would be law-abiding. See Musser v. Utah, 333 U. S. 95, 97 (1948). The constitutional requirements are met when the statute prescribes a course of conduct which any person acting in good faith can recognize and act upon. The presence of the forgotten
III.
The ultimate question presented by these cases is whether Congress has exceeded its constitutional power. I think it has not.
It appears that Congress in this Act has embarked on what it deemed the most effective course of action possible to eliminate one of the major sources of income to organized crime, while at the same time yielding to the policy of Nevada and a few other states where slot machines are legal and the underworld‘s control and profit are correspondingly minimized. The Act prohibits shipment of gambling devices into any state except those which act to exempt themselves from the statute. Section 3, which sets up the registration and filing requirements here in issue, was designed to make effective and enforceable the interstate shipment ban. It was thought that a report on each transfer of each machine before and after interstate shipment would enable enforcement officials to ascertain who transported the machine across state lines and thereby violated the law. Unless all such local sales were reported, it was thought that it would be an easy matter to conceal the identity of the interstate transporter by resorting to straw-man transactions, coverup intrastate “sales” before and after interstate shipment, and the like. In view of the established tie-up between slot machines and “Nation-wide crime syndicates,”4 more stringent methods of enforcement were deemed necessary to accomplish the ban on interstate
The question presented, then, is whether Congress is empowered by the Constitution to require information, reasonably necessary and appropriate to make effective and enforceable a concededly valid ban on interstate transportation of gambling devices, from persons not shown to be themselves engaged in interstate activity. I think that an affirmative answer is not inevitably dictated by prior decisions of the Court; but, more important, no decision precludes an affirmative answer. The question has not been previously decided because the legislative scheme utilized here apparently has not been heretofore attempted. But its novelty should not suggest its unconstitutionality.
In the body of decisional law defining the scope of Congress’ powers in regard to interstate commerce, it has been clearly established that activities local in nature may be regulated if they can fairly be said to “affect” commerce, or where local goods are commingled with goods destined for interstate commerce, or were previously in interstate commerce.5 For present purposes, these cases at least
The Court also has on several occasions stated that the commerce power “extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.”6 I think it may accurately be said that every sale of slot machines affects the exercise of the power of Congress over commerce, in view of the elusive
The Constitution empowers Congress “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers. . . .” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819), cited in the foregoing cases, interprets this as follows:
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”
The Court in that case added that much leeway is to be given Congress in determining what means are appropriate. 4 Wheat., at 423.
In their brief appellees attack the power of Congress under the Constitution solely on the basis that the registration and filing requirements are not reasonable means of enforcing the provision against interstate transportation of slot machines. I believe that the reasonableness and the necessity of the requirements have already been adequately demonstrated. None of the cases relied on by the appellees suggests a contrary conclusion. The Act‘s requirements of registration and filing as to local transactions are certainly not a mere ruse designed to invade areas of control reserved to the states, but are “naturally and reasonably adapted to the effective exercise of” the commerce power.7
If Congress by § 3 had sought to regulate local activity, its power would no doubt be less clear. But here there is no attempt to regulate; all that is required is information in aid of enforcement of the conceded power to ban interstate transportation. The distinction is sub-
In my view Congress has power to require the information described in § 3 of the Act since the requirement is a means reasonably necessary to effectuate the prohibition of transporting gambling devices interstate. If it be suggested that such a holding would open possibilities for widespread congressional encroachment upon local activities whose regulation has been reserved to the states, I would point out, first, that power of regulation heretofore exclusively vested in the states remains there; and second, that the situation here is unique: the commodity involved is peculiarly tied to organized interstate crime and is itself illegal in the great majority of the states, and the federal law in issue was actively sought by local and state law enforcement officials as a means to assist them, not supplant them, in local law enforcement. I would reverse the judgments.9
